

CANADA

**House of Commons Debates**  
OFFICIAL REPORT

SPEECH

OF

**MR. A. W. NEILL**

MEMBER FOR COMOX-ALBERNI

ON

**THE JAPANESE SITUATION  
IN BRITISH COLUMBIA**

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1942

Mr. A. W. NEILL (Comox-Alberni): Mr. Speaker, I wish to discuss this afternoon the question of the Japanese in British Columbia. Since it is an important and burning question there at the present time, it is almost impossible to tell the tale in the required time, and I may ask to have a few minutes longer. If so, it will be the first time I have had to do so.

I am not unmindful, nor shall I try to be, of the remarks of the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) when he warned against hasty and unwarranted language, calculated to inflame the situation in British Columbia, as regards Japanese. Mr. Speaker, I have listened to that appeasement talk for twenty years from the government benches, and I think the time has come to take a different stand. I believe we can best serve the interests of our country, and promote peace, by having plain talk, straightforward discussions and, I hope, definite action, with respect to the issues before us.

In the first campaign in which I took part for election to this house in the fall of 1921, I was struck by two outstanding features in the district, first, the predominant place the

Japanese had acquired in the fishing industry, and, second, the vast increase in their population in British Columbia, both through immigration and by birth. The fishing industry was dominated by the Japanese during the last war, when our men were overseas. Then, later, they started a policy of pushing the white men out of that industry. The methods they adopted in that procedure were too often those which are not expected in ordinary business competition.

Early in 1922 I got the then government of the day to make a cut in the quota of fishing licences allotted to Japanese in the salmon trolling—a part of the fishing industry—to the extent of thirty-three per cent. Later, in the summer, a royal commission was appointed, and it decided to cut all Japanese salmon fishing licences to the extent of forty per cent. The following year they were again cut another fifteen per cent, and the year after that another ten per cent. This made a very substantial reduction, which has been since maintained.

The house is aware that a few weeks ago all Japanese fishing vessels, numbering about 1,200, were seized. If the influx had been

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allowed to continue, and had not been checked in 1922, as I have described, the number now to be seized would have been something like 3,000 or possibly 3,500. That would have greatly aggravated the situation in British Columbia to-day.

Then, let us look at the other point, namely their increase in numbers by immigration and by birth. The Japanese birthrate is about double that of the white race—rather more than that. And that, of course, goes on all the time. We can stop immigration, but we cannot stop increases by birth, especially when the Japanese government allows to emigrate only those women who are likely to bear children. If they do not have those children, they are sent back to Japan, and others are sent out in their places.

Prior to 1884 there was no immigration of Japanese into British Columbia. From that time until 1907 they came in in ever-increasing numbers, until the situation became alarming. Then the government of the day—a Liberal government, by the way—made a deal with Japan or, as they called it, a gentleman's agreement. On the face of it, it was an arrangement whereby Japan pledged itself to see that no more than 400 Japanese left Japan to come to Canada in one year. No greater travesty of language could be found than to call that a gentleman's agreement, because when one makes a gentleman's agreement it is presupposed that both parties to the agreement are animated by the desire and intention to adhere to it in faith, truth and honesty. But when you find that one of the parties has not the slightest intention of adhering to those principles, control becomes much more difficult. In other words, in those circumstances a gentleman's agreement is just a joke. I have said that the matter was a joke, and I make that statement sincerely because I found that instead of only 400 entering Canada in any one year, the Japanese were entering to the extent of 1,700. That is a matter of record; I have taken it from the records. Then, the other part of the contract was such that the whole matter was left wide open. I shall leave that part of the subject for the moment.

In the spring of 1922, for once in their lives the British Columbia members had sense enough to take united action. I do not believe they have ever done it since, nor do I think it had been done before. We all got together—I believe there were four groups at that time—and presented a resolution to the house asking for the total exclusion of orientals from British Columbia and Canada. The government opposed the resolution and moved to amend it by striking out the words "total exclusion" and inserting the words

"effective restriction". Of course the government's majority carried the amendment. We were told at that time that the two expressions were synonymous, and that the term "effective restriction" meant total exclusion. The government majority carried the amendment—and that was the end of total exclusion. It did not operate as we had been led to believe.

Time has gone on and taken its toll of those fourteen members who supported that principle. There have been deaths, both politically and physically at one end of the rainbow, and the senate and big government appointments at the other end. All these have reduced that little band to the point where I am the only one left. I can say, like the man in the Bible—in the Book of Job, I believe it was; some of my parson friends can correct me if I am wrong—"I only am escaped alone to tell thee." I continued pressing the matter as best I could, but I found that governments were not sympathetic.

There was too much talk of appeasement in the air. One of the arguments was this, "We want to do a big trade with Japan, with her seventy million people. We do not want to lose that trade. If we do anything they don't like they will take their trade to the United States." That argument had some plausibility; at any rate it was good enough to stall me off for a year or two.

Then I saw the psychological moment open in 1924. The government of the United States, out of a clear sky, passed a total exclusion act against orientals, including Japanese. There was our chance to do the same, without loss of trade. I begged the then Prime Minister—the same one as we have to-day—to make it apply to all orientals; but he could not see his way clear to do so. He did apply it to Chinese, and that action has been most successful. Unfortunately, however, it was not applied to Japanese.

I continued from time to time to do what I could; and then along about 1928—possibly it was 1929—the Prime Minister was kind enough—and I give him full credit for it, because he did not have to do it—to readjust the joint agreement so that instead of an entry of 400 a year there would be only 150. He put some teeth in the terms of that agreement, so that we really had at least a gambler's chance of enforcing it. I believe the Japanese with their acuteness and subtlety found loopholes whereby at least to some extent they evaded the terms of the arrangement, but not to any great extent. Then, of later years the war has stopped any serious immigration.

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I was told at that time that there were other reasons why we should not do anything to offend the Japanese nation, reasons of a diplomatic nature. I remember as well as if it were yesterday the answer I gave—I believe it is in *Hansard*—"The house and government might be assured that the Japanese nation would attack us the very moment it suited them, no matter what we had done by way of appeasement, favours or anything else." The very moment it suited them to attack us they would do so—and to-day tells the answer.

If my advice had been taken, even as late as 1924, to-day there would have been in Canada perhaps 5,000 or 6,000 fewer Japanese than there are to-day. Six thousand taken from 24,000 would have helped to ease this very acute situation which exists in British Columbia to-day.

I continued to look anxiously at the situation, and in 1938 I thought I had another opportunity. I brought in a bill to provide for an educational test. The Japanese were not mentioned by name, but the provisions of this bill would have applied to three-quarters of the world's population. If it had been put into force, it would have set up a method which has been used in Australia and New Zealand for thirty years without any objection from the Japanese. This has helped to keep Australia and New Zealand white. The government refused to allow my bill to go through. The matter was put to a vote and, if hon. members are interested in the matter, they will find it fully set out in *Hansard* of May 31, 1938, at page 3411. The hon. member for Skeena (Mr. Hanson) and the hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. O'Neill) should be proud now that they withstood the pressure of the whip at that time and voted in the interests of their province rather than at the dictates of the party. In justice to the hon. member for Victoria, B. C. (Mr. Mayhew), I must say that he was sick at home at the time and could not possibly be here.

In September, 1940, Japan signed the deal, agreement or whatever you call it with Italy and Germany. In plain English, they bound themselves to enter into war against us and the United States whenever it suited Germany or Hitler. Pressure was put upon the government by British Columbia, and I suppose some realization of the situation also led the government to take action. They appointed a hand-picked committee to investigate the subject, which committee came back with a number of recommendations, I believe ten in all. There were only two of any importance, Nos. 5 and 7, and I shall deal with them. No. 5 recommended against allowing Japanese to enlist in our volunteer army then being

raised. That was a very good idea, otherwise we would have had perhaps 1,500 Japanese training in our army, possibly in key positions, petty officers and the like. They would have been familiar with every detail of our army operations. Protests were made by the mayor of Nanaimo, and I think by other cities and by myself, and the recommendation of the committee carried. That was all right.

Recommendation No. 7 was that there should be a re-registration of the Japanese in Canada. It had been claimed by many people that the registration that had been taken was just a fake as regards the Japanese. Only those who felt like it registered, and there was a demand for a new registration. The recommendation was that they should be photographed at the same time. That was a good idea, but it had one fatal defect, if deception is regarded as a fatal defect. It was clearly understood that this registration was compulsory. We were told how well it was going on, how successful it was, and it was hoped that we malignants would now be satisfied and keep quiet. The whole thing turned on the point that it was compulsory.

If it had been voluntary, what use would it have been? Supposing we decided to make a history of the people by the name of Smith, to have a record of everything they had done, whether they had been in gaol and so on. If this were carried on voluntarily, how many Smiths would come forward except those with clean hands? Was it expected that Japanese who had entered the country illegally would come forward and say, "Yes, I came in illegally, take me." Of course they would not. A lap is not a fool, any more than we are. The guilty ones did not register and the whole thing was a gigantic failure. It could not be otherwise if it were anything but compulsory.

Our main complaint was that many of them had come into the country illegally and this re-registration would have discovered that. Was it expected that those who had come in illegally would disclose that fact? The thing is ridiculous. When the war came on, after Pearl Harbour, it was discovered that it was not compulsory, that it was just a gesture to keep us quiet, just a farce. Then what happened? The war was on and the people know what war means; this government should know what it means. These same people were given two months in which to register; they were given until February 7 to get things fixed up, to get a fake birth certificate or a forged entry card. You can buy them in Vancouver. If they could not get either, they were given two months before they would be subject to the same action as



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that to which any other enemy alien would be exposed. Why give them two months? We were practically saying to them, "We are at war with you, but we will give you two months in which to get faked papers, or get out of the country." I never heard the like of it before, and I hope I never shall again.

If I were challenged to offer proof of these things, I could no more do it than I could offer proof of the day of the week on which my last birthday fell. You do not keep track of these things that are so well known. I suppose I could have kept the newspapers that I read at the time, but I did not. I never dreamed that such action would be necessary to show that they had said it was compulsory. On February 9, the Prime Minister made this statement, as reported on page 436 of *Hansard*:

The committee received the utmost cooperation from Japanese nationals as well as from Canadians of Japanese racial origin. When a state of war was proclaimed as existing between Japan and Canada, the registration was all but complete.

The utmost cooperation! We know the extent of that cooperation. Here is what a man wrote—a white man for a change, and perhaps we can take his word—to the local paper in Vancouver a few days ago:

About three years ago I was talking to a Canadian-born Japanese boy in a store and said to him, "if the Japs ever came over here would you fight against us?" He replied, "I wouldn't want to, but I would either have to or commit suicide."

That is the sort of blind it is. There is your cooperation. Only when they attacked Pearl Harbour was it announced that the whole thing had been only voluntary. Here is an article that appeared in the papers a few days afterwards:

During the registration proceedings, several hundred Japanese left Canada for Japan. Most of these were known to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Many of them were believed to have entered the country illegally.

It is only after war breaks out that we discover all that. They were given two months in which to fix things up or get out. If that registration had been compulsory, we would have got the best of these Jap agents and the best of their spies. They have now gone home with their charts and plans and with a local knowledge that could not be bought for any money. Perhaps we shall see some of these Japs again peering over the side of the bridge of a German gunboat in Vancouver, Nanaimo or Port Alberni, because we now know that many of them were expert naval men. Agitation continued, and the government called a conference which was held here on January 8 and 9. With possibly

one or two exceptions, the twenty-five gentlemen who attended this conference were in government service. Their continuing or advancement in the branch of the service in which they were, might depend upon—putting it politely—their thinking the same way as the government about these matters.

I suggested that they should call in the British Columbia members who were elected by the people and who have some claim to represent the people. But, oh, no! I should like to give another quotation. I shall not give names because I do not think it is fair to attack people when they are not in a position to reply. When an official is mentioned, I shall refer to an official, and when reference is made to a member of the government, I shall simply call him a minister. I quote:

I fail to see any need of getting the members from British Columbia together and asking them what they think should be done.

They were not called together, but the twenty-five government officials were there in full strength. They were fully informed of the government's views because some came from the Department of External Affairs.

I have here the statement got out by the Prime Minister. This is an official document, after the conference had reported, and so there is no harm in my quoting from it. It contains seventeen paragraphs, a great many of which are build-ups for the rest of it. I will deal with the more important ones, paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 11.

Paragraph 6 recommends that the government should seize immediately the Japanese fishing boats. That was done. It was done immediately war was declared, and for that action I have nothing but the utmost praise. It was done promptly and thoroughly. I have a vague idea that I see in it the efficient hand of the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (Mr. Macdonald). At any rate it was done, and done well. While this is not part of the report, I may as well finish up that matter by saying that after they had 1,200 Japanese boats in their hands, the question arose, what to do with them? It was desirable to get them back into fishing again, so that white men could catch the fish so badly needed for the British market. Therefore they set up a committee to try to sell these boats. Whoever chose that committee deserves great credit. They made excellent choices. Here they are: Chairman, Hon. Mr. Justice Sidney Smith, a man with a master mariner's papers, so he would understand boats; Commander B. L. Johnson, D.S.O., R.C.N.R., a man of outstanding ability and repute in Vancouver.

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Then there was a Japanese, Kishizo Kimura, who I am told, is a very able man, familiar with the work that he undertook. I give all credit for that. Like all government offices, it is true that they were rather slow in going about their work, but they got started at last. They issued a circular, a copy of which I hold in my hand, explaining their procedure. I am very glad to get this circular because I can pass the information along to the fishermen, who are continually writing to me to know what to do. I am afraid that the whole scheme will not be entirely successful because the government will have left on their hands hundreds of boats. That is not the fault of the government or of this committee. Well, they got this thing started and have sold fifty-six boats up to date, and marvellous to relate, they told the members of parliament about it. They even accepted a suggestion I made—another remarkable thing. I suggested that they could not sell these boats for cash because the fishermen did not have cash, but they would be able to buy them on time, and accordingly that was arranged. The general idea of a lot of these officials, the people on these new boards, seems to be that there is no loyalty, intelligence or usefulness in any member of parliament. I do not know where they get the idea because it is not so very long since the people elected us. But that is the idea you find among the people on these new boards and among these dollar-a-year men. Since we are not told what is being done, we shall have to guess or simply deal with what we see, and if we guess wrong, the government is to blame. I do not think members of parliament are any more unworthy than they were in years gone by.

I want to quote recommendation 7 in which was contained the policy of the cabinet. It reads:

For the same period—

That is during the war.

—the sale of gasoline and explosives to persons of Japanese racial origin will be directly controlled under conditions to be prescribed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

That is a good idea too, a very good idea, but unfortunately I read in the papers—I have to go to the press for information because I cannot get it anywhere else—that these sales are still going on.

Mr. HOMUTH: The sale of powder is still going on?

Mr. NEILL: Explosives. A man wrote to the Vancouver *Province* the other day and suggested that if this order was in effect, why was the Japanese station at the corner still selling gas the same as usual? That has been going on for two and a half months now, and

I rather think permission has been extended to the 1st of April. The language is doubtful, but if it can be interpreted to the benefit of the Japanese, be sure it will be so interpreted. You are dealing with clever, subtle, unscrupulous enemies—and they are enemies—and when you say that you are not going to stop the sale for two months, that is just an invitation to them to accumulate as much gas and explosives as they can in the meantime. We say to them: "Remember, on the 7th of February or on the 1st of April we are going to shut down on you." Is that not an invitation to them to get explosives and gasoline against a rainy day? That time limit should never have been put in. The order should have been made applicable at once.

I want to say one more good thing for the government, and it will be the last, I am sorry to say. It does not pay to state your case unfairly, and I wish to be strictly fair. In these two instances I have mentioned, the seizing of the Japanese boats, and this order with respect to the sale of gasoline and explosives was made applicable to all Japanese, and all honour is due to the government for doing it.

There are three classes of Japanese we must deal with. There are the Japanese nationals, those born in Japan and never naturalized in Canada; they are Japanese nationals. Then there is the man born in Japan and naturalized in Canada. He is called a naturalized Japanese or a Canadian. Then there is the Japanese who was born in Canada, who can call himself a Japanese-Canadian if he likes. The government orders with regard to seizing the boats and the sale of gas and explosives applied to all three classes. That was all right.

Now I deal with paragraph 8. It says that Japanese nationals will be forbidden to possess or use short-wave receiving sets or radio transmitters in Canada. A most excellent thing. Hon. members can all understand why it was necessary to do that. That was fine. But it does not come into effect until the 1st of April. Did the Japanese give us four months' notice of what they were going to do at Pearl Harbour? Yet we say to them: "Go wandering about with your cameras and take pictures, and use your receiving sets to send word to Japan, and your receivers to get instructions from Japan. You can do this as much as you like until the 1st of April." Even if the order had been withheld, and they had been allowed to continue doing these things without being told of any date when they must stop, it would not have been so bad, because then they would never have known when the order was coming into force.

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But they were warned—you will not be interfered with until the 1st of April. The order was the equivalent of that. We told them: "Do your dirty work now. Use your radio and your receiving set but, remember, hide or bury them before the 1st of April, and then everything will be lovely." They told the Japanese nationals that they must not use these things in a protected area. But they can use them outside. I have a police order to that effect. It is signed by the police and says:

No enemy alien shall have in his possession or use while in such protected area any camera, radio transmitter, radio short-wave receiving set, firearm, ammunition or explosive.

But that order does not apply outside the protected area, and it does not apply to a naturalized or native-born Japanese.

Mr. RALSTON: I am not quite familiar with the regulations as to cameras, but does my hon. friend suggest that the same date applied with regard to evacuating a protected area and the possession of cameras? They must evacuate by April 1.

Mr. NEILL: Yes.

Mr. RALSTON: My hon. friend used the same date, April 1, when speaking of cameras and receiving sets.

Mr. NEILL: Yes. I said that the language was so ambiguous that it could be read two ways. It reads:

Notices ordering all enemy aliens to evacuate the coastal areas of British Columbia west of the Cascade mountains by April 1 and to surrender cameras and radios will be posted in public buildings to-day.

Then:

Orders to Japanese . . . to get out of the coastal areas within forty-seven days and to surrender cameras, radios and other banned articles, were issued to-day.

Mr. RALSTON: I think my hon. friend is reading some sort of newspaper paraphrase of the order. The order to give up radios and cameras is effective immediately. The order of evacuation is not. The order referred to, is effective on April 1.

Mr. NEILL: It is signed by Colonel Hill, and states that no enemy alien shall have in his possession or use while in such protected area any camera, radio transmitter, radio short-wave receiving set, firearm, ammunition or explosive.

Mr. RALSTON: That is effective immediately. You don't wait until April 1 for that.

Mr. NEILL: Well, as I said, it is doubtful. There is, however, no question whatever that

a man who is not a Japanese national can do these things any time, any place. The order applies only to nationals; that is, to men born in Japan and coming over here, and these are comparatively few in number, something like 1,700 out of 24,000, and only while they are in the area. The remaining 22,000 of naturalized Japanese are free to come and go, as I have said, anywhere. They can photograph what they like, radio what they like. They can do something else which I have not touched upon, and which is—not to make a joke—a burning question in British Columbia. Three, two, one of them can do endless damage in British Columbia with a box of matches. The most deadly enemy of the lumber industry in British Columbia is fire. Lumbermen are so afraid of it, it is so dangerous, that they shut their camps down in the middle of summer, as soon as the humidity reaches a certain point. A man can wander out in that bush, ten, fifty, a hundred miles from anywhere, and do more damage with a box of matches than it would take two armies to put out. The large number of forest rangers whom we have could not touch the fringe of the thing if these aliens were determined to commit sabotage. Some of the biggest lumbermen on the coast are much alarmed at this situation. If the Japanese were out of the area, they could not do this damage, because you can't do a thing if you are not there.

I have spoken of the freedom of Japanese to come and go with cameras, radios and matches. That is not restricted to two months or four months; that is for eternity, if the war lasts that long; it is for the duration of the war that the naturalized or Canadian-born Jap can go out and commit sabotage; he is free to do it the whole time, and he is the most dangerous of the lot. The naturalized Japanese speaks our language fluently, possibly he has been to college. He possesses far greater potentialities of trouble as a spy or an agent than if he had just come from Japan. The fellow dressed up like a white man, speaking our language glibly, is the one who should be interned. It is very hard for me to believe that the government are so remote from what is taking place or may take place as not to understand the situation.

Paragraph 10 of the statement to which I referred makes a rather vague reference to the establishment of a civil corps for Canadian and naturalized Japanese. Because the project is a voluntary one, and in view of the vagueness to which I have referred, I imagine that presently it will fade away.

I should now like to make three charges against the government. The first is this, that, with the exception of seizing these boats,

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they have been far too slow in handling the Japanese situation. They have let days go by when it should have been hours, and a month when it should have been days. Look at what was done in Mexico. There the government dealt with the whole lot as soon as war was declared, and ordered into the interior every Jap who was on the coast. They did it; they didn't talk about it. Cuba did the same thing. They arrested, I believe, eighteen Japanese, all but two of whom were naval officers. Nicaragua took the same course, and took it speedily.

Mr. CRERAR: Could my hon. friend tell the house—I am merely asking for information—what has been done in the United States?

Mr. NEILL: No. I have not made myself familiar with what is happening there. I know that on the Pacific coast they took prompt steps. But they did not have the same incentive and need for action as we have, because there were not fishermen in the state of Washington; most Japanese there worked in paper mills and the like of that. But I am not in a position to state in detail what was done. I have troubles enough of my own. I do know what the situation is in British Columbia.

The only reason why we have not had a Pearl Harbour bombing in Canada is that we have no Pearl Harbour to bomb.

I note here that the council of the city of Vancouver has passed a resolution urging the government to get a move on. The report speaks of increasing irritation and criticism at the coast over the apparent failure of the government to implement its announced policy of removing Japanese.

The legislature of British Columbia, before adjourning a few days ago, passed unanimously a resolution urging the dominion government to strengthen Pacific defences. The feeling is very strong at the coast. I wish I could get the government to realize it.

Here is one incident I must quote, reported under a big headline in a leading Vancouver paper, the *Daily Province*:

Japanese live undisturbed on dike adjoining airport.

There are 200 Japanese living a mile west of the airport. They are living on a dike. It would be very easy to blow up or open that dike, and the airport would be rendered useless for a long time to come. Yet they are living undisturbed within a mile of the airport; they are on a dike into which a gap could be blown with a few sticks of powder that would make the airport useless for a long time to come. Why does the government not take some action in this case?

The second charge is that even the small restrictions to which I have referred are applicable only to nationals, and I say it is inexcusable that they are not made applicable to all naturalized Japanese aliens in this country. To whom do you suppose they think they owe loyalty? If they were scattered all over Canada, the case might be different, but think what may happen when they are turned loose in a small area, when 25,000 are concentrated in an area where they could so readily combine to take action against Vancouver, or Victoria, as the case may be. It constitutes an unspeakable menace; I cannot understand why it is allowed to continue.

The third charge is that the government have shown indifference to British Columbia defence, also to air raid precautions work and the like of that. I am not blaming the government for preparations which they might have made six years ago. That is not their fault; I know that. We could not get the appropriation through the house. The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation moved resolutions condemning the government for proposing, as the Minister of Pensions and National Health (Mr. Mackenzie) did, to spend some money for these purposes. But I do blame the government for not having taken the situation in hand since war was declared. They are too slack; they appear to adopt the attitude, "Oh, well, we have to take chances; we are doing the best we can; it will be all right." Well, they told us it would be all right about Hong Kong. But people make mistakes—even military men, even high military men. They told us it would be all right at Singapore. Yet we know that mistakes were made there. Here is the government's paper the *Vancouver Sun*, expressing this opinion:

Canada obviously has not made its plan of defence on the assumption of any real attack on the Pacific coast. . . . That is the plan which must be reconsidered. . . . we do expect a well-equipped, mobile striking unit which could pounce upon any Japanese landing attempt from Alaska southwards.

No such force exists on our coast. No such force exists in Canada.

I am afraid that is too true. Perhaps in the secret session which is to be held we shall be given more information on this matter. I do not propose to blame the government for things which happened before they had control and knowledge of the situation, or for not having done what at the time was beyond their power. But the government must be ready at that secret session to give us genuine information, not general assurances



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and smooth-sounding platitudes. There has been too much of this in connection with the management of the war.

There is a certain place—I will not name names, I will call it Y. When the government began to think about building aerodromes I thought that Y would make a good site for one, and I said so. I put it up to the officials, and they said that they were experts and ought to know better than I did. Well, I accepted that decision—but they are building that aerodrome now with frantic haste. I fear we may have to paraphrase the hymn and say:

Too late, too late will be the cry  
The Japanese gunboats have gone by.

There was another aerodrome at a place we will call X. I wrote to the government in connection with this one, informing them that there were two things wrong about it. This was a year or two ago. I pointed out to the officials that there was a Jap village 200 yards from the mouth of it where the Japs could take photographs and keep a record of any aeroplanes leaving, with all the details, so that they could have it all recorded for the benefit of the Japanese. They were about as far from the mouth of the aerodrome as Sparks street would be from where I am standing. I have in my desk a letter in which some official tried to stall me off. I was told that they would expropriate the Japanese, but that they could not do it because there was some hitch. However, they said they would look into the matter. Imagine looking into the question of expropriating this particular property when other nations, as we know, take first what they require and then talk about expropriation. Again, I pointed out to the officials that there was a Jap who had been seen taking photographs from an aeroplane over the harbour, where the aerodrome was being built. It was a civilian aeroplane. I took this matter up with various bodies—I will not mention any names because I do not wish to give them away—and what was the answer? I was informed that the investigation was closed. They had ascertained the name of the man and had found that he had gone to Japan. I suppose he took photographs with him as a memento of us because he loved us so much. Well, he has gone back to Japan with whatever photographs he took—we do not know how many—and God knows how many more may have gone there. But the officials did not seem to think it was important. I was told that it would be difficult to take photographs through the glass of any aeroplane unless you had a particular sort of apparatus with which to do it. Well, would the Japanese not have that type of apparatus?

I submitted all these matters to the department, and I have it all on record. One of the officials said to me, "There is nothing to this anyhow because it is not against the laws of the country to take photographs of an aerodrome."

I took it up with some of the higher officials, and they juggled with it and finally explained that they could get the Japs under the Official Secrets Act. The aerodrome is still there; the Japs are still staying there under their four months' lease of life, and doubtless they are still taking these photographs, which I have no doubt will be sent to the right place.

These men are not all Canadian nationals. Some of them may be the very best class of spies and foreign agents, and I contend that there has been too much sympathy for the Japanese viewpoint and Japanese interests. We must remember that we are at war with these people. Ottawa is 3,000 miles away from us out there, and it is useful to have a man here who is familiar with conditions on the coast to advise. So they sent for a man who for ten or fifteen years had been notorious—there is no other word by which to describe his activities—in the province of British Columbia, for his championship of the Japanese, for his advocacy of their interests. He was a protagonist of the Japanese. There was never a man who believed so strongly and implicitly in Japan.

Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. member has exceeded his time, and he may proceed only with the unanimous consent of the house.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Go on.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Go ahead.

Mr. NEILL: I thank the house and the Prime Minister; I have never asked for this licence before. To proceed, I may say that a great deal of ill-will has been excited in British Columbia. The people out there said that this man was paid a big salary as a provincial official, and they wanted to know why they should be paying him if he was so disloyal to the province. That was before the war, and it was said that it was only a matter of opinion. He has now been transferred to a position in Ottawa in which he can give advice—that is what he is here for, to speak with authority. He is on the ground, and he is also in a position to have early knowledge of any action that might be taken against the Japanese and to drop a hint in the right place. Anything of that sort, just a hint in the right quarters, might make a great deal of difference in the carrying out of a policy.

Perhaps I shall be told that this is unfair, that this is a fine man, and that I should not make such statements. I agree that he is en-

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titled to his weird opinions; he was entitled to that before the war. But since the war, no—a thousand times no. He is too one-sided and biased to be kept in such a place.

During the last war there was a member of the royal family, Prince Henry of Battenberg, I think, who was married to Queen Victoria's daughter. He was an admiral of the fleet and his loyalty could not be questioned, but he voluntarily asked to be retired. It did not look well to see a man of German origin in command of the fleet, and so he asked to be retired. I submit that in this case a feeling of decency should have impelled this gentleman to whom I have been referring to ask to be relieved of his position, where he is open to suspicion. Scripture says that we should abstain from even the appearance of evil.

We who have taken the position that I am now taking have been called all sorts of names. We have been called agitators. It is said that we are willing to exploit the interests of Canada for our own political advantage; that we are rabble-rousers, Jap-baiters, and that we have a very dangerous influence—that was not said of me; it was said of a reputable alderman in Vancouver. I have heard that sort of thing, and hints of it even in this house, and certainly in the government press. You can get a man to write any letter you want; you can get a white man to make a tool of himself for a Jap if you pay him enough. There was a man who wrote to the papers saying what fine people the Japs are. I laid a trap for him and I discovered that he was a white man all right, but also a paid agent of a Japanese association, but he did not say that when he signed his name.

Yes, we are all bad because we want a white British Columbia and not a place like Hawaii! Fifty years from now, unless something is done to stop it, all west of the Rockies will be yellow. I submit, Mr. Speaker, that we want, but little; we simply want to be left alone, like New Zealand and Australia, all white. I have no ill-will against the Japanese. Perhaps you may think I have been showing ill-will, but I assure you I have none towards the Japs. No Jap ever "did" me—I never gave him the chance. I wish to be fair to the Japanese, and I think that if we expatriated them, as we ought to do, they should be given full justice in regard to their property, because I am strongly in favour of a Japan controlled by the Japanese, just as I am in favour of a Canada controlled by

Canadians. Let us continue to trade with them; let us do business with them across the ocean; but do not force into one nation two peoples separated by something that is wider than the ocean, two peoples who are different in race, in religion, in traditions and in their whole philosophy of life. This difference always has prevented assimilation and always will prevent it, between two nations so utterly divergent in every respect. The greatest path towards assimilation is marriage. Well, the Japs have been here fifty-eight years and there is no record of a single marriage, although there might be one. I asked a Japanese to produce the record of one marriage and he could not do so. We have heard of second generation Japanese born here going to Japanese schools here to learn Japanese, and that has been regarded as a small matter. We went into their textbooks and had them translated and we found that they were very anti-British. Yet there were people who thought that was a small matter—only the sort of thing that irresponsible people like myself would talk about. But when the war came, it was thought wise to shut down the Jap schools. There were fifty-nine in British Columbia, and leaving out small areas where they could not run a school, the great bulk of those children must have attended some Japanese school.

I have one more word. When the time comes to talk peace, I suggest that the services rendered by Canada and by her Prime Minister should surely entitle both him and this dominion to be fully represented when the terms of peace are being settled, when the treaty comes to be made, and have their voice heard in no uncertain terms. I do suggest—perhaps it is too early to talk about it now, but it is well to get it started—that we should make an arrangement that when peace time comes, we expatriate all the Japanese left in Canada; do it on fair terms, buy them out, pay them liberally. It was done in the present war, I believe, between Russia and Germany; and after the last war it was done on a large scale, some 200,000 people, between the Greeks and the Turks, I think. If they could move 200,000, it is much easier for us to move 25,000, and it is better to move them while their numbers are so small. Let us settle once and for all this canker in the life of Canada which prevents us from being a united white Canada. And that is what British Columbia wants.

CANADA

## House of Commons Debates

OFFICIAL REPORT

SPEECH

OF

MR. A. W. NEILL

MEMBER FOR COMOX-ALBERNI

ON

## THE JAPANESE SITUATION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1942

Mr. A. W. NEILL (Comox-Alberni): Mr. Speaker, I wish to discuss this afternoon the question of the Japanese in British Columbia. Since it is an important and burning question there at the present time, it is almost impossible to tell the tale in the required time, and I may ask to have a few minutes longer. If so, it will be the first time I have had to do so.

I am not unmindful, nor shall I try to be, of the remarks of the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) when he warned against hasty and unwarranted language, calculated to inflame the situation in British Columbia, as regards Japanese. Mr. Speaker, I have listened to that appeasement talk for twenty years from the government benches, and I think the time has come to take a different stand. I believe we can best serve the interests of our country, and promote peace, by having plain talk, straightforward discussions and, I hope, definite action, with respect to the issues before us.

In the first campaign in which I took part for election to this house in the fall of 1921, I was struck by two outstanding features in the district, first, the predominant place the

Japanese had acquired in the fishing industry, and, second, the vast increase in their population in British Columbia, both through immigration and by birth. The fishing industry was dominated by the Japanese during the last war, when our men were overseas. Then, later, they started a policy of pushing the white men out of that industry. The methods they adopted in that procedure were too often those which are not expected in ordinary business competition.

Early in 1922 I got the then government of the day to make a cut in the quota of fishing licences allotted to Japanese in the salmon trolling—a part of the fishing industry—to the extent of thirty-three per cent. Later, in the summer, a royal commission was appointed, and it decided to cut all Japanese salmon fishing licences to the extent of forty per cent. The following year they were again cut another fifteen per cent, and the year after that another ten per cent. This made a very substantial reduction, which has been since maintained.

The house is aware that a few weeks ago all Japanese fishing vessels, numbering about 1,200, were seized. If the influx had been



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allowed to continue, and had not been checked in 1922, as I have described, the number now to be seized would have been something like 3,000 or possibly 3,500. That would have greatly aggravated the situation in British Columbia to-day.

Then, let us look at the other point, namely their increase in numbers by immigration and by birth. The Japanese birthrate is about double that of the white race—rather more than that. And that, of course, goes on all the time. We can stop immigration, but we cannot stop increases by birth, especially when the Japanese government allows to emigrate only those women who are likely to bear children. If they do not have those children, they are sent back to Japan, and others are sent out in their places.

Prior to 1884 there was no immigration of Japanese into British Columbia. From that time until 1907 they came in in ever-increasing numbers, until the situation became alarming. Then the government of the day—a Liberal government, by the way—made a deal with Japan or, as they called it, a gentleman's agreement. On the face of it, it was an arrangement whereby Japan pledged itself to see that no more than 400 Japanese left Japan to come to Canada in one year. No greater travesty of language could be found than to call that a gentlemen's agreement, because when one makes a gentlemen's agreement it is presupposed that both parties to the agreement are animated by the desire and intention to adhere to it in faith, truth and honesty. But when you find that one of the parties has not the slightest intention of adhering to those principles, control becomes much more difficult. In other words, in those circumstances a gentlemen's agreement is just a joke. I have said that the matter was a joke, and I make that statement sincerely because I found that instead of only 400 entering Canada in any one year, the Japanese were entering to the extent of 1,700. That is a matter of record; I have taken it from the records. Then, the other part of the contract was such that the whole matter was left wide open. I shall leave that part of the subject for the moment.

In the spring of 1922, for once in their lives the British Columbia members had sense enough to take united action. I do not believe they have ever done it since, nor do I think it had been done before. We all got together—I believe there were four groups at that time—and presented a resolution to the house asking for the total exclusion of orientals from British Columbia and Canada. The government opposed the resolution and moved to amend it by striking out the words "total exclusion" and inserting the words

"effective restriction". Of course the government's majority carried the amendment. We were told at that time that the two expressions were synonymous, and that the term "effective restriction" meant total exclusion. The government majority carried the amendment—and that was the end of total exclusion. It did not operate as we had been led to believe.

Time has gone on and taken its toll of those fourteen members who supported that principle. There have been deaths, both politically and physically at one end of the rainbow, and the senate and big government appointments at the other end. All these have reduced that little band to the point where I am the only one left. I can say, like the man in the Bible—in the Book of Job, I believe it was; some of my parson friends can correct me if I am wrong—"I only am escaped alone to tell thee." I continued pressing the matter as best I could, but I found that governments were not sympathetic.

There was too much talk of appeasement in the air. One of the arguments was this, "We want to do a big trade with Japan, with her seventy million people. We do not want to lose that trade. If we do anything they don't like they will take their trade to the United States." That argument had some plausibility; at any rate it was good enough to stall me off for a year or two.

Then I saw the psychological moment open in 1924. The government of the United States, out of a clear sky, passed a total exclusion act against orientals, including Japanese. There was our chance to do the same, without loss of trade. I begged the then Prime Minister—the same one as we have to-day—to make it apply to all orientals; but he could not see his way clear to do so. He did apply it to Chinese, and that action has been most successful. Unfortunately, however, it was not applied to Japanese.

I continued from time to time to do what I could; and then along about 1928—possibly it was 1929—the Prime Minister was kind enough—and I give him full credit for it, because he did not have to do it—to readjust the joint agreement so that instead of an entry of 400 a year there would be only 150. He put some teeth in the terms of that agreement, so that we really had at least a gambler's chance of enforcing it. I believe the Japanese with their accustomed ability and subtlety found loopholes whereby at least to some extent they evaded the terms of the arrangement, but not to any great extent. Then, of later years the war has stopped any serious immigration.

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I was told at that time that there were other reasons why we should not do anything to offend the Japanese nation, reasons of a diplomatic nature. I remember as well as if it were yesterday the answer I gave—I believe it is in *Hansard*—"The house and government might be assured that the Japanese nation would attack us the very moment it suited them, no matter what we had done by way of appeasement, favours or anything else." The very moment it suited them to attack us they would do so—and to-day tells the answer.

If my advice had been taken, even as late as 1924, to-day there would have been in Canada perhaps 5,000 or 6,000 fewer Japanese than there are to-day. Six thousand taken from 24,000 would have helped to ease this very acute situation which exists in British Columbia to-day.

I continued to look anxiously at the situation, and in 1938 I thought I had another opportunity. I brought in a bill to provide for an educational test. The Japanese were not mentioned by name, but the provisions of this bill would have applied to three-quarters of the world's population. If it had been put into force, it would have set up a method which has been used in Australia and New Zealand for thirty years without any objection from the Japanese. This has helped to keep Australia and New Zealand white. The government refused to allow my bill to go through. The matter was put to a vote and, if hon. members are interested in the matter, they will find it fully set out in *Hansard* of May 31, 1938, at page 3411. The hon. member for Skeena (Mr. Hanson) and the hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. O'Neill) should be proud now that they withstood the pressure of the whip at that time and voted in the interests of their province rather than at the dictates of the party. In justice to the hon. member for Victoria, B. C. (Mr. Mayhew), I must say that he was sick at home at the time and could not possibly be here.

In September, 1940, Japan signed the deal, agreement or whatever you call it with Italy and Germany. In plain English, they bound themselves to enter into war against us and the United States whenever it suited Germany or Hitler. Pressure was put upon the government by British Columbia, and I suppose some realization of the situation also led the government to take action. They appointed a hand-picked committee to investigate the subject, which committee came back with a number of recommendations, I believe ten in all. There were only two of any importance, Nos. 5 and 7, and I shall deal with them. No. 5 recommended against allowing Japanese to enlist in our volunteer army then being

raised. That was a very good idea, otherwise we would have had perhaps 1,500 Japanese training in our army, possibly in key positions, petty officers and the like. They would have been familiar with every detail of our army operations. Protests were made by the mayor of Nanaimo, and I think by other cities and by myself, and the recommendation of the committee carried. That was all right.

Recommendation No. 7 was that there should be a re-registration of the Japanese in Canada. It had been claimed by many people that the registration that had been taken was just a fake as regards the Japanese. Only those who felt like it registered, and there was a demand for a new registration. The recommendation was that they should be photographed at the same time. That was a good idea, but it had one fatal defect, if deception is regarded as a fatal defect. It was clearly understood that this registration was compulsory. We were told how well it was going on, how successful it was, and it was hoped that we malignants would now be satisfied and keep quiet. The whole thing turned on the point that it was compulsory.

If it had been voluntary, what use would it have been? Supposing we decided to make a history of the people by the name of Smith, to have a record of everything they had done, whether they had been in gaol and so on. If this were carried on voluntarily, how many Smiths would come forward except those with clean hands? Was it expected that Japanese who had entered the country illegally would come forward and say, "Yes, I came in illegally, take me." Of course they would not. A Jap is not a fool, any more than we are. The guilty ones did not register and the whole thing was a gigantic failure. It could not be otherwise if it were anything but compulsory.

Our main complaint was that many of them had come into the country illegally and this re-registration would have discovered that. Was it expected that those who had come in illegally would disclose that fact? The thing is ridiculous. When the war came on, after Pearl Harbour, it was discovered that it was not compulsory, that it was just a gesture to keep us quiet, just a farce. Then what happened? The war was on and the people know what war means; this government should know what it means. These same people were given two months in which to register; they were given until February 7 to get things fixed up, to get a fake birth certificate or a forged entry card. You can buy them in Vancouver. If they could not get either, they were given two months before they would be subject to the same action as

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that to which any other enemy alien would be exposed. Why give them two months? We were practically saying to them, "We are at war with you, but we will give you two months in which to get faked papers, or get out of the country." I never heard the like of it before, and I hope I never shall again.

If I were challenged to offer proof of these things, I could no more do it than I could offer proof of the day of the week on which my last birthday fell. You do not keep track of these things that are so well known. I suppose I could have kept the newspapers that I read at the time, but I did not. I never dreamed that such action would be necessary to show that they had said it was compulsory. On February 9, the Prime Minister made this statement, as reported on page 436 of *Hansard*:

The committee received the utmost cooperation from Japanese nationals as well as from Canadians of Japanese racial origin. When a state of war was proclaimed as existing between Japan and Canada, the registration was all but complete.

The utmost cooperation! We know the extent of that cooperation. Here is what a man wrote—a white man, for a change, and perhaps we can take his word—to the local paper in Vancouver a few days ago:

About three years ago I was talking to a Canadian-born Japanese boy in a store and said to him, "if the Japs ever came over here would you fight against us?" He replied, "I wouldn't want to, but I would either have to or commit suicide."

That is the sort of blind it is. There is your cooperation. Only when they attacked Pearl Harbour was it announced that the whole thing had been only voluntary. Here is an article that appeared in the papers a few days afterwards:

During the registration proceedings, several hundred Japanese left Canada for Japan. Most of these were known to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Many of them were believed to have entered the country illegally.

It is only after war breaks out that we discover all that. They were given two months in which to fix things up or get out. If that registration had been compulsory, we would have got the best of these Jap agents and the best of their spies. They have now gone home with their charts and plans and with a local knowledge that could not be bought for any money. Perhaps we shall see some of these Japs again peering over the side of the bridge of a German gunboat in Vancouver, Nanaimo or Port Alberni, because we now know that many of them were expert naval men. Agitation continued, and the government called a conference which was held here on January 8 and 9. With possibly

one or two exceptions, the twenty-five gentlemen who attended this conference were in government service. Their continuing or advancement in the branch of the service in which they were, might depend upon—putting it politely—their thinking the same way as the government about these matters.

I suggested that they should call in the British Columbia members who were elected by the people and who have some claim to represent the people. But, oh, no! I should like to give another quotation. I shall not give names because I do not think it is fair to attack people when they are not in a position to reply. When an official is mentioned, I shall refer to an official, and when reference is made to a member of the government, I shall simply call him a minister. I quote:

I fail to see any need of getting the members from British Columbia together and asking them what they think should be done.

They were not called together, but the twenty-five government officials were there in full strength. They were fully informed of the government's views because some came from the Department of External Affairs.

I have here the statement got out by the Prime Minister. This is an official document, after the conference had reported, and so there is no harm in my quoting from it. It contains seventeen paragraphs, a great many of which are build-ups for the rest of it. I will deal with the more important ones, paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 11.

Paragraph 6 recommends that the government should seize immediately the Japanese fishing boats. That was done. It was done immediately war was declared, and for that action I have nothing but the utmost praise. It was done promptly and thoroughly. I have a vague idea that I see in it the efficient hand of the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (Mr. Macdonald). At any rate it was done, and done well. While this is not part of the report, I may as well finish up that matter by saying that after they had 1200 Japanese boats in their hands, the question arose, what to do with them? It was desirable to get them back into fishing again, so that white men could catch the fish so badly needed for the British market. Therefore they set up a committee to try to sell these boats. Whoever chose that committee deserves great credit. They made excellent choices. Here they are: Chairman, Hon. Mr. Justice Sidney Smith, a man with a master mariner's papers, so he would understand boats; Commander B. L. Johnson, D.S.O., R.C.N.R., a man of outstanding ability and repute in Vancouver.

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Then there was a Japanese, Kishiso Kimura, who I am told, is a very able man, familiar with the work that he undertook. I give all credit for that. Like all government offices, it is true that they were rather slow in going about their work, but they got started at last. They issued a circular, a copy of which I hold in my hand, explaining their procedure. I am very glad to get this circular because I can pass the information along to the fishermen, who are continually writing to me to know what to do. I am afraid that the whole scheme will not be entirely successful because the government will have left on their hands hundreds of boats. That is not the fault of the government or of this committee. Well, they got this thing started and have sold fifty-six boats up to date, and marvellous to relate, they told the members of parliament about it. They even accepted a suggestion I made—another remarkable thing. I suggested that they could not sell these boats for cash because the fishermen did not have cash, but they would be able to buy them on time, and accordingly that was arranged. The general idea of a lot of these officials, the people on these new boards, seems to be that there is no loyalty, intelligence or usefulness in any member of parliament. I do not know where they get the idea because it is not so very long since the people elected us. But that is the idea you find among the people on these new boards and among these dollar-a-year men. Since we are not told what is being done, we shall have to guess or simply deal with what we see, and if we guess wrong, the government is to blame. I do not think members of parliament are any more unworthy than they were in years gone by.

I want to quote recommendation 7 in which was contained the policy of the cabinet. It reads:

For the same period—

That is during the war.

—the sale of gasoline and explosives to persons of Japanese racial origin will be directly controlled under conditions to be prescribed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

That is a good idea too, a very good idea, but unfortunately I read in the papers—I have to go to the press for information because I cannot get it anywhere else—that these sales are still going on.

Mr. HOMUTH: The sale of powder is still going on?

Mr. NEILL: Explosives. A man wrote to the Vancouver Province the other day and suggested that if this order was in effect, why was the Japanese station at the corner still selling gas the same as usual? That has been going on for two and a half months now, and

I rather think permission has been extended to the 1st of April. The language is doubtful, but if it can be interpreted to the benefit of the Japanese, be sure it will be so interpreted. You are dealing with clever, subtle, unscrupulous enemies—and they are enemies—and when you say that you are not going to stop the sale for two months, that is just an invitation to them to accumulate as much gas and explosives as they can in the meantime. We say to them: "Remember, on the 7th of February or on the 1st of April we are going to shut down on you." Is that not an invitation to them to get explosives and gasoline against a rainy day? That time limit should never have been put in. The order should have been made applicable at once.

I want to say one more good thing for the government, and it will be the last, I am sorry to say. It does not pay to state your case unfairly, and I wish to be strictly fair. In these two instances I have mentioned, the seizing of the Japanese boats, and this order with respect to the sale of gasoline and explosives was made applicable to all Japanese, and all honour is due to the government for doing it.

There are three classes of Japanese we must deal with. There are the Japanese nationals, those born in Japan and never naturalized in Canada; they are Japanese nationals. Then there is the man born in Japan and naturalized in Canada. He is called a naturalized Japanese or a Canadian. Then there is the Japanese who was born in Canada, who can call himself a Japanese-Canadian if he likes. The government orders with regard to seizing the boats and the sale of gas and explosives applied to all three classes. That was all right.

Now I deal with paragraph 8. It says that Japanese nationals will be forbidden to possess or use short-wave receiving sets or radio transmitters in Canada. A most excellent thing. Hon. members can all understand why it was necessary to do that. That was fine. But it does not come into effect until the 1st of April. Did the Japanese give us four months' notice of what they were going to do at Pearl Harbour? Yet we say to them: "Go wandering about with your cameras and take pictures, and use your receiving sets to send word to Japan, and your receivers to get instructions from Japan. You can do this as much as you like until the 1st of April." Even if the order had been withheld, and they had been allowed to continue doing these things without being told of any date when they must stop, it would not have been so bad, because then they would never have known when the order was coming into force.



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But they were warned—you will not be interfered with until the 1st of April. The order was the equivalent of that. We told them: "Do your dirty work now. Use your radio and your receiving set but, remember, hide or bury them before the 1st of April, and then everything will be lovely." They told the Japanese nationals that they must not use these things in a protected area. But they can use them outside. I have a police order to that effect. It is signed by the police and says:

No enemy alien shall have in his possession or use while in such protected area any camera, radio transmitter, radio short-wave receiving set, firearm, ammunition or explosive.

But that order does not apply outside the protected area, and it does not apply to a naturalized or native-born Japanese.

Mr. RALSTON: I am not quite familiar with the regulations as to cameras, but does my hon. friend suggest that the same date applied with regard to evacuating a protected area and the possession of cameras? They must evacuate by April 1.

Mr. NEILL: Yes.

Mr. RALSTON: My hon. friend used the same date, April 1, when speaking of cameras and receiving sets.

Mr. NEILL: Yes. I said that the language was so ambiguous that it could be read two ways. It reads:

Notices ordering all enemy aliens to evacuate the coastal areas of British Columbia west of the Cascade mountains by April 1 and to surrender cameras and radios will be posted in public buildings to-day.

Then:

Orders to Japanese . . . to get out of the coastal areas within forty-seven days and to surrender cameras, radios and other banned articles, were issued to-day.

Mr. RALSTON: I think my hon. friend is reading some sort of newspaper paraphrase of the order. The order to give up radios and cameras is effective immediately. The order of evacuation is not. The order referred to, is effective on April 1.

Mr. NEILL: It is signed by Colonel Hill, and states that no enemy alien shall have in his possession or use while in such protected area any camera, radio transmitter, radio short-wave receiving set, firearm, ammunition or explosive.

Mr. RALSTON: That is effective immediately. You don't wait until April 1 for that.

Mr. NEILL: Well, as I said, it is doubtful. There is, however, no question whatever that

a man who is not a Japanese national can do these things any time, any place. The order applies only to nationals; that is, to men born in Japan and coming over here, and these are comparatively few in number, something like 1,700 out of 24,000, and only while they are in the area. The remaining 22,000 of naturalized Japanese are free to come and go, as I have said, anywhere. They can photograph what they like, radio what they like. They can do something else which I have not touched upon, and which is—not to make a joke—a burning question in British Columbia. Three, two, one of them can do endless damage in British Columbia with a box of matches. The most deadly enemy of the lumber industry in British Columbia is fire. Lumbermen are so afraid of it, it is so dangerous, that they shut their camps down in the middle of summer, as soon as the humidity reaches a certain point. A man can wander out in that bush, ten, fifty, a hundred miles from anywhere, and do more damage with a box of matches than it would take two armies to put out. The large number of forest rangers whom we have could not touch the fringe of the thing if these aliens were determined to commit sabotage. Some of the biggest lumbermen on the coast are much alarmed at this situation. If the Japanese were out of the area, they could not do this damage, because you can't do a thing if you are not there.

I have spoken of the freedom of Japanese to come and go with cameras, radios and matches. That is not restricted to two months or four months; that is for eternity, if the war lasts that long; it is for the duration of the war that the naturalized or Canadian-born Jap can go out and commit sabotage; he is free to do it the whole time, and he is the most dangerous of the lot. The naturalized Japanese speaks our language fluently, possibly he has been to college. He possesses far greater potentialities of trouble as a spy or an agent than if he had just come from Japan. The fellow dressed up like a white man, speaking our language glibly, is the one who should be interned. It is very hard for me to believe that the government are so remote from what is taking place or may take place as not to understand the situation.

Paragraph 10 of the statement to which I referred makes a rather vague reference to the establishment of a civil corps for Canadian and naturalized Japanese. Because the project is a voluntary one, and in view of the vagueness to which I have referred, I imagine that presently it will fade away.

I should now like to make three charges against the government. The first is this, that, with the exception of seizing these boats,

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they have been far too slow in handling the Japanese situation. They have let days go by when it should have been hours, and a month when it should have been days. Look at what was done in Mexico. There the government dealt with the whole lot as soon as war was declared, and ordered into the interior every Jap who was on the coast. They did it; they didn't talk about it. Cuba did the same thing. They arrested, I believe, eighteen Japanese, all but two of whom were naval officers. Nicaragua took the same course, and took it speedily.

Mr. CRERAR: Could my hon. friend tell the house—I am merely asking for information—what has been done in the United States?

Mr. NEILL: No. I have not made myself familiar with what is happening there. I know that on the Pacific coast they took prompt steps. But they did not have the same incentive and need for action as we have, because there were not fishermen in the state of Washington; most Japanese there worked in paper mills and the like of that. But I am not in a position to state in detail what was done. I have troubles enough of my own. I do know what the situation is in British Columbia.

The only reason why we have not had a Pearl Harbour bombing in Canada is that we have no Pearl Harbour to bomb.

I note here that the council of the city of Vancouver has passed a resolution urging the government to get a move on. The report speaks of increasing irritation and criticism at the coast over the apparent failure of the government to implement its announced policy of removing Japanese.

The legislature of British Columbia, before adjourning a few days ago, passed unanimously a resolution urging the dominion government to strengthen Pacific defences. The feeling is very strong at the coast. I wish I could get the government to realize it.

Here is one incident I must quote, reported under a big headline in a leading Vancouver paper, the *Daily Province*:

Japanese live undisturbed on dike adjoining airport.

There are 200 Japanese living a mile west of the airport. They are living on a dike. It would be very easy to blow up or open that dike, and the airport would be rendered useless for a long time to come. Yet they are living undisturbed within a mile of the airport; they are on a dike into which a gap could be blown with a few sticks of powder that would make the airport useless for a long time to come. Why does the government not take some action in this case?

The second charge is that even the small restrictions to which I have referred are applicable only to nationals, and I say it is inexcusable that they are not made applicable to all naturalized Japanese aliens in this country. To whom do you suppose they think they owe loyalty? If they were scattered all over Canada, the case might be different, but think what may happen when they are turned loose in a small area, when 25,000 are concentrated in an area where they could so readily combine to take action against Vancouver, or Victoria, as the case may be. It constitutes an unspeakable menace; I cannot understand why it is allowed to continue.

The third charge is that the government have shown indifference to British Columbia defence, also to air raid precautions work and the like of that. I am not blaming the government for preparations which they might have made six years ago. That is not their fault; I know that. We could not get the appropriation through the house. The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation moved resolutions condemning the government for proposing, as the Minister of Pensions and National Health (Mr. Mackenzie) did, to spend some money for these purposes. But I do blame the government for not having taken the situation in hand since war was declared. They are too slack; they appear to adopt the attitude, "Oh, well, we have to take chances; we are doing the best we can; it will be all right." Well, they told us it would be all right about Hong Kong. But people make mistakes—even military men, even high military men. They told us it would be all right at Singapore. Yet we know that mistakes were made there. Here is the governments paper the *Vancouver Sun*, expressing this opinion:

Canada obviously has not made its plan of defence on the assumption of any real attack on the Pacific coast. . . . That is the plan which must be reconsidered. . . . we do expect a well-equipped, mobile striking unit which could pounce upon any Japanese landing attempt from Alaska southwards.

No such force exists on our coast. No such force exists in Canada.

I am afraid that is too true. Perhaps in the secret session which is to be held we shall be given more information on this matter. I do not propose to blame the government for things which happened before they had control and knowledge of the situation, or for not having done what at the time was beyond their power. But the government must be ready at that secret session to give us genuine information, not general assurances

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and smooth-sounding platitudes. There has been too much of this in connection with the management of the war.

There is a certain place—I will not name names, I will call it Y. When the government began to think about building aerodromes I thought that Y would make a good site for one, and I said so. I put it up to the officials, and they said that they were experts and ought to know better than I did. Well, I accepted that decision—but they are building that aerodrome now with frantic haste. I fear we may have to paraphrase the hymn and say:

Too late, too late will be the cry  
The Japanese gunboats have gone by.

There was another aerodrome at a place we will call X. I wrote to the government in connection with this one, informing them that there were two things wrong about it. This was a year or two ago. I pointed out to the officials that there was a Jap village 200 yards from the mouth of it where the Japs could take photographs and keep a record of any aeroplanes leaving, with all the details, so that they could have it all recorded for the benefit of the Japanese. They were about as far from the mouth of the aerodrome as Sparks street would be from where I am standing. I have in my desk a letter in which some official tried to stall me off. I was told that they would expropriate the Japanese, but that they could not do it because there was some hitch. However, they said they would look into the matter. Imagine looking into the question of expropriating this particular property when other nations, as we know, take first what they require and then talk about expropriation. Again, I pointed out to the officials that there was a Jap who had been seen taking photographs from an aeroplane over the harbour, where the aerodrome was being built. It was a civilian aeroplane. I took this matter up with various bodies—I will not mention any names because I do not wish to give them away—and what was the answer? I was informed that the investigation was closed. They had ascertained the name of the man and had found that he had gone to Japan. I suppose he took photographs with him as a memento of us because he loved us so much. Well, he has gone back to Japan with whatever photographs he took—we do not know how many—and God knows how many more may have gone there. But the officials did not seem to think it was important. I was told that it would be difficult to take photographs through the glass of any aeroplane unless you had a particular sort of apparatus with which to do it. Well, would the Japanese not have that type of apparatus?

I submitted all these matters to the department, and I have it all on record. One of the officials said to me, "There is nothing to this anyhow because it is not against the laws of the country to take photographs of an aerodrome."

I took it up with some of the higher officials, and they jugged with it and finally explained that they could get the Japs under the Official Secrets Act. The aerodrome is still there; the Japs are still staying there under their four months' lease of life, and doubtless they are still taking these photographs, which I have no doubt will be sent to the right place.

These men are not all Canadian nationals. Some of them may be the very best class of spies and foreign agents, and I contend that there has been too much sympathy for the Japanese viewpoint and Japanese interests. We must remember that we are at war with these people. Ottawa is 3,000 miles away from us out there, and it is useful to have a man here who is familiar with conditions on the coast to advise. So they sent for a man who for ten or fifteen years had been notorious—there is no other word by which to describe his activities—in the province of British Columbia, for his championship of the Japanese, for his advocacy of their interests. He was a protagonist of the Japanese. There was never a man who believed so strongly and implicitly in Japan.

Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. member has exceeded his time, and he may proceed only with the unanimous consent of the house.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Go on.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Go ahead.

Mr. NEILL: I thank the house and the Prime Minister; I have never asked for this licence before. To proceed, I may say that a great deal of ill-will has been excited in British Columbia. The people out there said that this man was paid a big salary as a provincial official, and they wanted to know why they should be paying him if he was so disloyal to the province. That was before the war, and it was said that it was only a matter of opinion. He has now been transferred to a position in Ottawa in which he can give advice—that is what he is here for, to speak with authority. He is on the ground, and he is also in a position to have early knowledge of any action that might be taken against the Japanese and to drop a hint in the right place. Anything of that sort, just a hint in the right quarters, might make a great deal of difference in the carrying out of a policy.

Perhaps I shall be told that this is unfair, that this is a fine man, and that I should not make such statements. I agree that he is en-

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titled to his weird opinions; he was entitled to that before the war. But since the war, no—a thousand times no. He is too one-sided and biased to be kept in such a place.

During the last war there was a member of the royal family, Prince Henry of Battenberg, I think, who was married to Queen Victoria's daughter. He was an admiral of the fleet and his loyalty could not be questioned, but he voluntarily asked to be retired. It did not look well to see a man of German origin in command of the fleet, and so he asked to be retired. I submit that in this case a feeling of decency should have impelled this gentleman to whom I have been referring to ask to be relieved of his position, where he is open to suspicion. Scripture says that we should abstain from even the appearance of evil.

We who have taken the position that I am now taking have been called all sorts of names. We have been called agitators. It is said that we are willing to exploit the interests of Canada for our own political advantage; that we are rabble-rousers, Jap-baiters, and that we have a very dangerous influence—that was not said of me; it was said of a reputable alderman in Vancouver. I have heard that sort of thing, and hints of it even in this house, and certainly in the government press. You can get a man to write any letter you want; you can get a white man to make a tool of himself for a Jap if you pay him enough. There was a man who wrote to the papers saying what fine people the Japs are. I laid a trap for him and I discovered that he was a white man all right, but also a paid agent of a Japanese association, but he did not say that when he signed his name.

Yes, we are all bad because we want a white British Columbia and not a place like Hawaii! Fifty years from now, unless something is done to stop it, all west of the Rockies will be yellow. I submit, Mr. Speaker, that we want but little; we simply want to be left alone, like New Zealand and Australia, all white. I have no ill-will against the Japanese. Perhaps you may think I have been showing ill-will, but I assure you I have none towards the Japs. No Jap ever "did" me—I never gave him the chance. I wish to be fair to the Japanese, and I think that if we expatriated them, as we ought to do, they should be given full justice in regard to their property, because I am strongly in favour of a Japan controlled by the Japanese, just as I am in favour of a Canada controlled by

Canadians. Let us continue to trade with them; let us do business with them across the ocean; but do not force into one nation two peoples separated by something that is wider than the ocean, two peoples who are different in race, in religion, in traditions and in their whole philosophy of life. This difference always has prevented assimilation and always will prevent it, between two nations so utterly divergent in every respect. The greatest path towards assimilation is marriage. Well, the Japs have been here fifty-eight years and there is no record of a single marriage, although there might be one. I asked a Japanese to produce the record of one marriage and he could not do so. We have heard of second generation Japanese born here going to Japanese schools here to learn Japanese, and that has been regarded as a small matter. We went into their textbooks and had them translated and we found that they were very anti-British. Yet there were people who thought that was a small matter—only the sort of thing that irresponsible people like myself would talk about. But when the war came, it was thought wise to shut down the Jap schools. There were fifty-nine in British Columbia, and leaving out small areas where they could not run a school, the great bulk of those children must have attended some Japanese school.

I have one more word. When the time comes to talk peace, I suggest that the services rendered by Canada and by her Prime Minister should surely entitle both him and this dominion to be fully represented when the terms of peace are being settled, when the treaty comes to be made, and have their voice heard in no uncertain terms. I do suggest—perhaps it is too early to talk about it now, but it is well to get it started—that we should make an arrangement that when peace time comes, we expatriate all the Japanese left in Canada; do it on fair terms, buy them out, pay them liberally. It was done in the present war, I believe, between Russia and Germany; and after the last war it was done on a large scale, some 200,000 people, between the Greeks and the Turks, I think. If they could move 200,000, it is much easier for us to move 25,000, it is better to move them while their numbers are so small. Let us settle once and for all this canker in the life of Canada which prevents us from being a united white Canada. And that is what British Columbia wants.



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CANADA

## House of Commons Debates

OFFICIAL REPORT

SPEECH

OF

MR. A. W. NEILL

MEMBER FOR COMOX-ALBERNI

ON

## THE JAPANESE SITUATION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1942

Mr. A. W. NEILL (Comox-Alberni): Mr. Speaker, I wish to discuss this afternoon the question of the Japanese in British Columbia. Since it is an important and burning question there at the present time, it is almost impossible to tell the tale in the required time, and I may ask to have a few minutes longer. If so, it will be the first time I have had to do so.

I am not unmindful, nor shall I try to be, of the remarks of the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) when he warned against hasty and unwarranted language, calculated to inflame the situation in British Columbia, as regards Japanese. Mr. Speaker, I have listened to that appeasement talk for twenty years from the government benches, and I think the time has come to take a different stand. I believe we can best serve the interests of our country, and promote peace, by having plain talk, straightforward discussions and, I hope, definite action, with respect to the issues before us.

In the first campaign in which I took part for election to this house in the fall of 1921, I was struck by two outstanding features in the district, first, the predominant place the

Japanese had acquired in the fishing industry, and, second, the vast increase in their population in British Columbia, both through immigration and by birth. The fishing industry was dominated by the Japanese during the last war, when our men were overseas. Then, later, they started a policy of pushing the white men out of that industry. The methods they adopted in that procedure were too often those which are not expected in ordinary business competition.

Early in 1922 I got the then government of the day to make a cut in the quota of fishing licences allotted to Japanese in the salmon trolling—a part of the fishing industry—to the extent of thirty-three per cent. Later, in the summer, a royal commission was appointed, and it decided to cut all Japanese salmon fishing licences to the extent of forty per cent. The following year they were again cut another fifteen per cent, and the year after that another ten per cent. This made a very substantial reduction, which has been since maintained.

The house is aware that a few weeks ago all Japanese fishing vessels, numbering about 1,200, were seized. If the influx had been

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allowed to continue, and had not been checked in 1922, as I have described, the number now to be seized would have been something like 3,000 or possibly 3,500. That would have greatly aggravated the situation in British Columbia to-day.

Then, let us look at the other point, namely their increase in numbers by immigration and by birth. The Japanese birthrate is about double that of the white race—rather more than that. And that, of course, goes on all the time. We can stop immigration, but we cannot stop increases by birth, especially when the Japanese government allows to emigrate only those women who are likely to bear children. If they do not have those children, they are sent back to Japan, and others are sent out in their places.

Prior to 1884 there was no immigration of Japanese into British Columbia. From that time until 1907 they came in in ever-increasing numbers, until the situation became alarming. Then the government of the day—a Liberal government, by the way—made a deal with Japan or, as they called it, a gentleman's agreement. On the face of it, it was an arrangement whereby Japan pledged itself to see that no more than 400 Japanese left Japan to come to Canada in one year. No greater travesty of language could be found than to call that a gentleman's agreement, because when one makes a gentleman's agreement it is presupposed that both parties to the agreement are animated by the desire and intention to adhere to it in faith, truth and honesty. But when you find that one of the parties has not the slightest intention of adhering to those principles, control becomes much more difficult. In other words, in those circumstances a gentleman's agreement is just a joke. I have said that the matter was a joke, and I make that statement sincerely because I found that instead of only 400 entering Canada in any one year, the Japanese were entering to the extent of 1,700. That is a matter of record; I have taken it from the records. Then, the other part of the contract was such that the whole matter was left wide open. I shall leave that part of the subject for the moment.

In the spring of 1922, for once in their lives the British Columbia members had sense enough to take united action. I do not believe they have ever done it since, nor do I think it had been done before. We all got together—I believe there were four groups at that time—and presented a resolution to the house asking for the total exclusion of orientals from British Columbia and Canada. The government opposed the resolution and moved to amend it by striking out the words "total exclusion" and inserting the words

"effective restriction". Of course the government's majority carried the amendment. We were told at that time that the two expressions were synonymous, and that the term "effective restriction" meant total exclusion. The government majority carried the amendment—and that was the end of total exclusion. It did not operate as we had been led to believe.

Time has gone on and taken its toll of those fourteen members who supported that principle. There have been deaths, both politically and physically at one end of the rainbow, and the senate and big government appointments at the other end. All these have reduced that little band to the point where I am the only one left. I can say, like the man in the Bible—in the Book of Job, I believe it was; some of my parson friends can correct me if I am wrong—"I only am escaped alone to tell thee." I continued pressing the matter as best I could, but I found that governments were not sympathetic.

There was too much talk of appeasement in the air. One of the arguments was this, "We want to do a big trade with Japan, with her seventy million people. We do not want to lose that trade. If we do anything they don't like they will take their trade to the United States." That argument had some plausibility; at any rate it was good enough to stall me off for a year or two.

Then I saw the psychological moment open in 1924. The government of the United States, out of a clear sky, passed a total exclusion act against orientals, including Japanese. There was our chance to do the same, without loss of trade. I begged the then Prime Minister—the same one as we have to-day—to make it apply to all orientals; but he could not see his way clear to do so. He did apply it to Chinese, and that action has been most successful. Unfortunately, however, it was not applied to Japanese.

I continued from time to time to do what I could; and then along about 1928—possibly it was 1929—the Prime Minister was kind enough—and I give him full credit for it, because he did not have to do it—to readjust the joint agreement so that instead of an entry of 400 a year there would be only 150. He put some teeth in the terms of that agreement, so that we really had at least a gambler's chance of enforcing it. I believe the Japanese with their accustomed ability and subtlety found loopholes whereby at least to some extent they evaded the terms of the arrangement, but not to any great extent. Then, of later years the war has stopped any serious immigration.

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I was told at that time that there were other reasons why we should not do anything to offend the Japanese nation, reasons of a diplomatic nature. I remember as well as if it were yesterday the answer I gave—I believe it is in *Hansard*—"The house and government would attack us the very moment it suited them, no matter what we had done by way of appeasement, favours or anything else." The very moment it suited them to attack us they would do so—and to-day tells the answer.

If my advice had been taken, even as late as 1924, to-day there would have been in Canada perhaps 5,000 or 6,000 fewer Japanese than there are to-day. Six thousand taken from 24,000 would have helped to ease this very acute situation which exists in British Columbia to-day.

I continued to look anxiously at the situation, and in 1938 I thought I had another opportunity. I brought in a bill to provide for an educational test. The Japanese were not mentioned by name, but the provisions of this bill would have applied to three-quarters of the world's population. If it had been put into force, it would have set up a method which has been used in Australia and New Zealand for thirty years without any objection from the Japanese. This has helped to keep Australia and New Zealand white. The government refused to allow my bill to go through. The matter was put to a vote and, if hon. members are interested in the matter, they will find it fully set out in *Hansard* of May 31, 1938, at page 3411. The hon. member for Skeena (Mr. Hanson) and the hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. O'Neill) should be proud now that they withstood the pressure of the whip at that time and voted in the interests of their province rather than at the dictates of the party. In justice to the hon. member for Victoria, B. C. (Mr. Mayhew), I must say that he was sick at home at the time and could not possibly be here.

In September, 1940, Japan signed the deal, agreement or whatever you call it with Italy and Germany. In plain English, they bound themselves to enter into war against us and the United States whenever it suited Germany or Hitler. Pressure was put upon the government by British Columbia, and I suppose some realization of the situation also led the government to take action. They appointed a hand-picked committee to investigate the subject, which committee came back with a number of recommendations, I believe ten in all. There were only two of any importance, Nos. 5 and 7, and I shall deal with them. No. 5 recommended against allowing Japanese to enlist in our volunteer army then being

raised. That was a very good idea, otherwise we would have had, perhaps 1,500 Japanese training in our army, possibly in key positions, petty officers and the like. They would have been familiar with every detail of our army operations. Protests were made by the mayor of Nanaimo, and I think by other cities and by myself, and the recommendation of the committee carried. That was all right.

Recommendation No. 7 was that there should be a re-registration of the Japanese in Canada. It had been claimed by many people that the registration that had been taken was just a fake as regards the Japanese. Only those who felt like it registered, and there was a demand for a new registration. The recommendation was that they should be photographed at the same time. That was a good idea, but it had one fatal defect, if deception is regarded as a fatal defect. It was clearly understood that this registration was compulsory. We were told how well it was going on, how successful it was, and it was hoped that we malignants would now be satisfied and keep quiet. The whole thing turned on the point that it was compulsory.

If it had been voluntary, what use would it have been? Supposing we decided to make a history of the people by the name of Smith, to have a record of everything they had done, whether they had been in gaol and so on. If this were carried on voluntarily, how many Smiths would come forward except those with clean hands? Was it expected that Japanese who had entered the country illegally would come forward and say, "Yes, I came in illegally, take me." Of course they would not. A Jap is not a fool, any more than we are. The guilty ones did not register and the whole thing was a gigantic failure. It could not be otherwise if it were anything but compulsory.

Our main complaint was that many of them had come into the country illegally and this re-registration would have discovered that. Was it expected that those who had come in illegally would disclose that fact? The thing is ridiculous. When the war came on, after Pearl Harbour, it was discovered that it was not compulsory, that it was just a gesture to keep us quiet, just a farce. Then what happened? The war was on and the people know what war means; this government should know what it means. These same people were given two months in which to register; they were given until February 7 to get things fixed up, to get a fake birth certificate or a forged entry card. You can buy them in Vancouver. If they could not get either, they were given two months before they would be subject to the same action as



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that to which any other enemy alien would be exposed. Why give them two months? We were practically saying to them, "We are at war with you, but we will give you two months in which to get faked papers, or get out of the country." I never heard the like of it before, and I hope I never shall again.

If I were challenged to offer proof of these things, I could no more do it than I could offer proof of the day of the week on which my last birthday fell. You do not keep track of these things that are so well known. I suppose I could have kept the newspapers that I read at the time, but I did not. I never dreamed that such action would be necessary to show that they had said it was compulsory. On February 9, the Prime Minister made this statement, as reported on page 436 of *Hansard*:

The committee received the utmost cooperation from Japanese nationals as well as from Canadians of Japanese racial origin. When a state of war was proclaimed as existing between Japan and Canada, the registration was all but complete.

The utmost cooperation! We know the extent of that cooperation. Here is what a man wrote—a white man for a change, and perhaps we can take his word—to the local paper in Vancouver a few days ago:

About three years ago I was talking to a Canadian-born Japanese boy in a store and said to him, "if the Japs ever came over here would you fight against us?" He replied, "I wouldn't want to, but I would either have to or commit suicide."

That is the sort of blind it is. There is your cooperation. Only when they attacked Pearl Harbour was it announced that the whole thing had been only voluntary. Here is an article that appeared in the papers a few days afterwards:

During the registration proceedings, several hundred Japanese left Canada for Japan. Most of these were known to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Many of them were believed to have entered the country illegally.

It is only after war breaks out that we discover all that. They were given two months in which to fix things up or get out. If that registration had been compulsory, we would have got the best of these Jap agents and the best of their spies. They have now gone home with their charts and plans and with a local knowledge that could not be bought for any money. Perhaps we shall see some of these Japs again peering over the side of the bridge of a German gunboat in Vancouver, Nanaimo or Port Alberni, because we now know that many of them were expert naval men. Agitation continued, and the government called a conference which was held here on January 8 and 9. With possibly

one or two exceptions, the twenty-five gentlemen who attended this conference were in government service. Their continuing or advancement in the branch of the service in which they were, might depend upon—putting it politely—their thinking the same way as the government about these matters.

I suggested that they should call in the British Columbia members who were elected by the people and who have some claim to represent the people. But, oh, no! I should like to give another quotation. I shall not give names because I do not think it is fair to attack people when they are not in a position to reply. When an official is mentioned, I shall refer to an official, and when reference is made to a member of the government, I shall simply call him a minister. I quote:

I fail to see any need of getting the members from British Columbia together and asking them what they think should be done.

They were not called together, but the twenty-five government officials were there in full strength. They were fully informed of the government's views because some came from the Department of External Affairs.

I have here the statement got out by the Prime Minister. This is an official document, after the conference had reported, and so there is no harm in my quoting from it. It contains seventeen paragraphs, a great many of which are build-ups for the rest of it. I will deal with the more important ones, paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 11.

Paragraph 6 recommends that the government should seize immediately the Japanese fishing boats. That was done. It was done immediately war was declared, and for that action I have nothing but the utmost praise. It was done promptly and thoroughly. I have a vague idea that I see in it the efficient hand of the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (Mr. Macdonald). At any rate it was done, and done well. While this is not part of the report, I may as well finish up that matter by saying that after they had 1,200 Japanese boats in their hands, the question arose, what to do with them? It was desirable to get them back into fishing again, so that white men could catch the fish so badly needed for the British market. Therefore they set up a committee to try to sell these boats. Whoever chose that committee deserves great credit. They made excellent choices. Here they are: Chairman, Hon. Mr. Justice Sidney Smith, a man with a master mariner's papers, so he would understand boats; Commander B. L. Johnson, D.S.O., R.C.N.R., a man of outstanding ability and repute in Vancouver.

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Then there was a Japanese, Kishizo Kimura, who I am told, is a very able man, familiar with the work that he undertook. I give all credit for that. Like all government officers, it is true that they were rather slow in going about their work, but they got started at last. They issued a circular, a copy of which I hold in my hand, explaining their procedure. I am very glad to get this circular because I can pass the information along to the fishermen, who are continually writing to me to know what to do. I am afraid that the whole scheme will not be entirely successful because the government will have left on their hands hundreds of boats. That is not the fault of the government or of this committee. Well, they got this thing started and have sold fifty-six boats up to date, and marvellous to relate, they told the members of parliament about it. They even accepted a suggestion I made—another remarkable thing. I suggested that they could not sell these boats for cash because the fishermen did not have cash, but they would be able to buy them on time, and accordingly that was arranged. The general idea of a lot of these officials, the people on these new boards, seems to be that there is no loyalty, intelligence or usefulness in any member of parliament. I do not know where they get the idea because it is not so very long since the people elected us. But that is the idea you find among the people on these new boards and among these dollar-a-year men. Since we are not told what is being done, we shall have to guess or simply deal with what we see, and if we guess wrong, the government is to blame. I do not think members of parliament are any more unworthy than they were in years gone by.

I want to quote recommendation 7 in which was contained the policy of the cabinet. It reads:

For the same period—

That is during the war.

—the sale of gasoline and explosives to persons of Japanese racial origin will be directly controlled under conditions to be prescribed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

That is a good idea too, a very good idea, but unfortunately I read in the papers—I have to go to the press for information because I cannot get it anywhere else—that these sales are still going on.

Mr. HOMUTH: The sale of powder is still going on?

Mr. NEILL: Explosives. A man wrote to the Vancouver Province the other day and suggested that if this order was in effect, why was the Japanese station at the corner still selling gas the same as usual? That has been going on for two and a half months now, and

I rather think permission has been extended to the 1st of April. The language is doubtful, but if it can be interpreted to the benefit of the Japanese, be sure it will be so interpreted. You are dealing with clever, subtle, unscrupulous enemies—and they are enemies—and when you say that you are not going to stop the sale for two months, that is just an invitation to them to accumulate as much gas and explosives as they can in the meantime. We say to them: "Remember, on the 7th of February or on the 1st of April we are going to shut down on you." Is that not an invitation to them to get explosives and gasoline against a rainy day? That time limit should never have been put in. The order should have been made applicable at once.

I want to say one more good thing for the government, and it will be the last, I am sorry to say. It does not pay to state your case unfairly, and I wish to be strictly fair. In these two instances I have mentioned, the seizing of the Japanese boats, and this order with respect to the sale of gasoline and explosives was made applicable to all Japanese, and all honour is due to the government for doing it.

There are three classes of Japanese we must deal with. There are the Japanese nationals, those born in Japan and never naturalized in Canada; they are Japanese nationals. Then there is the man born in Japan and naturalized in Canada. He is called a naturalized Japanese or a Canadian. Then there is the Japanese who was born in Canada, who can call himself a Japanese-Canadian if he likes. The government orders with regard to seizing the boats and the sale of gas and explosives applied to all three classes. That was all right.

Now I deal with paragraph 8. It says that Japanese nationals will be forbidden to possess or use short-wave receiving sets or radio transmitters in Canada. A most excellent thing. Hon. members can all understand why it was necessary to do that. That was fine. But it does not come into effect until the 1st of April. Did the Japanese give us four months' notice of what they were going to do at Pearl Harbour? Yet we say to them: "Go wandering about with your cameras and take pictures, and use your receiving sets to send word to Japan, and your receivers to get instructions from Japan. You can do this as much as you like until the 1st of April." Even if the order had been withheld, and they had been allowed to continue doing these things without being told of any date when they must stop, it would not have been so bad, because then they would never have known when the order was coming into force.

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But they were warned—you will not be interfered with until the 1st of April. The order was the equivalent of that. We told them: "Do your dirty work now. Use your radio and your receiving set but, remember, hide or bury them before the 1st of April, and then everything will be lovely." They told the Japanese nationals that they must not use these things in a protected area. But they can use them outside. I have a police order to that effect. It is signed by the police and says:

No enemy alien shall have in his possession or use while in such protected area any camera, radio transmitter, radio short-wave receiving set, firearm, ammunition or explosive.

But that order does not apply outside the protected area, and it does not apply to a naturalized or native-born Japanese.

Mr. RALSTON: I am not quite familiar with the regulations as to cameras, but does my hon. friend suggest that the same date applied with regard to evacuating a protected area and the possession of cameras? They must evacuate by April 1.

Mr. NEILL: Yes.

Mr. RALSTON: My hon. friend used the same date, April 1, when speaking of cameras and receiving sets.

Mr. NEILL: Yes. I said that the language was so ambiguous that it could be read two ways. It reads:

Notices ordering all enemy aliens to evacuate the coastal area of British Columbia west of the Cascade mountains by April 1 and to surrender cameras and radios will be posted in public buildings to-day.

Then:

Orders to Japanese . . . to get out of the coastal areas within forty-seven days and to surrender cameras, radios and other banned articles, were issued to-day.

Mr. RALSTON: I think my hon. friend is reading some sort of newspaper paraphrase of the order. The order to give up radios and cameras is effective immediately. The order of evacuation is not. The order referred to, is effective on April 1.

Mr. NEILL: It is signed by Colonel Hill, and states that no enemy alien shall have in his possession or use while in such protected area any camera, radio transmitter, radio short-wave receiving set, firearm, ammunition or explosive.

Mr. RALSTON: That is effective immediately. You don't wait until April 1 for that.

Mr. NEILL: Well, as I said, it is doubtful. There is, however, no question whatever that

a man who is not a Japanese national can do these things any time, any place. The order applies only to nationals; that is, to men born in Japan and coming over here, and these are comparatively few in number, something like 1,700 out of 24,000, and only while they are in the area. The remaining 22,000 of naturalized Japanese are free to come and go, as I have said, anywhere. They can photograph what they like, radio what they like. They can do something else which I have not touched upon, and which is—not to make a joke—a burning question in British Columbia. Three, two, one of them can do endless damage in British Columbia with a box of matches. The most deadly enemy of the lumber industry in British Columbia is fire. Lumbermen are so afraid of it, it is so dangerous, that they shut their camps down in the middle of summer, as soon as the humidity reaches a certain point. A man can wander out in that bush, ten, fifty, a hundred miles from anywhere, and do more damage with a box of matches than it would take two armies to put out. The large number of forest rangers whom we have could not touch the fringe of the thing if these aliens were determined to commit sabotage. Some of the biggest lumbermen on the coast are much alarmed at this situation. If the Japanese were out of the area, they could not do this damage, because you can't do a thing if you are not there.

I have spoken of the freedom of Japanese to come and go with cameras, radios and matches. That is not restricted to two months or four months; that is for eternity, if the war lasts that long; it is for the duration of the war that the naturalized or Canadian-born Jap can go out and commit sabotage; he is free to do it the whole time, and he is the most dangerous of the lot. The naturalized Japanese speaks our language fluently, possibly he has been to college. He possesses far greater potentialities of trouble as a spy or an agent than if he had just come from Japan. The fellow dressed up like a white man, speaking our language glibly, is the one who should be interned. It is very hard for me to believe that the government are so remote from what is taking place or may take place as not to understand the situation.

Paragraph 10 of the statement to which I referred makes a rather vague reference to the establishment of a civil corps for Canadian and naturalized Japanese. Because the project is a voluntary one, and in view of the vagueness to which I have referred, I imagine that presently it will fade away.

I should now like to make three charges against the government. The first is this, that, with the exception of seizing these boats,

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they have been far too slow in handling the Japanese situation. They have let days go by when it should have been hours, and a month when it should have been days. Look at what was done in Mexico. There the government dealt with the whole lot as soon as war was declared, and ordered into the interior every Jap who was on the coast. They did it; they didn't talk about it. Cuba did the same thing. They arrested, I believe, eighteen Japanese, all but two of whom were naval officers. Nicaragua took the same course, and took it speedily.

Mr. CRERAR: Could my hon. friend tell the house—I am merely asking for information—what has been done in the United States?

Mr. NEILL: No. I have not made myself familiar with what is happening there. I know that on the Pacific coast they took prompt steps. But they did not have the same incentive and need for action as we have, because there were not fishermen in the state of Washington; most Japanese there worked in paper mills and the like of that. But I am not in a position to state in detail what was done. I have troubles enough of my own. I do know what the situation is in British Columbia.

The only reason why we have not had a Pearl Harbour bombing in Canada is that we have no Pearl Harbour to bomb.

I note here that the council of the city of Vancouver has passed a resolution urging the government to get a move on. The report speaks of increasing irritation and criticism at the coast over the apparent failure of the government to implement its announced policy of removing Japanese.

The legislature of British Columbia, before adjourning a few days ago, passed unanimously a resolution urging the dominion government to strengthen Pacific defences. The feeling is very strong at the coast. I wish I could get the government to realize it.

Here is one incident I must quote, reported under a big headline in a leading Vancouver paper, the *Daily Province*:

Japanese live undisturbed on dike adjoining airport.

There are 200 Japanese living a mile west of the airport. They are living on a dike. It would be very easy to blow up or open that dike, and the airport would be rendered useless for a long time to come. Yet they are living undisturbed within a mile of the airport; they are on a dike into which a gap could be blown with a few sticks of powder that would make the airport useless for a long time to come. Why does the government not take some action in this case?

The second charge is that even the small restrictions to which I have referred are applicable only to nationals, and I say it is inexcusable that they are not made applicable to all naturalized Japanese aliens in this country. To whom do you suppose they think they owe loyalty? If they were scattered all over Canada, the case might be different, but think what may happen when they are turned loose in a small area, when 25,000 are concentrated in an area where they could so readily combine to take action against Vancouver, or Victoria, as the case may be. It constitutes an unspeakable menace; I cannot understand why it is allowed to continue.

The third charge is that the government have shown indifference to British Columbia defence, also to air raid precautions work and the like of that. I am not blaming the government for preparations which they might have made six years ago. That is not their fault; I know that. We could not get the appropriation through the house. The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation moved resolutions condemning the government for proposing, as the Minister of Pensions and National Health (Mr. Mackenzie) did, to spend some money for these purposes. But I do blame the government for not having taken the situation in hand since war was declared. They are too slack; they appear to adopt the attitude, "Oh, well, we have to take chances; we are doing the best we can; it will be all right." Well, they told us it would be all right about Hong Kong. But people make mistakes—even military men, even high military men. They told us it would be all right at Singapore. Yet we know that mistakes were made there. Here is the government's paper the *Vancouver Sun*, expressing this opinion:

Canada obviously has not made its plan of defence on the assumption of any real attack on the Pacific coast. . . . That is the plan which must be reconsidered. . . . we do expect a well-equipped, mobile striking unit which could pounce upon any Japanese landing attempt from Alaska southwards.

No such force exists on our coast. No such force exists in Canada.

I am afraid that is too true. Perhaps in the secret session which is to be held we shall be given more information on this matter. I do not propose to blame the government for things which happened before they had control and knowledge of the situation, or for not having done what at the time was beyond their power. But the government must be ready at that secret session to give us genuine information, not general assurances



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and smooth-sounding platitudes. There has been too much of this in connection with the management of the war.

There is a certain place—I will not name names, I will call it Y. When the government began to think about building aerodromes I thought that Y would make a good site for one, and I said so. I put it up to the officials, and they said that they were experts and ought to know better than I did. Well, I accepted that decision—but they are building that aerodrome now with frantic haste. I fear we may have to paraphrase the hymn and say:

Too late, too late will be the cry  
The Japanese gunboats have gone by.

There was another aerodrome at a place we will call X. I wrote to the government in connection with this one, informing them that there were two things wrong about it. This was a year or two ago. I pointed out to the officials that there was a Jap village 200 yards from the mouth of it where the Japs could take photographs and keep a record of any aeroplanes leaving, with all the details, so that they could have it all recorded for the benefit of the Japanese. They were about as far from the mouth of the aerodrome as Sparks street would be from where I am standing. I have in my desk a letter in which some official tried to stall me off. I was told that they would expropriate the Japanese, but that they could not do it because there was some hitch. However, they said they would look into the matter. Imagine looking into the question of expropriating this particular property when other nations, as we know, take first what they require and then talk about expropriation. Again, I pointed out to the officials that there was a Jap who had been seen taking photographs from an aeroplane over the harbour, where the aerodrome was being built. It was a civilian aeroplane. I took this matter up with various bodies—I will not mention any names because I do not wish to give them away—and what was the answer? I was informed that the investigation was closed. They had ascertained the name of the man and had found that he had gone to Japan. I suppose he took photographs with him as a memento of us because he loved us so much. Well, he has gone back to Japan with whatever photographs he took—we do not know how many—and God knows how many more may have gone there. But the officials did not seem to think it was important. I was told that it would be difficult to take photographs through the glass of any aeroplane unless you had a particular sort of apparatus with which to do it. Well, would the Japanese not have that type of apparatus?

I submitted all these matters to the department, and I have it all on record. One of the officials said to me, "There is nothing to this anyhow because it is not against the laws of the country to take photographs of an aerodrome."

I took it up with some of the higher officials, and they juggled with it and finally explained that they could get the Japs under the Official Secrets Act. The aerodrome is still there; the Japs are still staying there under their four months' lease of life, and doubtless they are still taking these photographs, which I have no doubt will be sent to the right place.

These men are not all Canadian nationals. Some of them may be the very best class of spies and foreign agents, and I contend that there has been too much sympathy for the Japanese viewpoint and Japanese interests. We must remember that we are at war with these people. Ottawa is 3,000 miles away from us out there, and it is useful to have a man here who is familiar with conditions on the coast to advise. So they sent for a man who for ten or fifteen years had been notorious—there is no other word by which to describe his activities—in the province of British Columbia, for his championship of the Japanese, for his advocacy of their interests. He was a protagonist of the Japanese. There was never a man who believed so strongly and implicitly in Japan.

Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. member has exceeded his time, and he may proceed only with the unanimous consent of the house.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Go on.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Go ahead.

Mr. NEILL: I thank the house and the Prime Minister; I have never asked for this licence before. To proceed, I may say that a great deal of ill-will has been excited in British Columbia. The people out there said that this man was paid a big salary as a provincial official, and they wanted to know why they should be paying him if he was so disloyal to the province. That was before the war, and it was said that it was only a matter of opinion. He has now been transferred to a position in Ottawa in which he can give advice—that is what he is here for, to speak with authority. He is on the ground, and he is also in a position to have early knowledge of any action that might be taken against the Japanese and to drop a hint in the right place. Anything of that sort, just a hint in the right quarters, might make a great deal of difference in the carrying out of a policy.

Perhaps I shall be told that this is unfair, that this is a fine man, and that I should not make such statements. I agree that he is en-

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titled to his weird opinions; he was entitled to that before the war. But since the war, no—a thousand times no. He is too one-sided and biased to be kept in such a place.

During the last war there was a member of the royal family, Prince Henry of Battenberg, I think, who was married to Queen Victoria's daughter. He was an admiral of the fleet and his loyalty could not be questioned, but he voluntarily asked to be retired. It did not look well to see a man of German origin in command of the fleet, and so he asked to be retired. I submit that in this case a feeling of decency should have impelled this gentleman to whom I have been referring to ask to be relieved of his position, where he is open to suspicion. Scripture says that we should abstain from even the appearance of evil.

We who have taken the position that I am now taking have been called all sorts of names. We have been called agitators. It is said that we are willing to exploit the interests of Canada for our own political advantage; that we are rabble-rousers, Jap-baiters, and that we have a very dangerous influence—that was not said of me; it was said of a reputable alderman in Vancouver. I have heard that sort of thing, and hints of it even in this house, and certainly in the government press. You can get a man to write any letter you want; you can get a white man to make a tool of himself for a Jap if you pay him enough. There was a man who wrote to the papers saying what fine people the Japs are. I laid a trap for him and I discovered that he was a white man all right, but also a paid agent of a Japanese association, but he did not say that when he signed his name.

Yes, we are all bad because we want a white British Columbia and not a place like Hawaii! Fifty years from now, unless something is done to stop it, all west of the Rockies will be yellow. I submit, Mr. Speaker, that we want but little; we simply want to be left alone, like New Zealand and Australia, all white. I have no ill-will against the Japanese. Perhaps you may think I have been showing ill-will, but I assure you I have none towards the Japs. No Jap ever "did" me—I never gave him the chance. I wish to be fair to the Japanese, and I think that if we expatriated them, as we ought to do, they should be given full justice in regard to their property, because I am strongly in favour of a Japan controlled by the Japanese, just as I am in favour of a Canada controlled by

Canadians. Let us continue to trade with them; let us do business with them across the ocean; but do not force into one nation two peoples separated by something that is wider than the ocean, two peoples who are different in race, in religion, in traditions and in their whole philosophy of life. This difference always has prevented assimilation and always will prevent it, between two nations so utterly divergent in every respect. The greatest path towards assimilation is marriage. Well, the Japs have been here fifty-eight years and there is no record of a single marriage, although there might be one. I asked a Japanese to produce the record of one marriage and he could not do so. We have heard of second generation Japanese born here going to Japanese schools here to learn Japanese, and that has been regarded as a small matter. We went into their textbooks and had them translated and we found that they were very anti-British. Yet there were people who thought that was a small matter—only the sort of thing that irresponsible people like myself would talk about. But when the war came, it was thought wise to shut down the Jap schools. There were fifty-nine in British Columbia, and leaving out small areas where they could not run a school, the great bulk of those children must have attended some Japanese school.

I have one more word. When the time comes to talk peace, I suggest that the services rendered by Canada and by her Prime Minister should surely entitle both him and this dominion to be fully represented when the terms of peace are being settled, when the treaty comes to be made, and have their voice heard in no uncertain terms. I do suggest—perhaps it is too early to talk about it now, but it is well to get it started—that we should make an arrangement that when peace time comes, we expatriate all the Japanese left in Canada; do it on fair terms, buy them out, pay them liberally. It was done in the present war, I believe, between Russia and Germany; and after the last war it was done on a large scale, some 200,000 people, between the Greeks and the Turks, I think. If they could move 200,000, it is much easier for us to move 25,000, and it is better to move them while their numbers are so small. Let us settle once and for all this canker in the life of Canada which prevents us from being a united white Canada. And that is what British Columbia wants.

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CANADA

## House of Commons Debates

OFFICIAL REPORT

SPEECH

OF

MR. A. W. NEILL

MEMBER FOR COMOX-ALBERNI

ON

## THE JAPANESE SITUATION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1942

Mr. A. W. NEILL (Comox-Alberni): Mr. Speaker, I wish to discuss this afternoon the question of the Japanese in British Columbia. Since it is an important and burning question there at the present time, it is almost impossible to tell the tale in the required time, and I may ask to have a few minutes longer. If so, it will be the first time I have had to do so.

I am not unmindful, nor shall I try to be, of the remarks of the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) when he warned against hasty and unwarranted language, calculated to inflame the situation in British Columbia, as regards Japanese. Mr. Speaker, I have listened to that appeasement talk for twenty years from the government benches, and I think the time has come to take a different stand. I believe we can best serve the interests of our country, and promote peace, by having plain talk, straightforward discussions and, I hope, definite action, with respect to the issues before us.

In the first campaign in which I took part for election to this house in the fall of 1921, I was struck by two outstanding features in the district, first, the predominant place the

Japanese had acquired in the fishing industry, and, second, the vast increase in their population in British Columbia, both through immigration and by birth. The fishing industry was dominated by the Japanese during the last war, when our men were overseas. Then, later, they started a policy of pushing the white men out of that industry. The methods they adopted in that procedure were too often those which are not expected in ordinary business competition.

Early in 1922 I got the then government of the day to make a cut in the quota of fishing licences allotted to Japanese in the salmon trolling—a part of the fishing industry—to the extent of thirty-three per cent. Later, in the summer, a royal commission was appointed, and it decided to cut all Japanese salmon fishing licences to the extent of forty per cent. The following year they were again cut another fifteen per cent, and the year after that another ten per cent. This made a very substantial reduction, which has been since maintained.

The house is aware that a few weeks ago all Japanese fishing vessels, numbering about 1,200, were seized. If the influx had been



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allowed to continue, and had not been checked in 1922, as I have described, the number now to be seized would have been something like 3,000 or possibly 3,500. That would have greatly aggravated the situation in British Columbia to-day.

Then, let us look at the other point, namely their increase in numbers by immigration and by birth. The Japanese birthrate is about double that of the white race—rather more than that. And that, of course, goes on all the time. We can stop immigration, but we cannot stop increases by birth, especially when the Japanese government allows to emigrate only those women who are likely to bear children. If they do not have those children, they are sent back to Japan, and others are sent out in their places.

Prior to 1884 there was no immigration of Japanese into British Columbia. From that time until 1907 they came in in ever-increasing numbers, until the situation became alarming. Then the government of the day—a Liberal government, by the way—made a deal with Japan or, as they called it, a gentlemen's agreement. On the face of it, it was an arrangement whereby Japan pledged itself to see that no more than 400 Japanese left Japan to come to Canada in one year. No greater travesty of language could be found than to call that a gentlemen's agreement, because when one makes a gentlemen's agreement it is presupposed that both parties to the agreement are animated by the desire and intention to adhere to it in faith, truth and honesty. But when you find that one of the parties has not the slightest intention of adhering to those principles, control becomes much more difficult. In other words, in those circumstances a gentlemen's agreement is just a joke. I have said that that matter was a joke, and I make that statement sincerely because I found that instead of only 400 entering Canada in any one year, the Japanese were entering to the extent of 1,700. That is a matter of record; I have taken it from the records. Then, the other part of the contract was such that the whole matter was left wide open. I shall leave that part of the subject for the moment.

In the spring of 1922, for once in their lives the British Columbia members had sense enough to take united action. I do not believe they have ever done it since, nor do I think it had been done before. We all got together—I believe there were four groups at that time—and presented a resolution to the house asking for the total exclusion of orientals from British Columbia and Canada. The government opposed the resolution and moved to amend it by striking out the words "total exclusion" and inserting the words

"effective restriction". Of course the government's majority carried the amendment. We were told at that time that the two expressions were synonymous, and that the term "effective restriction" meant total exclusion. The government majority carried the amendment—and that was the end of total exclusion. It did not operate as we had been led to believe.

Time has gone on and taken its toll of those fourteen members who supported that principle. There have been deaths, both politically and physically at one end of the rainbow, and the senate and big government appointments at the other end. All these have reduced that little band to the point where I am the only one left. I can say, like the man in the Bible—in the Book of Job, I believe it was; some of my parson friends can correct me if I am wrong—"I only am escaped alone to tell thee." I continued pressing the matter as best I could, but I found that governments were not sympathetic.

There was too much talk of appeasement in the air. One of the arguments was this, "We want to do a big trade with Japan, with her seventy million people. We do not want to lose that trade. If we do anything they don't like they will take their trade to the United States." That argument had some plausibility; at any rate it was good enough to stall me off for a year or two.

Then I saw the psychological moment open in 1924. The government of the United States, out of a clear sky, passed a total exclusion act against orientals, including Japanese. There was our chance to do the same, without loss of trade. I begged the then Prime Minister—the same one as we have to-day—to make it apply to all orientals; but he could not see his way clear to do so. He did apply it to Chinese, and that action has been most successful. Unfortunately, however, it was not applied to Japanese.

I continued from time to time to do what I could; and then along about 1928—possibly it was 1929—the Prime Minister was kind enough—and I give him full credit for it, because he did not have to do it—to readjust the joint agreement so that instead of an entry of 400 a year there would be only 150. He put some teeth in the terms of that agreement, so that we really had at least a gambler's chance of enforcing it. I believe the Japanese with their accustomed ability and subtlety found loopholes whereby at least to some extent they evaded the terms of the arrangement, but not to any great extent. Then, of later years the war has stopped any serious immigration.

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I was told at that time that there were other reasons why we should not do anything to offend the Japanese nation, reasons of a diplomatic nature. I remember as well as if it were yesterday the answer I gave—I believe it is in *Hansard*—"The house and government might be assured that the Japanese nation would attack us the very moment it suited them, no matter what we had done by way of appeasement, favours or anything else." The very moment it suited them to attack us they would do so—and to-day tells the answer.

If my advice had been taken, even as late as 1924, to-day there would have been in Canada perhaps 5,000 or 6,000 fewer Japanese than there are to-day. Six thousand taken from 24,000 would have helped to ease this very acute situation which exists in British Columbia to-day.

I continued to look anxiously at the situation, and in 1938 I thought I had another opportunity. I brought in a bill to provide for an educational test. The Japanese were not mentioned by name, but the provisions of this bill would have applied to three-quarters of the world's population. If it had been put into force, it would have set up a method which has been used in Australia and New Zealand for thirty years without any objection from the Japanese. This has helped to keep Australia and New Zealand white. The government refused to allow my bill to go through. The matter was put to a vote and, if hon. members are interested in the matter, they will find it fully set out in *Hansard* of May 31, 1938, at page 3411. The hon. member for Skeena (Mr. Hanson) and the hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. O'Neill) should be proud now that they withstood the pressure of the whip at that time and voted in the interests of their province rather than at the dictates of the party. In justice to the hon. member for Victoria, B. C. (Mr. Mayhew), I must say that he was sick at home at the time and could not possibly be here.

In September, 1940, Japan signed the deal, agreement or whatever you call it with Italy and Germany. In plain English, they bound themselves to enter into war against us and the United States whenever it suited Germany or Hitler. Pressure was put upon the government by British Columbia, and I suppose some realization of the situation also led the government to take action. They appointed a hand-picked committee to investigate the subject, which committee came back with a number of recommendations, I believe ten in all. There were only two of any importance, Nos. 5 and 7, and I shall deal with them. No. 5 recommended against allowing Japanese to enlist in our volunteer army then being

raised. That was a very good idea, otherwise we would have had perhaps 1,500 Japanese training in our army, possibly in key positions, petty officers and the like. They would have been familiar with every detail of our army operations. Protests were made by the mayor of Nanaimo, and I think by other cities and by myself, and the recommendation of the committee carried. That was all right.

Recommendation No. 7 was that there should be a re-registration of the Japanese in Canada. It had been claimed by many people that the registration that had been taken was just a fake as regards the Japanese. Only those who felt like it registered, and there was a demand for a new registration. The recommendation was that they should be photographed at the same time. That was a good idea, but it had one fatal defect, if deception is regarded as a fatal defect. It was clearly understood that this registration was compulsory. We were told how well it was going on, how successful it was, and it was hoped that we malignants would now be satisfied and keep quiet. The whole thing turned on the point that it was compulsory.

If it had been voluntary, what use would it have been? Supposing we decided to make a history of the people by the name of Smith, to have a record of everything they had done, whether they had been in gaol and so on. If this were carried on voluntarily, how many Smiths would come forward except those with clean hands? Was it expected that Japanese who had entered the country illegally would come forward and say, "Yes, I came in illegally, take me." Of course they would not. A Jap is not a fool, any more than we are. The guilty ones did not register and the whole thing was a gigantic failure. It could not be otherwise if it were anything but compulsory.

Our main complaint was that many of them had come into the country illegally and this re-registration would have discovered that. Was it expected that those who had come in illegally would disclose that fact? The thing is ridiculous. When the war came on, after Pearl Harbour, it was discovered that it was not compulsory, that it was just a gesture to keep us quiet, just a farce. Then what happened? The war was on and the people know what war means; this government should know what it means. These same people were given two months in which to register; they were given until February 7 to get things fixed up, to get a fake birth certificate or a forged entry card. You can buy them in Vancouver. If they could not get either, they were given two months before they would be subject to the same action as

that to which any other enemy alien would be exposed. Why give them two months? We were practically saying to them, "We are at war with you, but we will give you two months in which to get faked papers, or get out of the country." I never heard the like of it before, and I hope I never shall again.

If I were challenged to offer proof of these things, I could no more do it than I could offer proof of the day of the week on which my last birthday fell. You do not keep track of these things that are so well known. I suppose I could have kept the newspapers that I read at the time, but I did not. I never dreamed that such action would be necessary to show that they had said it was compulsory. On February 9, the Prime Minister made this statement, as reported on page 436 of *Hansard*:

The committee received the utmost cooperation from Japanese nationals as well as from Canadians of Japanese racial origin. When a state of war was proclaimed as existing between Japan and Canada, the registration was all but complete.

The utmost cooperation! We know the extent of that cooperation. Here is what a man wrote—a white man for a change, and perhaps we can take his word—to the local paper in Vancouver a few days ago:

About three years ago I was talking to a Canadian-born Japanese boy in a store and said to him, "If the Japs ever came over here would you fight against us?" He replied, "I wouldn't want to, but I would either have to or commit suicide."

That is the sort of blind it is. There is your cooperation. Only when they attacked Pearl Harbour was it announced that the whole thing had been only voluntary. Here is an article that appeared in the papers a few days afterwards:

During the registration proceedings, several hundred Japanese left Canada for Japan. Most of these were known to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Many of them were believed to have entered the country illegally.

It is only after war breaks out that we discover all that. They were given two months in which to fix things up or get out. If that registration had been compulsory, we would have got the best of these Jap agents and the best of their spies. They have now gone home with their charts and plans and with a local knowledge that could not be bought for any money. Perhaps we shall see some of these Japs again peering over the side of the bridge of a German gunboat in Vancouver, Nanaimo or Port Alberni, because we now know that many of them were expert naval men. Agitation continued, and the government called a conference which was held here on January 8 and 9. With possibly

one or two exceptions, the twenty-five gentlemen who attended this conference were in government service. Their continuing or advancement in the branch of the service in which they were, might depend upon—putting it politely—their thinking the same way as the government about these matters.

I suggested that they should call in the British Columbia members who were elected by the people and who have some claim to represent the people. But, oh, no! I should like to give another quotation. I shall not give names because I do not think it is fair to attack people when they are not in a position to reply. When an official is mentioned, I shall refer to an official, and when reference is made to a member of the government, I shall simply call him a minister. I quote:

I fail to see any need of getting the members from British Columbia together and asking them what they think should be done.

They were not called together, but the twenty-five government officials were there in full strength. They were fully informed of the government's views because some came from the Department of External Affairs.

I have here the statement got out by the Prime Minister. This is an official document, after the conference had reported, and so there is no harm in my quoting from it. It contains seventeen paragraphs, a great many of which are build-ups for the rest of it. I will deal with the more important ones, paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 11.

Paragraph 6 recommends that the government should seize immediately the Japanese fishing boats. That was done. It was done immediately war was declared, and for that action I have nothing but the utmost praise. It was done promptly and thoroughly. I have a vague idea that I see in it the efficient hand of the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (Mr. Macdonald). At any rate it was done, and done well. While this is not part of the report, I may as well finish up that matter by saying that after they had 1,200 Japanese boats in their hands, the question arose, what to do with them? It was desirable to get them back into fishing again, so that white men could catch the fish so badly needed for the British market. Therefore they set up a committee to try to sell these boats. Whoever chose that committee deserves great credit. They made excellent choices. Here they are: Chairman, Hon. Mr. Justice Sidney Smith, a man with a master mariner's papers, so he would understand boats; Commander B. L. Johnson, D.S.O., R.C.N.R., a man of outstanding ability and repute in Vancouver.

Then there was a Japanese, Kishizo Kimura, who I am told, is a very able man, familiar with the work that he undertook. I give all credit for that. Like all government offices, it is true that they were rather slow in going about their work, but they got started at last. They issued a circular, a copy of which I hold in my hand, explaining their procedure. I am very glad to get this circular because I can pass the information along to the fishermen, who are continually writing to me to know what to do. I am afraid that the whole scheme will not be entirely successful because the government will have left on their hands hundreds of boats. That is not the fault of the government or of this committee. Well, they got this thing started and have sold fifty-six boats up to date, and marvellous to relate, they told the members of parliament about it. They even accepted a suggestion I made—another remarkable thing. I suggested that they could not sell these boats for cash because the fishermen did not have cash, but they would be able to buy them on time, and accordingly that was arranged. The general idea of a lot of these officials, the people on these new boards, seems to be that there is no loyalty, intelligence or usefulness in any member of parliament. I do not know where they get the idea because it is not so very long since the people elected us. But that is the idea you find among the people on these new boards and among these dollar-a-year men. Since we are not told what is being done, we shall have to guess or simply deal with what we see, and if we guess wrong, the government is to blame. I do not think members of parliament are any more unworthy than they were in years gone by.

I want to quote recommendation 7 in which was contained the policy of the cabinet. It reads:

For the same period—

That is during the war.

—the sale of gasoline and explosives to persons of Japanese racial origin will be directly controlled under conditions to be prescribed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

That is a good idea too, a very good idea, but unfortunately I read in the papers—I have to go to the press for information because I cannot get it anywhere else—that these sales are still going on.

Mr. HOMUTH: The sale of powder is still going on?

Mr. NEILL: Explosives. A man wrote to the Vancouver Province the other day and suggested that if this order was in effect, why was the Japanese station at the corner still selling gas the same as usual? That has been going on for two and a half months now, and

I rather think permission has been extended to the 1st of April. The language is doubtful, but if it can be interpreted to the benefit of the Japanese, be sure it will be so interpreted. You are dealing with clever, subtle, unscrupulous enemies—and they are enemies—and when you say that you are not going to stop the sale for two months, that is just an invitation to them to accumulate as much gas and explosives as they can in the meantime. We say to them: "Remember, on the 7th of February or on the 1st of April we are going to shut down on you." Is that not an invitation to them to get explosives and gasoline against a rainy day? That time limit should never have been put in. The order should have been made applicable at once.

I want to say one more good thing for the government, and it will be the last, I am sorry to say. It does not pay to state your case unfairly, and I wish to be strictly fair. In these two instances I have mentioned, the seizing of the Japanese boats, and this order with respect to the sale of gasoline and explosives was made applicable to all Japanese, and all honour is due to the government for doing it.

There are three classes of Japanese we must deal with. There are the Japanese nationals, those born in Japan and never naturalized in Canada; they are Japanese nationals. Then there is the man born in Japan and naturalized in Canada. He is called a naturalized Japanese or a Canadian. Then there is the Japanese who was born in Canada, who can call himself a Japanese-Canadian if he likes. The government orders with regard to seizing the boats and the sale of gas and explosives applied to all three classes. That was all right.

Now I deal with paragraph 8. It says that Japanese nationals will be forbidden to possess or use short-wave receiving sets or radio transmitters in Canada. A most excellent thing. Hon. members can all understand why it was necessary to do that. That was fine. But it does not come into effect until the 1st of April. Did the Japanese give us four months' notice of what they were going to do at Pearl Harbour? Yet we say to them: "Go wandering about with your cameras and take pictures, and use your receiving sets to send word to Japan, and your receivers to get instructions from Japan. You can do this as much as you like until the 1st of April." Even if the order had been withheld, and they had been allowed to continue doing these things without being told of any date when they must stop, it would not have been so bad, because then they would never have known when the order was coming into force.



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But they were warned—you will not be interfered with until the 1st of April. The order was the equivalent of that. We told them: "Do your dirty work now. Use your radio and your receiving set but, remember, hide or bury them before the 1st of April, and then everything will be lovely." They told the Japanese nationals that they must not use these things in a protected area. But they can use them outside. I have a police order to that effect. It is signed by the police and says:

No enemy alien shall have in his possession or use while in such protected area any camera, radio transmitter, radio short-wave receiving set, firearm, ammunition or explosive.

But that order does not apply outside the protected area, and it does not apply to a naturalized or native-born Japanese.

Mr. RALSTON: I am not quite familiar with the regulations as to cameras, but does my hon. friend suggest that the same date applied with regard to evacuating a protected area and the possession of cameras? They must evacuate by April 1.

Mr. NEILL: Yes.

Mr. RALSTON: My hon. friend used the same date, April 1, when speaking of cameras and receiving sets.

Mr. NEILL: Yes. I said that the language was so ambiguous that it could be read two ways. It reads:

Notices ordering all enemy aliens to evacuate the coastal area of British Columbia west of the Cascade mountains by April 1 and to surrender cameras and radios will be posted in public buildings to-day.

Then:

Orders to Japanese . . . to get out of the coastal areas within forty-seven days and to surrender cameras, radios and other banned articles, were issued to-day.

Mr. RALSTON: I think my hon. friend is reading some sort of newspaper paraphrase of the order. The order to give up radios and cameras is effective immediately. The order of evacuation is not. The order referred to, is effective on April 1.

Mr. NEILL: It is signed by Colonel Hill, and states that no enemy alien shall have in his possession or use while in such protected area any camera, radio transmitter, radio short-wave receiving set, firearm, ammunition or explosive.

Mr. RALSTON: That is effective immediately. You don't wait until April 1 for that.

Mr. NEILL: Well, as I said, it is doubtful. There is, however, no question whatever that

a man who is not a Japanese national can do these things any time, any place. The order applies only to nationals; that is, to men born in Japan and coming over here, and these are comparatively few in number, something like 1,700 out of 24,000, and only while they are in the area. The remaining 22,000 of naturalized Japanese are free to come and go, as I have said, anywhere. They can photograph what they like, radio what they like. They can do something else which I have not touched upon, and which is—not to make a joke—a burning question in British Columbia. Three, two, one of them can do endless damage in British Columbia with a box of matches. The most deadly enemy of the lumber industry in British Columbia is fire. Lumbermen are so afraid of it, it is so dangerous, that they shut their camps down in the middle of summer, as soon as the humidity reaches a certain point. A man can wander out in that bush, ten, fifty, a hundred miles from anywhere, and do more damage with a box of matches than it would take two armies to put out. The large number of forest rangers whom we have could not touch the fringe of the thing if these aliens were determined to commit sabotage. Some of the biggest lumbermen on the coast are much alarmed at this situation. If the Japanese were out of the area, they could not do this damage, because you can't do a thing if you are not there.

I have spoken of the freedom of Japanese to come and go with cameras, radios and matches. That is not restricted to two months or four months; that is for eternity, if the war lasts that long; it is for the duration of the war that the naturalized or Canadian-born Jap can go out and commit sabotage; he is free to do it the whole time, and he is the most dangerous of the lot. The naturalized Japanese speaks our language fluently, possibly he has been to college. He possesses far greater potentialities of trouble as a spy or an agent than if he had just come from Japan. The fellow dressed up like a white man, speaking our language glibly, is the one who should be interned. It is very hard for me to believe that the government are so remote from what is taking place or may take place as not to understand the situation.

Paragraph 10 of the statement to which I referred makes a rather vague reference to the establishment of a civil corps for Canadian and naturalized Japanese. Because the project is a voluntary one, and in view of the vagueness to which I have referred, I imagine that presently it will fade away.

I should now like to make three charges against the government. The first is this, that, with the exception of seizing these boats,

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they have been far too slow in handling the Japanese situation. They have let days go by when it should have been hours, and a month when it should have been days. Look at what was done in Mexico. There the government dealt with the whole lot as soon as war was declared, and ordered into the interior every Jap who was on the coast. They did it; they didn't talk about it. Cuba did the same thing. They arrested, I believe, eighteen Japanese, all but two of whom were naval officers. Nicaragua took the same course, and took it speedily.

Mr. CRRERAR: Could my hon. friend tell the house—I am merely asking for information—what has been done in the United States?

Mr. NEILL: No. I have not made myself familiar with what is happening there. I know that on the Pacific coast they took prompt steps. But they did not have the same incentive and need for action as we have, because there were not fishermen in the state of Washington; most Japanese there worked in paper mills and the like of that. But I am not in a position to state in detail what was done. I have troubles enough of my own. I do know what the situation is in British Columbia.

The only reason why we have not had a Pearl Harbour bombing in Canada is that we have no Pearl Harbour to bomb.

I note here that the council of the city of Vancouver has passed a resolution urging the government to get a move on. The report speaks of increasing irritation and criticism at the coast over the apparent failure of the government to implement its announced policy of removing Japanese.

The legislature of British Columbia, before adjourning a few days ago, passed unanimously a resolution urging the dominion government to strengthen Pacific defences. The feeling is very strong at the coast. I wish I could get the government to realize it.

Here is one incident I must quote, reported under a big headline in a leading Vancouver paper, the *Daily Province*:

Japanese live undisturbed on dike adjoining airport.

There are 200 Japanese living a mile west of the airport. They are living on a dike. It would be very easy to blow up or open that dike, and the airport would be rendered useless for a long time to come. Yet they are living undisturbed within a mile of the airport; they are on a dike into which a gap could be blown with a few sticks of powder that would make the airport useless for a long time to come. Why does the government not take some action in this case?

The second charge is that even the small restrictions to which I have referred are applicable only to nationals, and I say it is inexcusable that they are not made applicable to all naturalized Japanese aliens in this country. To whom do you suppose they think they owe loyalty? If they were scattered all over Canada, the case might be different, but think what may happen when they are turned loose in a small area, when 25,000 are concentrated in an area where they could so readily combine to take action against Vancouver, or Victoria, as the case may be. It constitutes an unspeakable menace; I cannot understand why it is allowed to continue.

The third charge is that the government have shown indifference to British Columbia defence, also to air raid precautions work and the like of that. I am not blaming the government for preparations which they might have made six years ago. That is not their fault; I know that. We could not get the appropriation through the house. The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation moved resolutions condemning the government for proposing, as the Minister of Pensions and National Health (Mr. Mackenzie) did, to spend some money for these purposes. But I do blame the government for not having taken the situation in hand since war was declared. They are too slack; they appear to adopt the attitude, "Oh, well, we have to take chances; we are doing the best we can; it will be all right." Well, they told us it would be all right about Hong Kong. But people make mistakes—even military men, even high military men. They told us it would be all right at Singapore. Yet we know that mistakes were made there. Here is the governments paper the *Vancouver Sun*, expressing this opinion:

Canada obviously has not made its plan of defence on the assumption of any real attack on the Pacific coast. . . . That is the plan which must be reconsidered. . . . We do expect a well-equipped, mobile striking unit which could pounce upon any Japanese landing attempt from Alaska southwards.

No such force exists on our coast. No such force exists in Canada.

I am afraid that is too true. Perhaps in the secret session which is to be held we shall be given more information on this matter. I do not propose to blame the government for things which happened before they had control and knowledge of the situation, or for not having done what at the time was beyond their power. But the government must be ready at that secret session to give us genuine information, not general assurances

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and smooth-sounding platitudes. There has been too much of this in connection with the management of the war.

There is a certain place—I will not name names, I will call it Y. When the government began to think about building aerodromes I thought that Y would make a good site for one, and I said so. I put it up to the officials, and they said that they were experts and ought to know better than I did. Well, I accepted that decision—but they are building that aerodrome now with frantic haste. I fear we may have to paraphrase the hymn and say:

Too late, too late will be the cry  
The Japanese gunboats have gone by.

There was another aerodrome at a place we will call X. I wrote to the government in connection with this one, informing them that there were two things wrong about it. This was a year or two ago. I pointed out to the officials that there was a Jap village 200 yards from the mouth of it where the Japs could take photographs and keep a record of any aeroplanes leaving, with all the details, so that they could have it all recorded for the benefit of the Japanese. They were about as far from the mouth of the aerodrome as Sparks street would be from where I am standing. I have in my desk a letter in which some official tried to stall me off. I was told that they would expropriate the Japanese, but that they could not do it because there was some hitch. However, they said they would look into the matter. Imagine looking into the question of expropriating this particular property when other nations, as we know, take first what they require and then talk about expropriation. Again, I pointed out to the officials that there was a Jap who had been seen taking photographs from an aeroplane over the harbour, where the aerodrome was being built. It was a civilian aeroplane. I took this matter up with various bodies—I will not mention any names because I do not wish to give them away—and what was the answer? I was informed that the investigation was closed. They had ascertained the name of the man and had found that he had gone to Japan. I suppose he took photographs with him as a memento of us because he loved us so much. Well, he has gone back to Japan with whatever photographs he took—we do not know how many—and God knows how many more may have gone there. But the officials did not seem to think it was important. I was told that it would be difficult to take photographs through the glass of any aeroplane unless you had a particular sort of apparatus with which to do it. Well, would the Japanese not have that type of apparatus?

I submitted all these matters to the department, and I have it all on record. One of the officials said to me, "There is nothing to this anyhow because it is not against the laws of the country to take photographs of an aerodrome."

I took it up with some of the higher officials, and they juggled with it and finally explained that they could get the Japs under the Official Secrets Act. The aerodrome is still there; the Japs are still staying there under their four months' lease of life, and doubtless they are still taking these photographs, which I have no doubt will be sent to the right place.

These men are not all Canadian nationals. Some of them may be the very best class of spies and foreign agents, and I contend that there has been too much sympathy for the Japanese viewpoint and Japanese interests. We must remember that we are at war with these people. Ottawa is 3,000 miles away from us out there, and it is useful to have a man here who is familiar with conditions on the coast to advise. So they sent for a man who for ten or fifteen years had been notorious—there is no other word by which to describe his activities—in the province of British Columbia, for his championship of the Japanese, for his advocacy of their interests. He was a protagonist of the Japanese. There was never a man who believed so strongly and implicitly in Japan.

Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. member has exceeded his time, and he may proceed only with the unanimous consent of the house.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Go on.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Go ahead.

Mr. NEILL: I thank the house and the Prime Minister; I have never asked for this licence before. To proceed, I may say that a great deal of ill-will has been excited in British Columbia. The people out there said that this man was paid a big salary as a provincial official, and they wanted to know why they should be paying him if he was so disloyal to the province. That was before the war, and it was said that it was only a matter of opinion. He has now been transferred to a position in Ottawa in which he can give advice—that is what he is here for, to speak with authority. He is on the ground, and he is also in a position to have early knowledge of any action that might be taken against the Japanese and to drop a hint in the right place. Anything of that sort, just a hint in the right quarters, might make a great deal of difference in the carrying out of a policy.

Perhaps I shall be told that this is unfair, that this is a fine man, and that I should not make such statements. I agree that he is en-

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titled to his weird opinions; he was entitled to that before the war. But since the war, no—a thousand times no. He is too one-sided and biased to be kept in such a place.

During the last war there was a member of the royal family, Prince Henry of Battenberg, I think, who was married to Queen Victoria's daughter. He was an admiral of the fleet and his loyalty could not be questioned, but he voluntarily asked to be retired. It did not look well to see a man of German origin in command of the fleet, and so he asked to be retired. I submit that in this case a feeling of decency should have impelled this gentleman to whom I have been referring to ask to be relieved of his position, where he is open to suspicion. Scripture says that we should abstain from even the appearance of evil.

We who have taken the position that I am now taking have been called all sorts of names. We have been called agitators. It is said that we are willing to exploit the interests of Canada for our own political advantage; that we are rabble-rousers, Jap-baiters, and that we have a very dangerous influence—that was not said of me; it was said of a reputable alderman in Vancouver. I have heard that sort of thing, and hints of it even in this house, and certainly in the government press. You can get a man to write any letter you want; you can get a white man to make a tool of himself for a Jap if you pay him enough. There was a man who wrote to the papers saying what fine people the Japs are. I laid a trap for him and I discovered that he was a white man all right, but also a paid agent of a Japanese association, but he did not say that when he signed his name.

Yes, we are all bad because we want a white British Columbia and not a place like Hawaii! Fifty years from now, unless something is done to stop it, all west of the Rockies will be yellow. I submit, Mr. Speaker, that we want but little; we simply want to be left alone, like New Zealand and Australia, all white. I have no ill-will against the Japanese. Perhaps you may think I have been showing ill-will, but I assure you I have none towards the Japs. No Jap ever "did" me—I never gave him the chance. I wish to be fair to the Japanese, and I think that if we expatriated them, as we ought to do, they should be given full justice in regard to their property, because I am strongly in favour of a Japan controlled by the Japanese, just as I am in favour of a Canada controlled by

Canadians. Let us continue to trade with them; let us do business with them across the ocean; but do not force into one nation two peoples separated by something that is wider than the ocean, two peoples who are different in race, in religion, in traditions and in their whole philosophy of life. This difference always has prevented assimilation and always will prevent it, between two nations so utterly divergent in every respect. The greatest path towards assimilation is marriage. Well, the Japs have been here fifty-eight years and there is no record of a single marriage, although there might be one. I asked a Japanese to produce the record of one marriage and he could not do so. We have heard of second generation Japanese born here going to Japanese schools here to learn Japanese, and that has been regarded as a small matter. We went into their textbooks and had them translated and we found that they were very anti-British. Yet there were people who thought that was a small matter—only the sort of thing that irresponsible people like myself would talk about. But when the war came, it was thought wise to shut down the Jap schools. There were fifty-nine in British Columbia, and leaving out small areas where they could not run a school, the great bulk of those children must have attended some Japanese school.

I have one more word. When the time comes to talk peace, I suggest that the services rendered by Canada and by her Prime Minister should surely entitle both him and this dominion to be fully represented when the terms of peace are being settled, when the treaty comes to be made, and have their voice heard in no uncertain terms. I do suggest—perhaps it is too early to talk about it now, but it is well to get it started—that we should make an arrangement that when peace time comes, we expatriate all the Japanese left in Canada; do it on fair terms, buy them out, pay them liberally. It was done in the present war, I believe, between Russia and Germany; and after the last war it was done on a large scale, some 200,000 people, between the Greeks and the Turks, I think. If they could move 200,000, and it is much easier for us to move 25,000, and it is better to move them while their numbers are so small. Let us settle once and for all this canker in the life of Canada which prevents us from being a united white Canada. And that is what British Columbia wants.



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Feb. 19-1942

A.W. Neill

Re JAPANESE

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Gauthier Parent  
Gillis Pouliot  
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Mr. SPEAKER: The question is on the amendment.

Mr. A. W. NEILL (Comox-Alberni): Mr. Speaker, I wish to discuss this afternoon the question of the Japanese in British Columbia. Since it is an important and burning question there at the present time, it is almost impossible to tell the tale in the required time, and I may ask to have a few minutes longer. If so, it will be the first time I have had to do so.

I am not unmindful, nor shall I try to be, of the remarks of the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) when he warned against hasty and unwarranted language, calculated to inflame the situation in British Columbia, as regards Japanese. Mr. Speaker, I have listened to that appeasement talk for twenty years from the government benches, and I think the time has come to take a different stand. I believe we can best serve the interests of our country, and promote peace, by having plain talk, straightforward discussions and, I hope, definite action, with respect to the issues before us.

In the first campaign in which I took part for election to this house in the fall of 1921, I was struck by two outstanding features in the district, first, the predominant place the Japanese had acquired in the fishing industry, and, second, the vast increase in their population in British Columbia, both through immigration and by birth. The fishing industry was dominated by the Japanese during the last war, when our men were overseas. Then, later, they started a policy of pushing the white men out of that industry. The methods they adopted in that procedure were too often those which are not expected in ordinary business competition.

Early in 1922 I got the then government of the day to make a cut in the quota of fishing

(Mr. Pouliot.)

licences allotted to Japanese in the trolling industry—a part of the fishing industry—to the extent of thirty-three per cent. Later, in the summer, a royal commission was appointed, and it decided to cut all Japanese salmon fishing licences to the extent of forty per cent. The following year they were again cut another fifteen per cent, and the year after that another ten per cent. This made a very substantial reduction, which has been since maintained.

The house is aware that a few weeks ago all Japanese fishing vessels, numbering about 1,200, were seized. If the influx had been allowed to continue, and had not been checked in 1922, as I have described, the number now to be seized would have been something like 3,000 or possibly 3,500. That would have greatly aggravated the situation in British Columbia to-day.

Then, let us look at the other point, namely their increase in numbers by immigration and by birth. The Japanese birthrate is about double that of the white race—rather more than that. And that, of course, goes on all the time. We can stop immigration, but we cannot stop increases by birth, especially when the Japanese government allows to emigrate only those women who are likely to bear children. If they do not have those children, they are sent back to Japan, and others are sent out in their places.

Prior to 1884 there was no immigration of Japanese into British Columbia. From that time until 1907 they came in in ever-increasing numbers, until the situation became alarming. Then the government of the day—a Liberal government, by the way—made a deal with Japan or, as they called it, a gentleman's agreement. On the face of it, it was an arrangement whereby Japan pledged itself to see that no more than 400 Japanese left Japan to come to Canada in one year. No greater travesty of language could be found than to call that a gentlemen's agreement, because when one makes a gentlemen's agreement it is presupposed that both parties to the agreement are animated by the desire and intention to adhere to it in faith, truth and honesty. But when you find that one of the parties has not the slightest intention of adhering to those principles, control becomes much more difficult. In other words, in those circumstances a gentlemen's agreement is just a joke. I have said that the matter was a joke, and I make that statement sincerely because I find that instead of only 400 entering Canada in any one year, the Japanese were entering to the extent of 1,700. That is a matter of record; I have taken it from the records. Then, the other,

part of the contract was such that the whole matter was left wide open. I shall leave that part of the subject for the moment.

In the spring of 1922, for once in their lives the British Columbia members had sense enough to take united action. I do not believe they have ever done it since, nor do I think it had been done before. We all got together—I believe there were four groups at that time—and presented a resolution to the house asking for the total exclusion of orientals from British Columbia and Canada. The government opposed the resolution and moved to amend it by striking out the words "total exclusion" and inserting the words "effective restriction". Of course the government's majority carried the amendment. We were told at that time that the two expressions were synonymous, and that the term "effective restriction" meant total exclusion. The government majority carried the amendment—and that was the end of total exclusion. It did not operate as we had been led to believe.

Time has gone on and taken its toll of those fourteen members who supported that principle. There have been deaths, both politically and physically at one end of the rainbow, and the senate and big government appointments at the other end. All these have reduced that little band to the point where I am the only one left. I can say, like the man in the Bible—in the Book of Job, I believe it was; some of my parson friends can correct me if I am wrong—"I only am escaped alone to tell thee." I continued pressing the matter as best I could, but I found that governments were not sympathetic.

There was too much talk of appeasement in the air. One of the arguments was this, "We want to do a big trade with Japan, with her seventy million people. We do not want to lose that trade. If we do anything they don't like they will take their trade to the United States." That argument had some plausibility; at any rate it was good enough to stall me off for a year or two.

Then I saw the psychological moment open in 1924. The government of the United States, out of a clear sky, passed a total exclusion act against orientals, including Japanese. There was our chance to do the same, without loss of trade. I begged the then Prime Minister—the same one as we have to-day—to make it apply to all orientals; but he could not see his way clear to do so. He did apply it to Chinese, and that action has been most successful. Unfortunately, however, it was not applied to Japanese.

I continued from time to time to do what I could; and then along about 1928—possibly it was 1929—the Prime Minister was kind enough—and I give him full credit for it, because he did not have to do it—to readjust the joint agreement so that instead of an entry of 400 a year there would be only 150. He put some teeth in the terms of that agreement, so that we really had at least a gambler's chance of enforcing it. I believe the Japanese with their accustomed ability and subtlety found loopholes whereby at least to some extent they evaded the terms of the arrangement, but not to any great extent. Then, of later years the war has stopped any serious immigration.

I was told at that time that there were other reasons why we should not do anything to offend the Japanese nation, reasons of a diplomatic nature. I remember as well as if it were yesterday the answer I gave—I believe it is in *Hansard*—"The house and government might be assured that the Japanese nation would attack us the very moment it suited them, no matter what we had done by way of appeasement, favours or anything else." The very moment it suited them to attack us they would do so—and to-day tells the answer.

If my advice had been taken, even as late as 1924, to-day there would have been in Canada perhaps 5,000 or 6,000 fewer Japanese than there are to-day. Six thousand taken from 24,000 would have helped to ease this very acute situation which exists in British Columbia to-day.

I continued to look anxiously at the situation, and in 1938 I thought I had another opportunity. I brought in a bill to provide for an educational test. The Japanese were not mentioned by name, but the provisions of this bill would have applied to three-quarters of the world's population. If it had been put into force, it would have set up a method which has been used in Australia and New Zealand for thirty years without any objection from the Japanese. This has helped to keep Australia and New Zealand white. The government refused to allow my bill to go through. The matter was put to a vote and, if hon. members are interested in the matter, they will find it fully set out in *Hansard* of May 31, 1938, at page 3411. The hon. member for Skeena (Mr. Hanson) and the hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. O'Neill) should be proud now that they withstood the pressure of the whip at that time and voted in the interests of their province rather than at the dictates of the party. In justice to the hon. member for Victoria, B. C. (Mr. Mayhew), I must say that he was sick at home at the time and could not possibly be here.

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In September, 1940, Japan signed the deal, agreement or whatever you call it with Italy and Germany. In plain English, they bound themselves to enter into war against us and the United States whenever it suited Germany or Hitler. Pressure was put upon the government by British Columbia, and I suppose some realization of the situation also led the government to take action. They appointed a hand-picked committee to investigate the subject, which committee came back with a number of recommendations, I believe ten in all. There were only two of any importance, Nos. 5 and 7, and I shall deal with them. No. 5 recommended against allowing Japanese to enlist in our volunteer army then being raised. That was a very good idea, otherwise we would have had perhaps 1,500 Japanese training in our army, possibly in key positions, petty officers and the like. They would have been familiar with every detail of our army operations. Protests were made by the mayor of Nanaimo, and I think by other cities and by myself, and the recommendation of the committee carried. That was all right.

Recommendation No. 7 was that there should be a re-registration of the Japanese in Canada. It had been claimed by many people that the registration that had been taken was just a fake as regards the Japanese. Only those who felt like it registered, and there was a demand for a new registration. The recommendation was that they should be photographed at the same time. That was a good idea, but it had one fatal defect, if deception is regarded as a fatal defect. It was clearly understood that this registration was compulsory. We were told how well it was going on, how successful it was, and it was hoped that we malignants would now be satisfied and keep quiet. The whole thing turned on the point that it was compulsory.

If it had been voluntary, what use would it have been? Supposing we decided to make a history of the people by the name of Smith, to have a record of everything they had done, whether they had been in gaol and so on. If this were carried on voluntarily, how many Smiths would come forward except those with clean hands? Was it expected that Japanese who had entered the country illegally would come forward and say, "Yes, I came in illegally, take me." Of course they would not. A Jap is not a fool, any more than we are. The guilty ones did not register and the whole thing was a gigantic failure. It could not be otherwise if it were anything but compulsory.

Our main complaint was that many of them had come into the country illegally and this re-registration would have discovered that. Was it expected that those who had come in [Mr. Neill.]

illegally would disclose that fact? The thing is ridiculous. When the war came on, after Pearl Harbour, it was discovered that it was not compulsory, that it was just a gesture to keep us quiet, just a farce. Then what happened? The war was on and the people know what war means; this government should know what it means. These same people were given two months in which to register; they were given until February 7 to get things fixed up, to get a fake birth certificate or a forged entry card. You can buy them in Vancouver. If they could not get either, they were given two months before they would be subject to the same action as that to which any other enemy alien would be exposed. Why give them two months? We were practically saying to them, "We are at war with you, but we will give you two months in which to get faked papers, or get out of the country." I never heard the like of it before, and I hope I never shall again.

If I were challenged to offer proof of these things, I could no more do it than I could offer proof of the day of the week on which my last birthday fell. You do not keep track of these things that are so well known. I suppose I could have kept the newspapers that I read at the time, but I did not. I never dreamed that such action would be necessary to show that they had said it was compulsory. On February 9, the Prime Minister made this statement, as reported on page 436 of *Hansard*:

The committee received the utmost cooperation from Japanese nationals as well as from Canadians of Japanese racial origin. When a state of war was proclaimed as existing between Japan and Canada, the registration was all but complete.

The utmost cooperation! We know the extent of that cooperation. Here is what a man wrote—a white man for a change, and perhaps we can take his word—to the local paper in Vancouver a few days ago:

About three years ago I was talking to a Canadian-born Japanese boy in a store and said to him, "If the Japs ever came over here would you fight against us?" He replied, "I wouldn't want to, but I would either have to or commit suicide."

That is the sort of blind it is. There is your cooperation. Only when they attacked Pearl Harbour was it announced that the whole thing had been only voluntary. Here is an article that appeared in the papers a few days afterwards:

During the registration proceedings, several hundred Japanese left Canada for Japan. Most of these were known to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Many of them were believed to have entered the country illegally.

It is only after war breaks out that we discover all that. They were given two months in which to fix things up or get out. If that registration had been compulsory, we would have got the best of these Jap agents and the best of their spies. They have now gone home with their charts and plans and with a local knowledge that could not be bought for any money. Perhaps we shall see some of these Japs again peering over the side of the bridge of a German gunboat in Vancouver, Nanaimo or Port Alberni, because we now know that many of them were expert naval men. Agitation continued, and the government called a conference which was held here on January 8 and 9. With possibly one or two exceptions, the twenty-five gentlemen who attended this conference were in government service. Their continuing or advancement in the branch of the service in which they were, might depend upon—putting it politely—their thinking the same way as the government about these matters.

I suggested that they should call in the British Columbia members who were elected by the people and who have some claim to represent the people. But, oh, no! I should like to give another quotation. I shall not give names because I do not think it is fair to attack people when they are not in a position to reply. When an official is mentioned, I shall refer to an official, and when reference is made to a member of the government, I shall simply call him a minister. I quote:

I fail to see any need of getting the members from British Columbia together and asking them what they think should be done.

They were not called together, but the twenty-five government officials were there in full strength. They were fully informed of the government's views because some came from the Department of External Affairs.

I have here the statement got out by the Prime Minister. This is an official document, after the conference had reported, and so there is no harm in my quoting from it. It contains seventeen paragraphs, a great many of which are build-ups for the rest of it. I will deal with the more important ones, paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 11.

Paragraph 6 recommends that the government should seize immediately the Japanese fishing boats. That was done. It was done immediately war was declared, and for that action I have nothing but the utmost praise. It was done promptly and thoroughly. I have a vague idea that I see in it the efficient hand of the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (Mr. Macdonald). At any rate it was done, and done well. While this is not

part of the report, I may as well finish up that matter by saying that after they had 1,200 Japanese boats in their hands, the question arose, what to do with them? It was desirable to get them back into fishing again, so that white men could catch the fish so badly needed for the British market. Therefore they set up a committee to try to sell these boats. Whoever chose that committee deserves great credit. They made excellent choices. Here they are: Chairman, Hon. Mr. Justice Sidney Smith, a man with a master mariner's papers, so he would understand boats; Commander B. L. Johnson, D.S.O., R.C.N.R., a man of outstanding ability and repute in Vancouver. Then there was a Japanese, Kishizo Kimura, who I am told, is a very able man, familiar with the work that he undertook. I give all credit for that. Like all government offices, it is true that they were rather slow in going about their work, but they got started at last. They issued a circular, a copy of which I hold in my hand, explaining their procedure. I am very glad to get this circular because I can pass the information along to the fishermen, who are continually writing to me to know what to do. I am afraid that the whole scheme will not be entirely successful because the government will have left on their hands hundreds of boats. That is not the fault of the government or of this committee. Well, they got this thing started and have sold fifty-six boats up to date, and marvellous to relate, they told the members of parliament about it. They even accepted a suggestion I made—another remarkable thing. I suggested that they could not sell these boats for cash because the fishermen did not have cash, but they would be able to buy them on time, and accordingly that was arranged. The general idea of a lot of these officials, the people on these new boards, seems to be that there is no loyalty, intelligence or usefulness in any member of parliament. I do not know where they get the idea because it is not so very long since the people elected us. But that is the idea you find among the people on these new boards and among these dollar-a-year men. Since we are not told what is being done, we shall have to guess or simply deal with what we see, and if we guess wrong, the government is to blame. I do not think members of parliament are any more unworthy than they were in years gone by.

I want to quote recommendation 7 in which was contained the policy of the cabinet. It reads:

For the same period—

That is during the war.

—the sale of gasoline and explosives to persons of Japanese racial origin will be directly controlled under conditions to be prescribed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

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That is a good idea too, a very good idea, but unfortunately I read in the papers—I have to go to the press for information because I cannot get it anywhere else—that these sales are still going on.

Mr. HOMUTH: The sale of powder is still going on?

Mr. NEILL: Explosives. A man wrote to the Vancouver Province the other day and suggested that if this order was in effect, why was the Japanese station at the corner still selling gas the same as usual? That has been going on for two and a half months now, and I rather think permission has been extended to the 1st of April. The language is doubtful, but if it can be interpreted to the benefit of the Japanese, be sure it will be so interpreted. You are dealing with clever, subtle, unscrupulous enemies—and they are enemies—and when you say that you are not going to stop the sale for two months, that is just an invitation to them to accumulate as much gas and explosives as they can in the meantime. We say to them: "Remember, on the 7th of February or on the 1st of April we are going to shut down on you." Is that not an invitation to them to get explosives and gasoline against a rainy day? That time limit should never have been put in. The order should have been made applicable at once.

I want to say one more good thing for the government, and it will be the last, I am sorry to say. It does not pay to state your case unfairly, and I wish to be strictly fair. In these two instances I have mentioned, the seizing of the Japanese boats, and this order with respect to the sale of gasoline and explosives was made applicable to all Japanese, and all honour is due to the government for doing it.

There are three classes of Japanese we must deal with. There are the Japanese nationals, those born in Japan and never naturalized in Canada; they are Japanese nationals. Then there is the man born in Japan and naturalized in Canada. He is called a naturalized Japanese or a Canadian. Then there is the Japanese who was born in Canada, who can call himself a Japanese-Canadian if he likes. The government orders with regard to seizing the boats and the sale of gas and explosives applied to all three classes. That was all right.

Now I deal with paragraph 8. It says that Japanese nationals will be forbidden to possess or use short-wave receiving sets or radio transmitters in Canada. A most excellent thing. Hon. members can all understand why it was necessary to do that. That was fine. But it does not come into effect until the 1st of

[Mr. Neill.]

April. Did the Japanese give us four months' notice of what they were going to do at Pearl Harbour? Yet we say to them: "Go wandering about with your cameras and take pictures, and use your receiving sets to send word to Japan, and your receivers to get instructions from Japan. You can do this as much as you like until the 1st of April." Even if the order had been withheld, and they had been allowed to continue doing these things without being told of any date when they must stop, it would not have been so bad, because then they would never have known when the order was coming into force. But they were warned—you will not be interfered with until the 1st of April. The order was the equivalent of that. We told them: "Do your dirty work now. Use your radio and your receiving set but, remember, hide or bury them before the 1st of April, and then everything will be lovely." They told the Japanese nationals that they must not use these things in a protected area. But they can use them outside. I have a police order to that effect. It is signed by the police and says:

No enemy alien shall have in his possession or use while in such protected area any camera, radio transmitter, radio short-wave receiving set, firearm, ammunition or explosive.

But that order does not apply outside the protected area, and it does not apply to a naturalized or native-born Japanese.

Mr. RALSTON: I am not quite familiar with the regulations as to cameras, but does my hon. friend suggest that the same date applied with regard to evacuating a protected area and the possession of cameras? They must evacuate by April 1.

Mr. NEILL: Yes.

Mr. RALSTON: My hon. friend used the same date, April 1, when speaking of cameras and receiving sets.

Mr. NEILL: Yes. I said that the language was so ambiguous that it could be read two ways. It reads:

Notices ordering all enemy aliens to evacuate the coastal area of British Columbia west of the Cascade mountains by April 1 and to surrender cameras and radios will be posted in public buildings to-day.

Then:

Orders to Japanese . . . to get out of the coastal areas within forty-seven days and to surrender cameras, radios and other banned articles, were issued to-day.

Mr. RALSTON: I think my hon. friend is reading some sort of newspaper paraphrase of the order. The order to give up radios

and cameras is effective immediately. The order of evacuation is not. The order referred to, is effective on April 1.

Mr. NEILL: It is signed by Colonel Hill, and states that no enemy alien shall have in his possession or use while in such protected area any camera, radio transmitter, radio, short-wave receiving set, firearm, ammunition or explosive.

Mr. RALSTON: That is effective immediately. You don't wait until April 1 for that.

Mr. NEILL: Well, as I said, it is doubtful. There is, however, no question whatever that a man who is not a Japanese national can do these things any time, any place. The order applies only to nationals; that is, to men born in Japan and coming over here, and these are comparatively few in number, something like 1,700 out of 24,000, and only while they are in the area. The remaining 22,000 of naturalized Japanese are free to come and go, as I have said, anywhere. They can photograph what they like, radio what they like. They can do something else which I have not touched upon, and which is—not to make a joke—a burning question in British Columbia. Three, two, one of them can do endless damage in British Columbia with a box of matches. The most deadly enemy of the lumber industry in British Columbia is fire. Lumbermen are so afraid of it, it is so dangerous, that they shut their camps down in the middle of summer, as soon as the humidity reaches a certain point. A man can wander out in that bush, ten, fifty, a hundred miles from anywhere, and do more damage with a box of matches than it would take two armies to put out. The large number of forest rangers whom we have could not touch the fringe of the thing if these aliens were determined to commit sabotage. Some of the biggest lumbermen on the coast are much alarmed at this situation. If the Japanese were out of the area, they could not do this damage, because you can't do a thing if you are not there.

I have spoken of the freedom of Japanese to come and go with cameras, radios and matches. That is not restricted to two months or four months; that is for eternity, if the war lasts that long; it is for the duration of the war that the naturalized or Canadian-born Jap can go out and commit sabotage; he is free to do it the whole time, and he is the most dangerous of the lot. The naturalized Japanese speaks our language fluently, possibly he has been to college. He possesses far greater potentialities of trouble as a spy or an agent than if he had just come from

Japan. The fellow dressed up like a white man, speaking our language glibly, is the one who should be interned. It is very hard for me to believe that the government are so remote from what is taking place or may take place as not to understand the situation.

Paragraph 10 of the statement to which I referred makes a rather vague reference to the establishment of a civil corps for Canadian and naturalized Japanese. Because the project is a voluntary one, and in view of the vagueness to which I have referred, I imagine that presently it will fade away.

I should now like to make three charges against the government. The first is this, that, with the exception of seizing these boats, they have been far too slow in handling the Japanese situation. They have let days go by when it should have been hours, and a month when it should have been days. Look at what was done in Mexico. There the government dealt with the whole lot as soon as war was declared, and ordered into the interior every Jap who was on the coast. They did it; they didn't talk about it. Cuba did the same thing. They arrested, I believe, eighteen Japanese, all but two of whom were naval officers. Nicaragua took the same course, and took it speedily.

Mr. CRERAR: Could my hon. friend tell the house—I am merely asking for information—what has been done in the United States?

Mr. NEILL: No. I have not made myself familiar with what is happening there. I know that on the Pacific coast they took prompt steps. But they did not have the same incentive and need for action as we have, because there were not fishermen in the state of Washington; most Japanese there worked in paper mills and the like of that. But I am not in a position to state in detail what was done. I have troubles enough of my own. I do know what the situation is in British Columbia.

The only reason why we have not had a Pearl Harbour bombing in Canada is that we have no Pearl Harbour to bomb.

I note here that the council of the city of Vancouver has passed a resolution urging the government to get a move on. The report speaks of increasing irritation and criticism at the coast over the apparent failure of the government to implement its announced policy of removing Japanese.

The legislature of British Columbia, before adjourning a few days ago, passed unanimously a resolution urging the dominion government to strengthen Pacific defences. The feeling is very strong at the coast. I wish I could get the government to realize it.

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Here is one incident I must quote, reported under a big headline in a leading Vancouver paper, the *Daily Province*:

Japanese live undisturbed on dike adjoining airport.

There are 200 Japanese living a mile west of the airport. They are living on a dike. It would be very easy to blow up or open that dike, and the airport would be rendered useless for a long time to come. Yet they are living undisturbed within a mile of the airport; they are on a dike into which a gap could be blown with a few sticks of powder that would make the airport useless for a long time to come. Why does the government not take some action in this case?

The second charge is that even the small restrictions to which I have referred are applicable only to nationals, and I say it is inexcusable that they are not made applicable to all naturalized Japanese aliens in this country. To whom do you suppose they think they owe loyalty? If they were scattered all over Canada, the case might be different, but think what may happen when they are turned loose in a small area, when 25,000 are concentrated in an area where they could so readily combine to take action against Vancouver, or Victoria, as the case may be. It constitutes an unspeakable menace; I cannot understand why it is allowed to continue.

The third charge is that the government have shown indifference to British Columbia defence, also to air raid precautions work and the like of that. I am not blaming the government for preparations which they might have made six years ago. That is not their fault; I know that. We could not get the appropriation through the house. The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation moved resolutions condemning the government for proposing, as the Minister of Pensions and National Health (Mr. Mackenzie) did, to spend some money for these purposes. But I do blame the government for not having taken the situation in hand since war was declared. They are too slack; they appear to adopt the attitude, "Oh, well, we have to take chances; we are doing the best we can; it will be all right." Well, they told us it would be all right about Hong Kong. But people make mistakes—even military men, even high military men. They told us it would be all right at Singapore. Yet we know that mistakes were made there. Here is the government's paper the *Vancouver Sun*, expressing this opinion:

Canada obviously has not made its plan of defence on the assumption of any real attack on the Pacific coast. . . . That is the plan which must be reconsidered. . . . we do expect (Mr. Neil.)

a well-equipped, mobile striking unit which could pounce upon any Japanese landing attempt from Alaska southwards.

No such force exists on our coast. No such force exists in Canada.

I am afraid that is too true. Perhaps in the secret session which is to be held we shall be given more information on this matter. I do not propose to blame the government for things which happened before they had control and knowledge of the situation, or for not having done what at the time was beyond their power. But the government must be ready at that secret session to give us genuine information, not general assurances and smooth-sounding platitudes. There has been too much of this in connection with the management of the war.

There is a certain place—I will not name names, I will call it Y. When the government began to think about building aerodromes I thought that Y would make a good site for one, and I said so. I put it up to the officials, and they said that they were experts and ought to know better than I did. Well, I accepted that decision—but they are building that aerodrome now with frantic haste. I fear we may have to paraphrase the hymn and say:

Too late, too late will be the cry  
The Japanese gunboats have gone by.

There was another aerodrome at a place we will call X. I wrote to the government in connection with this one, informing them that there were two things wrong about it. This was a year or two ago. I pointed out to the officials that there was a Jap village 200 yards from the mouth of it where the Japs could take photographs and keep a record of any aeroplanes leaving, with all the details, so that they could have it all recorded for the benefit of the Japanese. They were about as far from the mouth of the aerodrome as Sparks street would be from where I am standing. I have in my desk a letter in which some official tried to stall me off. I was told that they would expropriate the Japanese, but that they could not do it because there was some hitch. However, they said they would look into the matter. Imagine looking into the question of expropriating this particular property when other nations, as we know, take first what they require and then talk about expropriation. Again, I pointed out to the officials that there was a Jap who had been seen taking photographs from an aeroplane over the harbour, where the aerodrome was being built. It was a civilian aerodrome. I took this matter up with various bodies—I will not mention any names because I do not wish to give them away—and what was

## Demand Action

# MASS MEETING ON JAPS URGED

Plans for a public meeting to protest to Ottawa the continued presence of Japanese in locations where sabotage would be costly were formulated Sunday at a meeting in the Belmont Hotel of about 45 representatives of city organizations, mostly veterans.

The chairman, James W. Wardrop, said the meeting had been called by the Flying Column, a war veterans' group.

John C. Hammit, an employee of Wartime Merchant Shipping, said Japanese were living in the vicinity of almost every defense works and wartime industrial establishment. "The whole situation here is definitely controlled by the Japs," he said. His information was "confirmed by the defenses and the R. C. M.P."

## HAVE NEW CARS.

"The Russian area is dominated by Japanese. . . . West Coast Shipyards (False Creek) are surrounded. . . ."

Hammit complained of the proximity of Japanese-operated shipyards on Coal Harbor. He said there were 1500 cars and trucks owned by Japanese—all of them new machines with good tires.

David Loughnan, representing the 6th Battalion Association, urged that "citizens 'scrupulously refrain from acts of violence,' that might be grounds for reprisals against prisoners. He favored the mass meeting to make public protests heard in Ottawa."

Alderman H. D. Wilson said: "We are not in a position to trust the Japanese population. . . . not even the Canadian-born. They are loyal as long as they have to be. There is a division of loyalty between Canada and the Mikado."

The alderman said he had slight hopes of satisfactory precautionary action by the Federal Government. "The day will come when the public will have to be told the danger that exists." H. E. Warburton, secretary of the Army and Navy Veterans, said his organization would give full support. "We are with you, to fight this issue to the finish."

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Perhaps I shall be told that this is unfair, that this is a fine man, and that I should not make such statements. I agree that he is entitled to that before the war. But since the war, no—a, thousand times no. He is too one-sided and biased to be kept in such a place.

During the last war there was a member of the royal family, Prince Henry of Battenberg, I think, who was married to Queen Victoria's daughter. He was an admiral of the fleet and his loyalty could not be questioned, but he voluntarily asked to be retired. It did not look well to see a man of German origin in command of the fleet, and so he asked to be retired. I submit that in this case a feeling of decency should have impelled this gentleman to whom I have been referring to ask to be relieved of his position, where he is open to suspicion. Scripture says that we should abstain from even the appearance of evil.

We who have taken the position that I am now taking have been called all sorts of names. We have been called agitators. It is said that we are willing to exploit the interests of Canada for our own political advantage; that we are rabble-rousers, Jap-baiters, and that we have a very dangerous influence—that that was said of me; it was said of a reputable alderman in Vancouver. I have heard that sort of thing, and hints of it even in this house, and certainly in the government press. You can get a man to write any letter you want; you can get a white man to make a tool of himself for a Jap if you pay him enough. There was a man who wrote to the papers saying what fine people the Japs are. I laid a trap for him and I discovered that he was a white man all right, but also a paid agent of a Japanese association, but he did not say that when he signed his name.

Yes, we are all bad because we want a white British Columbia and not a place like Hawaii! Fifty years from now, unless something is done to stop it, all west of the Rockies will be yellow. I submit, Mr. Speaker, that we want but little; we simply want to be left alone, like New Zealand and Australia,

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"THE JAPANESE SITUATION

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

BATES, 19 FEB. 1942.

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Here is one incident I must quote, reported under a big headline in a leading Vancouver paper, the *Daily Province*:  
Japanese live undisturbed on dike adjoining airport.

There are 200 Japanese living a mile west of the airport. They are living on a dike. It would be very easy to blow up or open that dike, and the airport would be rendered useless for a long time to come. Yet they are living undisturbed within a mile of the airport; they are on a dike into which a gap could be blown with a few sticks of powder that would make the airport useless for a long time to come. Why does the government not take some action in this case?

The second charge is that even the small restrictions to which I have referred are applicable only to nationals, and I say it is inexecutable that they are not made applicable to all naturalized Japanese aliens in this country. To whom do you suppose they think they owe loyalty? If they were scattered all over Canada, the case might be different, but think what may happen when they are turned loose in a small area, when 25,000 are concentrated in an area where they could so readily combine to take action against Vancouver, or Victoria, as the case may be. It constitutes an unspeakable menace; I cannot understand why it is allowed to continue.

The third charge is that the government have shown indifference to British Columbia defence, also to air raid precautions work and the like of that. I am not blaming the government for preparations which they might have made six years ago. That is not their fault; I know that. We could not get the appropriation through the house. The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation moved resolutions condemning the government for proposing, as the Minister of Pensions and National Health (Mr. Mackenzie) did, to spend some money for these purposes. But I do blame the government for not having taken the situation in hand since war was declared. They are too slack; they appear to adopt the attitude, "Oh, well, we have to take chances; we are doing the best we can; it will be all right." Well, they told us it would be all right about Hong Kong. But people make mistakes—even military men, even high military men. They told us it would be all right at Singapore. Yet we know that mistakes were made there. Here is the government paper the *Vancouver Sun*, expressing this opinion:

Canada obviously has not made its plan of defence on the assumption of any real attack on the Pacific coast. . . . That is the plan which must be reconsidered. . . . we do expect [Mr. Neill.]

a well-equipped, mobile striking unit which could pounce upon any Japanese landing attempt from Alaska southwards.

No such force exists on our coast. No such force exists in Canada.

I am afraid that is too true. Perhaps in the secret session which is to be held we shall be given more information on this matter. I do not propose to blame the government for things which happened before they had control and knowledge of the situation, or for not having done what at the time was beyond their power. But the government must be ready at that secret session to give us genuine information, not general assurances and smooth-sounding platitudes. There has been too much of this in connection with the management of the war.

There is a certain place—I will not name names, I will call it Y. When the government began to think about building aerodromes I thought that Y would make a good site for one, and I said so. I put it up to the officials, and they said that they were experts and ought to know better than I did. Well, I accepted that decision—but they are building that aerodrome now with frantic haste. I fear we may have to paraphrase the hymn and say:

Too late, too late will be the cry  
The Japanese gunboats have gone by.

There was another aerodrome at a place we will call X. I wrote to the government in connection with this one, informing them that there were two things wrong about it. This was a year or two ago. I pointed out to the officials that there was a Jap village 200 yards from the mouth of it where the Japs could take photographs and keep a record of any aeroplanes leaving, with all the details, so that they could have it all recorded for the benefit of the Japanese. They were about as far from the mouth of the aerodrome as Sparks street would be from where I am standing. I have in my desk a letter in which some official tried to stall me off. I was told that they would expropriate the Japanese, but that they could not do it because there was some hitch. However, they said they would look into the matter. Imagine looking into the question of expropriating this particular property when other nations, as we know, take first what they require and then talk about expropriation. Again, I pointed out to the officials that there was a Jap who had been seen taking photographs from an aeroplane over the harbour, where the aerodrome was being built. It was a civilian aerodrome. I took this matter up with various bodies. I will not mention any names because I do not wish to give them away—and what was

the answer? I was informed that the investigation was closed. They had ascertained the name of the man and had found that he had gone to Japan. I suppose he took photographs with him as a memento of us because he loved us so much. Well, he has gone back to Japan with whatever photographs he took—we do not know how many—and God knows how many more may have gone there. But the officials did not seem to think it was important. I was told that it would be difficult to take photographs through the glass of any aeroplane unless you had a particular sort of apparatus with which to do it. Well, would the Japanese not have that type of apparatus? I submitted all these matters to the department, and I have it all on record. One of the officials said to me, "There is nothing to this anyhow because it is not against the laws of the country to take photographs of an aerodrome."

I took it up with some of the higher officials, and they juggled with it and finally explained that they could get the Japs under the Official Secrets Act. The aerodrome is still there; the Japs are still staying there under their four months' lease of life, and doubtless they are still taking these photographs, which I have no doubt will be sent to the right place.

These men are not all Canadian nationals. Some of them may be the very best class of spies and foreign agents, and I contend that there has been too much sympathy for the Japanese viewpoint and Japanese interests. We must remember that we are at war with these people. Ottawa is 3,000 miles away from us out there, and it is useful to have a man here who is familiar with conditions on the coast to advise. So they sent for a man who for ten or fifteen years had been notorious—there is no other word by which to describe his activities—in the province of British Columbia, for his championship of the Japanese, for his advocacy of their interests. He was a protagonist of the Japanese. There was never a man who believed so strongly and implicitly in Japan.

Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. member has exceeded his time, and he may proceed only with the unanimous consent of the house.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Go on.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Go ahead.

Mr. NEILL: I thank the house and the Prime Minister; I have never asked for this licence before. To proceed, I may say that a great deal of ill-will has been excited in British Columbia. The people out there said that this man was paid a big salary as a provincial official, and they wanted to know

why they should be paying him if he was so disloyal to the province. That was before the war, and it was said that it was only a matter of opinion. He has now been transferred to a position in which he can give advice—that is what he is here for, to speak with authority. He is on the ground, and he is also in a position to have early knowledge of any action that might be taken against the Japanese and to drop a hint in the right place. Anything of that sort, just a hint in the right quarters, might make a great deal of difference in the carrying out of a policy.

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IN BRITISH COLUMBIA", HOUSE OF COMMONS,  
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all white. I have no ill-will against the Japanese. Perhaps you may think I have been showing ill-will, but I assure you I have none towards the Japs. No Jap ever "did" me—I never gave him the chance. I wish to be fair to the Japanese, and I think that if we expatriated them, as we ought to do, they should be given full justice in regard to their property, because I am strongly in favour of a Japan controlled by the Japanese, just as I am in favour of a Canada controlled by Canadians. Let us continue to trade with them; let us do business with them across the ocean; but do not force into one nation two peoples separated by something that is wider than the ocean, two peoples who are different in race, in religion, in traditions and in their whole philosophy of life. This difference always has prevented assimilation and always will prevent it, between two nations so utterly divergent in every respect. The greatest path towards assimilation is marriage. Well, the Japs have been here fifty-eight years and there is no record of a single marriage, although there might be one. I asked a Japanese to produce the record of one marriage and he could not do so. We have heard of second generation Japanese born here going to Japanese schools here to learn Japanese, and that has been regarded as a small matter. We went into their textbooks and had them translated and we found that they were very anti-British. Yet there were people who thought that was a small matter—only the sort of thing that irresponsible people like myself would talk about. But when the war came, it was thought wise to shut down the Jap schools. There were fifty-nine in British Columbia, and leaving out small areas where they could not run a school, the great bulk of those children must have attended some Japanese school.

I have one more word. When the time comes to talk peace, I suggest that the services rendered by Canada and by her Prime Minister should surely entitle both him and this dominion to be fully represented when the terms of peace are being settled, when the treaty comes to be made, and have their voice heard in no uncertain terms. I do suggest—perhaps it is too early to talk about it now, but it is well to get it started—that we should make an arrangement that when peace time comes, we expatriate all the Japanese left in Canada; do it on fair terms, buy them out, pay them liberally. It was done in the present war, I believe, between Russia and Germany; and after the last war it was done on a large scale, some 200,000 people, between the Greeks and the Turks, I think. If they could move 200,000, it is

[Mr. Neill.]

much easier for us to move 25,000, and it is better to move them while their numbers are so small. Let us settle once and for all this canker in the life of Canada which prevents us from being a united white Canada. And that is what British Columbia wants.

Mr. COLDWELL: I rise to a point of order. I believe we are discussing the amendment to the motion. I submit to you, sir, that on the basis of your ruling on the amendment to the amendment the amendment itself is clearly out of order.

You ruled that the subamendment sought to condemn the government on what amounted to a want of confidence motion for something it contemplated doing. The amendment states:

This house regrets that Your Excellency's advisers, instead of giving to the country the leadership so essential at a time properly described in the speech from the throne as the greatest crisis in the world's history, on the contrary, have sought to evade their responsibility by holding a plebiscite.

My submission is that the government has not held a plebiscite, but that the speech from the throne contemplates the holding of a plebiscite, which is precisely in the terms of the amendment to the amendment that was ruled out of order. Therefore on precisely the same ground this amendment to the motion is out of order.

Mr. SPEAKER: I think the difference is very apparent. The government has announced its determination to hold a plebiscite. The amendment that I ruled out of order referred to a contemplated future action of the government, which may or may not take place. Therefore I cannot see any similarity between that proposed subamendment and the amendment which is now before the house.

Mr. LIGUORI LACOMBE (Laval-Two Mountains): Now that the proposed subamendment of the hon. member for Témiscouata (Mr. Pouliot) has been ruled out of order, and before the vote is taken on the amendment moved by the hon. leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson) I intend to move an amendment to the amendment of the leader of the opposition.

Canada in its entirety condemned conscription on March 26, 1940. Canadians of all origins repudiated this measure. There is no better demonstration thereof than the defeat of the Right Hon. Arthur Meighen in York South on February 9. Personally I will not relieve the government from its solemn pledge and sacred commitments. Now the Prime Minister of our country, who heads the most powerful government which Canada has

had said the battle was raging in full fury, with British troops falling back slowly upon the Sittang.

(An All-India Radio report picked up in New York by C.B.S. said the R.A.F. reported shoot-