File Pocket 104(s)

In the Supreme Court of Canada

IN THE MATTER OF A REFERENCE AS TO THE VALIDITY OF ORDERS-IN-COUNCIL OF THE 15th DAY OF DECEMBER 1945,

(P.C. 7355, 7356 & 7357) IN RELATION TO PERSONS OF THE JAPANESE RACE.

FACTUM OF THE CO-OPERATIVE COMMITTEE ON JAPANESE CANADIANS

F. A. BREWIN, Solicitor for The Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians

- and -

J. P. ERICHSEN BROWN, Ottawa Agent for the Solicitor for the Co-operative Committee.

> TORONTO The Sovereign Press Limited 1946

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DRAFT FACTUM

IN THE MATTER OF A REFERENCE AS TO THE VALIDITY OF ORDERS-IN-COUNCIL OF THE 15th DAY OF DECEMBER 1945, (P.C. 7355,7356 & 7357) IN RELATION TO PERSONS OF THE JAPANESE RACE FACTUM OF THE CO-OPERATIVE COMMITTEE ON JAPANESE CANADIANS

PART I

10 By Order-in-Council P.C. 45 of the 8th day of January 1946, the following question was referred to the Court for hearing and consideration, namely:

"Are the Orders-in-Council dated the 15th day of December 1945, being P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357, *ultra vires* of the Governor in Council either in whole or in part and, if so, in what particular or particulars and to what extent?

The Orders-in-Council purport to be passed under the authority of the War Measures Act R.S.C. 1927, Chapter C206 "by reason of the War." P.C. 7355 provides that the Minister 20 of Labour may make Orders for the "deportation" to Japan of

the following classes of persons.

1. Nationals of Japan resident in Canada who since December 8th 1941, made a request for repatriation, or who were detained as of September 1st 1945 under the provisions of the Defence of Canada Regulations Order P.C. 946 of February 5th, 1943 as amended by P.C. 5637 August 16, 1945.

2. Every naturalized British Subject of the Japanese race resident in Canada who has made a request for repatriation provided that such person has not revoked in writing such request **30** before midnight on September 1st, 1945.

3. Natural born British Subjects of the Japanese race resident in Canada who made a request for repatriation provided that such person has not revoked in writing such request before the Minister makes an Order for "deportation."

4. The wives and children under 16 years of age of any person for whom the Minister makes an Order for "deportation."

The requests for repatriation which were in the form printed in the Appendix to this Factum, are to be deemed final and irrevocable, except as provided in regard to clauses 2 and 3 above.

P.C. 7356 provides that any person being a British Subject by naturalization under the Naturalization Act R.S.C. 1927, Chapter 138 who is deported from Canada under the provisions of P.C. 7355, shall as and from the date upon which he leaves Canada in the course of such deportation, cease to be either a British Subject or a Canadian National.

P.C. 7357 provides for the appointment of a commission of three persons to make inquiry concerning the activities, loyalty
10 and extent of co-operation with the Government of Canada during the war of Japanese Nationals and naturalized persons of the Japanese race in cases referred to the commission by the Minister of Labour for investigation with a view to recommending whether such person should be deported.

The commission is further empowered to inquire at the request of the Minister of Labour into the case of any naturalized British Subject of the Japanese race who has made a request for repatriation, and make recommendations. Any person of the Japanese race who is recommended by the commission for **20** deportation, is subject to deportation under the provisions of P.C. 7355. Where any person is recommended for deportation persuant to this Order, he shall as and from the date on which he leaves Canada in the course of such deportation, cease to be either a British Subject or a Canadian National.

The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945, provides that for the purpose of the War Measures Act, the war is deemed to have ceased as of January 1st, 1946, and the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act 1945, comes into force on that date. In purported pursuance of its terms, the Governor in **30** Council passed P.C. 7414 on the 28th day of December, 1945 purporting to continue in full force and effect, all Orders and Regulations lawfully made under the War Measures Act in force immediately before January 1, 1946.

PART II

Counsel for the Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians will submit that the question referred to the Court should be answered as follows:

1. The Orders-in-Council P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357 are wholly *ultra vires* of the Governor in Council.

PART III

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ARGUMENT

The impugned Orders-in-Council purport to be an exercise by the Governor in Council of the delegated powers conferred upon him by reason of War under the terms of Section 3 of the War Measures Act R. S.C. 1927 Chapter 206 in the following terms.

"The Governor in Council may do and authorize such acts and things and make from time to time such Orders and Regulations as he may by reason of the existence of real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection, deem necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada." These words taken by themselves confer the widest and most conprehensive legislative powers upon the Governor in 10 Council. They are, however, restricted by the qualifying context to use the language of Duff J., (in re Gray, 57 S.C.R. at 168) and are subject to the specific provisions of the Statute (Reference as to validity of the Regulations in relation to Chemicals 1943 S.C.R., 1.)

The qualifying context and specific provisions relevant in this case are to be found in the later words of the same section which read: "and for greater certainty but not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing terms, it is hereby declared that the powers of the Governor in Council shall extend to all matters coming with-20 in the classes of subjects hereinafter enumerated that is to say,-(b) arrest, detention, excusion and "deportation." The word "deportation" means "the forcible removal of aliens" (Fong-Yue-Ting vs. U.S.) 149 U.S. 698 at 709, Webster's Dictionary page 599 Attorney General for Canada vs Cain. 1906 A.C. 542 at 546. The word "deportation" is not apt to describe the sending to Japan of Canadian citizens who were either born in Canada or born in other parts of the world and naturalized in Canada and who have no connection with Japan other than that of "race." Deportation is the return of an alien to the country from whence 30 he came and not the exile or banishment of a citizen to an alien country.

Section 3 of the War Measures Act should therefore be read as follows:

"The powers of the Governor in Council shall extend to all matters coming within the classes of subject hereinafter enumerated that is to say (b) "arrest, detention, exclusion, and the forcible removal of aliens to their country of origin."

Admittedy the purpose of the enumeration of classes of subjects in Section 3 was not to cut down the generality of the **40** powers conferred by the broad language of the opening clause so as to require the operation of the ejusdem generis rule (in re Gray, supra,) but the purpose of the enumeration was, however, in respect at least to the enumerated classes of subjects themselves, to indicate that the powers of the Governor in Council "could go even thus far" (per Sir Charles Fitzpatrick, C.J. in re Gray 57 S.C.R. page 158,) or to indicate "marginal instances" (per Duff, J. ibidem page 168,) or "cases in which there might be such doubt that it was better to mention them specifically" (per Anglin, J. ibidem 177.) It is respectfully submitted that Parliament in saying that the forcible removal of aliens to the country of their origin is to be regarded as a "marginal instance" as to which there might be doubt, clearly indicated that the forcible removal of British subjects to a foreign country was regarded as beyond the line, beyond doubt, and very much further than the margin.

There are several rules of interpretation which support the 10 contention here advanced. Where there is ambiguity, a statute even in war time shoud be interpreted in favour of the liberty of the subject and the previous policy of the law.

The banishment of subjects by any court or body for any other reason than conviction of felony is expressly prohibited under heavy penalties by Habeas Corpus Act 31, Charles II, Chapter 2, section 60, R vs. Halliday 1917 A.C. 260 at 274, and Liversedge vs Anderson 1942 A.C., at page 244.

There is also a presumption that Parliament does not assert or assume jurisdiction which goes beyond the limits established **20** by the common consent of nations, (Halsbury Second Edition, volume 31, page 509). That the banishment of nationals particularly on racial grounds, is contrary to the accepted principles if International Law may be gathered from Attorney General of Canada vs Cain, 1906 A.C. 542 at 546. There are recent developments in the field of International Law by which the deportation of civilian population on racial grounds is regarded as a crime against humanity, See 23 Canadian Bar Review, page 754 and particularly 756 and 757. Public policy in respect to racial discrimination is discussed in re Drummond Wren 1945 O.R. 778.

302. At the time the War Measures Act was passed in 1914 and also when it was consolidated in 1927, the Parliament of Canada could not have delegated power to the Governor in Council to make laws or regulations repugnant to any act of the Imperial Parliament extending to the Dominion of Canada, as it could not have done so itself. (Colonial Laws Validity Act 29-30 Vict. (Imp.) Chapter 63 S 2). Various provisions of the Orders-in-Council are repugnant to the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 4-5 George V, C.17. In particular the discriminating provisions of Section 2 of P.C. 7355 are repugnant to Section 403 (1) of the Act; the provisions of P.C. 7356 and the provisions of 7357 which purport to deprive naturalized British Subjects of their status as British Subjects for no cause other than that they have signed a request not revoked, before a given date, or because the extent of their co-operation with the Government of Canada during war is deemed unsatisfactory by the commission appointed by the Government, are repugnant to Section 7 &8, 13-16

of the Imperial Act which deals with loss of nationality. The provisions in respect to the wives and children of naturalized Canadians who are deported and who are to lose their status without any option, are inconsistent with and are repugnant to Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the Imperial Act.

Part II of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act was only to apply to the Dominion of Canda, if adopted by the "legislature" of that Dominion, (Section 9). The Parliament of Canada did adopt the Act (4-5 George V, C44 and 5 George V C7). 10 Fhe Act is therefore an act to which the Colonial Laws Validity Act applies.

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It is clear that if the Parliament of Canada did not have the power to make laws repugnant to the Imperial Statute, it could not delegate such power and could not be assumed to have attempted to do so.

Since the passing of the Statute of Westminister by the Imperial Parliament in 1931, the Parliament of Canada could in matters within its competence make laws repugnant to the Imperial Statute. Parliament, however has not since 1931 re-enacted the War Measures Act which is still therefore, subject to the Colonial Laws Validity Act and the Orders-in-Council themselves are not "laws made after the commencement of this Act by the Parliament of the Dominion." They do not therefore fall within the provisions of Section 2 of the Statute of Westminister.

The Orders-in-Council throughout depend upon the persons affected being in fact of the "Japanese race." It would be the duty of the Court on any application for Habeas Corpus to determine the issue as to whether or not any particular individual was "of the Japanese race." Eshugbayi Eleko vs Government of **30** Nigeria 1931 A.C. at 670. The phrase "Japanese race" is so vague as to make the provisions unenforceable.

The text book authorities quoted in the Appendix hereto indicate that the word "race" is not definable in scientific terms and has not any precise meaning. It is a hypothetical group inferred to have existed in the past. Provisions in a will in regard to the "Jewish race" have been held to be void for uncertainty, Clayton vs Ramsden 1943 A.C. 320 referred to in re Drummond Wren 1945, O.R. 778 at 786.

It is true that Parliament has delegated legislative power 40 to the Governor in Council, but such power is not exercised by passing what purport to be orders and regulations so vague, as to unenforceable, and meaningless.

4. The impugned Orders-in-Council deal with a matter which, in the absence of the emergency of war, would fall within the competence of the Legislatures of the Provinces, namely, property and civil rights, Section 92, Head 13, British North America Act. To restrain the liberty of the subject where there has been no crime committeed is beyond question an interference with civil right; per Robertson, C. J. O. in re McKenzie 1945 O.R. at 796. The Orders-in-Council are preventive in nature, and are not criminal law and do not fall within any of the ennumerated heads of section 91.

It is conceded that, by reason of war, a new aspect of the business of Government has arisen which justifies the Dominion **10** Parliament in encroaching on subject matters normally reserved exclusively to Provincial Legislatures. It is also conceded that these exceptional interferences may continue to be justified after actual war conditions have ceased, Fort Francis Pulp & Paper Co. vs Manitoba Free Press 1923, A.C. 695. The Parliament of Canada by enactment of the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act has recognized that the emergency of war which justified or required the enactment of the War Measures Act, ceased on the first day of January 1946. The recital to the Act, however indicates, that certain transitional powers require to be **20** exercised by the Governor in Council, and that it may be necessary for this purpose to continue certain orders and regulations made under the War Measures Act.

Parliament has by Section 2 (1) further defined what powers may be necessary to be exercised by reason of the continued emergency. Clause "b" of Section 3 the War Measures Act in regard to "arrest detention, exclusion and deportation" is entirely omitted from the new Act. It is submitted that this constitutes a declaration by Parliament and the clearest evidence that in respect to "deportation" there is no continuing necessity for **30** the exercise of extra-ordinary powers by the Governor in Council from January 1, 1946 by reason of the emergency of war or by reason of any continuing transitional "post-war" emergency.

The impugned Orders-in-Council do not continue any action deemed necessary by reason of the war. Actual hostilities with Japan concluded on or about the 25 th day of August 1945 (see proclamation Canada Gazette 1945, page 3704.) No orders or regulations in respect to the banishment of Canadian Nationals or British Subjects had been passed at that time or indeed at the time the National Transitional Emergency Powers Act was 40 passed, which declared that only transitional and continuing powers were necessary. Parliament must therefore be taken either not to have delegated to the Governor in Council, the power to legislate for "deportation" after January 1, 1946 or alternatively, Parliament could not authoriize the invasion of a provincial sphere which it had itself declared no longer necessary to be invaded by reason of the emergency of war or the transitional post-war emergency. Parliament itself has absolved the Courts from the inquiry upon which otherwise the Court might be loathe to enter, namely, as to whether there exists any emergency either my reason of war, or by reason of the transition from war to peace in respect to the subject matter of the impugned Orders-in-Council.

5. P.C. 7355, 7356, 7357 are a part of one legislative scheme. It is possible that the Governor in Council could have passed a valid Order-in-Council for the deportation of one of the 4 classes
10 referred to, namely the Japanese Nationals, but all of the provisions of the Orders are inter-dependent, and it is impossible to say that the Governor in Council would not have abandoned the whole scheme if parts of it had been known to be ultra vires. In re Alberta Statutes the Bank Taxation Act 1938, S.C.R. 100 at 123 and 132.

All of which is respectfully submitted by

J. R. Cartwright, K.C. and F. A. Brewin.

Counsel for the Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians.

APPENDIX "A"

Form of Request for Repatriation

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

DECLARATION

registered as a Canadian-born British subject (J.R. No.....) under Order in Council P.C. No. 9760, dated December 16, 1941, hereby declare my desire to relinquish my British nationality and 10 to assume the status of a National of Japan.

Further, I request the Government of Canada, under the conditions set out in the Statement of the Minister of Labour dated February 13, 1945, to arrange for and effect my repatriation to Japan.

I declare that I fully understand the contents of this document, and I voluntarily affix my signature hereto:

	Date, 1945	SIGNATURE				
	Place					
20	20	INTERPRETER				
	Note: All persons sixteen years of age and over are required to sign a separate Declaration.					
	Application Recommended:	Application Approved:				
	R.C.M.P.	Commissioner of Japanese Placement				
	Date 1945	Date 1945				
30	N.B.—This form in respect to Naturalized British Subjects was the same with the substitution of the words "Canadian naturalized" for "Canadian born" in the above form.					

naturalized" for "Canadian born" in the above form.

APPENDIX "B"

STANDARD TEXTS ON "JAPANESE RACE"

1. "The People of Asia", by L. H. Dudley Buxton, M.A., F.S.A. Lecturer in Physical Anthropology, University of Oxford

Page 3-Referring to Blumenbach, he says:

"He recognized the fact that no sharp lines demarcate the several varieties of mankind and realized that the transition from type to type is imperceptible."

and on Page 15-

"But not only is the difficulty confined to the main racial stocks. The subdivisions of the main groups are almose infinite in number, and the subject for endless controversy and vast columns of figures and infinite measurements which appear often to be but imperfectly understood. There are few criteria which are generally accepted and the student is left to wander disconsolate in a welter of conflicting literature."

2. "The Study of Man", by Ralph Linton, Ph.D., Professor of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin.

Page 39:--

20 "Racial classifications are, therefore, based upon the presence of similarities with respect to a selected series of physical traits. The content of any group within the classification depends both upon the traits selected and upon the degree of similarity which the investigator considers significant.

Page 40:-

The real point of all this is that, while breeds are genuine biological entities, races, as we have chosen to use the term, are creations of the investigator and creation with regard to which all the creators are by no means in agreement".

30 Page 44:—

"These (breeds) are genuine biological entities, groups characterized by close physical resemblances and common heredity. Races and stocks, on the other hand, are abstractions".

3. "The Racial History of Man", by Roland B. Dixon, Professor of Anthropology at Harvard University.

Page 1:---

"The term "race" is one which has unfortunately acquired a somewhat varied meaning in our every-day speech".

Page 4:—

"However distinct, therefore, races may once have been, the peoples of the world to-day are complex mixtures of these original types, in which we must seek to discover, if we can, the constituent elements".

Page 7:-

"In other words, we cannot point to any group of criteria and say that these are inherently connected and form a true racial standard".

104.

"We Europeans", by Julian S. Huxley, D.Sc., and A. C. Haddon, Sc.D., F.R.S., formerly reader in Ethnology in the University of Cambridge.

Page 107:--

"The word "race" as applied scientifically to human groupings, has lost any sharpness of meaning. To-day it is hardly definable in scientific terms, except as an abstract concept which may, under certain conditions, very different from those now prevalent, have been realized approximately in the past, and might, under certain other but equally different conditions, be realized in the distant future.

Page 141:---

"A true "race" or sub-species, major or minor, is thus a hypothetical group inferred to have existed in the past: an "ethnic type" is a subjective judgment of the normal or ideal characteristics of a component of an existing population".

The examination of the Text Books further indicates that the population of the Japanese Island is itself composed of a mixture of races, and what races there are there, are indistinguishable from the people in Manchuria and Korea and other parts of Asia.


Dixon — Op. cit — page 287.

"The Races of Man" by A. C. Haddon, pages 32, 94 & 95. A. C. Haddon at Page 294 and 295.

"Man, Past and Present" by A. H. Keene, revised by A. C. Buxton — Op. cit. 206 and 217.

As indicating the great varieties of physical types in Japan, see the Journal of the Faculty of Science, University of Tokyo, volume 1, part 1, 1925.

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IN THE MATTER OF A REFERENCE AS TO THE VALIDITY OF ORDERS IN COUNCIL OF THE 15TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1945 (P.C. 7355, 7356 AND 7357), IN RELATION TO PERSONS OF THE JAPANESE RACE.

File Pocket 104(s)	
CASE	

F. P. VARCOE,

Solicitor for the Attorney General of Canada.

OTTAWA EDMOND CLOUTIER PRINTER TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY 1946

IN THE MATTER OF A REFERENCE AS TO THE VALIDITY OF ORDERS IN COUNCIL OF THE 15TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1945 (P.C. 7355, 7356 AND 7357), IN RELATION TO PERSONS OF THE JAPANESE RACE.

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P.C. 45

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA

TUESDAY, the 8th day of January, 1946.

PRESENT:

HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL:

Whereas Section 3 of the War Measures Act, Chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, provides as follows:—

10

3. The Governor in Council may do and authorize such acts and things, and make from time to time such orders and regulations, as he may by reason of the existence of real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection deem necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada; and for greater certainty, but not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing terms, it is hereby declared that the powers of the Governor in Council shall extend to all matters coming within the classes of subjects hereinafter enumerated, that is to say:—

- (a) Censorship and the control and suppression of publications, writings, maps, plans, photographs, communications and means of communication;
 (b) Arrest, detention, exclusion and deportation;
- 20
- (c) Control of the harbours, ports and territorial waters of Canada and the movement of vessels;
- (d) Transportation by land, air, or water and the control of the transport of persons and things;
- (e) Trading, exportation, importation, production and manufacture;
- (f) Appropriation, control, forfeiture and disposition of property and of the use thereof.

2. All orders and regulations made under this section shall have the force of law, and shall be enforced in such manner and by such courts, officers and authorities as the Governor in Council may prescribe, and may be varied, extended or revoked by any subsequent order or regulation; but if any order

or regulation is varied, extended or revoked, neither the previous operation or regulation is varied, extended thereworder, shall be affected thereby, nor shall thereof nor anything duly done thereworder, shall be affected thereby, nor shall thereof nor anything colligation or liability acquired, accrued, accrued thereof nor anything duly usine internet in a standard acquired, accrued, accruing or any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued, accruing or any right, privilege, opingation by such variation, extension or revocation.

And whereas on the fifteenth of December, 1945, Orders were made by the And whereas on the integration of the War Measures Act (P.C. 7355, Governor in Council under the authority of the War Measures Act (P.C. 7355, Governor in Council under the automotion annexed hereto) which Orders provided, P.C. 7356 and P.C. 7357, certified copies annexed hereto) which Orders provided, P.C. 7356 and P.C. 7357, certified or pursuant to the authority thereof of nationals amongst other things, for the removal pursuant to the authority thereof of nationals of Japan and other persons of the Japanese race;

And whereas these Orders were made only after a suitable arrangement had And whereas these of details there as set out in the dispatches of which copies been made with General MacArthur as set out in the dispatches of which copies 10

are annexed hereto;

And whereas the Acting Minister of Justice reports that representations have And whereas the actual have been made to him, by and on behalf of a number of Canadian organizations and been made to him, by and on behalf on advice of legal counsel that it been made to him, by and on based on advice of legal counsel that the Orders societies expressing the opinion based on advice of legal counsel that the Orders societies expressing the opinion requesting a reference to the Supreme Court of in Council are ultra vires and requesting a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada to test the question;

That an action has been commenced by Utaka Shimoyama and Yae Nasu against the Attorney General of Canada for a declaration that the Orders in 20 Council are ultra vires, illegal and void;

That an Order was made by the Governor in Council on the 28th of December, 1945, (P.C. 7414, certified copy annexed hereto), pursuant to Section 4 of The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945 ordering that all orders and regulations lawfully made under the War Measures Act in force immediately before the day The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945 came into force (January 1st, 1946), shall, while that Act is in force, continue in full force and effect; and

That in these circumstances it is urgently required in the public interest that the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada upon the question of the validity 30 of the Orders in Council aforesaid be obtained with the least possible delay which question is in the opinion of the Acting Minister of Justice, an important question of law touching the interpretation of Dominion legislation;

Therefore His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Acting Minister of Justice and under and by virtue of the authority

conferred by Section 55 of the Supreme Court Act, is pleased to refer and doth conferred by Section 55 of the Supreme Court of Canada for hearing hereby refer the following question to the Supreme Court of Canada for hearing

and consideration, namely:---Are the Orders in Council, dated the 15th day of December, 1945, being P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357, ultra vires of the Governor in Council either in

P.C. 7355, 7350 and 750, what particular or particulars and to what extent?

A. M. HILL,

Asst. Clerk of the Privy Council.

Documents annexed to Order of Reference. P.C. 7355

10

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA

SATURDAY, the 15th day of December, 1945.

PRESENT:

HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL:

Whereas during the course of the war with Japan certain Japanese nationals manifested their sympathy with or support of Japan by making requests for repatriation to Japan and otherwise;

And whereas other persons of the Japanese race have requested or may request 20 that they be sent to Japan;

And whereas it is deemed desirable that provisions be made to deport the classes of persons referred to above;

And whereas it is considered necessary by reason of the war, for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada, that provision be made accordingly;

Now, therefore, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Labour, concurred in by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and under the authority of the War Measures Act, Chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, is pleased to make and doth hereby make the following Order,-

ORDER

1. In this Order, unless the context otherwise requires:

(a) "deportation" means the removal pursuant to the authority of this Order of any person from any place in Canada to a place outside Canada;

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(b) "deported" means removed or sent from Canada pursuant to the authority

- of this Order;
- (c) "Minister" means the Minister of Labour; (d) "request for repatriation" means a written request or statement of desire,
- to be repatriated or sent to Japan.

2. (1) Every person of sixteen years of age or over, other than a Canadian national, who is a national of Japan resident in Canada and who,

- (a) has, since the date of declaration of war by the Government of Canada (a) has, since the date of declaration of war by the Government of Canada has, since the date of documents, 1941, made a request for repatriation; or against Japan, on December 8, 1941, made a request for repatriation; or
- (b) has been in detention at any place in virtue of an order made pursuant nas peen in account of the Defence of Canada Regulations or of Order in to the provisions of the Defence of Echnicery 1042 to the provisions of the 5th day of February, 1943, as amended by Council P.C. 946, of the 5th day of 1045 and more the february in the february in the second more than the seco P.C. 5637, of the 16th day of August, 1945, and was so detained as at midnight of September 1, 1945;

may be deported to Japan.

(2) Every naturalized British subject of the Japanese race of sixteen years of age or over resident in Canada who has made a request for repatriation may be deported to Japan: Provided that such person has not revoked in writing such request prior to midnight the first day of September, 1945.

(3) Every natural born British subject of the Japanese race of sixteen years of age or over resident in Canada who has made a request for repatriation may be 20 deported to Japan; Provided that such person has not revoked in writing such request prior to the making by the Minister of an order for deportation.

(4) The wife and children under sixteen years of age of any person for whom the Minister makes an order for deportation to Japan may be included in such order and deported with such person.

3. Subject to the provisions of section 2 of this Order a request for repatriation shall be deemed final and irrevocable for the purpose of this Order or any action taken thereunder.

4. The Minister may

- (a) make orders for the deportation of any persons subject to deportation:
- (b) take such measures as he deems advisable to provide or arrange for the deportation of such persons, and for their transportation, detention, discipline, feeding, shelter, health or welfare, pending their deportation;

10

- (c) make such orders, rules or regulations as he deems necessary for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Order;
- (d) subject to the approval of the Governor in Council, employ such officers and other employees as are necessary to assist him in carrying out this

Order and fix their remuneration;

(e) authorize from time to time any person to exercise on his behalf any power vested in him under paragraph (b) of this section.

5. An order for deportation made by the Minister shall be in force and effect from the date of the order.

6. (1) Any person for whom an order for deportation is made or who, having made a request for repatriation, is proceeding to Japan without the issue of such 10 an order, shall be entitled, in so far as circumstances at the time permit

- (a) at or immediately prior to the time of his deportation from Canada, to purchase suitable foreign exchange to the extent of any money in his possession or standing to his credit in Canada or advanced to him by the Minister pursuant to section seven and to take such foreign exchange out of Canada with him;
- (b) to deposit any money in his possession or standing to his credit in Canada
- with the Custodian of Enemy Property, who shall provide such person with a receipt therefor and purchase foreign exchange therewith, and transfer the same, less transfer charges, to such person whenever reasonably possible following upon his deportation;
- (c) at the time of his deportation to take with him such other personal property belonging to him as may be authorized by the Minister;

and the Foreign Exchange Control Board shall do such things and issue such permits as may be required to implement these provisions.

(2) Where real or personal property of a person who has been deported to Japan or who, having made a request for repatriation, has proceeded to Japan without the issue of an order for deportation, has not been sold or otherwise dis-30 posed of prior to departure such real and personal property shall, as of the date of deportation of such person, be vested in the Custodian of Enemy Property, who shall sell the same as soon as in his opinion it is reasonably practicable to do so, and in the meantime he may take such measures as he deems proper for the care, maintenance and safeguarding of such property, and the net proceeds realized from such sale, after the deduction of reasonable charges of handling shall be placed to the credit of such person and dealt with as provided in paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section.

7. (1) The Minister may at or immediately prior to the time of departure advance to or for a person who is being deported to Japan or who, having made a request for repatriation, is proceeding to Japan without the issue of an order for deportation, an amount in suitable foreign exchange equivalent to the following:
(a) Where such person is sixteen years of age or over and does not possess at

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- (a) Where such person is sixteen years of ago at the amount he possess at least two hundred dollars, the difference between the amount he possesses and two hundred dollars which shall be paid to such person;
- (b) Where such person has one or more dependents under sixteen years of age and does not possess at least two hundred dollars together with a further amount computed on the basis of fifty dollars for each such dependent, the difference between the amount he possesses and the total of two hundred dollars and the amount so computed, to be paid to such

(2) Any amount advanced as provided for in subsection (1) of this section shall be recoverable from the person to whom it is paid, from any money to the credit of such person with the Custodian of Enemy Property.

8. (1) The Minister may make arrangements with any department or agency of the Government of Canada to assist him in carrying out the provisions of this

Order. 20 (2) The Department of National Defence shall provide any military guard 20 personnel which may be required in carrying out the provisions of this Order.

(3) The Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police shall give all assistance which may be required of him by the Minister in the carrying out of the provisions of this Order.

9. Any person for whom an order for deportation is made and who is detained pending deportation or who is placed under restraint in the course of deportation by virtue of any order or measure made or taken under Section 4 of this Order shall, while so detained or restrained, be deemed to be in legal custody.

10. Any person who resists or obstructs or attempts to resist or obstruct any 30 peace officer or other person from carrying out his duties with respect to any order made pursuant to the provisions of this Order shall be guilty of an offence against this Order.

11. Any person who contravenes or omits to comply with any of the provisions of this Order or any order made or given pursuant thereto is guilty of an offence and liable upon summary conviction to a fine not exceeding Five Hundred Dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months or to both such fine and such imprisonment.

12. Every document purporting to be or to contain or to be a copy of an order, certificate or authority made or given by the Minister in pursuance of the provisions of this Order and purporting to be signed by the Minister shall be received as evidence of such order, certificate or authority without proof of the signature or of the official character of the person appearing to have signed the same and without further proof thereof.

GENERAL

13. The costs involved in the administration of this Order shall be paid from the amounts allotted from the war appropriation to the Department of Labour for

10 Japanese administration.

A. D. P. HEENEY. Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 7356

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA

SATURDAY, the 15th day of December, 1945.

PRESENT:

HIS EXCELLENCY

THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL:

Whereas by Order in Council P.C. 7355 of 15th December, 1945, provision 20 is made for the deportation of persons who, during the course of the war, have requested to be removed or sent to an enemy country or otherwise manifested their sympathy with or support of the enemy powers and have by such actions shown themselves to be unfit for permanent residence in Canada;

Therefore, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State (concurred in by the Secretary of State for External Affairs) and under the authority of the War Measures Act, Chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, is pleased to order and doth hereby order as follows:

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1. Any person who, being a British subject by naturalization under the Naturalization Act, Chapter 138, R.S.C. 1927, is deported from Canada under the provisions of Order in Council P.C. 7355 of 15th December, 1945, shall, as and from the date upon which he leaves Canada in the course of such deportation, cease to be either a British subject or a Canadian national.

2. The Secretary of State shall publish in the Canada Gazette the names of all persons who have ceased to be British subjects or Canadian nationals by virtue of this Order.

> A. D. P. HEENEY, Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 7357

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA

SATURDAY, the 15th day of December, 1945.

PRESENT:

HIS EXCELLENCY

THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL:

Whereas during the war particular measures with regard to persons of the Japanese race in Canada were made necessary by reason of their concentration along the Pacific coast of Canada;

10 And whereas experience during the war in the administration of Order in Council P.C. 946 of February 5, 1943, providing for the control of persons of the Japanese race has indicated the desirability of determining whether the conduct of such Japanese persons in time of war was such as to make the deportation of any of them desirable in the national interest;

And whereas it is deemed advisable to make provision for the appointment of a Commission to institute the investigation referred to above;

Therefore His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and under the authority of the War Measures Act, Chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, is pleased to order and 20 doth hereby order as follows:

1. A Commission consisting of three persons shall be appointed to make inquiry concerning the activities, loyalty and the extent of co-operation with the Government of Canada during the war of Japanese nationals and naturalized persons of the Japanese race in Canada in cases where their names are referred to the Commission by the Minister of Labour for investigation with a view to recommending whether in the circumstances of any such case such person should be deported.

2. Notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of Order in Council P.C. 7355 of the 15th day of December, 1945, the Commission may, at the request of the Minister of Labour, inquire into the case of any naturalized British subject of the Japanese race who has made a request for repatriation and which request is final under the said Order in Council and may make such recommendations with respect to such case as it deems advisable.

3. The Commission shall report to the Governor in Council.

4. Any person of the Japanese race who is recommended by the Commission for deportation shall be deemed to be a person subject to deportation under the provisions of Order in Council P.C. 7355 of the 15th day of December, 1945, and the provisions thereof shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to such person.

5. Where any person is recommended for deportation pursuant to this Order he shall, as and from the date on which he leaves Canada in the course of such deportation, cease to be either a British subject or a Canadian national.

6. The Commission shall, for the purpose of all inquiries and investigations made pursuant to this Order, have all the powers and authority of Commissioners appointed under Part One of the Inquiries Act.

7. The Commission is authorized to engage the services of such clerks, reporters, assistants and counsel as they deem advisable to aid and assist in the performance of their duties.

8. The Commissioners shall be paid such remuneration, allowances and expenses as the Governor in Council may fix.

9. All expenses incurred in connection with the inquiries and investigation of the Commission pursuant to this Order, including the remuneration, allowances and expenses of the commissioners, shall be paid from amounts allowed from the War Appropriation to the Department of Labour for such purpose.

> A. D. P. HEENEY, Clerk of the Privy Council.

Teletype Message

FROM: The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, To: The Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Washington,

OTTAWA, September 17th, 1945.

No. EX-3366 Secret Cypher

Please ask United States authorities to transmit the following message by the 30 most appropriate channel from Canadian Government to General MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Begins:

There are approximately 24,000 people of Japanese origin now resident in Canada. About 10,000 (including dependents) have expressed a desire to be

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repatriated to Japan. There are also about 500 Japanese nationals now interned whom it will probably be desired to deport. At a later date it is probable that there will be some additional deportees and voluntary repatriates who will also have to be removed. The Canadian Government is anxious to proceed with repatriation and deportation as soon as this can be done without causing you embarrassment. It is difficult to proceed with redistribution and relaxation of control over Japanese remaining in Canada until repatriates and deportees are

It is proposed that repatriates and deportees from Canada should be given removed. 10 free transportation for themselves and their effects and provided with a maintenance grant upon repatriation sufficient to take care of their immediate needs,

also that they be permitted to transfer remainder of their funds to Japan. You will appreciate the desire of the Canadian Government to proceed with these plans as soon as possible. The Canadian Government would be grateful for your advice as to the earliest date on which you would be prepared to have

For your own information the whole difficult subject of repatriation and these people arrive in Japan. Ends. relocation of persons of Japanese race is under consideration by a special Cabinet Committee. It would obviously simplify the problem if we were able to proceed

20 immediately to return to Japan the elements referred to in the above message and we would be obliged if you would let us know what action is contemplated by U.S. authorities in this connection. It occurs to us that if the United States have it in mind to repatriate any considerable numbers of disloyal Japanese simultaneous arrangements might be made which might expedite and simplify the problems involved.

Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Copy

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Teletype

FROM: The Canadian Ambassador to the United States The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada. To:

CYPHER TELETYPE WA-5545

WASHINGTON, October 29th, 1945.

WA-5545. Further my Wa-5323 of October 15th and in reply to Mr. Wrong's letter to Mr. Pearson of October 27th respecting repatriation to Japan of persons of Japanese race in Canada. I have been advised this morning by State Department that a reply has been received from General MacArthur.

2. The reply is to the effect that he authorizes the immediate repatriation of some 160 special cases now held in the United States. In addition, repatriation of all Japanese now held in the United States and Canada who desire to return, or whose return is desired by the two Governments, is authorized subject only to

3. State Department are proceeding immediately with the repatriation of the provision of shipping. special cases and intend to hold a meeting within the next week to review the situation respecting the balance of the persons to be repatriated. A representative of the Embassy will attend the meeting and I would appreciate the following:

(a) Most recent figure on the Number of Japanese in Canada who will be

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- (b) Whether any representative may offer to assist by the provision of trans-
- portation, and, if so, to what extent. Charge D'Affaires.

P.C. 7414

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA

FRIDAY, the 28th day of December, 1945.

PRESENT:

HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL:

Whereas The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945 comes into force on the first day of January, 1946 and by its terms provides that on and after that day the war shall for the purposes of the War Measures Act be deemed no longer to exist;

And whereas under section 4 of The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945 the Governor in Council may, without prejudice to any other power conferred by that Act, order that orders and regulations lawfully made under the War Measures Act or pursuant to authority created thereunder in force immediately before the day The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945 comes into 30 force shall, while that Act is in force, continue in full force and effect subject to amendment or revocation thereunder;

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And whereas section 12 of the Interpretation Act provides that where an Act is not to come into operation immediately on the passing thereof and confers power to make any order, that power may, unless the contrary intention appears, so far as may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of making the Act effective at the date of the commencement thereof, be exercised at any time after the passing the Act, subject to this restriction, that any such order shall not come into operation until the Act comes into operation;

And whereas it is necessary and expedient for the purpose of making The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945 effective at the date of the National Emergency Transitional Powers and regulations made under the War 10 commencement thereof that those orders and regulations made under the War 10 kessures Act or pursuant to authority created thereunder in force immediately Measures Act or pursuant to authority created thereunder in force immediately before the first day of January, 1946 should be in full force and effect from such commencement and that there should be no cessation in the operation of such orders and regulations resulting from the War Measures Act (sections 3, 4 and 5 thereof) ceasing to operate;

Now, therefore, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice, and under the powers conferred by The Mational Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945, is pleased to order and doth National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945, is pleased to order and doth hereby order that all orders and regulations lawfully made under the War Measures hereby order that all orders and regulations lawfully made under the War Measures hereby order that all orders and regulations lawfully made under the War Measures before the day The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945 comes into before the day The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945 comes into force shall, while that Act is in force, continue in full force and effect subject to amendment or revocation under that Act.

A. D. P. HEENEY, Clerk of the Privy Council.

2. Order of the Honourable, the Chief Justice of Canada, for inscription of Reference.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

WEDNESDAY, the 9th day of January, A.D. 1946.

Before The Honourable, The Chief Justice of Canada.

IN THE MATTER of a reference as to the validity of Orders in Council of the 15th day of December, 1945, (P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357) in relation to persons of the Japanese race.

UPON the application of the Attorney General of Canada for directions as to 10 the inscription for hearing of the question in relation to the above mentioned Orders in Council referred by His Excellency the Governor General in Council for hearing and consideration by the Supreme Court of Canada under the provisions of section 55 of the Supreme Court Act and upon hearing read the Order in Council of the 55 of the Supreme Court Act and upon hearing forth the said question and upon 8th day of January, 1946, (P.C. 45) setting forth the said question and upon hearing what was alleged by Counsel for the Attorney General of Canada:

IT IS ORDERED that the said reference be inscribed for hearing by this Honourable Court on the 24th day of January, 1946;

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respective Attorneys General of the Provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, 20 Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec and Saskatchewan be notified by the Attorney General of Canada of the hearing of the argument on the said reference by telegram and by serving on the agents in Ottawa of the said Attorneys General on or before the 10th day of January, 1946, a copy of the said Order in Council, together with a copy of this order.


AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the persons comprising the Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians be notified by the Attorney General of Canada of the hearing of the argument on the said reference by telegram addressed to the solicitor for the said Committee and by serving on the agents in Ottawa of the said solicitor on or before the 10th day of January, 1946, a copy of the said Order 30 in Council, together with a copy of this order. AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Attorney General of Canada shall file with the Registrar of the Supreme Court the printed case on the said reference on or before the 16th day of January, 1946, and serve copies forthwith on the agents in Ottawa of the said Attorneys General of the said Provinces and of the solicitor for the Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the said Attorney General of Canada and the said respective Attorneys General of the said Provinces be at liberty to file Factums of their respective arguments on or before the 21st day of January, 1946 and to appear and be heard by Counsel on the argument of the said reference.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians be at liberty to file a Factum of its arguments on or before the 21st day of January, 1946, and to appear and be heard by Counsel on the argument of the said reference.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the said reference be given by publishing a copy of the said Order in Council without the appendices thereto and of this order in the *Canada Gazette* on or before the 14th day of January, 1946.

"T. RINFRET," C.J.C.



File Pocket 104(s)

In the Supreme Court of Canada

IN THE MATTER OF A REFERENCE AS TO THE VALIDITY OF ORDERS IN COUNCIL OF THE 15TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1945 (P.C. 7355, 7356, AND 7357), IN RELATION TO PERSONS OF THE JAPANESE RACE.

FACTUM OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA.

THE HON. R. L. MAITLAND, K.C., Counsel.

EWART, SCOTT, & CO., Ottawa Agents.

IN THE MATTER OF A REFERENCE AS TO THE VALIDITY OF ORDERS IN COUNCIL OF THE 15TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1945 (P.C. 7355, 7356, AND 7357), IN RELATION TO PERSONS OF THE JAPANESE RACE.

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FACTUM OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA.

The question for determination is whether Orders in Council dated the 15th day of December, 1945, being P.C. 7355, 7356, and 7357 are *ultra* 10 *vires* of the Governor in Council, either in whole or in part, and, if so, in what particular or particulars and to what extent. The Orders in Council are set out in the case, page —, and are made under the authority of the "War Measures Act," R.S.C. 1927, chap. 206. The question of their validity involves a consideration of "The National Emergency Transitional validity involves a consideration of " The National Emergency Act"), Powers Act, 1945" (hereinafter referred to as the "Emergency Act"), which was assented to on the — day of December, 1945, and which came into force on the 1st day of January, 1946. Section 4 of that Act provides:—

"Without prejudice to any other power conferred by this Act the "Governor-in-Council may order that the orders and regulations made "under the 'War Measures Act' or pursuant to authority created "under the said Act in force immediately before the day this Act comes "into force shall, while this Act is in force, continue in full force and "effect subject to amendment or revocation under this Act."

Section 5 provides:-

"This Act shall come into force on the first day of January one "thousand nine hundred and forty-six, and on and after that day the "war against Germany and Japan shall for the purposes of the 'War "Measures Act' be deemed no longer to exist."

30 Pursuant to the powers contained in section 4, the Governor in Council on the 28th day of December, 1945, passed Order in Council P.C. 7414 (case, p. ____), under which it is ordered that all orders and regulations lawfully made under the "War Measures Act" or pursuant to authority created under the said Act in force immediately before the day the "Emergency Act" comes into force, shall, while that Act is in force, continue in full force and effect subject to amendment or revocation under that Act. It is noted that this Order in Council purports also to be made pursuant to

section 12 of the "Interpretation Act," which gives authority to make an Order in Council under an Act which is not yet in force, for the purpose of making the Act effective at the date of the commencement thereof. It will be seen therefore that, *prima facie*, Orders in Council Nos. 7355, 7356, and 7357 made under the "War Measures Act" are now in force pursuant to the provisions of the "Emergency Act" and P.C. 7414 made thereunder.

The validity of the Orders in Council in question depends upon, first, whether they were a valid exercise of the powers contained in the "War Measures Act" at the time they were passed—i.e., 15th December, 1945— 10 and second, whether they are now validly in force by virtue of the "Emerg-

ency Act " and the Order in Council made thereunder.
As to the first, there is now no doubt that the "War Measures Act" is within the legislative competence of the Dominion Parliament, re Gray, 57 s.C.R. 150; Fort Frances Pulp and Power Co. v. Manitoba Free Press S.C.R. 150; S.C.R. 1. The Fort Frances case is also authority for the exercise (1943), S.C.R. 1. The Fort Frances case is also authority for the exercise of the powers under the "War Measures Act" after the cessation of hosof the powers under the "War Measures Act" after the cessation of hosof the powers under the "War Measures Act" after the emergency The sole question for determination, therefore, is whether the emergency resulting from the war existed at the time the Orders in Council were passed. The emergency is stated in the preamble to Order in Council P.C. 7355 as follows:—

"Whereas during the course of the war with Japan certain Japa-"nese nationals manifested their sympathy with or support of Japan "by making requests for repatriation to Japan and otherwise;

" by making requests for repatriation to sapar and the requested "And whereas other persons of the Japanese race have requested " or may request that they be sent to Japan;

"And whereas it is deemed desirable that provisions be made to "deport the classes of persons referred to above;

"And whereas it is considered necessary by reason of the war, for "the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada, that pro-"vision be made accordingly."

This statement of fact must be taken to be conclusive. The Courts do not overrule the Government in a matter of this sort, except upon very clear evidence that it was wrong. On this point Lord Haldane in the *Fort Frances* case said, p. 706:—

"The effect of the economic and other disturbance occasioned "originally by the war may thus continue for some time after it is "terminated. The question of the extent to which provision for cir-"cumstances such as these may have to be maintained is one on which "a Court of law is loath to enter. No authority other than the central "government is in a position to deal with a problem which is essen-"tially one of statesmanship. It may be that it has become clear that "the crisis which arose is wholly at an end and that there is no justifi-"cation for the continued exercise of an exceptional interference which

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" becomes *ultra vires* when it is no longer called for. In such a case "the law as laid down for distribution of powers in the ruling instru-"ment would have to be invoked. But very clear evidence that the "crisis had wholly passed away would be required to justify the "judiciary, even when the question raised was one of *ultra vires* which "it had to decide, in overruling the decision of the government that "exceptional measures were still requisite. In saying what is almost obvious, their Lordships observe themselves to be in accord with the "view taken under analogous circumstances by the Supreme Court of "the United States, and expressed in such decisions as that in *Hamil*-"ton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co. 251 U.S. 146."

See also the judgment of Sir Lyman Duff, C.J., in The Chemicals Reference (1943), S.C.R. 1, at p. 12, as follows:—

"I cannot agree that it is competent to any court to canvass the considerations which have, or may have, led him (the Governor-in-Council) to deem such regulations necessary or advisable for the transcendent objects set forth. The authority and the duty of passing on that question are committed to those who are responsible for the security of the country—the Executive Government itself, under, I repeat, its responsibility to Parliament. The words are too plain for dispute: the measures authorized are such as the Governor-in-Council (not the courts) deems necessary or advisable."

In A.G. v. Wilts United Dairies, 1922, 91 L.J.K.B. 897, an order of the Food Controller made in April, 1919, came into question, whereby he regulated the sale of milk by licence and imposed a charge of 2d. a gallon as a condition of granting a licence. It was held he had no authority to impose the licence fee. As stated by Lord Buckmaster, p. 700:—

"The only question here is, Were such powers granted?"

In Halliday's Case, 1917, A.C. 260, Lord Finlay, L.C., stated, p. 30 268-9:-

"It may be necessary in time of great public danger to entrust "great powers to His Majesty in Council, and that Parliament may do "so feeling certain that such powers will be reasonably exercised."

It is submitted, therefore, that with respect to the persons mentioned in the Orders in Council in question there existed a national emergency as a result of the war sufficient to justify the passage of the Orders in Council, and that this question is not now open to debate.

Apart from the question of the existence of a national emergency, the Orders in Council are a valid exercise of the powers of the Governor in 40 Council under the "War Measures Act" within the meaning of section 3 of that Act as an "order deemed necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada" and comes within clause (b) of the said section—"Arrest, detention, exclusion and deportation," also

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clause (f)—"Appropriation, control, forfeiture and disposition of property and of the use thereof." The Act also provides that all orders made under section 3 shall have the force of law. On this point *see* Rinfret, *J.*, as he then was, in the *Chemicals Reference* (*supra*), p. 17–8:—

"The powers conferred upon the Governor in Council by the 'War "Measures Act' constitute a law-making authority, an authority to "pass legislative enactments such as should be deemed necessary and "advisable by reason of war; and, when acting within those limits, "the Governor in Council is vested with plenary powers of legislation "as large and of the same nature as those of Parliament itself (Lord "Selborne in *The Queen v. Burah*, 1878, 3 A.C., 889). Within the "ambit of the Act by which his authority is measured, the Governor in "Council is given the same authority as is vested in Parliament itself. "He has been given a law-making power."

For these reasons it is submitted the Orders in Council were a valid exercise of the powers contained in the "War Measures Act" at the time they were passed.

With regard to the second branch of the question—i.e., the validity of the "Emergency Act" and P.C. 7414 made thereunder—it is convenient to 20 deal with the Order in Council first.

The preamble to the Order in Council shows the authority under which the Order is made and the enacting part of the Order follows closely the wording of the Act, so that assuming the Act to be valid there is no objection to the Order in Council.

As to the Act itself, under the reasoning of the *Fort Frances* case the only objection that can be raised against the Act is that there was no emergency in existence sufficient to justify the passing of the Act, and conversely it would appear that if it can be said that such an emergency existed the Act is valid. In this connection attention is called to the long recital in the

- 30 preamble to the Act setting out the nature of the emergency which existed at the time the Act was passed, and, as stated in the *Fort Frances* case and quoted above, very clear evidence would be required to justify the judiciary in overruling the decision of the Government that exceptional methods were still requisite. No such evidence is before the Court. It might be argued that the Government was exceeding its powers in passing an Act such as the Act in question some eight months after hostilities had ceased, but a close parallel can be found between the action of the Government in this respect and what was done at the conclusion of the first Great War in regard to paper control, which was the subject of the *Fort Frances* case.
- 40 In that case the impugned Orders in Council were made pursuant to an Act passed on the 7th of July, 1919, 9–10 Geo. V., chap. 63, some eight months after the cessation of hostilities, confirming and extending the powers, jurisdiction, and authority of the Commissioner and Controller of Paper to such extent as might be necessary to enable the Commissioner and Controller to fully complete all work and investigations begun by him under previous Orders in Council made under the "War Measures Act," and to

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determine all questions and to make all necessary orders with respect to matters begun or coming before them prior to the publication in the Canada Gazette of a proclamation that the war no longer existed. It further extended the powers of the Paper Control Tribunal to determine all matters pending at the declaration of peace and subsequent appeals, and further provided that except for the purpose of finally completing all matters undertaken and determining all questions arising prior to the declaration of peace the powers, authority, and jurisdiction of the Commissioner, Controller of Paper, and the Paper Control Tribunal should cease upon the The validity of that Act came 10 publication of the proclamation of peace. into question in the Fort Frances case, and after disposing of the constitutional issue in favour of the Dominion, Lord Haldane stated as follows, p. 705 - 6:-

"The other point which arises is whether such exceptional neces-"sity as must be taken to have existed when the war broke out, and "almost of necessity for some period subsequent to its outbreak, con-"tinued through the whole of the time within which the questions in "the present case arose.

"When war has broken out it may be requisite to make special "provision to ensure the maintenance of law and order in a country "even when it is in no immediate danger of invasion. Public opinion "may become excitable, and one of the causes of this may conceivably "be want of uninterrupted information in newspapers. Steps may " have to be taken to ensure supplies of these and to avoid shortage, and "the effect of the economic and other disturbance occasioned originally "by the war may thus continue for some time after it is terminated. ". . . When then, in the present instance, can it be said that the "necessity altogether ceased for maintaining the exceptional measure " of control over the newspaper print industry introduced while the war "was at its height? At what date did the disturbed state of Canada " which the war had produced so entirely pass away that the legislative "measures relied on in the present case became ultra vires? It is "enough to say that there is no clear and unmistakable evidence that "the government was in error in thinking that the necessity was still " in existence at the dates on which the action in question was taken by "the Paper Control Tribunal."

Lord Haldane then goes on to deal with statements which had been made to the effect that the war itself was at an end and refers to the statement to that effect made by the Government itself in an Order in Council on 40 December 20th, 1919, some seven months before the passage of the Order in Council in question in the case, and observed that the first-mentioned Order in Council dealt only with the results following from the cessation of actual war conditions, and excepted from repeal certain measures concerned with consequential conditions arising out of war, which might obviously continue to produce effects remaining in operation after war itself was over, and concluded (page 708) :---

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"Their Lordships find themselves unable to say that the Dominion "Government had no good reason for thus temporarily continuing the "paper control after actual war had ceased, but while the effects of "war conditions might still be operative."

It is submitted that the reasoning of Lord Haldane in the Fort Frances case applies in all respects to the case at bar. In the present case various Orders were made under the "War Measures Act" dealing with the custody and control of persons of the Japanese race and their property during the war, and Parliament, recognizing that a national emergency still existed 10 as a result of war conditions, passed the "Emergency Act" some eight months after hostilities had ceased, and by section 4 empowered the Governor in Council to make an Order that orders and regulations made under the "War Measures Act" should continue in force for another year.

It might further be contended that the fact of enacting the "Emergency Act" and by that Act declaring (section 5) that after that Act came into force, the war against Germany and Japan shall, for the purposes of the "War Measures Act," be deemed no longer to exist, in itself was an indication that the emergency had ceased to exist, otherwise it would have been sufficient to have left the orders and regulations made under the "War

- 20 Measures Act" in operation until they were revoked or until peace was declared, and in this connection reference is made to section 2 of the "War Measures Act," which provides that the issue of a proclamation shall be conclusive evidence that war exists and of its continuance until by the issue of a further proclamation it is declared that the war no longer exists. This latter proclamation has of course not yet been issued. As to this contention it is submitted that the same reasoning applies here as to what was said by Lord Haldane in the *Fort Frances* case dealing with the statements made in the Order in Council of December 20th, 1919, that the war no longer existed (p. 707), where he pointed out that this Order in Council
- 30 deals only with the results following from the cessation of actual war conditions, and excepts from repeal certain measures concerned with consequential conditions arising out of war which may obviously continue to produce effects remaining in operation after war itself is over. What was done in the present case is merely an extension or enlargement of what was done in the matter of paper control at the end of the first Great War, and instead of continuing the Orders in Council made under the "War Measures Act" relating solely to persons of the Japanese race, the Government has continued in force all the orders and regulations made under the "War Measures Act" which existed on 31st December, 1945, for a further period of one year. No different principle is involved, and it is submitted that as


long as the Government was satisfied that an emergency existed as a result of the war requiring the legislation in question, it was competent to enact it. Parliament has said in the preamble to the "Emergency Act" that the emergency existed, and it is not for the Courts to question that statement unless there is strong and clear evidence that the Government was mistaken. Much and strong evidence could be adduced to show the reason why the Government came to that conclusion, but on a reference of this kind such evidence is not and can not be before the Court for consideration, and the Court is limited to the consideration of the question as to whether it was competent for the Government to enact the legislation, and if the answer to this question is in the affirmative that is an end to the question.


For these reasons it is respectfully submitted that the answer to the question submitted for the consideration of this Court should be that the Orders in Council in question are wholly *intra vires* of the Governor in Council.

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E. PEPLER, Of Counsel for the Attorney-General of British Columbia.

Victoria, B.C., 17th January, 1946.





IN THE MATTER OF A REFERENCE AS TO THE VALIDITY OF ORDERS IN COUNCIL OF THE 15TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1945 (P.C. 7355, 7356 AND 7357), IN RELATION TO PERSONS OF THE JAPANESE RACE.

Factum of the Attorney General of Canada

OTTAWA EDMOND CLOUTIER PRINTER TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY 1946

IN THE MATTER OF A REFERENCE AS TO THE VALIDITY OF ORDERS IN COUNCIL OF THE 15TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1945 (P.C. 7355, 7356 AND 7357), IN RELATION TO PERSONS OF THE JAPANESE RACE.

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Factum of the Attorney General of Canada

PART I

By Order in Council of January 8, 1946 (P.C. 45) the following question is referred to this Court for hearing and consideration, namely:—

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Are the Orders in Council dated the 15th day of December, 1945, being P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357, *ultra vires* of the Governor in Council either in whole or in part and if so in what particular or particulars and to what extent?

The first Order in Council referred to (P.C. 7355), is an Order authorizing the repatriation or sending to Japan of designated classes of persons who are nationals of Japan or who are of the Japanese race and conferring authority on the Minister of Labour for that purpose. The second Order in Council (P.C. 7356) provides that persons leaving Canada pursuant to the first mentioned Order, if they are naturalized British subjects under the Naturalization Act of Canada, shall cease to be either British subjects or Canadian nationals. The third Order **20** in Council (P.C. 7357) authorizes a Commission to investigate the activities, loyalty and extent of co-operation with the Government of Canada during the war of Japanese nationals and naturalized persons of the Japanese race named by the Minister of Labour with a view to making recommendations as to the deportation of such persons under the first mentioned Order.

The latter two Orders in Council have no operation except by reason of the first Order in Council. The three Orders in Council constitute one scheme the validity of which depends on the first Order in Council, P.C. 7355.

Order in Council P.C. 7355 is made following recitals that during the course of the war with Japan certain Japanese nationals manifested their sympathy with or support of Japan by making requests for repatriation to Japan and otherwise and other persons of the Japanese race have requested or may request that they be sent to Japan. It further recites that it is considered necessary by reason of the war for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada that provision be made to deport these classes of persons.

The Order in Council is expressed to be made under the authority of the War Measures Act.

10 Section two of the Order establishes three categories of persons who "may be deported to Japan".

The first category includes every national of Japan, who is not also a Canadian national, of sixteen years of age or over, resident in Canada who was detained pursuant to the provisions of the Defence of Canada Regulations or of Order in Council P.C. 946 of February 5, 1943, as amended by Order in Council P.C. 5637 of August 16, 1945, at midnight of September 1, 1945, the day before the formal unconditional surrender of the military forces of Japan. The relevant regulations of the Defence of Canada Regulations (Consolidation) 1942 were regulations 21, 24 and 25. Regulation 21 provided that the Minister of Justice, if satisfied 20 that with a view to preventing any particular person from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or the safety of the state it was necessary so to do, might make an order directing that the person be detained. Regulation 24 provided that all enemy aliens who were members of enemy armed forces and who attempted to leave Canada and in regard to whom there was reasonable ground to believe that their attempted departure was with a view to assisting the enemy or who were engaged or had attempted to engage in espionage or acts of a hostile nature or who gave or attempted to give information to the enemy or who assisted or attempted to assist the enemy or who were on reasonable grounds suspected of doing or attempting to do any of these acts should be arrested and 30 detained. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of regulation 25 provided that if any enemy alien refuses to give an undertaking to report and to observe the laws of Canada and to abstain from acts of hostility or communication with the enemy or who in the judgment of the Registrar or the Minister of Justice could not consistently with the public safety be allowed at large or who fails to register when required or to answer questions truthfully or to observe any of the conditions upon which he was permitted his liberty, might be interned as a prisoner of war. When regulation 21 mentioned above was revoked by Order in Council P.C. 5637 of August 16, 1945, a further provision was added to Order in Council P.C. 946 of February

5, 1943, that all persons of the Japanese race who were detained pursuant to the provisions of regulation 21 prior to August 15, 1945, and were so detained on August 15, 1945, should continue to be detained subject to release by the Minister of Justice. Order in Council P.C. 946 of February 5, 1943, confers certain powers on the Minister of Labour and makes certain other provisions in connection with persons of the Japanese race evacuated from the protected areas of British Columbia and for the control of persons of the Japanese race in Canada.

The second category of persons who "may be deported to Japan" includes certain persons of the Japanese race of sixteen years of age or over resident in 10 Canada, who have made written "requests for repatriation" i.e. have requested in writing that they be repatriated or sent to Japan (P.C. 7355, section 1(d)). Three classes of such persons are designated in this category:—

- 1. every such person who is a national of Japan and who made such a request since the date of declaration of war by the Government of Canada against Japan on December 8, 1941, (section 2 (1)(a));
- 2. every such person who is a naturalized British subject who made such a request which was not revoked in writing prior to September 1, 1945, the day before the unconditional surrender of the armed forces of Japan, (section 2 (2)); and
- 3. every such person who is a natural-born British subject who has not revoked his request prior to the making by the Minister of an order for his deportation (section 2 (3)).

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Except as provided in paragraphs enumerated 2 and 3 a request for repatriation is final and irrevocable for the purposes of the Order (section 3). Notwithstanding such a request by any person or that the request has become irrevocable by him, the Minister of Labour may, under Order in Council P.C. 7357, refer the case of any naturalized person to the Commission established by that Order in Council for investigation and its recommendation with reference to deportation (P.C. 7357, section 2).

30 The third category of persons includes the wife and children under sixteen years of age of any person against whom an order for deportation is made. They may be included in the order. (section 2(4)).

It is apparent on examination of the Order that, in conjunction with the later provisions of the Order, the authority conferred by the provision "may be deported to Japan" in section 2 is two-fold, namely it contemplates the making of orders for the compulsory deportation of certain persons within the designated categories and it also contemplates the making of arrangements for the transportation and care of persons who have requested to be sent to Japan and who voluntarily proceed to Japan. "Deport" is defined in the Order to mean removal or send from Canada pursuant to the authority of the Order and "deportation" is defined to mean the removal pursuant to the authority of the Order of any person from any place in Canada to a place outside of Canada (section 1(a) and (b)). In subsection 1 of section 6 of the Order, reference is made to "any person for whom an order for deportation is made or who having made a request for repatriation is proceeding to Japan without the issue of such an Order" and it is provided that he "shall be entitled insofar as circumstances at the time 10 permit . . . at or immediately prior to the time of his deportation from Canada . . ." to certain rights. "Deportation" and "deport" clearly include voluntary as well as forcible removal and provide for those persons who have requested to be sent to Japan.

By section 4 of the Order the Minister of Labour is authorized to make orders for the deportation of any person "subject to deportation" i.e. who may be deported under section 2, to take such measures as he deems advisable to provide or arrange for the deportation of such persons and for their transportation, detention, discipline, feeding, shelter and welfare pending their deportation and to make such orders, rules and regulations as he deems necessary for the purpose 20 of carrying out the provision of the Order (paragraphs (a), (b) and (c)). The authority conferred is to make the necessary arrangements for taking to Japan those persons who have requested to be sent as well as those who are to be forcibly deported.

Section 6 of the Order provides that any person for whom an order for deportation is made or who, having made a request for repatriation, is proceeding to Japan without the issue of such an order shall be entitled, insofar as circumstances at time permit, at or immediately prior to the date of his deportation from Canada, to purchase suitable foreign exchange to the extent of any money in his possession or standing to his credit in Canada or advanced to him by the Minister 30 in the circumstances mentioned below and to take the foreign exchange out of Canada with him. He may also deposit any money in his possession or standing to his credit in Canada with the Custodian of enemy property who shall provide him with a receipt therefor and purchase foreign exchange therewith and the Custodian shall transfer the foreign exchange, less transfer charges, to such person whenever it is reasonably possible following upon his deportation. The person deported may also at the time of his deportation take with him such personal property belonging to him as may be authorized by the Minister. The Foreign Exchange Control Board is required to do such things and to issue such permits as may be required to implement the foregoing provisions (section 6(1)).

Where real or personal property of a person who has been deported or who, having made a request for repatriation, has proceeded to Japan without the issue of any order for deportation has not been sold or otherwise disposed of prior to his departure, the property shall as of the date of his deportation be vested in the Custodian of enemy property. The Custodian shall take such measures as he deems proper for the care, maintenance and safeguarding of the property and shall sell it as soon as, in his opinion, it is reasonably practical to do so. The net proceeds realized from the sale shall, after deduction of reasonable handling charges, be held to the credit of the person deported and utilized to purchase 10 foreign exchange to be transferred to the deported person whenever reasonably possible following upon his deportation. (Section 6(2)).

The Minister of Labour is authorized to advance to a person who is being deported or who having made a request for repatriation is proceeding to Japan without the issue of an order for deportation, an amount in suitable foreign exchange which will provide such person with the amount of at least two hundred dollars together with an additional fifty dollars for each dependent when added to the money he already possesses (section 7).

The remaining provisions of the order are largely administrative or ancillary.

The other Orders in Council referred to in the question refered to the Court 20 for consideration and hearing (P.C. 7356 and 7357) are merely complementary to Order in Council P.C. 7355. Both of them in the recitals and in their substantive provisions expressly refer to Order in Council P.C. 7355.

Order in Council P.C. 7356 applies only to persons who are British subjects by naturalization under the Naturalization Act of Canada and provides that any such person, who is deported under the provisions of Order in Council P.C. 7355, shall, as and from the date on which he leaves Canada in the course of his deportation, cease to be either a British subject or a Canadian national. "Deportation" here also is to be interpreted to mean forcible or voluntary removal from Canada.

30 Order in Council P.C. 7357 provides for the establishment of a commission to make inquiries concerning the activities, loyalty and extent of co-operation with the Government of Canada during the war of Japanese nationals and naturalized persons of the Japanese race in Canada in cases where their names are referred to the Commission by the Minister of Labour for investigation with a view to recommending whether in the circumstances of any such case the persons should be deported. Notwithstanding that the requests for repatriation made by naturalized persons of the Japanese race is final under Order in Council P.C. 7355, the Commission may at the request of the Minister of Labour inquire into the case of any such person and may make such recommendations with respect to such case as it deems advisable. Any person of the Japanese race who is recommended by the Commission for deportation shall be deemed to be a person subject to deportation under the provisions of Order in Council P.C. 7355 and as and from the date he leaves Canada in the course of deportation shall cease to be either a British subject or a Canadian national. The remaining provisions of the Order in Council are administrative.

The foregoing Orders in Council were made after the authority of the Supreme 10 Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan had been obtained for the repatriation and sending of the Japanese affected, subject only to provision of shipping (dispatches attached to Order of Reference). Repatriation or sending of these persons to Japan is being carried out as an act of war by the military forces of the allied powers, the acceptance of the persons departed being imposed on Japan.

It is necessary to observe that The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945 came into operation on January 1, 1946 and that Act provides that for the purposes of the War Measures Act the war against Germany and Japan is deemed no longer to exist (section 5). That Act also provides for the continuation by the Governor in Council of Orders lawfully made under the War Measures 20 Act (section 4).

Order in Council P.C. 7414 of December 28, 1945, passed pursuant to section 4 of The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945, is a general order providing that all orders and regulations lawfully made under the War Measures Act or pursuant to authority created under the said Act in force immediately before the day The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945 comes into force, shall, while the latter Act is in force, continue in full force and effect subject to amendment or revocation under the latter Act. The Orders in Council referred to this Honourable Court are now in force pursuant to this general order.

PART II

30 The Attorney General of Canada submits that Orders in Council P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357 were enacted within the authority of the Governor in Council under the War Measures Act and continue in full force and effect by reason of Order in Council P.C. 7414 of December 28, 1945.

PART III

ARGUMENT

The question of the validity of these Orders in Council is solely one of interpretation and application of the provisions of the War Measures Act and the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945.

No question of constitutionality under the British North America Acts or in relation to any other imperial enactment is raised.

Parliament has authority to legislate to confer subordinate legislative authority to enact these Orders in Council.

10 Parliament clearly could have enacted the provisions of the Orders in Council directly.

The distribution of legislative authority effected by the British North America Act between Parliament and the legislatures of the provinces is exhaustive of the whole field of sovereign legislative authority subject only to such limitations as are contained in the British North America Acts.

Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887) 12 A.C. 575, Lord Hobhouse at 588, Attorney General for Canada v. Cain, 1906, A.C. 542; Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for Canada, 1912, A.C.

571, Earl Lorebourn L.C. at 581 and at 583-4;

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Nadan v. The King, 1926, A.C. 482; Statute of Westminster, 1931, sections 2, 3, and 7 (2) and (3). Croft v. Dunphy, 1933, A.C. 156;

British Coal Corporation v. The King, 1935, A.C. 500, Viscount Sankey L.C. at 517-18.

It is clearly within the sovereign power of a state to deport or exile or banish aliens or subjects or citizens of the state and to deprive them of citizenship or nationality acquired by naturalization under the laws of the state and to make such necessary ancillary arrangements as may be required. The fact that external arrangements with other countries may be necessary to carry out such legislation 30 does not affect its legal operation within the state. In any event in the present case external arrangements with the government of the country receiving the persons deported are not necessary. They are deported and their acceptance is imposed on Japan as an act of war through the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, of which Canada is a member. There is nothing in the British North America Acts restricting or limiting the totality of legislative power conferred under those Acts with reference to the deportation, exile or banishment of aliens or British subjects. There is no other imperial legislation effective on these subjects in Canada which cannot be altered in the exercise of the legislative power conferred on Parliament or the legislatures of the provinces under the British North America Acts. Statute of Westminster, 1931, Sections 2, 3 and 7(2) and (3).

Under the British North America Acts the authority to enact legislation in relation to the matters dealt with in Orders in Council P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357 10 is conferred on Parliament.

The matters in relation to which these Orders in Council are enacted clearly fall within the emergency power of Parliament during time of war.

Fort Frances Pulp and Paper Company v. Manitoba Free Press Company Limited, 1923, A.C. 695.

In any event the legislation enacted in these Orders in Councils is "in relation to" matters falling within the normal legislative authority of Parliament under head 25 "naturalization and aliens" and under the opening words "for the peace, order and good government of Canada" of section 91 of the British North America Act. The deportation of aliens and the revocation or termination of status as a 20 British subject acquired by naturalization clearly falls within head 25. The deportation from Canada of persons other than aliens is clearly a matter which does not fall within section 92 of the British North America Act. The legislature of a province cannot provide for deportation from Canada or enact legislation "in relation to" such a subject matter. Since the legislative authority conferred by the British North America Act is exhaustive of full sovereign legislative authority, where a matter does not fall within any of the enumerated heads of 92 it must fall within the opening words of section 91. The omission from the text of the Act of specific reference to any matter in relation to which legislation may be enacted does not raise a presumption that the power to do so is omitted from the 30 Act. On the contrary it is to be taken for granted that the power is bestowed in some quarter . . ." (Earl Loreburn L.C. in Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for Canada (Companies Reference) 1912, A.C. 571 at 583.

John Deere Plow Company Limited v. Wharton, 1915, A.C. 330, Viscount Haldane at 340.

Great West Saddlery Company v. The King, 1921, 2 A.C. 91, Viscount Haldane at 114-5.

Attorney General for Alberta v. Attorney General for Canada (Debt Adjustment Reference) 1943, A.C. 356, Viscount Maugham at 371.

Since Parliament could directly enact the provisions of Orders in Council P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357 it can confer subordinate authority on the Governor in Council to legislate on these subject matters. Where there is no specific provision in the British North America Acts restricting the legislative authority of Parliament in relation to a particular subject matter to legislating directly on such matter itself, Parliament may confer subordinate authority to legislate in relation to that subject matter.

Hodge v. The Queen, (1883) 9 A.C. 117.

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Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board; Attorney General for British Columbia intervening, 1938 A.C. 708.

Reference as to the Validity of the Regulations in Relation to Chemicals, 1943, S.C.R. 1.

There is no provision in the British North America Acts restricting the authority of Parliament, in relation to the matters provided for by the Orders in Council, to legislation enacted directly by Parliament itself.

It is clearly, therefore, within the authority of Parliament to confer authority by the War Measures Act on the Governor in Council to legislate in relation to the 20 matters provided by the Orders in Council.

Moreover no question of constitutionality under the British North America Acts arises with reference to continuation of these Orders in force under The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945. That Act was enacted in recognition of the continued existence of the war to confer authority to legislate in relation to the matters therein mentioned during the emergency period arising out of the war, i.e. the remainder of the war and the period of transition from conditions of war to conditions of peace. The Act contemplates that the state of war continues. Preamble; Sections 2(i)(e), 5 and 7. Section 4 confers authority on the Governor in Council to continue in full force and effect orders and regula-**30** tions made under the War Measures Act. All such orders and regulations were made by reason of the war. It is within the authority of Parliament to confer authority to continue orders and regulations made by reason of the war for the remaining period of the war and until the measures taken can be discontinued in an orderly manner.

The provisions of the War Measures Act empower the Governor in Council to enact the provisions of Orders in Council P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357 of December 15, 1945, and section 4 of The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945 empowers the Governor in Council to continue these Orders in Council in full force and effect.

Section 3 of the War Measures Act provides: "The Governor in Council may do and authorize such acts and things, and make from time to time such orders and regulations, as he may by reason of the existence of real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection deem necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada; and for greater certainty, but not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing terms, it is hereby declared that the powers 10 of the Governor in Council shall extend to all matters coming within the classes of subjects hereinafter enumerated, that is to say:—

- (b) Arrest, detention, exclusion and deportation.
- (f) Appropriation, control, forfeiture and disposition of property and of the use thereof."

"The action of carrying away; forcible removal esp. into exile; transportation"—New English Dictionary edited by Sir James Murray, LL.D. and Henry Bradley, M.A. (Oxford English Dictionary). "Act of deporting or state of being deported; banishment; transportation. In modern law, the removal from a country of an alien considered inimicable to the public welfare; distinguished from *transportation* and *extradition*". Webster's New International Dictionary. "The act of carrying away; removal; transportation; exile; banishment". Worcester's Dictionary.

Order in Council P.C. 7355 providing for the removal voluntarily or forcibly of all the classes designated in Orders in Council mentioned or those recommended for deportation under P.C. 7357 is clearly within the meaning of the term "deportation". The provisions of the Orders in Council in relation to loss of status as a British subject and as a Canadian national and in relation to the control and disposition of property are necessarily incidental to effective legislation in relation **30** to deportation. They, therefore, fall within this enumerated head.

In any event it is not necessary that they should fall within the specific heads enumerated because the authority conferred on the Governor in Council by the general power under the War Measures Act is the fullest plenary legislative power which Parliament can confer subject only to the two conditions that a state of war must exist and that the Governor in Council deems the order necessary by reason of the war for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada. *Reference*

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as to the Validity of the Regulations in Relation to Chemicals, 1943, S.C.R. 1. Duff C. J. at 11 and 12; Rinfret J. at 17-18; Davis J. at 24; Kerwin J. at 29; In Re Gray (1918) 57 S.C.R. 150, the Chief Justice at 158-9; Anglin J. 178-80. The enumeration of powers contained in section 3 does not limit the generality of the general power but on the contrary emphasizes the comprehensive character of the plenary power conferred by it. Re Gray, supra, the Chief Justice at 158; Duff J. at 168; Anglin J. at 177-9.

The Orders in Council were a valid and effective exercise of the authority of the Governor in Council under the War Measures Act and are validly continued in 10 full force and effect under the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945.

A state of war existed between Canada and Japan at the time of the making of the Orders in Council. By section 2 of the War Measures Act the issue of a proclamation by His Majesty or under the authority of the Governor in Council shall be conclusive evidence that war exists until by the issue of a further proclamation it is declared that war no longer exists. By a proclamation dated December 8, 1941, published in the CANADA GAZETTE on the same date, it was declared that a state of war with Japan exists in Canada as and from the 8th day of December, 1941. No proclamation declaring that such a state of war no longer exists had been issued at the time the Orders in Council were made. In fact the 20 state of war with Japan continues to exist.

Oppenheim's International Law (5th Ed.) Vol. II, Chapter VII, page 464 et seq.

Kotzias v. Tyser, 1920, 2 K.B. 69.

Lloyd v. Bowring, 36 T.L.R. 397.

Ruffy-Arnell and Baumann Aviation Company Limited v. The King, 1922, 1 K.B. 599.

Luse Land and Development Company v. North Saskatchewan Land Company Limited, 1920, 3 W.W.R. 571.

The Governor in Council expressly states in Order in Council P.C. 7355, and 30 by reference to that Order in Council states in Orders in Council P.C. 7356 and 7357, that the provisions thereof are considered necessary by reason of the state of war then existing for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada. It is not open to a court to investigate whether in the opinion of the court these provisions are necessary for these purposes. The decision as to the necessity of the measures is one entrusted exclusively to the Governor in Council and where the Governor in Council has decided that they are necessary or advisable the court has no jurisdiction or authority to consider the question. R.V. Comptroller-General of Patents, 1941, 2 A.E.R. 677; Scott L. J. at 681 and Clawson L. J. at 683-4.

Reference re Chemicals, supra. Duff, C. J. at 12-13; Rinfret J. at 19. Liversidge v. Anderson, 1941 3 A.E.R. 338. Greene v. Home Secretary, 1941, 3 A.E.R. 388.

Point of Ayr Collieries Limited v. Lloyd George; 1943, 2 A.E.R. 546 at 547.

Moreover it is apparent that the provisions of the Orders in Council if deemed necessary or advisable for the welfare of Canada, are so necessary or advisable by reason of the war. In the main the persons to be deported are persons who were 10 detained in time of war to preserve the safety of the state or who in time of war requested repatriation or to be sent to an enemy country. The provision for the deportation of the wife and infant children of persons in the first two categories who are ordered to be deported is necessarily incidental to proper humanitarian provisions with reference to persons in the first two categories. The deportation of persons who have indicated by reason of and during the war the undesirability of retaining them in Canada is being effected as an act of war namely by imposing acceptance of these persons on Japan. The provision for revocation of naturaliza-The provisions for recommending tion is necessary to effective deportation. deportation of other persons of the Japanese race after investigation of their 20 activities, loyalty and the extent of their co-operation with the Government of Canada during the war is a provision of the same type as that with reference to the first two categories in Orders in Council P.C. 7355.

No provision of Orders in Council 7355, 7356 and 7357 is inconsistent with or repugnant to any of the provisions of the War Measures Act itself. "Deportation" is patently not considered for the purpose of the War Measures Act as a penalty or a forfeiture. The restrictions relating to penalties and forfeitures do not, therefore, affect the power of deportation. The provision with reference to the vesting of property in the Custodian of enemy property for the purpose of safekeeping and realization of the value thereof is not in conflict with the provisions relating to the **30** appropriation of property by the Crown. "Appropriation" means "The making of a thing private property, whether another's or (as now commonly) one's own; taking as one's own or to one's own use". (A New English Dictionary edited by Sir James Murray L.L.D.); "Appropriation" in the War Measures Act applies to a case where the Crown appropriates property as its own or for its own use. This is clearly in accordance with the provisions of section 7 of the War Measures Act.

Dominion Iron and Steel Company Limited v. The King, (1920) 20 Ex.C.R. 245, Cassels J. at 256.


The vesting of property in a public officer for safekeeping and for disposition for the benefit of the owner is not an appropriation.

Order in Council P.C. 7414 of December 28, 1945, is within the powers conferred on the Governor in Council by the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945.

The authority conferred on the Governor in Council is a plenary legislative power to continue these orders and regulations and is not subject to review in a court.

> AIMÉ GEOFFRION DAVID MUNDELL

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TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT

IN THE MATTER OF

JAPANESE CANADIAN ECONOMIC LOSSES

ARISING FROM EVACUATION

NATIONAL JAPANESE CANADIAN CITIZENS ASSOCIATION

61 COLLEGE STREET

TORONTO, ONTARIO

SUBMISSION TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT

IN THE MATTER OF JAPANESE CANADIAN ECONOMIC LOSSES ARISING FROM EVACUATION

ENTERED BY THE NATIONAL JAPANESE CANADIAN CITIZENS ASSOCIATION 61 COLLEGE STREET, TORONTO 2, ONTARIO

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To the Right Honourable Louis St. Laurent, Prime Minister, and Honourable Members of the Government of Canada.

This submission is made by the National Japanese Canadian Citizens' Association and its component chapter organizations in the provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec. This national body was founded by a conference of representatives of various Japanese Canadian organizations through Canada on September 2, 1947. It has as its primary aims the protection of the economic and social welfare of persons of Japanese ancestry in the Dominion and the development of a truly democratic society wherein fundamental rights and liberties are preserved for all citizens.

After Pearl Harbour in December, 1941, it was deemed expedient to evacuate all persons of the Japanese race from the Pacific Coast of Canada. It was considered to be essential to carry out this task with the least possible delay. Some 22,000 persons were evacuated within 6 months. Being an emergency measure, emergency methods had to be employed.

The B. C. Security Commission was vested with the responsibility of the physical removal of this mass of persons. The immensity of the task and the haste required left little room for the protection of individual rights and humanitarian consideration.

To the Secretary of State, acting as Custodian, fell the onerous and difficult task of protecting the personal chattels and real property of the evacuated population from vandalism, depreciation and destruction. The task was difficult by reason of:

(a) the necessity to hurriedly organize a large staff;(b) the removal on short notice of families, particularly

from remote and isolated areas, without adequate provision for recording or protecting their property;

- (c) the strong anti-Japanese attitude in the community which lowered the moral barriers to condone theft, destruction and exploitation in acquiring assets;
- (d) the panic of uncertainty amongst the evacuees which influenced them to overlook the taking of many precautions for the protection of their property which might have assisted in its preservation.

Prior to evacuation these persons were allowed to dispose of their own assets. In certain cases they were encouraged by the Custodian to do so. However, being under notice to evacuate, many improvident sales were made, and all such sales were as if made on a forced liquidation and were not free sales in a normal market. Heavy losses were sustained. Exploitation was rampant and the Government by various Orders-in-Council recognized the need for protective action. P.C. 288 of January 13, 1942 creating the Japanese Fishing Vessels Disposal Committee, recognized the need for protection from duress in the sale of vessels. However, other types of property were sold at heavy sacrifices.

Once evacuated, all property of evacuees were vested in the Custodian except cash and securities and until August, 1942, vessels. At first it was the intention of the Government to preserve the property of these hapless people. In good faith and in reliance upon this frequently stated policy of the Government and the Custodian,

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many persons left their properties in his care. In this expectation, many persons after leaving their belongings, if they had time, did not make full inventories. In the same expectation, the Custodian's field men often made only general inventories when they were able to get around to the property. They, too, worked under haste and pressure.

After a year's experience with the impossible task of protecting all this property, the Government changed its policy to one of "orderly liquidation". In the meantime vandalism, theft and depreciation had had their toll. Had this policy been established at the time of evacuation and had time permitted, the Japanese could have made full inventories and obtained valuations of their property. However. orderly the liquidation of all of the property of 22,000 people to the last kitchen chair may be, such a sale, it is submitted, must remain a liquidation. The essential difference in price between a liquidation and voluntary sale is universal knowledge. Such sales are the happy hunting ground of bargain seekers, dealers and speculators.

As indicated above, vessels at first did not vest in the Custodian. It was decided at the outset to sell these as rapidly as possible to avoid depreciation and to get them into use in the essential fishing industry. That the boats were damaged in their collection and early detention by the navy has been recognized by the Government. However, compensation for damage and missing essential gear was paid to the purchaser. The market was flooded by the dump-

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ing of these boats in a 7 month period. The unsold boats vested in the Custodian in August, 1942.

Recognizing that injustices had been done, the Government in mid-year, 1947, after study of the problem by the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons, set up a Commission under the Public Inquiries Act to determine the losses suffered and to recommend just and equitable awards therefore. The operative portion of the Orders-in-Council, P.C. 1810 of July 18, 1947 and P.C. 3737 of September 17, 1947 read as follows as amended:

"That the Honourable Mr. Justice Henry Irvine Bird be appointed a Commissioner to inquire into the following claims, namely:-

- (a) that real and personal property vested in the Custodian was disposed of by the Custodian for less than the fair market value thereof at the time of sale
- (b) that personal property vested in the Custodian was lost, destroyed or stolen while in the possession or under the control of the Custodian or some person appointed by him."

Mr. Justice Bird, a Judge of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, was appointed Commissioner. The Commission held hearings and discussions for over two years and the Commissioner has reported his findings.

With respect to the Bird Commission and the awards recommended by the Commissioner, having regard to the immensity and difficulty of the problem, we believe the vast majority of the persons of Japanese ancestry in Canada regard these awards as a measure of rough justice within the limited terms of reference. We respectfully submit, however, that the people of Canada will fall far short of providing "reasonable and just compensation" to evacuees if that compensation is limited to the results of the enquiry. This submission is based upon the following considerations:

- 1. The Difficulty Caused by Limited Scope of Terms of Reference -
 - (a) Fair Market value was to be determined as at date of sale, thus:
 - (i) Deterioration, in some cases admitted by the Crown to be extensive, and not caused through any fault of claimant, had the effect of reducing the award.
 - (ii) Properties which were tenanted at date of sale, by reason of eviction freezing orders, brought less than they would had the claimant been in occupation. This factor was excluded by the terms of reference. However the properties were only tenanted because of evacuation and the evacuees were urged by the Government to rent and if they did not do so the Custodian rented the property himself.
 - (iii) Depression of market value by reason of towns or areas becoming substantially 'ghost towns' resulting from evacuation of Japanese.
 - (b) Loss of goodwill of business was excluded from the terms of reference. For the most part the goodwill of business disappeared when the owner was evacuated. In many cases

tenancies of premises in which businesses were carried on were terminated leaving only the equipment and stockin-trade to sell. In some cases the Custodian sold the business premises and the chattels separately.⁹

- (c) Exclusion of losses on accounts receivable. Evacuees could not themselves collect these accounts by force of law. The Custodian did not, except in a very few cases, employ any collection agency or legal counsel, as a result, a very large number of these accounts were never collected and are now uncollectable.
- (d) By requiring that the property must have been sold by the Custodian the terms of reference excluded:
 - (i) Forced sales by individuals made in the panic of evacuation, despite the fact that the Custodian encouraged sales of businesses particularly.
 - (ii) Sales of vessels through the Japanese Fishing Vessels
 Disposal Committee concurred in by the claimants
 only because any further delay would mean rapid
 depreciation to the vessels. (Report of Royal Commission on Japanese Property, page 42, par. 2 re
 rejection of claims, & page 44, par. 3.)
- (e) Failure to provide for losses incidental to evacuation in addition to the sale of property such as has been provided by Act of Congress in the U.S.A.

2. The Difficulty of Strict Legal Proof of Value -

(a) On all types of property after 6 or 7 years have elapsed.
 (Report of Royal Commission on Japanese Property, page 38, par. 3)

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- (b) By reason of extensive alterations and /or deterioration to real property.
- (c) By reason of the inability to have appraisers examine personal property lost or sold.
- (d) By reason of inadequate records by the claimant due to: (Report of Royal Commission on Japanese Property, re Custodian's administration, page 12, par. 1).
 - (i) The assurance given by the police and the Custodian that his property would be protected. Many of the evacuees therefore did not make detailed inventories of all chattels or have any valuations made on property. A large amount of vandalism occured in many cases before the Custodian took physical possession.
 - (ii) The Custodian often did not take detailed inventories until quite late for the same reason.
 - (iii) In outlying places particularly, the claimants were given very short notice of removal and did not have time to carefully inventory property.
 - (iv) In many cases, records and evidence of value of property were left on the premises and never recovered, being discarded by the Custodian's field men as unsaleable.
- (e) By reason of wide dispersion of claimants, counsel have not been able to consult fully with their clients.
- (f) The unwillingness of many persons to give evidence or take part in the proceedings - a problem common to all public enquiries.

3. Proposals -

In the light of the circumstances we have recounted we propose to the Government that over and above the awards made by the Commissioner within the terms of reference, further compensation should be allowed fully to remedy the injustices suffered by the claimants.

- (a) A percentage of Sale Price allowance on all real properties sold subject to rental regulations.
- (b) A percentage of Sale Price allowance on all real properties to cover depreciation.
- (c) A percentage of Sale Price allowance for goodwill on all businesses subject to sale.
- (d) Percentage of all uncollected accounts receivable.
- (e) Establishment of an adjustment agency to adjust losses on forced sales on claims filed within 12 months with an appeal to the Attorney General for Canada.
- (f) A grant of monies to each adult evacuee to compensate for general losses.
- (g) Interest on all awards from date of sale.
- (g) Adjustments on Real Property not sold to Veterans Land Administration where no special award at a rate equal to the percentage which the average special award bears to the average sale price of properties on which special awards were made.

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4. Conclusion -

This submission has been concerned with drawing to your Government's attention issues which are relevant under the Royal Commission inquiry on Japanese property and issues which were completely excluded or given little attention due to the inadequate terms of reference of the Inquiry.

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We tender as an appendix to this submission, the Association's submission to the Royal Commission on Japanese Canadian Property, derling with the broad aspects of the evacuation property losses and the deeply human and significant experience of a people in Canada which no Ganadian citizen would bear without the utmost sense of grave injustice.

We therefore respectfully suggest a broad appreciation of all the circumstances which shaped the problem into its present form is fully merited, if it is the intent of your Government to provide for a measure of justice which is equal to the standards of a truly democratic, Canadian way of life.

Respectfully submitted,

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HAROLD A. HIROSE, President,

GEORGE TAWAKA, Executive Secretary,

National Japanese Canadian Citizens Association,

61 College Street, Toronto 2, Ontario.

September twenty-second, Nineteen hundred and fifty.

For file pocked of 104-S MR.

IN THE MATTER OF A REFERENCE AS TO THE VALIDITY OF ORDERS IN COUNCIL OF THE 15TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1945 (P.C. 7355, 7356 AND 7357), IN RELATION TO PERSONS OF THE JAPANESE RACE.

THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

WEDNESDAY, the twentieth day of February, A.D. 1946.

PRESENT:

The Honourable The CHIEF JUSTICE OF CANADA; The Honourable Mr. Justice KERWIN; The Honourable Mr. Justice Hudson; The Honourable Mr. Justice TASCHEREAU; The Honourable Mr. Justice RAND; The Honourable Mr. Justice KELLOCK; The Honourable Mr. Justice ESTEY.

IN THE MATTER of a Reference as to the Validity of Orders in Council of the 15th day of December, 1945 (P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357), in relation to persons of the Japanese race.

WHEREAS by Order of His Excellency the Governor General in Council, bearing date the eighth day of January, in the year of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and forty-six (P.C. 45), the important question of law hereinafter set out was referred to the Supreme Court of Canada, for hearing and consideration, pursuant to section 55 of the Supreme Court Act, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, chapter 35:—

"Are the Orders in Council dated the 15th day of December, 1945, being P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357, *ultra vires* of the Governor in Council either in whole or in part and, if so, in what particular or particulars and to what extent?"

AND WHEREAS the said question came before this Court for hearing and consideration on the twenty-fourth 56639-11

and twenty-fifth days of January, in the year of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and forty-six, in the presence of Mr. Aimé Geoffrion, K.C., and Mr. D. W. Mundell, of counsel for the Attorney General of Canada; the Honourable R. L. Maitland, K.C., Attorney General of British Columbia, and Mr. Cuthbert Scott, of counsel for the said Attorney General of British Columbia; Mr. F. A. Brewin, of counsel for the Attorney General of Saskatchewan, and Mr. J. R. Cartwright, K.C., Mr. F. A. Brewin and Mr. J. A. MacLennan, of counsel for the Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians; and after due notice to the Attorneys General for the Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Prince Edward

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Island and Alberta;

WHEREUPON and upon hearing what was alleged by counsel aforesaid, this Court was pleased to direct that the said Reference should stand over for consideration, and the same having come on this day for determination;

THIS COURT HEREBY CERTIFIES to His Excellency the Governor General in Council, for his information, pursuant to subsection 2 of section 55 of the Supreme Court Act, that the opinions in respect of the question referred

The Chief Justice, Kerwin and Taschereau, JJ. are of opinion that the Orders in Council in question are not ultra vires of the Governor in Council, either in

whole or in part. Hudson and Estey, JJ. are of opinion that the Orders in Council are not ultra vires of the Governor in Council with the exception of paragraph 4 of Section 2 of P.C.

7355.

Rand, J. is of opinion that:

(1) Order in Council 7355 is not ultra vires of the Governor in Council in relation to Japanese nationals and to persons of the Japanese race, naturalized under the Naturalization Act of Canada, as well as to persons voluntarily leaving Canada; but is ultra vires in relation to the compulsory deportation of natural born British subjects resident in Canada, and of wives and children under 16 who do not come within the first two classes; and that:

(2) Order in Council 7356 is not ultra vires insofar as it takes away incidental rights and privileges of persons of the Japanese race as Canadian nationals; but that it is ultra vires of the Governor in Council to the extent that it purports to revoke the naturalization of such persons under the Naturalization Act; and that:

(3) Order in Council 7357 is not ultra vires of the Governor in Council, subject to the observance of the requirements of the Naturalization Act as to grounds for the revocation of naturalization.

Kellock, J. is of opinion that:

(1) Order in Council 7355 is not ultra vires except in the following particulars:

(a) Subsection 3 of Section 2 and Section 3 are ultra vires insofar as they authorize the deportation of natural born British subjects who do not wish to leave Canada, and insofar as it prevents such persons from withdrawing consents at any time and in any manner.

(b) Subsection 4 of Section 2 is ultra vires in toto.

(2) Order in Council 7356 is not ultra vires with the exception of Section 1 thereof insofar as it provides for loss of the status of a British subject.

(3) Order in Council 7357 is not ultra vires save insofar as it may purport to authorize a departure from the provisions of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914.

and that the reasons for such answers are to be found in the judgments written and certified by the individual members of the Court, copies of which are hereunto annexed.

> PAUL LEDUC, Registrar.

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(2) Order in Council 7356 is not altra vires in toto, exception of Section 1 thereof insofar as it provides for loss of the status of a British subject.

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the provisions of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1014.

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in the judgments written and certified by the individual members of the Court, copies of which are beseinted and the second of the Court, copies of which are beseinted in a second second second second which are beseinted in a second sec IN THE MATTER of a Reference as to the Validity of Orders in Council of the 15th day of December, 1945 (P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357), in relation to persons of the Japanese race.

BEFORE: The Chief Justice and Kerwin, Hudson, Taschereau, Rand, Kellock and Estey JJ.

The judgment of The Chief Justice and of Kerwin and Taschereau JJ. was delivered by:—

THE CHIEF JUSTICE: On the 15th day of December, 1945, His Excellency, the Governor General in Council, ordered as follows:—

2. (1) Every person of sixteen years of age or over, other than a Canadian national, who is a national of Japan resident in Canada and who,

- (a) has, since the date of declaration of war by the Government of Canada against Japan, on December 8, 1941, made a request for repatriation; or
- (b) has been in detention at any place in virtue of an order made pursuant to the provisions of the Defence of Canada Regulations or of Order in Council P.C. 946, of the 5th day of February, 1943, as amended by P.C. 5637, of the 16th day of August, 1945, and was so detained as at midnight of September 1, 1945;

may be deported to Japan.

(2) Every naturalized British subject of the Japanese race of sixteen years of age or over resident in Canada who has made a request for repatriation may be deported to Japan: Provided that such person has not revoked in writing such request prior to midnight the first day of September, 1945.

(3) Every natural born British subject of the Japanese race of sixteen years of age or over resident in Canada who has made a request for repatriation may be deported to Japan: Provided that such person has not revoked in writing such request prior to the making by the Minister of an order for deportation.

(4) The wife and children under sixteen years of age of any person for whom the Minister makes an order for deportation to Japan may be included in such order and deported with such person.

The Order further provided that a request for repatriation, made under the above provisions, would be deemed final and irrevocable for the purpose of the Order or any action taken thereunder after a fixed delay.

The Minister of Labour was thereby authorized to "make orders for the deportation of any persons subject

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to deportation"; to take such measures as he deemed advisable to arrange for the deportation and for the detention, transportation, etc., of the persons subject thereto, and generally to make such rules or regulations and employ such officers or adopt such measures as he would from time to time deem necessary for the purpose of carrying out the Order.

Certain ancillary provisions are added to the Order with

regard to property and belongings of the person being deported, or subject to deportation, or for the purpose of enabling the Minister to carry out the provisions of the Order. Of these ancillary provisions, section (9) alone

(9) Any person for whom an order for deportation is made and who is detained pending deportation or who is placed under restraint in the is detained pending deportation by virtue of any order or measure made or taken course of deportation by order shall, while so detained or restrained, be under section 4 of the Order shall, while so detained or restrained, be

deemed to be in legal custody. This Order in Council was given No. P.C. 7355 and the reasons for its adoption are stated in the preamble as

Whereas during the course of the war with Japan certain Japanese follows:--nationals manifested their sympathy with or support of Japan by making

requests for repatriation and otherwise; And whereas other persons of the Japanese race have requested or

may request that they be sent to Japan; And whereas it is deemed desirable that provisions be made to deport

the classes of persons referred to above;

And whereas it is considered necessary by reason of the war, for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada, that provision be

On the same day two other Orders in Council were made accordingly; adopted under numbers P.C. 7356 and P.C. 7357. The first of these (7356) refers to Order in Council 7355 whereby provision is made for the deportation of persons who, during the course of the war, have requested to be

removed or sent to an enemy country

or otherwise manifested their sympathy with or support of the enemy powers and have by such actions shown themselves to be unfit for permanent residence in Canada.

It orders that any person who, being a British subject by naturalization under the Naturalization Act, chapter 138, R.S.C. 1927, is deported from Canada under the provisions of Order in Council P.C. 7355 of the 15th of December, 1945,

shall, as and from the date upon which he leaves Canada in the course of such deportation, cease to be either a British subject or a Canadian

Order in Council P.C. 7357 begins by stating that during the war particular measures with regard to persons of the Japanese race were made necessary by reason of their concentration along the Pacific Coast of Canada; that experience during the war in the Administration of Order in Council P.C. 946 of February 5th, 1943, providing for the control of persons of the Japanese race has indicated the desirability of determining whether the conduct of such Japanese persons in time of war was such as to make the deportation of any of them desirable in the national interest, and that it is deemed advisable to make provision for the appointment of a Commission to institute the investigation concerned. It is then ordered that a Commission consisting of three persons shall be appointed to make inquiry concerning the activities, loyalty and the extent of cooperation with the Government of Canada during the war of Japanese nationals and naturalized persons of the Japanese race in Canada in cases where their names are referred to the Commission by the Minister of Labour for investigation with a view to recommending whether in the circumstances of any such case such person should be deported. The Commission is given power, at the request of the Minister of Labour, to inquire into the case of any naturalized British subject of the Japanese race who has made a request for repatriation and which request is final, and to make such recommendations with respect to such case as it deems advisable. The Commission is to report to the Governor in Council. Any person of the Japanese race who is recommended by the Commission for deportation shall be deemed to be a person subject to deportation under the provisions of Order in Council P.C. 7355, which order shall then apply, mutatis mutandis, to such person. As a result of the deportation, the person in question shall cease to be either a British subject or a Canadian national. And, further, the Commission is given, for the purpose of 56639-2

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all inquiries and investigations made pursuant to this Order, all the powers and authority of Commissioners appointed

under part one of the Inquiries Act.

As will be seen, the latter two Orders in Council (7356-7357) have no operation except by reason of the first Order in Council (7355); the three Orders constitute one scheme, the validity of which depends upon the first Order in

I have outlined above the preamble of the first Order in Council. Council. The Order contains certain definitions. "Deportation" is stated to mean the removal, pursuant to the authority of this Order (7355), of any person from any place in Canada to a place outside Canada. "Deported" is stated to mean removed or sent from Canada pursuant to the authority of this Order. "Minister" means the Minister of Labour. "Request for repatriation" means a written request or statement of desire to be repatriated or sent to

The Order establishes three categories of persons who may be deported to Japan. The first category includes Japan.

every national of Japan, who is not also a Canadian national, of sixteen years of age or over, resident in Canada who was detained pursuant to the provisions of the Defence of Canada Regulations or of Order in Council P.C. 946 of February 5th, 1943, as amended by Order in Council P.C. 5637 of August 16th, 1945, at midnight of September 1st, 1945, the day before the formal unconditional surrender of

The second category includes certain persons of the the military forces of Japan.

Japanese race of sixteen years of age or over resident in Canada, who have made written requests for repatriation. It includes either a national of Japan, a person who is a naturalized British subject, or a natural-born British subject, provided their requests were made before certain dates and were not revoked prior to the making by the Minister of an order for deportation.

The third category of persons includes the wife and children under sixteen years of age of any person against whom an order for deportation is made. They may be

included in the order. These Orders in Council are expressed to have been made under the authority of the War Measures Act, chapter 206.

of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927. It is stated and established that these Orders were made only after a suitable arrangement had been made with General Mc-Arthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan.

Following the adoption of the Orders, representations were made to the Acting Minister of Justice by and on behalf of a number of Canadian organizations and societies expressing the opinion based on advice of legal counsel that the Orders were ultra vires and requesting a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada to test the question. An action had even been commenced against the Attorney General of Canada for a declaration that the Orders in Council were ultra vires, illegal and void. It was, therefore, felt that, in the circumstances, in the public interest, the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada should be obtained upon the question of the validity of the aforesaid Orders in Council, because, in the opinion of the Acting Minister of Justice, they raised an important question of law touching the interpretation of Dominion legislation. Therefore, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Acting Minister of Justice and under and by virtue of the authority conferred by section 55 of the Supreme Court Act referred the following question to the Supreme Court of Canada for hearing and consideration:-

Are the Orders in Council, dated the 15th day of December, 1945, being P.C. 7355, 7356, and 7357, ultra vires of the Governor in Council either in whole or in part and, if so, in what particular or particulars and to what extent?

In The matter of a Reference as to the validity of the regulations in relation to Chemicals enacted by the Governor General of Canada on the 10th day of July, 1941, P.C. 4996, and of an Order of the Controller of Chemicals, dated the 16th day of January, 1942, made pursuant thereto, (1) this Court held that the authority vested in the Governor General in Council by the War Measures Act (its constitutional validity having been finally determined in Re Gray, (2) and the Fort Frances case (3), is legislative in its character; and an Order in Council passed in conformity with the conditions prescribed by, and the provisions of,

(1) [1943] S.C.R. 1. (2) (1918) 57 Can. S.R. 150. (3) [1923] A.C. 695. 56639-21

that Act, i.e. a legislative enactment such as should be that Act, i.e. a legislative encounter such as should be deemed necessary and advisable by reason of war, has the deemed necessary and advisable at the final redeemed necessary and auvisant, although the final respon-deemed of an Act of Parliament, although the final responeffect of an Act of Parnament, and Government rests upon effect of an Act of the Executive Government rests upon sibility for the acts of the has not abdicated its sibility for the acts of the bacon not abdicated its general reliament. Parliament has not abdicated its general Parliament. Dowers nor abandoned its control. The sur Parliament. Parliament nas not accurated its general Parliament. Parliament nas not abandoned its control. The subor-legislative powers nor abandoned it has created for event legislative powers nor available instrumentality, which it has created for exercising dinate instrumentality, remains responsible directly to Parliament dinate instrumentality, which directly to Parliament and the powers, remains responsible directly to the continuer the powers, remains responsible that is a rinament and depends upon the will of Parliament has not effaced itself depends upon the will of a ment has not effaced itself, and its official existence. Parliament has not effaced itself, and its official existence. Farmanient has not enaced itself, and has full power to amend or repeal the War Measures Act, has full power to amenu of topour one of the Orders in Council passed or to make ineffective any of the Orders in time. D or to make ineffective any or and if, at any time, Parlia-in pursuance of its provisions; and if, at any time, Parlia-in pursuance of that too great a power has been conf in pursuance of its provisions, and a, at any time, Parlia-in pursuance of its provisions, and a power has been conferred ment considers that too great a power has been conferred ment considers of General in Council, the remedy 1: ment considers that too great a pound mas been conferred upon the Governor General in Council, the remedy lies in bend.

ts own hand. On this occasion it was stated by Sir Lyman Duff, then that (p. 9):its own hand.

Chief Justice, that (p. 9):nief Justice, that (P. Came before this Court for consideration in The War Measures Act came before this Court for consideration in The War Measures and a point of capital importance touching its and a The War Measures Act came before the Count for consideration in The War Measures Act came before the count for consideration in 1918 in Re Gray (1), and a point of capital importance touching its effect 1918 in Re Gray (1), and a point of capital importance touching its effect

1918 in Re Gray (1), and a point of capital importance touching its effect was settled by the decision in that case. It was decided there that the was settled by the decision in the Governor General in Council is legislative : 1918 in the decision in that case. It has accured there that the was settled by the decision in that case in Council is legislative in its authority vested in the Governor General in Council is legislative in its authority and an order in council which had the effect of radically among its authority vested in the Governor General in Council is regislative in its authority vested in the Governor which had the effect of radically amending character and an order in council which had to be valid. The decision invol authority and an order in council which had to be valid. The decision involved character and an order in council which must be taken in this Court to be settled, they the Military Service Act, 1917, was held to be valid. charactery Service Act, 1917, was need to be taken. The decision involved the Military Service Act, 1917, was need to be taken in this Court to be settled, that an the principle, which must be taken in the conditions prescribed by and the principle, which must be taken in the conditions prescribed by, and the order in council in conformity with the conditions prescribed by, and the order in council in *War Measures Act* may have the effect of an Act order in council in conformity with the containing prescribed by, and the provisions of, the War Measures Act may have the effect of an Act of

Parliament.

The judgment of the Privy Council in Fort Frances Pulp & Power The judgment of the Frivy Council in 2 or 1 rances Pulp & Power Co. v. Manitoba Free Press Co. (2) laid down the principle that, in an Co. v. Manitoba war, the authority of the Dominion in respect Co. v. Manitoba Free Press Co. Co, have down one principle that, in an emergency such as war, the authority of the Dominion in respect of emergency such as war, the peace, order and good government of Co. emergency such as war, the authority of the peace, order and good government of Canada legislation relating to the peace, order arising from the emergency, displayed legislation relating to the peace, order and good government of Canada may, in view of the necessities arising from the emergency, displace or may, in view of the provinces in relation to a vast field in the may, in view of the necessaries uncessing in relation to a vast field in which overbear the authority of the provinces in relation to a vast field in which overbear the authority otherwise have exclusive jurisdiction.

But any Order made under the War Measures Act is

But any Olucion provisions: The Governor in Council subject to two specific provisions: Such acts and the subject to two spoons a authorize such acts and things, and is empowered to do and authorize such acts and things, and to make such orders and regulations, provided there exists to make such there done war, invasion, or insurrection; and a real or apprehended war, invasion, or insurrection; and a real or approvided that the act or thing done, or the order or also provided that the act that the Common the order or also provided that the Governor in Council, regulation made, are such that the Governor in Council,

(1) (1918) 57 Can. S.C.R. 150.

by reason of real or apprehended war, deems them necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada.

And at p. 12 of the Chemicals Reference (1) Sir Lyman Duff states:-

The duty rests upon the Executive Government to decide whether, in the conditions confronting it, it deems it necessary or advisable for the safety of the state to appoint such subordinate agencies and to determine what their powers shall be.

There is always, of course, some risk of abuse when wide powers are committed in general terms to any body of men. Under the War Measures Act the final responsibility for the acts of the Executive rests upon Parliament. Parliament abandons none of its powers, none of its control over the Executive, legal or constitutional.

The enactment is, of course, of the highest political nature. It is the attribution to the Executive Government of powers legislative in their character, described in terms implying nothing less than a plenary discretion, for securing the safety of the country in time of war. Subject only to the fundamental conditions explained above (and the specific provisions enumerated), when Regulations have been passed by the Governor General in Council in professed fulfilment of his statutory duty, I cannot agree that it is competent to any court to canvass the considerations which have, or may have, led him to deem such Regulations necessary or advisable for the transcendent objects set forth. The authority and the duty of passing on that question are committed to those who are responsible for the security of the country-the Executive Government itself, under, I repeat, its responsibility to Parliament. The words are too plain for dispute: the measures authorized are such as the Governor General in Council (not the courts) deems necessary or advisable.

The Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians appeared through Counsel in the matter and submitted that the question referred to the Court should be answered in the affirmative, that is to say, that the Orders in Council are wholly ultra vires of the Governor in Council.

First, they said that the word "deportation" means, and means exclusively, "the forcible removal of aliens"; and that it is not apt to describe the sending to Japan of Canadian citizens who were either born or naturalized in Canada and who have no connection with Japan other than that of "race". According to them, "deportation" is the return of an alien to the country from whence he came and not the exile or banishment of a citizen to an alien country.

In the second place, they said that the purpose of the enumeration in section 3 of the War Measures Act was to

(1) [1943] S.C.R. 1.

indicate that the powers of the Governor in Council "could go even thus far", or to indicate "marginal instances", or "cases in which there might be such doubt that it was better to mention them specifically". For that contention, certain dicta in the Gray case, (1) are referred to. They added that the banishment of subjects by any court or body for any other reason than conviction of felony is expressly prohibited by heavy penalties by the Habeas Corpus Act 31, Charles II, chapter 2, section 60. Moreover, they said that the banishment of nationals, particularly on racial grounds, is contrary to the accepted principles of International Law, such as may be gathered

from Attorney General of Canada v. Cain (2). They also contended that various provisions of the

Orders in Council are repugnant to the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 4-5 George V, chapter 17, and that the latter is an Act to which the Colonial Laws

Their conclusion is, of course, that if the Parliament of Validity Act applies.

Canada did not have the power to make laws repugnant to the Imperial Statute, it could not delegate such power and

could not be assumed to have attempted to do so. Then they urged that section 9 of Order in Council P.C.

7355 does away with the right to the writ of habeas corpus and, moreover, conflicts with section 5 of the War Measures Act; and they contended that none of the sections, including said section 9, are severable from the three Orders in Council, so that it cannot be said that the Governor in Council would have passed the Orders at all if some of the sections thereof were being left out, all the provisions of the Orders in Council being interdependent. They argued that it is impossible to say that the Governor in Council would not have abandoned the whole scheme if parts of it

had been known to have been ultra vires. A further argument was put forward on the ground that the words "Japanese race" are so vague as to make the provision unenforceable and, for that reason also, the Orders in Council should be set aside.

(2) [1906] A.C. 542, at 546. (1) (1918) 57 Can. S.C.R. 150,

at 158, 168, 177.

In respect of the last argument, the Court indicated immediately that it would not be taken into consideration as the question referred to us is whether the Orders in Council are ultra vires, and the point whether some words or sentences therein are vague does not fall within that question. The Orders in Council would not be ultra vires even if some parts thereof were vague.

The attack upon the use of the word "deportation" is addressed, of course, to the word in the War Measures Act, for, in so far as the Orders in Council themselves are concerned, they contain a definition of the word which is said to mean, for the purposes of the Orders,

the removal pursuant to the authority of this Order of any person from any place in Canada to a place outside Canada.

There can be no doubt that "deportation" so understood clearly covers the cases and categories of persons affected by the Orders.

But section 3 of the War Measures Act, after stating that the Governor in Council may do and authorize such acts and things, and make from time to time such orders and regulations, as he may by reason of the existence of real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection deem necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace,

and for greater certainty, but not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing terms, it is hereby declared that the powers of the Governor in Council shall extend to all matters coming within the classes of subjects hereinafter enumerated;

and among the matters enumerated are (section (b)) "Arrest, detention, exclusion and deportation". The contention of the Co-operative Committee is that, as "deportation" is specifically mentioned in that sub-section of section 3, the powers of the Governor in Council, under the War Measures Act, are strictly limited to such "deportation" as means "the forcible removal of aliens."

But, to begin with, it is far from being sure that the word "deportation" is limited to what the Co-operative Committee contends. Counsel for the Attorney General of Canada was able to quote several definitions from standard dictionaries where the meaning of the word is stated to be

more extensive. The New English Dictionary, edited by

more extensive. The New Engrand Bradley, M.A., known Sir James Murray, LL.D., and Henry Bradley, M.A., known as the Oxford English Dictionary, The action of carrying away; forcible removal esp. into exile;

Webster's New Internation deported; banishment, transportation. Act of deporting or state of being deported; an alien considered inim: Act of deporting or state of being deported; parisiment, transportation. In modern law, the removal from a country of an alien considered inimical In modern law, the removal from a country of an allen considered inimica to the public welfare; distinguished from transportation and extradition.

In Worcester's Dicurculary, The act of carrying away; removal; transportation; exile; banishment. The act of carrying away, temperate above definitions that the word It would follow from the above the word "deportations that the word It would follow from the above the word "deportation"; "exile" could well come under the word "deportation"; "exile" could well come under "deportation" should, in and, if it is submitted that "deportation" should, in

and, if it is submitted that "the forcible removal of ordinary language, be used for "the forcible removal of ordinary language, be used for aliens", it should also, according to the above quotations include the word "exile" aliens", it should also, according to the word "exile" which from reputed dictionaries, include the word "exile" which from reputed dictionaries, moment of a national from his admittedly means the banishment of a national from his admittedly means use values of the Interpretation Section of country, or, in the words of the removal of any normality country, or, in the words of the removal of any person from the Order itself (7355), "the removal of any person from

any place in Canada to a place outside Canada ". However, I would not pause to further consider the However, 1 would not proved, because sub-section (b) objection raised upon that ground, because sub-section (b) objection raised upon the Bares Act also contains the word of section 3 of the War Measures Act also contains the word of section 3 of the first would be apt to cover the measures "exclusion", which would be apt to Orders in Council that are being adopted through the Orders in Council under that are peng anopted under, if the measures so adopted consideration; and, moreover, if the measures so adopted consideration, and, models strictly and specifically contemare not, as contention, words "exclusion and deportation " plated by the use of the words "being done number plated by the use of what is now being done pursuant to the in sub-section (b), what is now being done pursuant to the Orders in Council is undoubtedly covered by the general terms of the War Measures Act. The enumeration therein terms of the first to be only "for greater certainty, but not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing terms", and, in the first part of section 3, the Governor in Council

to do and authorize such acts and things, and make from time to time to do and authorize such acts and the may by reason of the existence of real such orders and regulations, as he may by reason of the existence of real such orders and regulations, as inclusive construction, deem necessary or advisable or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection, deem necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada.

So that the discussion as to the exact meaning of the words "exclusion and deportation" in sub-section (b) is really immaterial, for either the "acts and things" mentioned in Orders in Council 7355, 7356 and 7357 are covered by these two words or they are not. If they are, cadit questio; if they are not, they then come under the general powers conferred by the first part of section 3.

Order in Council P.C. 7355 expressly states:-It is considered necessary by reason of the war, for the security, defence,

peace, order and welfare of Canada, that provision be made accordingly. The other two Orders in Council, as already pointed out, are merely ancillary to Order in Council 7355, and, although bearing separate numbers, would have no real existence but for Order in Council 7355. Indeed this is the very argument of the Co-operative Committee, that they are so completely interdependent that one cannot stand without the others. They are really the subordinate provisions and means for the purpose of carrying out the main Order contained in P.C. 7355. They must be read together and be taken to have been adopted because they were deemed necessary and advisable by reason of the war. This statement of fact made by the Governor in Council, so far as the Court is concerned, cannot be overruled in the circumstances of the matter before us. In the Fort Frances case (1), Viscount Haldane had this to say at page 706:-

It may be that it has become clear that the crisis which arose is wholly at an end and there is no justification for the continued exercise of an exceptional interference which becomes ultra vires when it is no longer called for. In such a case the law as laid down for distribution of powers in the ruling instrument would have to be invoked. But very clear evidence that the crisis had wholly passed away would be required to justify the judiciary, even when the question raised was one of ultra vires which it had to decide, in overruling the decision of the Government that exceptional measures were still requisite. In saying what is almost obvious, their Lordships observe themselves to be in accord with the view taken under analogous circumstances by the Supreme Court of the United States, and expressed in such decisions as that in October, 1919, in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., (2).

Later, in the Chemicals Reference (3), Sir Lyman Duff points out at page 13 that

it is perhaps theoretically conceivable that the Court might be required to conclude from the plain terms of the Order in Council itself that the Governor General in Council had not deemed the measure to be necessary or advisable, or necessary or advisable by reason of the existence of war.

(1) [1923] A.C. 695. (2) (1919) 251 U.S. 146. (3) [1943] S.C.R. 1.

56639 - 3

And whereas other persons of the Japanese race have requested or may

uest that they be sent to Japan; And whereas it is deemed desirable that provisions be made to deport

And whereas it is considered and welfare of Canada, that provision

hen comes the fore, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on Now, therefore, His Excellency of Labour, concurred in but in

It is clear from this that the Order is made under the

It is clear from the max and act. The Japanese nationals authority of the War Measures Act. The Japanese nationals authority of the man in the first recital are covered by the enacting referred to in the first recital are covered by the enacting referred to in the mat 1, subparagraph 1; "other persons provisions, paragraph 2, subparagraph 1; "other persons

provisions, paragraph 2, supparagraph 2, "Not

of the Japanese lave, the subparagraph 2: "Naturalized dealt with by paragraph 2, subparagraph 2: "Naturalized dealt with by paragraph, ", surface,", and by subparagraph British subject of the Japanese race", and by subparagraph

British subject of the Japanese race". 3: "natural born British subject of the Japanese race".

3: "natural point states that it is deemed desirable that The third recital states deport these classes when

The third recital state to deport these classes who have re-provision be made to deport naturalized on not quested, or (in the case of naturalized or natural born

quested, or (in the may request that they be sent to British subjects) who may request that they be sent to

Japan, and the fourth recital is surely a plain statement

that the Governor General in Council has deemed it neces-

that the dovoting the war to provide with reference to these sary by reason of the war to provide forth in

various classes in the manner set forth in paragraph 2

It will be noticed that in the first recital dealing with

Japanese nationals, the word "repatriation" is used, while

in the second recital, dealing with other persons of the

Japanese race, the reference is to requests "that they be

sent to Japan". After these recitals surely the word

"deport", in the third recital, is sufficient, notwithstanding

Now, therefore, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Labour, concurred in by the

the recommendation of the Minister of Labour, concurred in by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and under the authority of the Chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada 100 Secretary of State for External Allans, and under all authority of the War Measures Act, Chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927,

War Measures Act, Onapter 200 of the formed Matures of Ca is pleased to make and doth hereby make the following Order;

And whereas it is considered necessary by reason of the war, for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada, that provision be

requests for repatriation to Japan and otherwise;

request that they be sent to Japan;

made accordingly;

the classes or persons referred to above;

of the Order and elsewhere.

Such a situation must indeed be rare and certainly it Such a situation must instance. I repeat the four

Citals in F.C. (200.) Whereas during the course of the war with Japan certain Japanese Whereas during the course of the war with or support of Japan by mel-Whereas during the course of the war with support of Japan by making nationals manifested their sympathy with or support of Japan by making

any argument that might on other occasions be made that the word "deport" would not apply to the sending to Japan of natural born British subjects of the Japanese

Whatever might be said as to certain of the remarks made in Re Price Bros. and Company and the Board of Commerce of Canada (1), in view of the later decision in the Fort Frances case (2), it is quite clear from a perusal of all the opinions in the former that not only was there before the Court an opinion by the then Minister of Justice that there was no emergency, but also there was no definite statement such as we find in the fourth recital in P.C. 7355. In the Price Bros. case (1), Sir Lyman Duff referred to the recitals in the Order in Council of December 20th, 1919, as being

in themselves sufficient to constrain any Court to the conclusion that the Order of 29th January was not preceded or accompanied by any such

i.e., a decision

that the particular measure in question is necessary or advisable for reasons which have some relation to the perils actual or possible of real or

At page 707 of the Fort Frances case (2) appears at least one statement in the Order of December 20th, 1919, to which Sir Lyman Duff must have been referring, i.e., that it must

be realized that although no proclamation has been issued declaring that the war no longer exists, actual war conditions have in fact long ago ceased to exist, and consequently existence of war can no longer be urged as a reason in fact for maintaining these extraordinary regulations as necessary or advisable for the security of Canada.

It will be noticed that notwithstanding this reference in the Fort Frances case (2), their Lordships of the Judicial Committee had no difficulty in determining the validity of the Orders in Council there under review.

It is suggested that it cannot be said that the Governor General in Council really considered it necessary by reason of the war, for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada that natural born British subjects should be expelled. The argument is that while P.C. 7356

(1) (1920) 60 Can. S.C.R. 265. (2) [1923] A.C. 695. 56639-31

provides that any person who being a British subject by provides that any person from Canada under 7355 naturalization is deported from which he leaves Canada naturalization is deported which he leaves Canada in the course shall as and from the date upon which a British subject or a Canad: shall as and from cease to be either a naturation the date upon which he leaves Canada in the course shall as and from the date upon which he leaves Canada in the course of such deportation cease to be either a British subject or a Canadian

national, no provision is made anywhere that a natural born British no provision is made any who is deported shall cease subject of the Japanese race who is deported shall cease pritish subject or a Canadian national; and +1 no provide the Japanese rac Canadian national; and that, subject of the subject or a Canadian national; and that, to be a British subject there would be nothing to prosubject British subject of a Gamma monomal; and that, to be a British subject of a Gamma monomal; and that, therefore, theoretically there would be nothing to prevent therefore, mentioned person from immediately re-enter to be a theoretically their from immediately re-entering therefore, theoretically person from immediately re-entering such last mentioned person for out that once such per thereion is mentioned person it out that once such person such last mentioned person and sent to Japan under Canada. It is sufficient to country and sent to Japan under Canada. It is sufficient to point of sent to Japan under the is expelled from the country and sent to Japan under the is expelled from the country and MacArthur, it is incon-arrangements made with General MacArthur, it is inconarrangements made with deficulty can ever arise. In ceivable that any practical difficulty are not unknown of ceivable that any practical time are not unknown of cases the history of England examples are not unknown of cases the history of England examples that they should lose the where natural born British subjects have been exiled withwhere natural born British and that they should lose their out any provision being made that they should lose their

British nationally: British nationally: It has also been suggested that since any natural born It has also been suggested that since any natural born British nationality. It has also been suggested a race who has made a British subject of the Japan may revoke in writing British subject of the gapan may revoke in writing such request to be sent to Japan may by the Minister of La request to be sent to making by the Minister of Labour request prior to the making, it could not be said that request prior to the manual of Labour of an order for deportation, it could not be said that the of an order for depointened, it really deemed it necessary Governor General in Council really deemed it necessary Governor General in course and good government of to provide for the peace, order and good government of to provide for the meto Japan. As to this, and good to provide for the peace, and As to this, and generally, Canada to send them to Japan. As to this, and generally, Canada to send them to the borne in mind that the to all such arguments, it must be borne in mind that the to all such arguments, to uncil was dealing with people Governor General in Council was dealing with people Governor General in the sent to Japan or who might who had made requests to be sent to Japan or who might who had made requests. 7355 make such requests. Surely after the making of P.C. 7355 that existed during the after the making of a constances that existed during the actual under the circumstances in the ensuing months the under the circumstances in the ensuing months, the Gov-hostilities with Japan or in the ensuing months, the Govhostilities with sapan council might well be justified in con-ernor General in Council menace to Canada and the ernor General in con-sidering such people a menace to Canada and the mere sidering such poor given an opportunity of retraction fact that they were given the Covernor Concerd fact that the fact that the Governor General in Council cannot alter the fact that the Governor General in Council did so decide. Even if it turned out that every natural born British subject of the Japanese race did withdraw born pruss, it could not alter the fact as expressed in the Order in Council that it was considered advisable to

provide for the event of any number of such class not taking advantage of the opportunity of revocation.

Nor are we concerned with the policy of these measures. As was said by Lord Buckmaster in Attorney General v. Wilts United Dairies (1), in dealing with an Order of the Food Controller made in April, 1919:-"The only question here is: were such powers granted?"

That Canada possessed the power to expel an alien from its territory, or to deport him to the country whence he entered it, is a question that may now be regarded as settled since the judgment of the Privy Council in Attorney General for Canada v. Cain (2). It was also decided in that case that the power could be delegated to the Government, with the authority to impose such extra-territorial constraint as was necessary to execute the power.

As to the second point raised by the Co-operative Committee. I do not think it can be said that any provision of the Orders in Council now under discussion are repugnant to the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 4-5 George V, chapter 17. It does not seem necessary to me to develop that statement, as, after all, the fact of no conflict can be ascertained only by comparison of the respective provisions of the latter Act and the text of the Orders in Council. Section 26 of the British Nationality Act, at the beginning, would seem to eliminate any possibility of conflict. The question which naturally comes to one's mind is: Why should Canada not be able to denaturalize the persons whom it had previously naturalized? The loss of the quality of British subject, resulting from the deportation and the denaturalization which takes place under the Orders, must be read, of course, to mean the cessation of the privileges of a British subject only in so far as Canada is concerned. Moreover, the attempt by the Co-operative Committee to apply here the provisions of the Colonial Laws Validity Act is, in my opinion, ineffective, because each of the Orders in Council are, by force of the War Measures Act, the equivalent of a statute; they have the force of law, and, to all intents and purposes, while they stand, they are exactly on the

(1) (1922) 91 L.J. (K.B.) 897. (2) [1906] A.C. 542.

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same footing as an Act of Parliament. It would follow, that they must be looked upon with regard same footing as an Act of a looked upon with regard to therefore, that they must be looked upon with regard to as bearing the date of the same fore, that they must be to bearing the date of the therefore, that they must be to bearing the date of the the Statute of Westminster, as bearing the date of the the Statute of Westminster, and consequently, much pos-the Statute of December, 1945, and consequently, much pos-15th of December, into force of that statute. So the December, 1940, and force of that statute. So that 15th of the coming into force the benefit of the Stat terior to the coming into toring the benefit of the Statute being posterior to it and getting the benefit of the Statute terior to it and general thus withdrawn from the being posterior itself, they are thus withdrawn from the of Westminster itself, the Colonial Laws Validity Act.

of Westminster Itsell, unoy and William William application of the Colonial Laws Validity Act. pplication of the Colonius Landing Act cannot be said Moreover, the British Nationality Act cannot be said Moreover, the British ty area and a The Canadian Act to have been adopted by Canada. The Canadian Act independent enactment, which was intended to have been adopted by Canadian Act was an independent enactment, which was intended by was an independent here as its own Act, with was an independent enacting as its own Act, with the the Canadian Parliament here as its own Act, with the the Canadian that it can be truly said that the P. the Canadian Parliament net us said that the British consequence that it can be truly said that the British

consequence that it can never applied to Canada. Nationality merial reference ought to be made 4Vationality Act as such the ought to be made to section Perhaps a special reference ought in respect of the output Perhaps a special reference ought to be made to section 9 of Order in Council P.C. 7355, in respect of which 9 of Order the Co-operative Committee made a 9 of Order in Council 1.00. Committee made a very counsel for the Co-operative Committee made a very counsel for the Co-operation of the insistent argument that it conflicted with section 5 of the insistent argument that it had the effect of abolist insistent argument that it had the effect of abolishing War Measures Act and that it had the effect of abolishing War Measures Act and mass corpus. Section 5 in ques-the right to resort to habeas corpus.

on enacts: No person who is held for deportation under this Act or under any No person who is held for is under arrest or detention as an No person who is held for account and any and the any negulation made thereunder, or is under arrest or detention as an alien regulation made thereunder, he is an alien enemy, or to prevent in regulation made thereunder, or is under alien enemy, or to prevent his enemy, or upon suspicion that he is an alien enemy, or to prevent his enemy, or upon suspicion that he released upon bail or otherwise dischar

regulation upon suspicion that he is an upon bail or otherwise discharged departure from Canada, shall be released upon bail or otherwise discharged departure from Canaua, shan be receased upon ball or o or tried, without the consent of the Minister of Justice.

Section 9 of P.C. 7355 enacts:-Section 9 01 1.0. Any person for whom an order for deportation is made and who is Any person for whom an or who is placed under restraint :

Any person for whom an or who is placed under restraint in the detained pending deportation or who is placed under restraint in the detained pending deportation of any order or measure made or taken course of deportation by virtue of any order or measure made or taken course of deportation by virtue of any other of incasure made or taken under section 4 of this Order shall, while so detained or restrained, be

I do not see any conflict between the two sections. It is deemed to be in legal custody. I do not see any course of the Act really deals with the apparent that section 5 of the order for deportation while apparent that structure order for deportation, while section situation anterior to the order for deportation, while section situation antende with the situation after the order for 9 of the Order deals with the situation after the order for 9 of the Order usans made. Even if the two sections dealt deportation has been made. it does not follow that h deportation has been in the same situation, it does not follow that because the with the same situation, it deelared to be de with the same strained is declared to be deemed to be person detained or restrained is declared to be deemed to be person detailed of the section 9, it could not happen that in legal custody under section 9, it could not happen that the same person could be released upon bail, or otherwise the same person content of the Minister of discharged or tried, with the consent of the Minister of

Justice.

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But, above all, there is a good deal to be said for the contention that section 9 of the Order is really superfluous, because, if the order for deportation was made, or if the person detained pending deportation, or placed under restraint in the course of deportation, was so placed "by virtue of any order or measure made or taken under section 4 of this Order ", such person is necessarily in legal custody. The whole of section 9 is predicated upon the assumption that the order for deportation, or detention, or restraint, was properly made or taken under section 4; and, if the provisions of section 4 are valid and followed, the necessary consequence is that the person detained, or restrained, is in legal custody. Section 9, therefore, appears to be superfluous, and to have been put there ex abundanti cautela, or, in other words, in order to avoid a doubt as to the legality of the detention or restraint. That very legality necessarily results from the fact that any order, or measure, taken under section 4, means precisely what it says, that is to say, an order or measure in conformity with section 4.

But I do not think that it can be concluded from the wording of section 9 that the intention of the Order in Council is that the recourse to habeas corpus is thereby abolished. At Bar, counsel for the Crown did not so contend; on the contrary, he stated that it was not. The language of section 9 refers to an order authorized by Order in Council P.C. 7355 and, therefore, a valid order resulting in legal custody.

In addition to any other argument in respect to section 9, it may be said that it is clearly severable; and, even if it was held to be ultra vires-which, in my opinion, it is notit is quite evident that declaring it ultra vires would not in any way affect the remainder of the several Orders in Council now submitted.

The third recital in P.C. 7355.

And whereas it is deemed desirable that provisions be made to deport the classes of persons referred to above.

in terms applies only to the classes referred to in the first two recitals, i.e., Japanese nationals who had manifested their sympathy with or support of Japan by making requests for repatriation to Japan and otherwise, and other persons of the Japanese race who had requested, or might

request, that they be sent to Japan. Subparagraph 4 of request, that they of the Order, however, provides:--request, that they order, however, provides:-(4) The wife and children makes an order for deportation to Japan maximum deported with such person. (4) The wife and children under since years of age of any person (4) The wife makes an order for deportation to Japan may be for whom the Minister and deported with such person.

for whom the Minister makes an order for deportatic included in such order and deported with such person. As to children, at what age under sixteen would a consent As to children, at what ago third both children and wives, it was be of any value? As to both that the Minister sho As to any value? As to both and wives, it was be of any considered advisable that the Minister should apparently considered the sums mentioned in paragram apparently considered auvisuum mentioned in paragraph 7 have power to expend the sums mentioned in paragraph 7 apparent to expend the sum interview in paragraph 7 have power to keep families together. Even though no in a desire to keep or children under sixteen is required have here to keep tamines under sixteen is required by in a desire to keep tamines under sixteen is required by request from wives or children under sixteen is required by request from wives or cultured 2, it appears that the Gover-subparagraph 4 of paragraph 2, it appears that the Goversubparagraph 4 of paragraph 5, 50 mp cars that the Gover-subparagraph 4 of paragraph 5, 50 mp cars that the Gover-nor in Council deemed it necessary for the security, defence, nor in Council deemed to authorize the Minister of Labour nor in Council deemed it necessary for the Security, defence, etc., of Canada to authorize the Minister of Labour to etc., of Canada to authorize covering a person of either include this class in an Order covering a person of either East two classes. That the Governor in Cou include this class in an That the Governor in Council of the first two classes. That the Governor in Council of the first two classes. considered the matter necessary may appear without specific considered the matter necessary may appear without specific considered the matter new Controller General of Patents (1), words being used, Rex v. Controller General of Patents (1), words being used, new satisfied upon a consideration of all and in this case I am satisfied this occurred.

the terms of the Order that this occurred. he terms of the officers in Council 7355, 7356 and My conclusion is that Orders in Council 7355, 7356 and

My conclusion is that that could have been adopted by 7357 contain legislation that, under the War Measures 4 7357 contain legislation under the War Measures Act, the Parliament itself; that, under the War Measures Act, the Parliament itsell; unay, and empowered to adopt any legis. Governor in Council was empowered; that such a Governor in Council, used have adopted; that such legis-lation that Parliament could have adopted; that such legislation that Parliament of and impliedly, adopted because it was lation was, expressly and impliedly for the security def lation was, expressive and visable for the security, defence, deemed necessary or advisable of Canada by reason deemed necessary of data of Canada by reason of the peace, order and welfare of Covernor in Council peace, order and watthe Governor in Council was the existence of war; that the Governor in Council was the existence of war, that is or advisability of these measures sole judge of the necessity or advisability of these measures sole judge of the necessary to any Court to canvass the con-and it is not competent to any Led the Governor in G and it is not composed have led the Governor in Council siderations which may have led the Governor in Council siderations which may be advisable for the objectives

The authority conferred on the Governor General in set forth. Council is a plenary legislative power, both to adopt the Council is a promitive them in force, which is not subject to review in a Court of Justice.

(1) [1941] 2 K.B. 306, at 314.

My answer to the question submitted to the Court is, therefore, that the Orders in Council dated the 15th of December, 1945, being P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357 are not ultra vires of the Governor General in Council either in whole or in part.

We hereby certify to His Excellency the Governor General in Council that the foregoing are our reasons for the answer to the question referred herein for hearing and consideration.

T. RINFRET P. KERWIN R. TASCHEREAU

Hudson J.—The question submitted for our opinion is the following:

Are the Orders in Council dated 15th December, 1945, being P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357 ultra vires of the Governor in Council, either in whole or in part and, if so, in what particular or particulars?

These Orders in Council purport to be made under the authority of the War Measures Act and provide for the removal from Canada to Japan of a large number of persons of Japanese race, the revocation of naturalization of such of them as have been naturalized and the disposition of the properties of such persons in Canada.

The reasons given in Order P.C. 7355, which is basic, are stated as follows:

Whereas during the course of the war with Japan certain Japanese nationals manifested their sympathy with or support of Japan by making requests for repatriation to Japan and otherwise;

And whereas other persons of the Japanese race have requested or may request that they be sent to Japan:

And whereas it is deemed desirable that provisions be made to deport the classes of persons referred to above;

The persons to whom this Order applies are of four classes. The first is:

Every person of sixteen years of age or over, other than a Canadian national, who is a national of Japan resident in Canada and who,

(a) has, since the date of declaration of war by the Government of Canada against Japan, on December 8, 1941, made a request for repatriation; or

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(b) has been in detention at any place in virtue of an order made (b) has been in detentions of the Defence of Canada Regulat:) has been in detention at any prove in virtue of an order made pursuant to the provisions of the Defence of Canada Regulations pursuant to the provisions of the 16th day of Ar) has been to the provisions of the 5th day of February, 1943, pursuant to Council P.C. 946, of the 5th day of February, 1943, or of Order in Council p.C. 5637, of the 16th day of August, 1945 pursuant to for Council P.O. 940, of the oth day of February, 1943, or of Order in Council P.C. 5637, of the 16th day of August, 1945, and as amended by P.C. 5637, of September 1, 1945. as amended by F.O. 2007, of one forn day of Augu was so detained as at midnight of September 1, 1945.

By section 91, heading 25, of the British North America By section 91, heading is given exclusive legislative authorit By section 91, heading 20, of the legislative authority in Act the Dominion is given exclusive legislative authority in Act the functuralization and aliens, and it was held in Act the Dominion is given and aliens, and it was held in the respect of naturalization and v. Cain (1), that the Current of attraney-General v. Cain (1), that the Current of the current respect of naturalization and *Cain* (1), that the Crown case of Attorney-General v. Cain (1), that the Crown respect Attorney-Generative power to expel an alien from case of Attorney-Generative power to expel an alien from undoubtedly possesses the power to deport him to the course undoubtedly possesses the point of the point an alien from the Dominion of Canada, or to deport him to the country the Dominion of Canada it. In giving the judgment of the Dominion of Canaua, it. In giving the judgment of the from whence he entered it. In giving the judgment of the

Committee, Lord Atkinson said at p. 546: One of the rights possessed by the supreme power in every State is One of the rights possessed by the other that State, to anney at One of the rights possessed by the capterne power in every State is the right to refuse to permit an alien to enter it, and to expel or de-

One of the refuse to permit an anen to enter that blate, to annex what the right to refuse to the permission to enter it, and to expel or deport conditions it pleases to the permission to enter it, and to expel or deport the State, at pleasure, even a friendly alien, especially if it const the right we releases to the permission to enter 10, and to expel or deport sonditions it pleases to the permission to enter 10, and to expel or deport from the State, at pleasure, even a friendly alien, especially if it considers from the State, at pleasure, even a friendly alien, especially if it considers from the State opposed to its peace, order, and good government conditions to reach at pleasure, even a menuty and, especially if it considers from the State, at pleasure, even a menuty and, especially if it considers his presence in the State opposed to its peace, order, and good government, its social or material interests.

or to its social or material interests. or to its social of that the Dominion has the power to It was also held that the Dominion has is necessary It was also held that the power to power to exercise such extra-territorial constraint as is necessary to

The second class provided for in the Order includes: execute the power.

The second data F subject of the Japanese race of sixteen years Every naturalized British subject of the Japanese race of sixteen years Every naturalized British subject to has made a request for repatriation of age or over resident in Canada who has made a request for repatriation of age or over resident in Provided that such person has not revoluof age or over resident in Canada who that such person has not revoked in may be deported to Japan: Provided that such person has not revoked in may be deported to Japan: Provided the first day of September. 1945 may be deported to Japan: Flowneet that such person has not revoked writing such request prior to midnight the first day of September, 1945.

It is provided by section 9 of the Naturalization Act,

R.S.C. 1927, chapter 138, that: S.C. 1921, Source in Council, upon the report of the Minister, is Where the Governor in Council, upon granted by the Minister, is

Where the Governor in outuralization granted by the Minister, is satisfied that a certificate of naturalization Act heretofore in f satisfied that a certificate of havinaturalization Act heretofore in force in this Act or granted under any Naturalization Act heretofore in force in this Act or granted under any false representation or fraud this Act or granted under any false representation or fraud, or by Canada has been obtained by false, or that the person to make the person to mak Canada has been obtained by act or speech to be dimensioned by the shown the concealment of material circumstances, or that the person to whom the concealment of material the data himself by act or speech to be disaffected certificate was granted has shown himself by act or speech to be disaffected certificate was granted has shown of the Governor in Council shall by order revoke or disloyal to His Majesty the Governor in Council shall by order revoke

Here the request for repatriation by a Japanese has been the certificate.

Here the four in Council as evidence of "disaffec-treated by the Governor in Maiostry" under th treated by the disloyalty to His Majesty" under the conditions subsisting in Canada at the time, that is, when this country was at war with Japan, or just emerging therefrom.

(1) [1906] A.C. 542.

As the Canadian Parliament have power to grant naturalization, they have equally the power to revoke such naturalization and may delegate such power to the Governor

in Council. Once the naturalization is revoked, the person concerned reverts to his original status of being an alien and thus becomes subject to deportation in the same way as any other alien.

It must also be remembered that in making the order for deportation, the Governor in Council is doing what the person involved himself had authorized.

The third class of persons included in Order in Council 7355 consists of:

Every natural born British subject of the Japanese race of sixteen years of age or over resident in Canada who has made a request for repatriation may be deported to Japan: Provided that such person has not revoked in writing such request prior to the making by the Minister of an order for deportation.

The form of request for repatriation used by this class was supplied to us by counsel for the Co-operative Committee of Japanese Canadians and reads as follows:

"I,), born.....)

(M. or F.) (day, month, year) registered as a Canadian-born British subject (J. R. No.....) under Order in Council P.C. No. 9760, dated December 16, 1941, hereby declare my desire to relinquish my British nationality and to assume the status of a National of Japan.

Further, I request the Government of Canada, under the conditions set out in the Statement of the Minister of Labour dated February 13, 1945, to arrange for and effect my repatriation to Japan.

I declare that I fully understand the contents of this document, and I voluntarily affix my signature hereto: 1045

Date1345	Signature
Place	
Witness Note: All persons sixteen years of s separate Declaration. Application Recommended:	Interpreter age and over are required to sign a

	Commissioner of Japanese			
R.С.М.Р.	Placement.			
Date1945	Date1945			

N.B.-This form in respect to Naturalized British Subjects was the same with the substitution of the words "Canadian naturalized" for "Canadian born" in the above form. $56639 - 4\frac{1}{3}$

It will be observed that, by the terms of the Order in It will be observed that, by the terms of the Order in It will be observed unit, so have a right to revoke the Council, persons in this class have a deportation order have Council, persons in before a deportation order has actu-request at any time before a deportation order has acturequest at any time better when made is no more ally been made, so that the order when made is no more

than a compliance with such request. han a compliance this class does not impose a loss of The order as to this class does signed contains The order as to this of request signed contains a dec-citizenship. desire to relinquish British nationality citizenship. The form of a desire to relinquish British nationality and laration of a desire to relinquish of Japan. Any laration of a desire to reactional of Japan. Any change assume the status of a national of Japan. Any change assume the status of a list left to action by the person of nationality, however, is left to action by the person of nationality, log of the Naturalization Act of nationality, nowever, the Naturalization Act provides himself. Section 16 of the Naturalization Act provides

A British subject who, when in any foreign state and not under A British subject who, when in any foreign state and not under A British subject who, when in any lotting state and not under disability, by obtaining a certificate of naturalization or by any other disability, by obtaining a certificate and not under disability, by obtaining a certificate of institution or by any other voluntary and formal act becomes naturalized therein, shall thenceforth be

deemed to have ceased to be a British subject. I should say that no question could be raised as to the

I should say that no grouncil to facilitate the depart-right of the Governor in Council to facilitate the departright of the Government of the Japanese race who desires to ure of any member of the Japanese race who desires to ure of any memory of A question of compulsion can make his home in Japan. A question of compulsion can make his home in a person seeks to withdraw his request arise only where a person seeks to finally acted on the arise only where in Council has finally acted on it.

fter the Government between a British subject and his The relationship between a British Subject and his The relationship in Blackstone's Commentaries, vol.

1, p. 370, as follows: Natural allegiance is therefore perpetual, * * * allegiance Natural allegiance is uncertained an implied contract with the prince, is a debt due from the subject, upon an implied contract with the prince, is a debt due from the subject, appendix of the other with the prince, that so long as the one affords protection, so long the other will demean that so long as the one affords protection is always under a that so long as the one anotas proceeding of the other will demean himself faithfully. As therefore the prince is always under a constant himself faithfully. himself faithfully. As unerelate and planter is under a constant tie to protect his natural-born subjects, at all times and in all countries, for the to protect his natural born due to him is equally universal and tie to protect his natural point subject, at an end of an an ecountries, for this reason their allegiance due to him is equally universal and permanent.

The mutual obligations there are spoken of as those arising from an implied contract.

It would seem to follow that such obligations could be modified or cancelled by mutual agreement expressed be mounted of forbidden by law. The facts here establish a concurrence in some modifications leading to a final extinguishment of all.

The request of the subject states his desire to relinquish his British nationality and to assume the status of a national of Japan and asks the Government of Canada to arrange for and effect his repatriation to Japan. By this he must mean his naturalization in Japan. This is a plain indication that, with him, the ties of race are stronger than the obligations of nationality.

By the order the Governor in Council concurs in his proposal with no qualification, except that the subject is given an option to withdraw his request at any time before the final deportation order is actually made. If there is no withdrawal in time, it would seem that there was in the language of commerce "a firm contract", so that the deportation order when made and carried out will be in fulfilment of the promise made on behalf of the Government.

It remains to consider whether or not Parliament has power to authorize the Governor in Council to make these orders and, if so, whether such power has been delegated.

As to the first two classes, for the reasons already given, I am satisfied that Parliament has that power and can delegate it to the Governor in Council.

As to the third class, there would be more difficulty in upholding the order, were it not for the terms of the request. Ample opportunity has been and still is given to the subject for reconsideration and withdrawal before the final order is made. It would be hard indeed if the Governor in Council, as soon as arrangements for transportation and reception are completed, is not permitted to carry out the arrangement. It has, in my opinion. adequate legislative sanction.

The British Parliament would undoubtedly have power to order the deportation from the realm of a British subject and the Canadian Parliament appears to have similar powers. Under the British North America Act it has a right to legislate in regard to the peace, order and good government of Canada and, in heading 25 of section 91, it is given exclusive power to legislate in regard to aliens and naturalization. Although deportation of a British citizen would not fall within this heading. vet it is of the same character and is a subject which could not be dealt with by a Provincial Legislature.

Under the War Measures Act, section 3, the Governor Under the War measured to do all acts and things and make in Council is authorized to do all acts and regulations as be in Council is authorized orders and regulations as he may from time to time such orders of real or apprehended way from time to time such of real or apprehended war deem by reason of the existence of real or apprehended war deem by reason of the existence the security, defence, peace, order necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order necessary or advisable for this enables the Governor in Coun-and welfare of Canada. This enables the Governor in Counand welfare of Canada, subject matter within the power of cil to deal with any subject matter within the power of during the prescribed time, which doe cil to deal with any supported time, which does not Parliament during the prescribed time, which does not Parliament during vision of the War Measures Act itself. conflict with any provision of the *War Measures Act* itself. conflict with any provision of the stabilished in Re Gray (1), and Fort This was conclusively established in Re Gray (1), and Fort This was conclusively over Co. v. Manitoba Free Press (2). Frances Pulp and Power Co. v. Manitoba Free Press (2). Frances Pulp and Lyman Duff in the Chemicals Reference As was said by Sir Lyman Duff in the Chemicals Reference

The enactment is, of course, of the highest political nature. It is the The enactment is, be Executive Government of powers legislative is the formula of th The enactment is, of course, of the instance powers legislative. It is the attribution to the Executive Government of powers legislative in their described in terms implying nothing less than a place attribution to the Executive Government of pointing less than a plenary character, described in terms implying nothing less than a plenary for securing the safety of the country in time of war. character, described in terms introduced in terms in time of war. discretion, for securing the safety of the country in time of war.

The Act also provides in section 2 that it shall be con-

The Act also provide war, invasion, or insurrection, real or clusive evidence that war, invasion, or insurrection, real or clusive evidence that and has not ceased until by proclama-apprehended, exists and has not ceased until by proclamaapprehended, exists and such proclamation was made up to tion it is so declared. No such proclamation was made up to tion it is so declared. The Council were passed. Even if it the time these Orders in Council were case (2) the the fort Frances case (2) the the time these of the Fort Frances case (2) that Par-were, it was held in the Fort Frances case (2) that Parwere, it was not a power to conclude matters under way liament still had power to conclude matters under way

while the war was still going on. The Orders with which we are here concerned plainly

The Orders nature originating during the war, so that I arose out of matters originating can be taken to be arose out of mars in Council can be taken to be an exercise think the Orders in Council can be taken to be an exercise think the older of the powers vested in Parliament bearing on the subject

matter under consideration. The very able arguments presented by counsel for the

Co-Operative Committee of Japanese Canadians have been dealt with by some of the other members of the Court and I shall make brief reference to only two or three.

It was argued that clause 9 of Order in Council P.C. No.

7355 might have the effect of depriving a person about to be deported from any right to a writ of habeas corpus. I agree with the other members of the Court that such is not a proper interpretation of this clause. I think that where any question of fact bearing on the jurisdiction of the (1) (1918) 57 Can. S.C.R. 150.

(3) [1943] S.C.R. 1, at p. 12.

Governor in Council is raised, the person concerned would have a right to put it forward: for example, whether or not he had signed any request or had been induced to sign by misrepresentation or coercion, or whether or not he was of the Japanese race. The validity of the Orders depends on the reality of the requests and any individual who wishes to raise a question of fact, so far as it affects him, should not be deprived of an opportunity of establishing his case.

I am in agreement with what Mr. Justice Estey has said in regard to the fourth class, that is, women and children.

The question submitted in this reference is as follows:

Are the Orders in Council dated 15th December, 1945, being P.C. 7355. 7356 and 7357 ultra vires of the Governor in Council, either in whole or in part and, if so, in what particular or particulars?

In my opinion all the Orders in Council are intra vires of the Governor in Council with the exception of paragraph 2 (4) of P.C. 7355.

I HEREBY CERTIFY to His Excellency the Governor General in Council that the foregoing are my reasons for the answer to the question referred herein for hearing and consideration.

A. B. HUDSON.

RAND J.—His Excellency in Council has referred to this Court the following question arising out of certain Orders in Council which deal with the deportation of persons of the Japanese race:---

Are the Orders in Council dated the 15th day of December, 1945, being P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357, ultra vires of the Governor in Council either in whole or in part, and if so, in what particular or particulars and to what extent?

The Orders provide for the deportation in certain circumstances of:-

- (a) Japanese nationals:
- (b) Naturalized British subjects of the Japanese race resident in Canada;
- (c) Natural born British subjects of the Japanese race resident in Canada; and

(d) The wives and children under 16 years of age of (d) The wives in classes (a), (b) and (c).

persons in classes (a), (b) and (c). The power of the Governor in Council to enact legislation The power of the from section 3 of the War M. The power of the derived from section 3 of the War Measures by Order is derived from section there, is as follows by Order 15 utility as it is pertinent here, is as follows:-

3. The Governor in Council may do and authorize such acts, and 3. The Governor in Council may us orders and regulations, as he things, and make from time to time such orders and regulations, as he things, and make from time to think and regulations, as he may by reason of the existence of real or apprehended war, invasion or may by reason of the existence of advisable for the security, defence may by reason of the existence of reach of the security, defence, peace, insurrection deem necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, insurrection deem necessary or auvisative for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada; and for greater certainty, but not so as to order and welfare of the foregoing terms, it is hereby declared that order and welfare of Canada, and for generality, but not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing terms, it is hereby declared that the restrict the generality of the foregoing shall extend to all matters restrict the generality of the foregoing shall extend to all matters coming powers of the Governor in Council shall extend to all matters coming

(b) Arrest, detention, exclusion and deportation. Apart from a consideration I shall deal with later, I am Apart from a constant this Court and of the Judicial Com-bound by decisions of this Parliament the intention of bound by decisions of Parliament the intention of clothing mittee to attribute to Parliament the intention of clothing mittee to attribute uncil with authority to enact by Order, the Governor in Council of the Act. legislation in a Corder, the Governor in Ovisions of the Act, legislation in a field as subject to the provisions of the Parliament itself subject subject to use processed by Parliament itself subject only to wide as that possessed by Parliament of Parliament wide as that possed the power of Parliament under the any restriction of the power of Parliament under the any restriction of the America Act to delegate to the Governor in British North America Chemicals Reference (1) British Words that Dower is that the C Council: Due of that power is that the Governor in dition of the exercise of that power is that the Governor in dition of the case of the existence of real or appre-Councy should be apprehended way, interesting, defence, peace, order and welfare advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare advisuule for acts and things which by Order he purports of Canada the acts and things to condition the purports of Canada in our for the courts to substitute their view of to do. It is not for the courts but it but it any such necessity or advisability: but it must appear from the Order or be presumed that that decision has been made, or the condition laid down by Parliament is not fulfilled.

The preamble of Order P.C. 7355 contains the following

recitals:-Whereas during the course of the war with Japan certain Japanese nationals manifested their sympathy with or support of Japan by making requests for repatriation to Japan and otherwise;

And whereas other persons of the Japanese race have requested or

may request that they be sent to Japan; And whereas it is deemed desirable that provisions be made to deport the classes of persons referred to above;

(1) [1943] S.C.R. 1, at p. 10.

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And whereas it is considered necessary by reason of the war, for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada, that provision be made accordingly;

Now, therefore, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Labour, concurred in by the secretary of State for External Affairs, and under the authority of the War Measures Act, chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, is pleased to make and doth hereby make the following Order:

A request for repatriation is defined as a written request or statement of desire to be repatriated or sent to Japan. Then follow specific provisions dealing with the different classes of persons affected.

Of these classes there is first that of Japanese nationals. The preamble quoted recites certain conclusions of the Governor in Council pertinent to jurisdiction, and we are to say whether from these and the operative provisions of the Order we find that the decision which the statute has prescribed as its condition has not been made: in re Price Bros. and Company (1), Duff J. (as he then was):

In this connection the sole point requiring examination is that which arises out of Mr. Biggar's contention in his admirable argument that orders in council made by the Governor General in Council professedly under the authority of section 6 of that Act are not judicially revisable. I think such orders are reviewable, in this sense that when in a proper proceeding the validity of them is called into question, it is the duty of a court of justice to consider and decide whether the conditions of jurisdiction are fulfilled and if they are not being fulfilled, to pronounce the sentence of the law upon the illegal order.

One of the conditions of jurisdiction is, in my judgment, that the Governor in Council shall decide that the particular measure in question is necessary or advisable for reasons which have some relation to the perils actual or possible of real or apprehended war-(I leave the case of insurrection out of view as having no relevancy) or as having some relation to the prosecution of the war or the objects of it.

Rex v. Comptroller (2). The language of the preamble is not precisely that employed by the statute, but in relation to this class of persons it appears, I should say, from the Order that the condition has been satisfied. The words "deport" and "repatriation" are appropriate to the return to his native country of an alien. The power of Parliament to deal with aliens is unquestioned, and that field is under delegation to the Governor in Council. The obligation of his own state to receive him must be deemed correlated with the power of the foreign state to expel him,

(1) (1920) 60 Can. S.C.R. 265. (2) [1941] 2 K.B. 306, at 316. 56639 - 5

and this has been implemented here by a direction of

and this has been to which I shall refer later. As is seen, the Japanese race", but from the ar

As is seen, the scould apanese race", but from the operative "other persons of the Japanese race", but from the operative "other persons of the Order it is clear that this language refers paragraphs of the Order of the Japanese race and paragraphs of the Japanese race and natural to both naturalized persons of the Japanese race and natural to both naturalized points of Canada who have a Japanese racial born British subjects of Canada to naturalized subject born British subjects of relation to naturalized subjects must origin. The Order in relation to deals only with the origin. The Order 7356 which deals only with that class be read with Order 7356 which deals only with that class

Whereas by Order in Council P.C. 7356 of 15th December, 1945, and is as follows:

Whereas by Order in Counter of persons who, during the course provision is made for the deportation of persons who, during the course have requested to be removed or sent to an enemy count provision is made for the deportation of persons who, during the course of the wir, have requested to be removed or sent to an enemy country or of the wir, have requested their sympathy with or support of the enemy reof the war, have requested to be removed or support of the enemy country or otherwise manifested their sympathy with or support of the enemy powers otherwise har such actions shown themselves to be unfit for perm otherwise manifested their sympacity must of support of the enemy powers and have by such actions shown themselves to be unfit for permanent

Therefore, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the residence in Canada; Therefore, His Excentency of State (concurred in by the Secretary recommendation of the Secretary of State (concurred in by the Secretary

recommendation of the Secretary and under the authority of the War Measures of State for External Affairs) and under the authority of the War Measures of State for External Analis, and External Analis,

order and doth hereby order as follows: ler and down metalization under 1. Any person who, being a British subject by naturalization under 1. Any person tot chapter 138, R.S.C. 1927, is deported from C 1. Any person who, being a Brush Carlos Sy naturalization under the Naturalization Act, chapter 138, R.S.C. 1927, is deported from Canada the Naturalization of Order in Council P.C. 7355 of 15th Decemb

the Naturalization Act, chapter about the council P.C. 7355 of 15th December, 1945, under the provisions of Order in Council P.C. 7355 of 15th December, 1945, under the provisions of Oruge upon which he leaves Canada in the course of shall, as and from the date upon which he leaves Canada in the course of shall, as and from the date upon the either a British subject or a Canadian such deportation, cease to be either a British subject or a Canadian

2. The Secretary of State shall publish in the Canada Gazette the 2. The Secretary of Brate cased to be British subjects or Canadian names of all persons who have ceased to be British subjects or Canadian

nationals by virtue of this Order.

As in the case of Japanese nationals, these two Orders show As in the case of the decision of the Governor in Council in the Jurisdividualized Japanese. But a question arises of relation to naturalized Japanese. But a question arises of the relation between revocation by Order 7356 and deportathe relation vote. No doubt the expulsion was intended to be followed by alienage of the deported persons; but if no or only a partial effect has been brought about by Order 7356, does that modify the operation of Order 7355?

The Naturalization Act contains a number of grounds upon which the revocation of naturalization can be effected, but the only one of interest here is that set forth in section 9 of chapter 138, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, which is as follows:

Where the Governor in Council, upon report of the Secretary of State of Canada, is satisfied * * * that the person to whom the of Canada, is granted has shown himself by act or speech to be disaffected or disloyal to His Majesty, the Governor in Council shall, by order, revoke the certificate.

Order 7356 does not refer to any naturalized person being "disaffected or disloyal"; it deals only with the deportation of a person under Order 7355, and this in turn puts the deportation on the fact of a request for repatriation which has not been revoked in writing prior to September 1st, 1945. Are we to imply from this language that the Governor in Council is satisfied in each case of the disaffection or disloyality of the naturalized person? Here is a penal provision of a drastic nature, and as it affects British subjects, I am unable to supply that conclusion by implication. The revocation for that cause seems to require the aid of the War Measures Act to enable the Governor in Council, as distinguished from the Secretary of State for Canada, to act under the Naturalization Act, but in either case, action must be strictly within the provisions of the latter as to grounds in order to bring about the revocation. It was argued that as Parliament could rescind the adoption, the Governor in Council could revoke on any ground he might see fit: but that view. I think, misconceives the foundation of the Naturalization Act. The legislative efficacy under which the naturalization arises is that of the British Nationality Act, part II of which has been "adopted" by the Canadian Parliament. That word would seem to mean simply that the Canadian Parliament has cleared the way for the extension to Canada of an Imperial Act providing an empire naturalization. That Act directly authorizes the Canadian Government to exercise the powers it creates. The form of the Canadian statute is not ex facie strictly in accordance with that conception, but if we look upon it as an exercise of Canadian legislative jurisdiction then that jurisdiction must be deemed to be by way of a specific investment additional to the British North America Act. but limited strictly to the precise language of the Imperial Act. No question of the Colonial Laws Validity Act arises because of the express power under the statute to rescind the adoption. But naturalization effect-

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ing an empire-wide section 91 of the Constitutional power of Canada under section 91 of the Constitutional power of Canada under of revocation have not been Act: and as the conditions of British subject has not Act: and as the contained of British subject has not been complied with, the status of British subject has not been

Another view of these statutes might be that each mem-Another view of most start with concurrent action of the ber of the Commonwealth with legislation which in ber of the Commonweater wide legislation which in rela-others itself enacts empire-wide naturalization it would others itself enacts empire of naturalization it would be tion to grant or revocation of naturalization it would be tion to grant or tevolution its pleasure without affecting the at liberty to amend at its pleasure members. But the at liberty to amend by the other members. But that is recognition accorded by the other members. But that is recognition accorded by the British Nationality Act. ot the legisland, declares a cesser also of being a Cana-But Order 7356 declares a cesser also of being a Cana-But Order (and in this goes beyond status. By the dian national and in this chapter 21 of the Revised St dian national and in the chapter 21 of the Revised Statutes Canadian Nationals Act, chapter 21 of the Revised Statutes Canadian National is a British subject who is a (1927) a Canadian national is definition of the Immi (1927) a Canadian much the definition of the Immigration Canadian citizen within the purpose here requires Canadian clutter for the purpose here requires a Cana-Act. The latter for the right to residence in G Act. The latter to residence in Canada dian domicile: and the right to residence in Canada dian domicue: and the Order takes away from the appears to be what the country of origin correction the with the country of origin correction. appears to be with the country of origin consenting deported person. With the country of origin consenting deported person, the requirement for permanent exclusion to his return, in these circumstances I am unable to say is obtained. In these circumstances of naturalization is optained, in revocation of naturalization is of such that the failure in revocation of Order 7977 a nature as to affect the operation of Order 7355.

In relation to the third class, natural born British subjects resident in Canada, serious questions arise.

I observe first that the expulsion of persons in the other two classes is in conjunction with an order or the otner two others of the equivalent of an order made by General MacArthur for their reception as repatriates in Japan. The letters passing between the Governments of Canada and the United States make it clear that what was asked for and conceded was "repatriation". That word is defined in Order 7356 in effect as either a "return" to Japan or "being sent" to that country, but obviously that definition is irrelevant to the meaning of the word as it is used in the communications between the two countries. "Repatriation" means simply a return to the patria or fatherland, and it has no relation to the compulsory transfer of a natural born British subject to a foreign country. Whatever legal rights it

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may confer to enter or to remain in Japan do not apply

to such a subject. Banishment with or without the loss of citizenship status

or rights, as an effective exile over a period of time, whatever its feasibility in the early political organization of ever not dis to-day, considering the tenacity with which every foot of land and water is now sought and held, a every the and executive impossibility. Admittedly one legislation into sovereignty has no legal power to force its own citizen into sovereight of another. It is quite the case that banishment and exile were known to the common law, but in each it was either a deportation to politically unorganized lands, a transportation to a British colony by way of punishment for a criminal offence, or a voluntary exile made either by way of abjuration of the realm or as fulfilment of a condition in a pardon or other remission or as an avoida containing self-exile. In none of these ance of present and the slightest suggestion of compulsory invasion of another's territory.

The process and effects of deportation of natural born British subjects under the Order seem to be these: a physical compulsion to leave Canadian shores; a de facto but not de jure entry upon Japanese territory: no citizenship rights in Japan and a retention of the rights of Canadian citizenship.

Now I must deal with this case as if, instead of a Canadian national of Japanese origin, I were dealing with that of a natural born Canadian national of English extraction who sympathized with Mosley or a French-Canadian national who supported Pétain or an Irish-Canadian national who thought deValera's course justified. I am asked to hold that, without a convention with those countries. the Government may, under the War Measures Act, and without affecting the national status or the citizenship rights of these persons, issue an order for their deportation, to those foreign shores. I am unable to agree with that contention.

In these days, we are familiar with exchanges or transfers of sections of population from one country to another by agreement or imposed, but they are carried out as changes of nationality as well as of country: a deprivation of citizen-

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ship rights by one state and an investment of them by the other. That is not what is done or intended to be done by the Order with which I am dealing.

he Order with Warliament in enacting the War Measures I think that I attemplated, as a fundamental assumption Act must have contemplated, the delegation of legislation Act must have contact, the delegation of legislative power underlying the statute, the delegation of legislative power underlying the statute only, and must have intended of a strictly legal character only, and must have intended of a strictly legal ofference in Council to measures or actions to restrict the Governor in Council to measures or actions to restrict the Government quality would inhere: that power in which full juridical character would be excluded by in which tuit juitance legal character would be excluded. What without recognized legal character is an act environment in the second s without recognized to guidical: it is an act envisaging the is proposed here is not juridical: it is an act envisaging the is proposed nere is the sovereign rights of another state by an violation of the sovereign and an affront to its difference by an violation of the territory and an affront to its dignity as invasion of its the occupying power. This quality, of represented by the occupying the case of an align the represented by the in the case of an alien: there the course, is not present in the case of an alien: there the course, is not present is a necessary corollary to that of authority of expulsion is a necessary corollary to that of authority of explusive Attorney General v. Cain (1): but the right to exclude: Attorney hetween the two the right to exclude the between the two cases is, I the fundamental distinction between the two cases is, I the fundamental and the a further illustration of the prin-think, unquestionable. As a further illustration of the printhink, unquestion against the presumption against the ciple invoked, I mention the presumption against the ciple invoken, the troactive orders, which I suggest would power to make retroactive orders, though there is power to many tor on Council, though there is no such restriction on Parliament.

On another ground I would come to the same conclusion. In Order 7355 the recital which, among others, relates to In Order (1999) this subjects, refers only to a request to be natural point pitting, as I think, a continuing request: sent to Japan, imposed it desirability" that provision be made the general results of the necessity to make to deport and ingly, apply to all three classes. The right to revoke the request by the natural born Canadian national is preserved up to the issue of the Order for deportation and this time limit is simply an administrative convenience. "Deportation" connotes only a single act and no period of time beyond the accomplishment of the expulsion. There is nothing in the Order to prevent such a Canadian from returning at once to the land of his birth. The contrast with the alien is obvious; once an alien leaves this country, he must establish a right given him by the legislature to return; at common law he has no (1) [1906] A.C. 542

right to enter which is recognized in our courts: Musgrove v. Toy (1). Considering, then, that the operation of the Order against the British subject by birth is placed solely upon a request which implies a continuing desire to leave this country, that the Order contemplates as well the withdrawal of persons voluntarily and enables the Minister to make financial arrangements to that end, in conjunction with the other circumstances I have detailed, I find in the Order clear evidence that that act of expulsion is not deemed by the Governor in Council either necessary or advisable for the peace, order or welfare of this country by reason of war; and the essential condition of the provision for compulsion is lacking.

The members of the family of a Canadian national may under Order 7355 be included in the deportation order. If revocation of naturalization takes place, the status of the wife and minor children may thereby be affected. But where by the Order only incidents of the status of the husband and father are reached, the full citizenship rights of the wife and minor children continue. It was not seriously urged that the Governor in Council has deemed the expulsion of such persons advisable or necessary to the peace or welfare of Canada for any reason arising out of war; the most suggested was that it was advisable to the peace and welfare of indivdual families; but that purpose does not seem to be among the objects of Parliament's delegation of legislative power to the Governor in Council.

Mr. Cartwright argued that the war emergency must be deemed to have ended when the War Measures Act became inoperative on January 1st of this year. But that, I think, confuses the emergency with a particular period of it to which particular legislation is related. The emergency as a state of fact underlies both the War Measures Act and the Transitional Powers Act which came into force on January 1st, 1946.

Then it was argued that section 9 of Order 7355 is ultra vires because of conflict with section 6 of the War Measures Act. But an "order" for deportation under Order 7355 means one that carries with it the force of law. The "legal

(1) [1891] A.C. 272.

custody" which is declared relates only to the agents or custody which is uctuated instruments by which the restraint is effected: Liverside v.

Sir John Anderson (1).

1. Order 7355 is intra vires of the Governor in Council 1. Order (200 is used nationals and to persons of the in relation to Japanese nationals and to persons of the in relation to Japanese under the Naturalization Act of Japanese race naturalized under the Naturalization Act of Japanese race have been to persons voluntarily leaving Canada; Canada as well as to persons to the compulsor d Canada as well as the lation to the compulsory deportation but is ultra vires in relation to the compulsory deportation but 15 untra varia the subjects resident in Canada, and of of natural born British subjects resident compared and of of natural point provident and of not come within the wives and children under 16 who do not come within the

2. Order 7356 is ultra vires of the Governor in Council first two classes. to the extent that it purports to revoke the naturalization to the extent that is panese race under the Naturalization ot persons of antra vires so far as it takes away incidential Act put it is used of such persons as Canadian nationals. 3. Order 7357 is intra vires of the Governor in Council.

3. Orget to the observance of the requirements of the subject to the observance for the subject to the subject to grounds for the revocation of Naturalization Act as to grounds for the revocation of

naturalization. I HEREBY CERTIFY to His Excellency the Governor General in Council that the foregoing are my reasons for the answer to the question referred herein for hearing and consideration.

I. C. RAND

KELLOCK J.-By Order in Council of the 8th day of January, 1946, P.C. 45, His Excellency the Governor General in Council referred to this Court pursuant to the provisions of section 55 of the Supreme Court Act the following question, namely:---

Are the Orders in Council, dated the 15th day of December, 1945. being P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357, ultra vires of the Governor in Council either in whole or in part, and, if so, in what particular or particulars and

The first named order, P.C. 7355 contains the following to what extent?

recitals:-

Whereas during the course of the war with Japan certain Japanese nationals manifested their sympathy with or support of Japan by making requests for repatriation to Japan and otherwise;

(1) [1942] A.C. 206, at 273.

And whereas other persons of the Japanese race have requested or may

request that they be sent to Japan; And whereas it is deemed desirable that provisions be made to deport

the classes of persons referred to above; And whereas it is considered necessary by reason of the war, for the And whereas a security by reason of the war, for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada, that provision be

Now, therefore, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on made accordingly;

Now, merchand, on the Minister of Labour, concurred in by the the recommendation of External Affairs, and under the authority of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and under the authority of the Secretary of black the chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, War Measures Act, chapter 206 broky make the full War measures and doth hereby make the following Order,—

By section 2 (1), it is provided that every person of sixteen years of age or over, other than a "Canadian sixuen ", who is a national of Japan resident in Canada national", who is a national of Japan resident in Canada national , a) has, since the date of declaration of war by and who (a) has, since the date of declaration of war by and war by the Government of Canada against Japan on December 8, the dotted a request for repatriation; or (b) has been in 1941, made a request for repatriation; or (b) has been in detention at any place in virtue of an order made pursuant to the provisions of the Defence of Canada Regulations or of Order in Council P.C. 946, of the 5th day of February, 1943, as amended by P.C. 5637, of the 16th day of August, 1943, and was so detained as at midnight of September 1, 1945, may be deported to Japan. By subsection 2, provision is made for the deportation to Japan of every naturalized British subject of the Japanese race of 16 years of age or over resident in Canada who has made a request for repatriation, provided that the same had not been revoked in writing prior to midnight of September 1st, 1945. Subsection 3 makes similar provision with respect to natural born British subjects of the Japanese race of 16 years of age or over, provided that requests in the case of these persons are not revoked in writing prior to the making by the Minister of Labour of a deportation order. By subsection 4, the Minister may include in any order for deportation the wife and children under 16 years of age of any deportee.

By section 3 a request for repatriation shall be deemed final and irrevocable for the purposes of the Order, subject only to the provisions for revocation already mentioned. By section 9, it is provided that any deportee detained pending deportation or placed under restraint in the course of deportation shall be deemed to be in legal custody.

By the second Order, P.C. 7356, it is provided, with re-By the second on naturalized under the provisions of the spect to any person naturalized need to a spect to any person act. R.S.C. 1927, cap. 138 and spect to any person Act, R.S.C. 1927, cap. 138, and who is Naturalization Act, Brom the date upon which b Naturalization, the shall, from the date upon which he leaves deported, that he shall, from the date upon which he leaves deported, that he plan, and a subject or a Canadian national. Canada, cease to be a British subject or a Canadian national. By R.S.C. cap. 21 it is provided:-

2. The following persons are Canadian Nationals, viz:-2. The following persons and is a Canadian citizen within the meaning (a) Any British subject who is a Canadian citizen within the meaning of the Immigration Act;

(b) The wife of any such citizen;

(b) The wife of any such of Canada, whose father was a Canadian (c) Any person born out of that person's birth, or with Terror and the time of that person's birth, or with Terror Any person born out of that person's birth, or with regard to National at the time of third day of May, one thousand to National at the time of the third day of May, one thousand to persons born before the third day of May, one thousand nine persons born before the any person whose father at the time of hundred and twenty-one, any person whose father at the time of hundred and twenty-one, any process and the time of hundred and twenty-one, any process and the time of such birth, possessed all the qualifications of a Canadian National,

as defined in this Act. as defined in this act, as defined in this act, as defined in this bar, as def

3. (a) Any person who by the who at his birth or during his minority is a Canadian National, but who at his birth or during his minority is a Canadian National, put who are of any self-governing his minority became under the law of Great Britain or of any self-governing Dominion became under the law of antional also of that Kingdom or Dominic became under the law of Great Line of that Kingdom or Dominion Dominion, and of the British Empire, a national; and

is still such a national; and till such a national; and (b) Any person who though born out of Canada is a Canadian

National; may, if of full age and not under disability, make a declaration, renouncing

his Canadian nationality. Canadian nationality. Canadian nationality. 2. Such declaration may be made before a notary public or other 2. Such declaration may be much in the locality public or other person authorized to administer oaths in the locality in which the

person authorized to administer out in the form set out in the Schedule to declaration is made, and may be in the

3. The declarant shall transmit his declaration to the Secretary of 3. The declarant shall the Secretary of State being satisfied of the State of Canada and upon the Secretary of State being satisfied of the

State of Canada and upon the bethat it has been duly executed, it shall sufficiency of the declaration and that it has been duly executed, it shall sufficiency of the declaration and declarant shall cease to be a Canadian be filed on record, whereupon the declaration shall be forwarded to be filed on record, whereupon the declaration shall be forwarded to the National, and a certified copy of the declaration shall be forwarded to the National, and a certined copy of the even that the original declaration has declarant with an endorsement thereon that the original declaration has

been filed of record. By the third Order, P.C. 7357, provision is made for the appointment of a Commission to make inquiry concerning appointments, loyalty and the extent of co-operation with the Government of Canada during the war of Japanese nationals and naturalized persons of the Japanese race in Canada in cases where their names are referred to the Commission by the Minister for investigation with a view to recommending whether, in the circumstances of any such case, such person should be deported. It is further provided that notwithstanding any provision of P.C. 7355, the Commission may, at the request of the Minister, inquire into the case of any naturalized British subject of the Japanese race who has made a request for repatriation which is final under the terms of the said Order in Council and may make such recommendations with respect to such case as the Commission deems advisable. It is further provided that any person of the Japanese race recommended by the Commission for deportation shall be subject to deportation under the provisions of Order in Council P.C. 7355, and where any person is so recommended for deportation he shall, from the date on which he leaves Canada in the course of such deportation, cease to be a British subject or a "Canadian national."

All of the above orders purport to be made pursuant to the provisions of the War Measures Act, R.S.C. 1927.

On the 28th of December, 1945, P.C. 7414 was passed. By this Order it is recited that the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945, is to come into force on the first of January, 1946, and by its terms provides that on and after that day the war, for the purposes of the War Measures Act, shall be deemed no longer to exist, that under section 4 of the first mentioned Act the Governor in Council may order that orders and regulations lawfully made under the War Measures Act, or pursuant to authority created thereunder in force immediately before the first of January, 1946, shall, while the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945, is in force, continue in full force and effect subject to amendment or revocation thereunder, and that all orders and regulations so made and in force immediately before the day the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945, comes into force, shall, while that Act is in force, continue in full force and effect subject to amendment or revocation under that Act.

In pursuance of the order of reference to this Court, we heard argument on behalf of the Attorney General of Canada, the Attorney General of British Columbia and the Cooperative Committee of Japanese Canadians. Counsel for the Attorney General of British Columbia supported the submissions of counsel for the Attorney General of Canada, while counsel for the Committee attacked the validity of the orders in question.

Mr. Cartwright argues that the Orders in Council here in Mr. Cartwright and a matter which, in the absence of the question deal with a matter would fall within the composiquestion dear with would fall within the competence of the emergency of war, would fall within the competence of emergency of way, there as being property and civil rights. the provincial legislatures as being property of the subject the provincial restrict the liberty of the subject where He contends that to restrict is an interferonce He contends that to committed is an interference with a no crime has been committed to the decision of the C no crime has been efferred to the decision of the Court of civil right and he referred to MacKonzio (1). The civil right and no to the MacKenzie (1). The contention Appeal of Ontario in Council are in their nature Appeal of Ontention are in their nature preventive is that the Orders in Council are of criminal law. It is that the Orucis in the sphere of criminal law. It is con-and are not within the sphere of war a new scene of and are not wrothing the reason of war, a new aspect of the ceded however, that, by reason of which justifies logicle. ceded nowever, and arises which justifies legislation by business of government in this aspect on matters the Dominion Parliament in this aspect on matters normally the Dominion transection 92 of the B.N.A. Act. It is also exclusively within section may continue to b exclusively interest legislation may continue to be justified conceded that such legislation but while conditions are conceded way but a seased but while conditions arising out after actual war has our reference is made to Fort Frances of war continue, and reference is made to Fort Frances of war contained, and pany v. Manitoba Free Press (2). Pulp and Paper Company that Parliament by the Counsel contends, however, that Parliament by the enact-Counsel contenue, no mergency Transitional Powers Act. ment of the fynder and VI, cap. 24) has recognized that 1945 (9 and 10 George VI, cap. 24) has recognized that 1945 (9 and 10 war which justified or required the enactment of the War Measures Act ceased on the first of January, 1946. It is further contended that as the Act of 1945 does not include the provisions contained in clause (b)of subsection 1 of section 3 of the War Measures Act, this constitutes a declaration by Parliament that in respect to the matters included in such clause there is no continuing necessity for the exercise of extraordinary powers by the Governor in Council from the first of January, 1946, by reason of the emergency of war or of any continuing transitional post-war emergency.

Under the provisions of section 2 of the War Measures

Act, the issue of a proclamation is to constitute conclusive evidence that war, real or apprehended, exists or has existed for any period of time therein stated and of its continuance until, which has not yet happened, by the issue of a further proclamation, it is declared that the war no longer exists. The Act of 1945 recites among other things as follows:

And whereas the national emergency arising out of the war has continued since the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan and (2) [1923] A.C. 695. (1) [1945] O.R. 787, at 796.

is still continuing; and whereas it is essential in the national interest that is still continuing, and the continue to be exercisable by the Governor in transitional powers continuance of the exceptional conditional conditional interest that certain transitional point of the exceptional conditions brought Council during the continuance of the exceptional conditions brought Council during the war and it is preferable that such transitional powers be about by the war and it is preferable that such transitional powers be about by the war and it is precial authority in that such transitional powers be exercised hereafter under special authority in that behalf conferred by exercised hereared of being exercised under the War Measures Act; and Parliament instead of circumstances it may be necessary that certain acts whereas in the existing circumstances it may be necessary that certain acts whereas in the earstain orders and certain orders and regulations made and things done and authorized and certain orders and regulations made and things done dealers Act be continued in force and that it is essential under the War Measures Act be continued in force and that it is essential under the War in Council be authorized to and authorize such further that the Governor in Council be authorized to and authorize such further that the Governor and make such further orders and regulations as he may acts and times are advisable by reason of the emergency and for the discontinuance in an orderly manner as the discontinuance in a dis the discontinuance in a discontinuance in an orderly manner as deem necessary deem necessary purpose of the discontinuance in an orderly manner as the emergency of measure adopted during and by reason of the purpose of the emergency.

By section 2, the Governor in Council may do and authorize such acts and things and make from time to time such orders and regulations, as he may, by reason of the continued existence of the national emergency arising out of the war against Germany and Japan, deem necessary or advisable for the purpose of certain specified matters including, by clause (e),

continuing or discontinuing in an orderly manner as the emergency permits measures adopted during and by reason of the war.

Section 4 provides:

Without prejudice to any other power conferred by this Act, the Governor in Council may order that the orders and regulations lawfully made under the War Measures Act or pursuant to authority created under the said Act in force immediately before the day this Act comes into force the said Act in Act is in force, continue in full force and effect subject to amendment or revocation under this Act.

By section 5, provision is made for the Act to come into force on the first of January, 1946, and it is declared that On and after that day the war against Germany and Japan shall, for the on and the War Measures Act, be deemed no longer to exist.

It would appear that the effect of the declaration in section 5 just referred to is, so far as the War Measures Act is concerned, to render that statute no longer available as authority for orders or regulations thereunder. However, the statute of 1945 becomes the authority for the orders and regulations for which it provides, and an Order in Council of the 28th December, 1945, P.C. 7414, passed under its provisions and pursuant to section 12 of the Interpretation Act, provides that

all orders and regulations lawfully made under the War Measures Act or pursuant to authority created under the said Act in force immediately before the day the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945, before the day the National that Act is in force, continue in full force comes into force shall, while that Act is in force, continue in full force

and effect subject to amendment or revocation under that Act. I think, therefore, that although the Orders in Council I think, therefore, and derive any force from the provi-here in question cease to derive any force from the provihere in question coast act from and after the first of sions of the War Measures Act from and after the first of sions of the *W ar th* that date, they derive their force from January, 1946, after that date, they derive their force from January, 1940, attest by reason of the existence of the emer-the statute of 1945, by reason of the not think theref the statute of 1940, by the I do not think, therefore, that gency therein referred to. I do not think, therefore, that effect can be given to the argument of Mr. Cartwright effect can be given a declared by the statute of 1945 that that Parliament has declared by for the everying that Parmament has accessity for the exercise of such there is no continuing necessity in subsection. there is no containing contained in subsection 1 of sec-

tion 3 of the War Measures Act. With the exception of the above argument, no other

attack (apart from the question of severability) was made upon the orders which affects the validity of the orders with respect to nationals of Japan. As I know of no other ground of invalidity in this respect, I would hold the orders valid with respect to this class of person.

It was next argued on behalf of the Committee that

the Orders in Council in question in so far as they provide for the removal from Canada of persons other than aliens are not authorized by the provisions of the War Measures

It will be convenient, in considering this submission, to Act.

quote section 3 of that Act: The Governor in Council may do and authorize such acts and things,

and make from time to time such orders and regulations, as he may by reason of the existence of real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection deem necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada; and for greater certainty, but not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing terms, it is hereby declared that the powers of the Governor in Council shall extend to all matters coming within the classes of subjects hereinafter enumerated, that is to say;-

As will be observed, "deportation" is not defined in the Act but by section 1 (a) of P.C. 7353 it is defined as

the removal pursuant to the authority of this order of any person from any place in Canada to a place outside Canada.

(It is also to be observed that the words used in subsections (1) (2) and (3) of section 2 of P.C. 7355 are "deported to Japan.") The contention on behalf of the Committee in effect is that these provisions are not authorized by the provisions of the War Measures Act.

counsel for the Attorneys General contend that "depor-Counsel for tation" as used in the statute is wide enough to include the tation" as used in the second meaning group or definition in the order is authorized by in any event, the earlier general language of subsection 1 of the Act. In In re Gray (1), Fitzpatrick C.J.C. said with refer-

In In the specified subjects in the subsection at p. 138, ence to the reason for introducing specifications was that those specified that the reason for introducing specifications was that those specified that the reason for less remote from those which were connected with subjects were more or less remote thought expedient to declare evaluated with subjects were more thought expedient to declare explicitly that the war, and it was therefore thought expedient to declare explicitly that the war, and the power of the Governor could go even thus far,"

Duff J., as he then was, said at 168.

Duff J., as and there is in the second branch of the section an enumeration (an enumeration there is an arid rather of groups of subjects which it appears to be there is in an enumeration (an enumeration let it be said rather of groups of subjects which it appears to have been it marginal instance." let it be such that possibly be regarded as "marginal instances" as to have been thought might conceivably arise some controversy whether thought might conceivably arise some controversy whether or not they fell within the first branch of the section) * *

At 177 Anglin J., as he then was, with whom Fitzpatrick C.J.C. also agreed, said

C.J.C. the specification should be deemed to be of cases in which there might be the specification whether they fell within the ambit of the the specification whether they fell within the ambit of the general terms_ such doubt as to me that ex abundanti cautela it was safer to mention them specifically.

In Murray's New English Dictionary, "deportation" is defined as "to carry away," "carry off," "remove," "transport," "especially to remove into exile," "to banish." "Exile" by the same authority is defined as "enforced removal from one's native land according to an edict or sentence," " penal expatriation or banishment," " the state or condition of being penally banished," " enforced residence in some foreign land;" and "banish" is defined as " to put to the ban," " proclaim as an outlaw," " to outlaw," " to condemn a person by public edict or sentence, to leave the country," "to exile, expatriate."

Counsel for the Attorney General of Canada also called our attention to the definition of "deportation" in Webster's New International Dictionary, namely, the

act of deporting or state of being deported; banishment; transportation; in modern law the removal from the country of an alien considered in modern the public welfare; distinguished from "transportation" and "extradition".

(1) (1918) 57 Can. S.C.R. 150.

This last is evidently taken from the judgment of Gray, This last is evidence V. United States (1), as follows:-In FORG 1 40 (transportation", "extradition", and "deportation", Strictly speaking, "transportation" a person from the count Strictly speaking, "transportation", and "deportation", although each has the effect of removing a person from the country, are "Transportation" is but although each has the effect of removing a person from the country, are different things, and have different purposes. "Transportation" is by way different things, and have different purposed of an offence against the laws of the of punishment of one convicted of an offence country of one of the surrender to another country of the surrender t of punishment of one convicted and another country of one accused country. "Extradition" is the surrender to be tried, and, if found country. "Extradition" is the suitchard to be tried, and, if found guilty, of an offence against is laws, there to be tried, and, if found guilty, of an offence against is laws, unlet us be then, and, it found guilty, punished. "Deportation" is the removal of an alien out of the country, punished. "Deportation" is the removal of an alten out of the country, simply because his presence is deemed inconsistent with the public welfare simply because his presence is deemen incomposed or contemplated either under and without any punishment being imposed or of those of the co and without any punishment peng imposed of concemptated either under the laws of the country out of which he is sent or of those of the country

Mr. Geoffrion points out that the Court in the case last to which he is taken. Mr. Geomrion points only with aliens and that the cited was in fact dealing only with aliens and that the

cited was in fact usaming outed was obiter. He says in portion of the judgment is not binding on this any event that the judgment is not binding on this court. The importance or relevance of the above citation is, of The importance of four ding effect it may have, but as course, not from any binding effect it may have, but as

course, not from any assigned to the word in question in illustrating a meaning assigned to the word in question in illustrating a meaning with a cognate subject. This use a modern statute dealing with a lithough of anoth a modern statute using a statute, although of another juris-of the word in such a statute, inquint as to the of the word in subally to the inquiry as to the meaning diction, leads naturally to the inquiry of Barli with which the word is used in statutes of Parliament and

particularly in the War Measures Act. To consider the word merely as the equivalent of

"remove" or "carry away," as in fact it may be used, is to give effect to the contention of counsel for the Attorneys give enect to an out of the equivalent of " to General. To consider it, however, as the equivalent of " to General. To consider a "to banish" involves the idea of remove the came such as was involved in the old sentence of outlawry now abolished in criminal cases by the provisions of section 1031 of the Code. Such a meaning, in my opinion, is not apt in the case of citizens who have committed no offence, and as to whom there is no charge no trial and no conviction, nor is it apt in modern times in application to a natural born citizen of a country as it involves the idea that there is some other country to which the citizen may be sent, which is under some obligation to receive him by reason of some previous connection of the citizen with that country. No country is under any obligation to receive the natural born citizens of another country and any attempt to force such a citizen upon

(1) [1893] 149 U.S. 697, at 709.

country would involve an infringement of another sovereignty.

In Bar on Private International Law, second ed., p. 135, the author says:---

However far a State may go in hospitably receiving foreigners, still However far a black of the community, or in need of relief from However law, may be refused a right of residence, and in extra form foreigners who are tanget foreigners who are tanget a right of residence, and in extraordinary the poor law, that right may be limited by special legislation of the right are the poor band no States and the special legislation of the spe foreign law, may be that right may be limited by special legislation to some the poor least that right may be limited by special legislation to some cases affect. On the other hand, no State can in these days of the some the st least that the other hand, no State can in these days effectively other to receive back into its own territory subjects of its own effectively other effect. On the into its own territory subjects of its own, who have refuse to receive by a foreign country. The banishment of a Station have other to receive back much a country. The banishment of a State's own who have refuse rejected by a foreign country. The banishment of a State's own been rejected a power which is still sometimes exercised as an own who have refuse rejected by a which is still sometimes exercised as an exceptional subjects, a power which is not power which is still sometimes exercised as an exceptional subjects, and measure, in truth can only be exercised with the knowledge of sublicity of the second seco been subjects, a power in truth can only be exercised as an exceptional subjects, a measure, in truth can only be exercised with the knowledge that political measure to the rules of public law, and that it is impossible that political measure, in the rules of public law, and that it is impossible to carry it is contrary to far as other States refuse to receive the exiles it is contrary of an as other States refuse to receive the exiles.

It may be that the removal of citizens of one country to It may be that an be arranged with the consent of the another country to be observed in the present of the another country another but it is to be observed in the present case that the latter, but it is to be observed in the present case that the latter, but it and through General MacArthur, the Supreme consent of our the Allied Powers, is a consent to "repa-Commander to "repa-triation" and nothing else. "Repatriation" is defined by triation and to return to one's country;" "to restore a Murray as person to his own country." Thus in the present case there person to the reception of natural born Canadians is no consent country but Canada. Japan is a sovereign who have no power subject to the control of the powers represented by general MacArthur and no act such as is here in question General induces a network of the second seco can be legared a natural born Canadian to another country would involve an infringement of the sovereignty of the would involve apart from the consent of that country at a time when Canada has formally recognized the end of a time when and that the government of Japan is now as above stated, is, in my opinion, strong ground for construing above statute in question, in the absence of clear language, in a manner which does not involve such a result.

It is relevant here to refer to the official communication from the Government of Canada to General MacArthur to which the consent of the latter relates. That communication is contained in a letter of the 17th September, 1945, to the Canadian Ambassador at Washington and reads as follows:----

There are approximately 24,000 people of Japanese origin now resident in Canada. About 10,000 (including dependents) have expressed a desire

Pollock, C.B. in Bowditch v. Balchin (1), cited with Pollock, U.J. Wright in Barnard v. Gorman (1), cited with approval by Lord Wright in Barnard v. Gorman (2) said, at p. 381,

P. 381, p. a_{case} in which the liberty of the subject is concerned, we cannot In a_{the} natural construction of the statute. In a case in intervention of the subject go beyond the natural construction of the statute.

^{beyond} the statutes in force in 1927 when the statutory I turn of that year was made. The Immigration Act, revision of 93 section 2 (c) contains a definition Act, R.S.C. cap. 93 for the purposes of that Art of the R.S.C. cap. deportation" for the purposes of that Act. It is defined as

defined as defined and under authority of this Act of any rejected immigrant or the removal under any immigrant or other person who has also are on the person of any immigrant or the removal unuer of any immigrant or other person who has already been other person, or who has entered or who remains in Canada, or who has entered or who remains in Canada the person, or or who has entered or who remains in Canada aready been other in Canada, or who has entered or who remains in Canada contrary landed in Consistence of this Act, from any place in Canada at a contrary other in Canada, of this Act, from any place in Canada at which such and provision of this rejected or detained to the place such as the such to any provision of person is rejected or detained to the place which such immigrant or other person is rejected or detained to the place whence he immigrant or other to the country of his birth or citizenship. "Immigrant" is defined in clause (g) of the same section

as who enters Canada with the intention of acquiring Canadian a person who can be purposes of this Act every person entering Canadian domicile, and for the purposes of this Act every person entering Canadian domicile, presumed to be an immigrant unless belonging to domicile, and to be an immigrant unless belonging to one of the shall be presumed to be an immigrant called "non-immigrant of the shall be presumed persons hereinafter called "non-immigrant classes"

following follows a long list of classes, the first of which is Here follows and persons who have Canadian domi-"Canadian citizen" in turn is defined by clause (f)cile." Canada with a person born in Canada who has of the section as "(1) a British subject who has of the section an alien," "(2) a British subject who has Cana-not become an alien," "(3) a person naturality of the bas Cananot become and a cana-dian domicile," or "(3) a person naturalized under the dian dominanda who has not subsequently become an alien laws of Canadian domicile." By section 3 the classes of or lost our may be denied entry to Canada, or who, having persons with Canada, may be removed, do not include Canadian citizens or persons with Canadian domicile. "Deportation" does not apply to them. The same situation exists under the provisions of the Chinese Immigration Act R.S.C. cap. 95; Shin Shim v. The King (3).

Again by The Opium and Narcotic Drug Act R.S.C., cap. 144, section 24, any alien convicted of certain enumerated offences may be deported under the provisions of the Immigration Act "relating to enquiry, detention and deportation."

(1) (1850) 5 Exch. 378.

(2) [1941] 3 All. Eng. R. 45 at 55 (3) [1938] S.C.R. 378.

to be repatriated to Japan. There are also about 500 Japanese nationals to be repatriated to supart. There are desired to deport. At a later date now interned whom it will probably be some additional deportant and now interned whom it will probable additional deportees and voluntary it is probable that there will be some additional deportees and voluntary it is probable that there will be bound advected. The Canadian Government repatriates who will also have to be removed. The Canadian Government repatriates who will also have a proceed with repatriation and deportation as soon as this is anxious to proceed with repatriation ambarrasment. It is different is anxious to proceed with repartment. It is difficult to proceed can be done without causing you embarrassment. It is difficult to proceed can be done without causing you choose an ontrol over Japanese remaining in with redistribution and relaxation of control over Japanese remaining in

Canada until repatriates and deportees are removed. It is proposed that repatriates and deportees from Canada should be

It is proposed that repayments and their effects and provided given free transportation for themselves and their effects and provided given free transportation for enclassion sufficient to take care of their with a maintenance grant upon repatriation sufficient to take care of their with a maintenance grant upon repairment of the care care of their immediate needs, also that they be permitted to transfer remainder of

ir funds to Japan. You will appreciate the desire of the Canadian Government to proceed You will appreciate the desire of the Canadian Government to proceed with these plans as soon as possible. The Canadian Government would

with these plans as soon as possible. The earliest date on which you would be be grateful for your advice as to the earliest date on which you would be prepared to have these people arrive in Japan.

It is to be observed that the word "deport" in the above

communication is used only with respect to aliens. The word "repatriate" used with respect to the other persons is properly usable only with respect to persons other than natural born Canadian citizens. In my opinion, this communication affords the best evidence as to the sense in which the word "deport" is understood in this country. As I have already indicated, nowhere in the communication is it used with reference to natural born Canadian citizens and even the word "repatriate" as applied to such persons is not appropriate. What is being done in the case of such persons is expatriation.

Counsel for the Committee further argues that where the personal liberty of the subject is in question, the view most favourable to the preservation of that liberty should be accepted. In Rex v. Halliday (1), Lord Atkinson said

for myself, I must say that I never could appreciate the contention that statutes invading the liberty of the subject should be construed after one manner, and statutes not invading it after another, that certain words should in the first class have a meaning put upon them different from what the same words would have put upon them when used in the second. I think the tribunal whose duty it is to interpret the statute of one class or the other should endeavour to find out what, according to the wellknown rules and principles of construction, the statute means, and if the meaning be clear to apply it in that sense. Should the statute be ambiguous, equally susceptible of two meanings, one leading to an invasion of the liberty of the subject and the other not, it may well be that the latter should be preferred on the ground of the presumed intention of the legislature not to interfere with it.

(1) [1917] A.C. 260.

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We have not been referred to and I have not We have not boy other statute of Parliament where been able to find any other statute of Parliament where been able to nitu any "is used. In Eshugbayi Eleko v. the word "deportation" is used. In Eshugbayi Eleko v. the word "deportation" (1), the legislation there in question Government of Nigeria (1), the legislation there in question Government "deported" with reference to the removed "deported" with reference to the removed "deported" with reference to the removed of the removed Government of Wyorted" with reference to the removal of a used the word "deported" Nigeria to another. I have used the word appoint of Nigeria to another. I have not citizen from one part of Nigeria to another. I have not citizen from one part any instance in which the word been able to find, however, any instance in which the word been able to nnu, now statute in modern times with the has been used in any statute for the Attorneys of has been used in any counsel for the Attorneys General

ontend. Apart from its now suggested meaning in the Warcontend. Apart from the meret in any statute with meret Measures Act, used used used with regard to previously in Parliament in any statute with regard to previously in training on texts. This being so and the word itself natural born uning contexts, as set out above, a wider or having, in varying T think it is the duty of the having, in varying, I think it is the duty of the Court a narrower meaning, I think it is the canon of court a narrower incanances to adopt the canon of construction in such circumstances from the judgments already cited expressed in the passages from the judgments already cited expressed in the part, L.C.J. in Rex v. Chapman (2) where, and by Lord Hewart, D.Statutes 7th Ed p. 244 and by Lord House, on Statutes 7th Ed. p. 244, he said: referring word or ambiguous sentence leaves a reasonable doubt where an equivocal which the canons of interpretation fail to solve, the benefit of its meaning which the given to the subject and against the of its meaning which the given to the subject and against the legislature of the doubt should be given to the subject and against the legislature which has failed to explain itself.

When one looks at the enumerated powers in clause (b). "arrest, detention, exclusion and deportation," it is not unreasonable to conclude that in the case of citizens the powers of arrest, and detention added to the existing sanctions of the criminal law might well have been regarded by Parliament as ample, with the additional powers of exclusion and deportation in the case of other persons. All the powers given to the executive by the statute are emergency powers and in the scheme of things laid down in the statute it is not easy to see how Parliament either did or would contemplate the extension to natural born citizens, at least. of the power of removal from the state. These considerations, therefore, lead also to the conclusion which I have already expressed.

When once it is determined that the specified power of "deportation" is not as wide as the definition in P.C. 7355, I do not think that what is lacking can be made up. (2) [1931] 2 K.B. 606, at 609. (1) [1931] A.C. 662.

in a case like the present, by the general words with which in a case like words. These words, or indeed, which the subsection deportation" itself, are not to be in the parthe subsection "deportation" itself, are not to be interpreted ticular word and the sovereignty of another count to be interpreted as authorizing what is really an illegal act, namely the as authorizons as authorizons of the sovereignty of another country, unless infringement of the sovereignty of another country, unless infringement of infringement of that intention is clearly expressed. In my opinion, unless that is so far as the Orders in Council provider there. that internion the orders in Council provide for the fore, in so far as the Orders in Council provide for the fore, in so has a second provide for the removal of natural-born Canadian citizens against their removal are invalid. Consequently, the provide for the removal of the invalid. Consequently, the provisions which will, the prevent such persons withdrawing the will, they are used by a with the provisions which purport to prevent such persons withdrawing their requests purport to part and in any manner cannot be supported. t any time and Mr. Geoffrion also founded himself upon the word "ex-

Mr. Geomican clusion," but admitted that, as commonly used at least, "to prevent entry": In Murray's N clusion," but used at least, it means "to prevent entry": In Murray's New English it means to provide as "to bar or keep out (what is Dictionary it is defined as "to shut out (persona live what is Dictionary it what is already outside);" "to shut out (persons, living things);" already outside," "to hinder from entering." It is by the same authority also "to banish." "ornel." "to hinder non ut," "to banish," "expel." As used in defined as "to put out," "to banish," "expel." As used in defined as the War Measures Act in the context of clause section 3 of the War Measures Act in the context of clause section 3 of the section 3 (1) I think it is used as the equivalent of (b) of section 3 (1) I think it is used as the equivalent of (b) of section Attorney General for Canada v. Cain (1), expulsion. In Attorney with validity of sortion of Cain (1), expulsion. In Lord Atkinson, dealing with validity of section 6 of the then Lord Atkinson, dealing with validity of section 6 of the then Lord Atkinson, at of Canada, 60 and 61 Victoria, cap. 11 Alien Laborna, cap. 11 as amended by 1 Edward VII Cap. 13, section 13, said at 547,

at Jun, the power of expulsion is in truth but the complement of the power of the power of entry be prohibited, it would seem to fin the power of explanation of the power of exclusion. If entry be prohibited, it would seem to follow that the exclusion should be a should exclusion. If the power of exclusion should have the power to Government which has the power in opposition to its laws Governments who enters in opposition to its laws.

I cite this passage only as an illustration of the use of the word "exclude" in relation to a subject matter allied to the subject matter here under consideration. The power of "deportation" is used in the statute in my opinion as the complement of the power of "exclusion."

Mr. Cartwright further argued that at the time that the War Measures Act was passed in 1914 and also at the time of the revision of 1927, Parliament could not have authorized the Governor in Council to make orders or regulations repugnant to Part II of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, as Parliament, apart from a rescission of the adoption of that Act had not that power itself. He (1) [1906] A.C. 542.

contends that the orders here in question, in so far as they affect naturalized British subjects of the Japanese race are repugnant to the provisions of the Imperial Act, and he contends that even had Parliament purported to legislate with respect to this class of person as in the Orders in Council, such legislation would be invalid by reason of the provisions of the Colonial Laws Validity Act. Mr. Cartwright further contends that although Parliament, since the passing of the Statute of Westminster in 1931 is not subject to such a limitation, nevertheless, Parliament was so subject in 1914 and 1927 and has not since 1931 reenacted the War Measures Act so that there is no "law made after the commencement of this Act" (the Statute of Westminster) "by the Parliament of a dominion"; (section 2 (1) of the Statute of Westminster). Mr. Geoffrion submits on the other hand that the Imperial Act of 1914 was never adopted by Canada.

In view of subsection 4 of section 9 of the Imperial Act which provides for rescission at any time by a dominion which has adopted the provisions of Part II of the Act, it does not seem necessary to consider the bearing, if any. of the Colonial Laws Validity Act. It is first necessary to consider the question as to whether or not there was an adoption of Part II by Canada.

While it would doubtless have been sufficient and perhaps preferable for Parliament to have adopted the provisions of Part II merely by legislating in express terms to that effect, I think that Parliament has done the same thing in another way. By 10-11 George V, cap. 59, passed in 1920, the provisions of the former Naturalization Acts of 1914 were revived. Mr. Geoffrion points out that the first Act of 1914 was in fact passed by Parliament before the date of the passing of the Imperial Act and that the latter when passed differed from the Canadian Act. In the second Act of 1914 the differences between the Canadian and the Imperial legislation were enacted by Parliament and this Act contains a recital that Parliament had "adopted" the Imperial Act by the first Act of 1914. Mr. Geoffrion contends that in fact that was not so. However that may be, I think the Act of 1920 by reviving the Acts of 1914, both of which had been repealed in 1919,

which would include the declaration in the second Act as which would and the Imperial Act, is a declaration by to the ment in 1920 that the Imperial legislation by to the adoption to the in 1920 that the Imperial legislation by Parliament in Foote's Private International Law was Parliament In Parliament In Foote's Private International Law, 5th ed. adopted. In Foote's that Canada, Australia and ed. adopted. In Law, 5th ed. adopted. at author states that Canada, Australia and New-p. Jond did adopt the Act and I think that as the Newp. 35 the automotion of the Act and I think that as to Canada foundland did adopt the Act and I think that as to Canada that is a correct statement.

There has been no rescission of this adoption by Parlia-There has been is no attempt at rescission in the Orders ment and the orders in Council in question and it is provided, in any event, by in Council in quality of the Imperial Act that rescission is section 9 subsection 4 of the Imperial Act that rescission is section 9 subset not to affect legal rights previously acquired. Section 26 not to affect assume or growides that nothing in the Act subsection i, any legislature or Government of any British shall prevent treating differently different classes of possession from treating different subjects. As to persons whose Certificate possession increases of British subjects. As to persons whose Certificates of Natu-British subjects. British subjects. ralization have been granted under the Act elsewhere than ralization it is provided by subsection 5 of sort: ralization nave and by subsection 5 of section 7 of the in Canada, it is provided by subsection 5 of section 7 of the in Canada, it is a result of 1918, 8 and 9 George V, cap. 38, that Imperial legislation of 1918, 8 and 9 George V, cap. 38, that Imperial legislate may be revoked in accordance with the section

section with the concurrence of the Government of that part of His Majesty's Dominions in which the Certificate was granted.

As to naturalized persons, therefore, whose certificates As to make outside of Canada their status, by virtue of were granted outside may not be affected by with of were granted Act, may not be affected by unilateral action the Imperial Act, may not by reason of the the Imperial action on the part of Canada, but by reason of the provisions of on the part of section 26 subsection 1 the rights and liabilities incidental to status are left to Canada. This provision was the law existing before the statute as applied in the case Re Henry existing both No one would suggest that the provisions of Adam (1). No one would suggest that the provisions of the Immigration Act R.S.C. cap. 93 which excluded from Canada British subjects coming within the classes mentioned in section 3 of that Act are in any way in conflict with the provisions of Part II of the Imperial statute and the same may be said of the provisions of the Chinese Immigration Act R.S.C. cap. 95. It follows, therefore, that it is competent for Parliament to deny to British subjects naturalized outside of Canada the right of residence in Canada, but not to interfere with their status except upon the terms set forth in the Imperial Act, including the (1) (1837) 1 Moore P.C. 459.

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concurrence of whatever other government is concerned, nor in the case of persons naturalized in Canada to revoke in the case of potential upon the terms of the Imperial Act. but again in the case of such persons it is competent to but again in the rights and liabilities growing from such

Order P.C. 7355 recites in the case of Japanese nationals status. that they have manifested their sympathy with or support that they have have requests for repatriation to Japan and ot Japan by manual is no similar recital in the case of otherwise, but there is no similar recital in the case of otherwise, but attral born subjects. The recital with which P.C. 7356 begins is not to be interpreted, in my opinion, as broadening the scope of the recital in P.C. 7355. opinion, as production declared by Order 7356 is merely The loss of naturalization declared by Order 7356 is merely consequent upon physical removal of the persons concerned from Canada. It is not put upon any ground of disaffection upon which it might have been put under the provisions of section 7 of the Imperial Act as amended in 1918. The omission so to place it must, in my opinion, be taken to be deliberate, and as the ground upon which it is in fact put is not available under the terms of the Act in question, Order 7356 is invalid in so far as it purports to revoke naturalization but valid otherwise, and the provisions of Order 7355 which deny to naturalized persons the right of continued residence in Canada are valid.

As to the fourth class of persons dealt with by the orders in question, namely, the wives and children under 16 years of age "of any person for whom the Minister makes an order for deportation to Japan" my opinion is that the Orders in Council are invalid. It may be that some of the persons within this class are also within some one or other of the other classes and their position to that extent has already been dealt with. As to those who are not, however. there is nothing in any of the Orders to show that the Governor in Council considers their removal necessary or advisable within the ambit of the War Measures Act. The only attempt made in argument to support the Orders in the case of this class of person was the contention that the provision for their enforced removal was a humanitarian measure to prevent separation of families. That is not

sufficient however. In Rex v. Comptroller of Patents (1), Clauson L.J. said:—

It has been said that there might be a case where, on the face of it, It has been was bad * * * If that means that if on of it, It has been said that the second a case where, on the face of it, It has been said that in fact it did not appear that it did not app the regulation was bad the regulation was bad the Order in Council, it appeared that in fact it did not appear to His the order to be necessary or expedient for the relevant purposes to His the regulation, I quite agree that, on the face of the order, it was the section. the Order to be necessary of experiment for the relevant purposes to His Majesty to be necessary of the order, it would be the regulation, I quite agree that, on the face of the order, it would be arative under this section. inoperative under this section. the inoperative under the by Duff C.J.C. in the Chemicals case This was referred to by Duff C.J.C. in the Chemicals case

This was referred to the Orders in Council here in question (2). In my opinion, the Orders in Council here in question (2). In my open circumstances described by Clauson L.J. fall to the extent already indicated, invalid fall within the extent already indicated, invalid. nd are to the further argued that section 9 of P.C. 7355 Mr. Cartwright as contrary to section 5 of the War P.C. 7355

Mr. Cartwing of Mr. Cartwing to section 5 of the War Measures was invalid in which it is implicit that a parent Measures was invalid as which it is implicit that a person held for Act itsell, in a with the consent of the Minister of Justice deportation may with the consent of the Minister of Justice deportation may deportation may remedy by way of Habeas Corpus. Mr. have the orthing of that the words "be deemed to be in Cartwright argued that the words "be deemed to be in Cartwinght "in section 9 rules out this remedy, gal custouy I do not think this argument is well founded. The

I do not that an order valid on its face would, by reason argument is that an order, preclude all Habers G argument is the words quoted, preclude all Habeas Corpus proof the words although the person held on the basis of ceedings, even although to any of the classes of ceedings, even not belong to any of the classes mentioned such order in Council. in the Order in Council.

The point arose in R. v. Secretary of State for Home The point and Green (3). In the Court of Appeal, at p. 121 Goddard L.J. said:-

121 Goudant I am of opinion that, where on the return, an order or warrant which the face is produced, it is for the prisoner to a I am of opinion is produced, it is for the prisoner to prove the facts necessary to controvert.

A little lower down on the same page he said:

Before dealing with the subsidiary points raised by counsel for the Before dealing appellant, I will deal with the question whether para. (8) of the regulation appellant, I will deal with to apply for a writ. It is said the regulation appellant, I will deal of the right to apply for a writ. It is said that, if it does itself takes away the right be deemed to be in lawful sustain. itself takes and, if it does not, the words "shall be deemed to be in lawful custody" are otiose, and not, the words that, if the order purports to show that it not, the words that, if the order purports to show that the prisoner is it is claimed that, if the regulation, he must be deemed to be it the prisoner is it is claimed the regulation, he must be deemed to be in lawful custody. detained under the think that this is the meaning of, or the reason fawful custody. detained under that this is the meaning of, or the reason for, the clause, I do not think that this is the meaning of, or the reason for, the clause. I do not units the been irregularly made, the prisoner is not detained in If the order has been irregulation. It is to be not detained in If the order has been despite the regulation. It is to be noted that the Aliens pursuance of order, 1916, contained a similar provision. It provided that Restriction Order, 1916, contained a shin and detained in the provided that Restriction of the put on board a ship and detained in such manner as an alien might of State directed and that, while so detained, should be the Secretary of State directed and that, while so detained, should be (1) [1941] 2 K.B. 306, at 316. (2) [1943] S.C.R. 1, at 13.

(3) [1941] All. Eng. R. 104; in the House of Lords, at 388.

deemed to be in lawful custody. In R. v. Chiswick Police Station deemed to be in lawing custody. Superintendent, Ex. p. Sacksteder (1), I think that Pickford L.J., at p. 584 superintenaent, Ex. p. Bucksteart, (17) to expressed of this provision. The took the same view as that which I have expressed of this provision. The took the same view as that which that one provide that, once an order of object of the clause, in my opinion, is to provide that, once an order of object of the clause, in my opinion, is the order may be kept in custody detention is made, the person named in the order may be kept in custody detention is made, the person named in the seven if the Secretary of State anywhere, and not only in a lawful prison, even if the Secretary of State has not specified in the order a particular place for his internment.

See also the judgment of MacKinnon L.J. at p. 116. In the House of Lords, I refer to the judgment of Viscount Maugham at 394; Lord Wright, at 402 and 403. In my opinion the principles enunciated in these judgments are applicable to the point raised by Mr. Cartwright and I do not think that the paragraph objected to is other than valid. Mr. Cartwright further argued that the provisions of

Order 7355 relating to the sale of real and personal property of deportees by the Custodian of Enemy Property was invalid as repugnant to section 7 of the War Measures Act. "Appropriation" is defined by Murray among other definitions as "to take possession for one's own." I think it is in this sense that "appropriation" is used in the War Measures Act and I do not think that the provisions of P.C. 7355 amount to appropriation in that sense.

Mr. Cartwright next argued that the Orders in Council constitute one scheme and the invalid parts are not severable from those parts which are valid. In fact it is stated in the factum of the Attorney General of Canada that the latter two Orders in Council have no operation except by reason of the first Order in Council. The three Orders in Council constitute one scheme the validity of which depends on the first Order in Council P.C. 7355.

In my opinion, however, applying the proper principle to this question the orders are severable.

The question submitted on this reference is as follows:

Are the Orders in Council dated the 15th day of December, 1945. being P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357 ultra vires of the Governor in Council either in whole or in part and if so in what particular or particulars and to what extent.

I would answer the question as follows:

1. Order P.C. 7355 is valid except in the following particulars:

(1) [1918] 1 K.B. 578.

(a)

Subsection 3 of section 2 and section 3 are invalid Subsection 5 of a sthey authorize the deportation of natural in so far as they authorize who do not wish are invalid British subjects who do not wish a statural in so far as inc, subjects who do not wish to leave born Brussi and in so far as it prevents such persons

(b) Subsection 4 of section 2 is invalid in toto.

(b) Subscience
2. Section 1 of Order P.C. 7356 is invalid in so far as it
2. for loss of the status of a British subject 2. Section loss of the status of a British subject.

ovides for P.C. 7357 is valid save in so far as it may purport 3. Order P.C. 7357 is valid save in so far as it may purport to automality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914.

I hereby certify to His Excellency the Governor Gen-I hereby council that the foregoing are my reasons for the eral in Council that the foregoing are my reasons for the eral in Councer to the question referred herein for hearing and answer to the question. consideration.

R. L. KELLOCK.

ESTEY J.:- The three Orders in Council numbered P.C. ESTEY 5... 7355, 7356 and 7357, with which we are here concerned, 7355, 7356 under the authority of the War March 7355, 7350 under the authority of the War Measures Act, were passed under the authority of the War Measures Act, were passed under a 206, on the 15th of December, 1945, and 1927, R.S.C., c. 206, on the 15th of December, 1945, and 1927, R.S.C., 1945, and continued by Order in Council P.C. 7414 passed under the continued of section 4 of the National Emerge continued by continued by authority of section 4 of the National Emergency Transi-authority of section 4, 1945, (1945 R.S.C. c. 25) authoral Powers Act, 1945, (1945 R.S.C., c. 25).

Counsel for the Committee submits, apart from any other duestion respecting the validity of these Orders, they question to be effective when The National Emergency ceased to be effective when The National Emergency ransitional Powers Act came into force on January 1st, 1946. He points out that these Orders to be valid must be within the ambit of the War Measures Act and therefore passed as provided in the third section thereof "by fore passed the existence of real or apprehended war." That Parliament in enacting the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act embodied in section 5 thereof a declaration that on and after the 1st day of January, 1946, the war against Germany and Japan, for the purposes of the War Measures Act, should be deemed no longer

ing the last war. One of these was considered in Fort the last war. ing the Pulp and Power Co. v. Manitoba Free Press (1), Frances At P. 310 of Cameron, vol. 2, Viscount Haldes (1), ing Frances Pulp and Free Press (1), Frances p. 310 of Cameron, vol. 2, Viscount Haldane, (1), where at p. diagram the judgment of the Privy Council, stated, in where at p. or judgment of the Privy Council, stated: delivering the judgment that the crisis had whole livering the stated in the crisis had wholly passed away would But very clear evidence that the crisis had wholly passed away would But very clear evidence that the crisis had wholly passed away would

dent. But very clear evidence judiciary, even when the question raised away would required to justify the judiciary, even when the question raised way be required vires which it had to decide, in overruling the decision raised was But to justify the had to decide, in overruling the decision raised was required vires which it had to decide, in overruling the decision raised was one of ultra vires which it had measures were still requisite. be of ultra vules when the exceptional measures were still requisite.

And at p. 311:

d at p. our At what date did the disturbed state of Canada which the war had At what date that we way that the legislative measures relied on in At what date that we way that the legislative measures relied on in produced so entirely pass away that the course of Canada which the war had produced so entirely pass away that the course of the say that the on in At so entirely put *ultra vires*? It is enough to say that there is no produced so entirely put *ultra vires*? It is enough to say that there is no the present case became ultra vires? It is enough to say that there is no the present unmistakable evidence that the Government was in case is no produced to say that there is no the present case because evidence that the Government was in error in the present that the necessity was still in existence at the dates on which error in the time that the mass taken by the Paper Control or which the dates on which error in the dates on the the prese unmistakable events and the Government was in error in clear and that the necessity was still in existence at the dates on which the thinking question was taken by the Paper Control Tribunal. thinking that the was taken by the Paper Control Tribunal.

Apart from the provision embodied in section 5 of The Apart from the presence of the section 5 of The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945, there National Entry of that the emergency arising out of the war was no suggestion. no longer existed.

o longon Then it is provided in section 4 of the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945:

4. Without prejudice to any other power conferred by this Act, the 4. Without prejume 4. Without prejume in Council may order that the orders and regulations lawfully Governor in Council may order that the orders and regulations lawfully Governor the War Measures Act or pursuant to authority grad Governor in Council Measures Act or pursuant to authority created under made under the War Measures Act or pursuant to authority created under made id Act in force immediately before the day this Act comes in force made under the man immediately before the day this Act comes into force the said Act in force immediately before the day this Act comes into force the said this Act is in force, continue in full force and effect the said Act in force is in force, continue in full force and effect subject to shall, while this Act is under this Act. shall, shall, amendment or revocation under this Act.

Parliament by this provision expressly authorized the Gov-Parliament of the Gov-ernor in Council already passed and still in factor all of the ernor in Council already passed and still in force under the Orders in Council already passed and still in force under the War Measured on the 28th day of December, 1945, passed this authority, on the 28th day of December, 1945, passed this authority of P.C. 7414 whereby it was ordered that:

* * all orders and regulations lawfully made under the War * * * Measures Act or pursuant to authority created under the said Act in force Measures Act of the day The National Emergency Transitional Powers immediately before the day The National Emergency Transitional Powers immediately been into force shall, while that Act is in force, continue in full Act, 1945, comes into force shall, while that Act is in force, continue in full Act, 1945, control and effect subject to amendment or revocation under that Act.

This Order in Council, passed under said section 4, continues as effective the Orders in Council here in question, namely P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357.

(1) [1923] A.C. 695; 2 Cam. 302, at 310.

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to exist, and that therefore these Orders, even if valid when made on the 15th day of December, 1945, ceased to be effective as of the 1st day of January, 1946. Section 5 of the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945, reads as follows:

5. This Act shall come into force on the first day of January, one 5. Inis Act shan could forty-six, and on and after that day the war thousand nine hundred and forty-six, and on and after that day the war against Germany and Japan shall, for the purposes of the War Measures Act, be deemed no longer to exist.

This provision that "the war against * * * Japan shall * * * be deemed no longer to exist" is specifically limited in its application to the provisions of the War Measures Act and in effect merely removes the basis on which Orders in Council may be passed under that Act. It is not and does not purport to be a proclamation under section 2 of the War Measures Act declaring "that the war, invasion or insurrection no longer exists." Section 2 of the War Measures Act provides:

2. The issue of a proclamation by His Majesty, or under the authority of the Governor in Council shall be conclusive evidence that war, invasion. or insurrection, real or apprehended, exists and has existed for any period of time therein stated, and of its continuance, until by the issue of a further proclamation it is declared that the war, invasion or insurrection no longer exists.

This section contemplates a period after the conclusion of actual combat during which the period of emergency caused by the war will continue. Parliament gave expression to the same view when it passed The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945, and embodied in the preamble thereof:

the national emergency arising out of the war has continued * * * since the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan and is still continuing;

Parliament did recognize that the intensity and magnitude of the emergency had changed and diminished and under the provisions of this Act curtailed the extensive powers exercised by the Governor in Council under the War Measures Act.

The question whether an emergency exists or not is primarily a matter for Parliament, and through the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945, Parliament is doing in a general way what was done in special cases follow-

The fact that Order in Council P.C. 7414 was made and The fact that of December, 1945, and therefore prior dated the 28th day of December, 1945, and therefore prior dated the 28th day of the National Emergency Tran-to the coming into force of The National Emergency Tranto the coming into the 1945, on January 1, 1946, does not sitional Powers Act, 1945, a procedure is provided a sitional Powers that such a procedure is provided for in affect its validity as such a procedure is provided for in affect 115 values Interpretation Act, 1927, R.S.C., c. 1. section 12 of the Interpretation submitted the section 12 of the Interpretation and the section 12 of the Interpretation and the section and the sec Counsel for the Committee submitted that if these Orders

Counsel for the cas above indicated that the provisions were still effective as above exceeded the powers dol were still enective and the powers delegated by thereof, at least in part, exceeded the powers delegated by thereof, at least in the War Measures Act to the Governor in Parliament under the Covernor in Council can only t Parliament under the Governor in Council can only legislate Council. That the Governor in Council can only legislate Council, that in the powers so delegated is stated by Order in Council within the powers in Re Chemicals (1)

by Order in Other Chief Justice in Re Chemicals (1), by my Lord The Chief Justice in Re Chemicals (1), The powers conferred upon the Governor in Council by the War

The powers conferred upon and authority, an authority to pass Measures Act constitute a law-making authority, an authority to pass Measures Act constitute a should be deemed necessary and advisable legislative enactments such as should be deemed necessary and advisable legislative enactments such as acting within those limits, the Governor in by reason of war; and, when acting within those limits, the Governor in by reason of war; and, many powers of legislation as large and of the Council is vested with plenary powers of legislation as large and of the Council is vested with plenary periods the large and of the same nature as those of Parliament itself (Lord Selborne in The Queen v. same nature as those of Parliament itself (Lord Selborne in The Queen v. same nature as those of the ambit of the Act by which his authority is Burah (2)). Within the ambit of the Act by which his authority is Burah (2)). Within the Council is given the same authority is authority is measured, the Governor in Council is given a law-making power. measured, the double like has been given a law-making power.

That it is an enactment to enable the government to deal effectively in time of emergency with matters of security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada, and that its language should be so construed has been emphasized in this Court. Fitzpatrick C.J.:

It seems to me obvious that parliament intended, as the language used It seems to the executive with the widest powers in time of danger, implies, to clothe the executive of the section contains amlimit Taken literally, the language of the section contains unlimited powers. In re Gray (3).

Kerwin J .:

The provisions of subsection 1 of section 3 are in as wide terms as may be imagined. As Mr. Justice Anglin stated in In re Gray, (4), "more may pe magneti, the interval de difficult to find". In Re Chemicals (5).

It is under the War Measures Act that these three Orders in Council have been passed. There is much to be said for the view that they should be read and construed as a code or a unit designed in the main to carry out the express desires of those of the Japanese race who have

(2) (1878) 3 App. Cas. 889. (1) [1943] S.C.R. 1, at 17. (3) (1918) 57 Can. S.C.R. 150, at 158. (4) [1918] 57 Can. S.C.R. 150. (5) [1943] S.C.R. 1, at 29.

requested the government to arrange for their going to requested the strue that in addition to those who have Japan. Japanese nationals of the return have Japan. Japan. made requests, these Orders provide for the who have made of those Japanese nationals who were intern to made requests, made of those Japanese nationals who were interned to Japan of those Japanese nationals who were interned dur-Japan of those of the second second second were interned to Japan of the war and remained so on September 1st, 1945. They ing the war and remained so on September 1st, 1945. They ing the war and the commission to inquire and recommend also provide to certain Japanese nationals and recommend with respect to certain Japanese race in Canada. They also with respect to vive and the children under sixteen persons of the wives and the children under sixteen propersons of the wives and the children under sixteen of any vide with respect to whom an order for deportation vide that the may be included." These provisions one with respect on a provision has been made "may be included." These provisions will be particularly discussed hereafter, but they will be been made main intent and purpose underly do not more particularly main intent and purpose underlying the detract from these Orders in Council. detrace of these Orders in Council.

That these Orders do not apply to all of the Japanese That these of the sent in the main to those only who have race in that they be sent to Japan is made not have race in Canada requested that they be sent to Japan is made plain in the request to P.C. 7355: recitals to P.C. 7355:

itals to -Whereas during the course of the war with Japan certain Japanese Whereas prifested their sympathy with or support of Japanese Whereas during their sympathy with or support of Japan certain Japanese nationals manifested their sympathy with or support of Japan by making nationals and or repatriation to Japan and otherwise; uests for republication of the Japanese race have requested or may And whereas other be sent to Japan;

request that they be sent to Japan;

uest that they be uest that they be used to desirable that provisions be made to deport And whereas it is deemed to above; the classes of persons referred to above;

classes of personal and whereas it is considered necessary by reason of the war, for the And whereas it is considered necessary by reason of the war, for the And whereas the war, for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada, that provision be security; made accordingly;

This Order includes provisions for revocation of the request on the part of those of the Japanese race who were naturalized or born in Canada. It seems appropriate that this purpose and intent be kept in mind throughout an examination of the provisions and construction of these orders in Council. Such was the position taken in England as evidenced by the statement of Lord Maugham:

My Lords, I think we should approach the construction of reg. 18B My Lords, (General) Regulations without any general presumption as of the Defence (General) Regulations without any general presumption as of the Defence except the universal presumption, applicable to Orders in to its meaning except like instruments, that, if there is a recent be orders in to its meaning other like instruments, that, if there is a reasonable doubt as to Council and other like words used, we should prefer a construction of the words used. Council and once the words used, we should prefer a construction which will the meaning of the plain intention of those represents the meaning of the plain intention of those responsible for the Order carry into effect then one which will defeat that intention in Council rather than one which will defeat that intention.

except by virtue of the provisions of the Naturalization except by virtue of the Naturalization Act, 1927, R.S.C., c. 138. More particularly because it Act, as Part II of the Naturalization Act, Part it Act, 1927, Rationality and Status of Aliens Act, II of British Ref. 5 Geo V and amoud Act, as Part 1 adopts, as Part 1 adopts, as Part 1 the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, Part II of the 17, 4 & 5 Geo. V, and amendments thereto, 1914, adop British Water Act, and amendments thereto as con-the British Water Act, and amendments thereto as con-being c. 17, 4 & 5 Geo. V, and amendments thereto as conthe c. 17, 4 a c latter Act; the purpose and intent being c. 17, 4 a c latter Act; the purpose and intent of as con-templated by the latter uniformity in the procedure being templated by the uniformity in the procedure and intent being to make for greater uniformity and the procedure and the grant: to make 101 British nationality and the procedure and to requirements of British nationality and the granting of requirements certificates throughout specified points of requirements of these certificates throughout specified parts of and parts of these certificates. It also have been appreciated to the second naturalization of these certificates. Section of Section of Section of the section of these certificates. the British Council of these certificates. It also provides the revocation of these certificates. Section 9 in part for the states follows: reads as follows:

g. (1) Where the Governor in Council, upon the report of the Min-9. (1) Where the determine the person to whom the report of the Min-g. (1) Where the determine the person to whom the certificate was granted ister, is satisfied * * that the person to be disaffected or dislowal stated 9. the Satisfied to the second to be disaffected or disloyal to His has shown himself by act or speech to be disaffected or disloyal to His has shown himself by act or council shall by order revoke the certificate was granted to has shown be disaffected or disloyal to his has shown himself by act or speech to be disaffected or disloyal to himself by act or himself by act or speech to be disaffected or disloyal to himself by act or speech to be disaffected or disloyal to himself by act or himself by act or speech to be disaffected or disloyal to himself by act or speech to be disaffected or disloyal to himself by act or himself by act or speech to be disaffected or disloyal to himself by act or speech to be disaffected or disloyal to himself by act or himself has shown himsen by the Governor in Council shall by order revoke the certificate.

This provision was enacted by the Parliament of Great This provident of Great Britain in 1918, being an Act to amend the British Britain and Status of Aliens Act, 1914 (8 & 0 C Britain in Antiparticle British British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914 (8 & 9 Geo. V. Nationality and Nationality and was enacted in Canada by an Act to revise and c. 38), and was enacted in Canada by an Act to revise and the Naturalization Act, 1914 (1920, RSC c. 38), and was constrained at the line of the and the new see and amendments were made as a result of the amendments for the amendments were made as a result of the amend the matter made as a result of the experiences. These amendments were made as a result of the experiences These amendments of the last war and deal specifically with and arising onlarge the provisions for revocation of arising out of the provisions for revocation of naturaliza-greatly enlarge the provisions for revocation of naturalizagreatly entarge Westlake's Private International Law, 7th ed. at p. 371, referring to this particular legislation:

1, release The powers of revocation are large and somewhat vague; and the idea The powers of revocational on good behaviour and on keeping the idea The powers of revocational on good behaviour and on keeping in close of a mationality conditional on mation is one new in English law To close of a nationality contactor of a nationality cont touch will show whether it will be desirable to keep it as a permanent alone of citizenship. variety of citizenship.

And again, referring to the same legislation, at p. 372;

The legislature the same power to grant a certificate of naturalization as the secretary of state has power to Act; and the provisions of the Act as to the grant as power to grant a contraction of the Act as to the secretary of state has under the Act; and the provisions of the Act as to the grant and revocation of the certificate of naturalization apply.

This section 9 provides authority for the revocation of a certificate of naturalization when the recipient thereof a certificate thereof shows "himself by act or speech to be disaffected or disloyal to His Majesty." A revocation at least by that government which has granted same and issued the certificate

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Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson (1) Counsel for the Committee submitted that the word "deportation" as used in section 3 of the War Measures Act is restricted to the deportation of aliens, and as these Orders made under that Act deal with other than aliens, the Governor in Council has exceeded his authority. The the Governor in the second standard dictionaries do not agree as to the precise meanstandard divide. It is restricted to aliens in Fong Yue Ting v. U.S.A. (2). It is applied to native-born in Ting V. J.B.A. V. Government of Nigeria (Officer Eshugbayi Eleko V. Government in The Vigeria (Officer Administering), (3). As defined in the Immigration Act, Aamutister and the second Act, 1927, R.S.C., c. 93, it is not restricted to aliens. Upon this reference it is not necessary to precisely define the word. It is enough to emphasize that as it is applied in law it is a compulsory sending out of, or as stated in the Oxford Dictionary "a forcible removal," and that while it need not be restricted to aliens, it does apply to them.

The first of these Orders in Council, P.C. 7355, deals with four groups. Para. 2(1) provides for those Japanese nationals who either have made a request for repatriation since December 8th, 1941, or were detained under the Defence of Canada Regulations and so detained on September 1st, 1945. These Japanese nationals are aliens and as such are subject to deportation. The provision of the Order in Council for their deportation is valid. Attorney-General for Canada v. Cain (4), where Lord Atkinson at p. 634 states as follows:

One of the rights possessed by the supreme power in every State is the right to refuse to permit an alien to enter that State, to annex what conditions it pleases to the permission to enter it, and to expel or deport from the State, at pleasure, even a friendly alien, especially if it considers his presence in the State opposed to its peace, order, and good government, or to its social or material interest.

The second group is dealt with under para. 2 (2) of P.C. 7355. It provides for the deportation of those of the Japanese race who have become naturalized, who have requested repatriation since the declaration of war and who have not revoked that request prior to midnight of the first day of September, 1945. It is contended that the Parliament of Canada has no power to revoke this naturalization (3) [1931] A.C. 662.

(1) [1942] A.C. 206, at 219. (4) [1906] A.C. 542; 1 Cam. 631. (2) (1892) 149 U.S. R. 698 at 709.

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therefor. This appears from the entire section, but is made abundantly clear by subsection (6) hereafter quoted, which goes further and envisages the cancellation by one government of a naturalization granted by another government in some other part of His Majesty's dominions. It was contended by Mr. Geoffrion that Canada had not adopted Part II but had enacted a new Act modelled after the British Act. In either view, in my opinion the legislation provides for revocation by the government granting the naturalization.

It seems to me that if during a state of war and the emergency resulting therefrom one so naturalized makes a request in writing for repatriation, he does so because of the war and matters associated therewith. The making of such a request and the persistence therein, as in this case to September 1st, 1945, a date after the cessation of hostilities, provides evidence that with respect to such a person his affections are not with Canada, the land of his adoption, but rather with the country from which he originally came. The effect of such conduct is a matter for the consideration of the responsible authorities of the State.

The only question with which we are here concerned is whether the Governor in Council had authority under the War Measures Act to provide for the deportation and the revocation of certificates of naturalization by Order in Council P.C. 7355. In my opinion the authority here exercised could in peacetime be exercised under the Naturalization Act. In time of emergency this can be accomplished under the War Measures Act through the medium of the Governor in Council passing an Order in Council and therefore in my opinion this paragraph in Order in Council P.C. 7355 is valid. In Re Gray. (1)

The same section 9 contains a sub-paragraph (6) reading as follows:

6. Where a person to whom a certificate of naturalization has been granted in some other part of His Majesty's dominions is resident in Canada, the certificate may be revoked in accordance with this section by the Governor in Council, with the concurrence of the Government of that part of His Majesty's dominions in which the certificate was granted.

A paragraph to the same effect is in the Imperial Act (Sec. 7 (5), c. 38, 8 & 9 Geo. V). It expressly contemplates the (1) (1918) Can. S.C.R. 150.

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revocation of naturalization certificates granted by some revocation of hatting Majesty's dominions, but that by some other government in His Majesty's dominions, but that the other will not be exercised without the concurrence of this revolution other government in a second structure in the second structure of t other will not be care it. This may concurrence of that right will not be care it. This may conceivably affect government which granted it. This may conceivably affect right government which set we were supplied with no informa-some parties, although we were supplied with no informa-upon the point. If there be some, we can rely government in the exercise of these powers to movernment in the exercise of these powers to movernment in the exercise of these powers to movern applications which it is a power to mover the power of the second s some upon the point tion upon the point in the exercise of these powers to rely upon the government in the exercise of these powers to respect tion government in the statutory obligations which it has assumed to respect any component parts of the British Commonweald the statutory owner any component parts of the British Commonwealth of other component parts of the existence of such an wealth of any component in think the existence of such an under. Nations invalidates this paragraph. king invaluance is dealt with under para 2(3) of P.C. The third group is dealt with subject of the Lever.

The third group ______ The third group ______ The third group ______ 7355. It is the natural-born British subject of the Japanese mbo has "made a request for repatriation." and 7355. It is the have a request for repatriation," and who race who has "made a request for repatriation," and who race of an order for d race who has must be provided in writing such request prior to the making has not "revoked in writing such request prior to the making has not "invoked in writing such request prior to the making has not "revoked in writing such request prior to the making has not "revoked in writing such request prior to the making has not "revoked in writing such request prior to the making the making the making such request prior to the making the making the making such request prior to the making such request prior to the making the making such request prior to the ma has not "revolved in has not "revolved in order for deportation." It is not by the request but the persistence in that request the by the request but the persistence in that request that is only basized by paras. 2(2) and 2(3). The natural states by the request set only the request by paras. 2(2) and 2(3). The naturalized emphasized by paras are might have revoked emphasized by remaining the second of the se citizen of the 1st day of September, 1945. The natural-midnight of the 1st day of the Japanese race may revoked up to midnight of the Japanese race may revoke at born British such the moment of the Minister making his any At the hearing counsel stated no order had his any time up to any time up to order. At the hearing counsel stated no order had been order. and would not be made until after this doe order. At the would not be made until after this decision is made and would not be made until after this decision is made and would with respect to this group the right to handed down. With respect to this group the right to handed down. handed down. revoke still remains, but unless that right to revoke is revoke as above indicated the Governor in Course is revoke still revoke indicated the Governor in Council conexercised as about respect to such a person it was "neces-cluded that with respect to the security * * * " cluded that "say by reason of the war for the security * * * " he should sary by reason." he should go to Japan.

to Japan. It is contended that these people are being compelled to It is contended. In reality they are going because go, are being deported. In reality they are going because go, are being derived and have persisted in that they made the videnced by their not revoking same. The request as evidenced by their not revoking same. The request as compliance with their request, has arranged government, in compliance the cost thereof, the dimensional stranged to the dimensional stranged stranged to the dimensional stranged government, managed government, and the cost thereof, the disposition of for their transportation, the dispatch of the proceed for their transport and the dispatch of the proceeds therefrom their property and has arranged for their second therefrom their property and has arranged for their own reception to them in Japan, and has arrangements number of the second secon to them in Japan. In making these arrangements pursuant to the in Japan. In parties, it was only reasonable, if not necesrequests of the part of the pa

The fourth group is dealt with in para. 2(4). It affects The fourth group the sixteen years 2(4). It affects the wife and children under sixteen years of age of any the movides that the an order for do any the wife and the Minister makes an order for deporta-person for whom the Minister makes an order for deportaperson for whom and provides that they "may be included in tion to Japan and person with such person." It is not be included in tion to Japan and deported with such person." It is possible such order and the wives may be classed under para. 2(3), but apart from those it will be observed 2(1), that some of one of the source under para. 2(1), 2(2) or 2(3), but apart from those it will be observed that may be sent away notwithstanding they be 2(2) or 2(3), but 1 2(2) may be sent away notwithstanding they have have hey they d a request, nor is there any recital or statement they may be sent to is there any recital or statement on signed a request, nor is there any recital or statement on signed a request, is signed a request, is the part of the Governor in Council that "such is necestated or statement on the part of the security * * *," as required as required to the security * * *," as required to the security * *, *," as required to the security * *, *," as required to the security *, *," as required to the part of the security * * *" as required by sary or advisable for the security * * *" as required by sary or advisable Act. Moreover, under the Naturalizathe War Maturaliza-the Act, and particularly the amendments thereto in 1931, tion Act, and particulate the wives were born in 1931, it may be that many of the wives were born in Canada, it may be that it may be that still retain their British citizenship and desire to Canada, there is, therefore, involved with respect still retain there is, therefore, involved with respect to remain here. Interest of compulsion which under this of them here. Inere an element of compulsion which under this Order in

It was suggested that this paragraph was included that It was might not be separated. That is desirable, and families may be all that was contemplated. As passed the that may be much further. It may be amended the paragraph goes much further. It may be amended under paragraph good the provisions of section 4 of the National Emergency the provisional Powers Act to take care of such cases and Transitional the possibility of a British subi *Transitional* The possibility of a British subject who has not involve the possibility of a British subject who has not involve and therefore entitled to remain in herefore being compelled to go to Japan because here in the second not signed a second being compelled to go to Japan because her hus-Canada, being compelled that he go. It is difficult Canada, being that he go. It is difficult to phrase a band has requested that he go. It is difficult to phrase a band has require to all of the children, but generally rule that she children ought not to be sent unless both speaking the supported as valid graph cannot be supported as valid.

Counsel for the Committee submits that para. 6 of P.C. 7355 is beyond the powers of the Governor in Council because it is in conflict with section 7 of the War Measures Act. I do not think that contention is tenable. Section 7 of the War Measures Act is dealing with the appropriation of property by His Majesty for which compensation is to be made, and in the event of no agreement as to the compensation it will be determined by the Exchequer or other designated Court. In para. 6 of P.C. 7355 His Majesty is

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be made. It appears that this Order in Council fixes the last practical date upon which revocation ought to be per-

In no real sense can this be regarded as deportation. It mitted. is the procedure of deportation founded upon the request of the respective individuals to go to Japan and to become a citizen of Japan. It is not a "forcible removal." There is no element of compulsion, a going against the will that is present in deportation. For reasons of their own these British subjects, entitled to the benefits and privileges and obligated to discharge the duties and responsibilities of British subjects at a critical time in the history of this country, intimate a desire to return to the country of their racial origin and to remain and become citizens of that country.

If these same parties went to Japan and acquired a citizenship there, the Naturalization Act, 1927, R.S.C., c. 138, s. 16, provides for their being deprived of British citizenship. A similar provision is contained in the Imperial Act, 4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 13, s. 17. This cancellation of citizenship is recognized by the comity of nations. The basis, therefore, is disaffection as evidenced by the voluntary acquisition of nationality in the country of their now residence. The people with whom we are here concerned have expressed their disaffection for Canada and set forth their affection for Japan. They have coupled therewith a desire to go to Japan. The Governor in Council under the circumstances decided to facilitate their going by perfecting the arrangements therefor as above indicated. This is more a matter of policy for the government than a question of jurisdiction for the courts.

It should be observed that their British citizenship is not cancelled by these Orders in Council. It is therefore suggested that at some future date they may return to Canada. That is a matter for the authorities and one which they have no doubt considered. In any event, it does not affect the validity of the Order and is not a matter to be considered upon this reference.

In my opinion the Parliament of Canada could so legislate and this paragraph is valid.

not appropriating property in that sense, but is taking possession of the property, disposing of same and transpossession of proceeds, less expenses incurred therewith, to mitting the proceeds, less expenses incurred therewith, to the owner who has gone to Japan under one of these Orders. No question of compensation is involved. The sections deal with entirely different matters with respect to which there is no conflict.

Counsel for the Committee also submits that para. 9 of P.C. 7355 is ultra vires in that it is contrary to the provisions of section 5 of the War Measures Act. Para. 9 reads as follows:

9. Any person for whom an order for deportation is made and who is detained pending deportation or who is placed under restraint in the course detained pending up to the of any order or measure made or taken under of deportation by virtue of any order or measure made or taken under ot deportation by the shall, while so detained or restrained, be deemed to section 4 of this Order shall, while so detained or restrained, be deemed to be in legal custody.

Section 5 of the War Measures Act reads as follows:

5. No person who is held for deportation under this Act or under any regulation made thereunder, or is under arrest or detention as an any regulation as an alien enemy, or upon suspicion that he is an alien enemy, or to prevent his departure from Canada, shall be released upon bail or otherwise discharged or tried, without the consent of the Minister of Justice. In particular Counsel contends that para. 9 deprives a person detained under Order in Council P.C. 7355 of the right to have the legality of his detention inquired into under habeas corpus proceedings because by its express provisions the legality of the custody is finally determined in the words "deemed to be in legal custody," and therefore a return to the writ that the person was so detained would preclude further inquiry. While section 5 of the War Measures Act specifically contemplates such proceedings with the consent of the Minister of Justice, this para. 9 purports to take away the right thereto and is therefore beyond the powers of the Governor in Council.

It should be observed that there are no express words in para. 9 which deny the party detained the right to apply for a writ of habeas corpus nor provide that a return as above indicated would preclude further inquiry. This writ and its availability to the subject is jealously guarded by the courts. It is one of the methods by which the subject may question the legality of his detention and is regarded as an assurance to the subject that he will not be illegally

held under arrest or detention. Therefore, it has become held under all that only express language or language an established rule that only express language or language or language an established rate directly and imperatively to such so nelusion that will be sufficient to deprive the such an definite as the sufficient to deprive the subject a conclusion that will be sufficient to deprive the subject a conclusion that will be strong language b and b benefit of this writ. In Shin Shim v. The subject a conclusion that is writ. In Shin Shim v. The subject of the benefit of this strong language of the Chinese I (1) of the benefit of the strong language of the Chinese Immi-notwithstanding the strong language of the Chinese Imminotwithstanding r. R.S.C., c. 95, a procedure by way of a gration Act, 1927, R.S.C., c. 95, a procedure by way of a gration Act, 10-1, gration Act, 10-1, writ of habeas corpus was held to be open to a party writ ined under that Act who desired to raise the control of a writ of nuclear that Act who desired to raise the a party detained under that Act who desired to raise the question detained under a British subject, notwithstanding the question that she was a British subject, notwithstanding the decision that she was a -that she was a -of the Controller of Chinese Immigration to the decision of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939 the Control (General) Regulations, 1939, as adopted by

The Determent of Great Britain, include as adopted the Government of detained in pursuance of this regulation 8: 8. Any person detained in pursuance of this regulation shall be detained in such place a beddemed

8. Any person decaded and shall be detained in such place as may be to be in lawful custody and shall be detained in accordance with inclusion of the secretary of State and in accordance with inclusion of the secretary be to be in lawful custody and of State and in accordance with instructions authorized by the Secretary of State and in accordance with instructions issued by him.

The words "deemed to be in lawful custody" are identical The words and effect to those used in section 9 of P.C. in meaning and in meaning and polication for writ of habeas corpus was 7355, and yet an application for writ of habeas corpus was 7355, and yet and ing the provisions of section 8. The Secretary of State for Home Affairs (2018). The heard notwinnerry of State for Home Affairs, (2) Green v. King v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, (3) In the Green v. King v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, (3). In the former Secretary 8 was not referred to, or if so not not secretary Secretary 0, 201 case section 8 was not referred to, or if so not seriously case section the latter is was specifically raised as a bar to pressed. In the latter is was specifically raised as a bar to pressed. In the court of habeas corpus both in the Court of Appeal and the writ of House of Lords. In the Court of Appeal and the writ of House of Lords. In the Court of Appeal and before the House Goddard at p. 116 specifically doubted (4) before the follows: provision as follows:

I will deal with the question whether para. (8) of the regulation itself I will deal what to apply for a writ. It is said that, if it does not, the takes away the right to be in lawful custody" are climated and the same to be in lawful custody. takes away the right deemed to be in lawful custody" are otiose, and it is words "shall be deemed to be in lawful custody" are otiose, and it is words "shall be the order purports to show that the prisoner is detained claimed that, if the order purports to show that the prisoner is detained claimed that, it is the must be deemed to be in lawful custody. I do ander the regularity made the prisoner is not the paragraph. If not think that the irregularly made the prisoner is not detained in pur-the order has been irregularly made the prisoner is not detained in purthe order has despite, the regulation. It is to be noted that the Aliens suance of, but despite, contained a similar provision T suance of, but deepined, contained a similar provision. It provided that Restriction Order, 1916, contained a ship and detained in our provided that Restriction of the put on board a ship and detained in such a manner as an alien might be put of State directed, and while so detained about a manner as an alien might be directed, and while so detained should be deemed the Secretary of State directed, and while so detained should be deemed to be in lawful custody. In ex parte Sacksteder, (5) I think that Pickford to be in lawren came view that I have expressed of this provision. The

(1)	[1938]	S.C.R.	3/8	(3)	[1942]	A.C. 284.	1.00
(2)	[1941]	1 K.B	. 72.	(4)	19421	1 KD OF	
(2)			(5) [1918] :	K.B. 578	at 584	I I.D. 87.	

object of the paragraph, in my opinion, is to provide that once an order object of the paragraph, person named in the order may be kept in custody of detention is made, the person named in the order may be kept in custody anywhere, and not only in a lawful prison, even if the Secretary of State anywhere, and not other a particular place for his internment, which has not specified in the order a particular place for his internment, which

In the House of Lords Lord Wright speaks as follows: he can do later.

In the first place, para. 8 of the regulation does not, in my opinion, render lawful a detention which is, apart from para. 8, unlawful and unwarranted by the Secretary's powers. It is inserted to settle possible doubts as to prison law and practice. Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson (1)

A perusal of this section 9 will indicate how apt are the words of Lord Goddard in ascertaining its effect. It reads

in part: Any person * * * who is detained * * * or who is placed under restraint in the course of deportation * * * shall * * while so detained or restrained, be deemed to be in legal custody.

It is his detention or restraint, wherever that may be, that will "be deemed to be in legal custody." It does not preclude an inquiry as to whether that legal custody is justified or legal within the terms of the Order in Council. It does not therefore deprive the party so detained or restrained of his right to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. This suggested conflict between section 9 and section 5 in my opinion does not exist.

It is contended that the right of a British subject to reside and to remain in Canada is a civil right and further that para. 6 of Order in Council P.C. 7355 providing for the protection, sale and dispatch of the proceeds to Japan realized from the sale of property belonging to a party who has been deported, is also a matter of property and civil rights; that under the B.N.A. Act by section 92(13) such matters are of provincial jurisdiction and in so far as the Parliament of Canada may purport to legislate with respect thereto, that legislation will be ultra vires and therefore in so far as these Orders in Council being legislation purporting to deal with these matters they are ultra vires.

The validity and effect of these contentions under normal conditions need not be here examined. These Orders in Council constitute legislation passed under cir-(1) [1942] A.C. 206, at 273.

cumstances of an emergency when the relationship becumstances of an end the provinces is for the be-tween the dominion and the provinces is for the be-somewhat changed. Similar questions were culled the dominant of the sources is for the be-tween somewhat changed. Similar questions were the time being somewhat changed. Power Co. v. Manitoh being somewhat cruck Power Co. v. Manitoba Free in Fort Frances Pulp & Power Co. v. Manitoba Free being Fort Frances 1 and the answer there given is applicable to this in Fort, (1) and the answer there given is applicable to this Press, Viscount Haldane (2 Cam. at p. 309):

ge. Visco-it is proprietary and civil rights in new relations, which they do not in normal times, that have to be dealt with; and these relations It is proprietary and that have to be dealt with; and they do not present in normal times, that have to be dealt with; and they do not present in affect Canada as an entirety, fall within s. 91, because in these relations, tond beyond what s. 92 can really cover the their factors. It is a normal times, once have to be dealt with; and they do not present in normal times, and entirety, fall within s. 91, because relations, which affect Canada as an entirety, fall within s. 91, because in these relations, which affect Canada as an entirety fall within s. 91, because in these relations, they extend beyond what s. 92 can really cover. The kind of present first Canada as an entry, tan within s. 91, because relations, which affect Canada as an entry of the second seco which any extend beyond them is only to be found in their full-ness they extend beyond them is only to be found in that part of full-adequate for dealing with them is only to be found in that part of the con-adequate method which establishes power in the State as a whole. For it is not ness the for dealing with and a bound to be found in that part of power adequate for dealing which establishes power in the State as a whole. For it is not one stitution which establishes power for by depending on collective action of the individual Provinces agreeing for estimation of the state as a state of the individual provinces agreeing for the state of the state of the individual provinces agreeing for the state of the stat adequate which establishes point in the brate as a whole. For it is not one stitution which establishes provided for by depending on collective action of the that can be reliably provided Provinces agreeing for the purpose of the islatures of the individual Provinces agreeing for the purpose of the stitution be reliably provided for by depending on collective action of the that can be reliably provided for the purpose. That that can be reliably provided for the character of the entire constitution of the basic instrument on which the character of the entire constitution. that can be that can be basic instrument on which the character of the entire constitution of the the basic instrument on which the character of the entire constitution of the the basic instrument on which the character of the entire constitution of the the basic instrument on which the character of the entire constitution of the the basic instrument on which the character of the entire constitution of the the basic instrument on which the character of the entire constitution of the the basic instrument on the manifester. Legislate instrument on which as providing for such centralised power. That the basic instrument of which as providing for such centralised power in pends should be construed as providing for such centralised power in omergency situation follows from the manifestation in the langer in the basis should be construct as providing for such centralised power in pends should be principle that the instrument has among its pluroes of Act of the State regarded as a whole and the language of pends the emergency situation to the instrument has among its provide of the principle that the instrument has among its purposes to the for the State regarded as a whole, and for the expression of the principle opinion as such. * * * The or the expression of the state regarded as a such as a state of the expression of the principle opinion as such as a state of the expression of the principle opinion as such as a state of the expression of the principle opinion as such as a state of the expression of the principle opinion as such as a state of the expression of the principle opinion as such as a state of the principle opinion opi an entropy of the principle and the first the samong its purposes of the Act of the State regarded as a whole, and for the expression and provide for the sublic opinion as such. * * * Their Lordships, the state and counce of its public opinion as such. * * * Their Lordships, the the Act for the State reparted as a whole, and for the expression and provide for its public opinion as such. * * * Their Lordships, therefore, influence of its public opinion as work under which, as a general set of the provide of its public operations the wording of ss. 91 and 92 may have influence of its public operations of the wording of ss. 91 and 92 may have entertain no doubt that however the wording of ss. 91 and 92 may have influence entertain no doubt that noncoord the working of ss. 91 and 92 may have entertain a framework under which, as a general principle, and 92 may have laid down a framework under from trenching on property and civil make comment is to be excluded from trenching on property and civil make entertaine a framework under from trenching on property and civil rights in laid down a framework under the sufficiently great emergency and civil rights in provinces of Canada, yet in a sufficiently great emergency rights in laid use parliament is to be canada, yet in a sufficiently great emergency and civil rights in Parliament of war, there is implied the power to deal adequate as Parliance of Canada, by a province of the power to deal adequately with the provinces of war, there is implied the power to deal adequately such as that arising out of the safety of the Dominion as a whole. The output with the arising out of war, such as the power to deal adequately such as that arising out of the safety of the Dominion as a whole. The enumeration of the business of Coverne event of such an onethat and emergency for the business of Government is recognized as emergence, new aspect of the business of Government is recognized as emerged. that in s. 92 is not in any the business of Government is recognized as occurrence, but a new aspect of the business of government is recognized as emerging, tion in but a new aspect of the second or precluded by the general words as emerging, an aspect which is not covered or precluded by the general words in which are assigned to the Legislatures of the Provinces as individually an aspect which is not to the Legislatures of the Provinces as individual powers are assigned to the legislatures of the Provinces as individual an abr powers are assigned to the of demarcation will lie in such cases it may not units. Where an exact line of demarcation will lie in such cases it may not

In view of the foregoing authority, the contentions that In view of these Orders in Council are in these the provisions of these Governor in Council are in these the provisions of regards ultra vires the Governor in Council under the War

The second of these Orders in Council, P.C. 7356, provides that:

Any person who, being a British subject by naturalization * * * Any person who, being a derived by naturalization * * * is deported from Canada under the provisions of Order in Council P.C. is deported from Canada *** cease to be either a British subject or a 7355 *** pational.

It concerns only those of the Japanese race who have been It concerns only naturalized in Canada and have been dealt with under para. 2(2) of Order in Council 7355, and for the reasons (1) [1923] A.C. 695; 2 Cam. 302.

The question submitted on this reference is as follows: The question Are the Orders in Council dated the 15th day of December, 1945, D.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357, ultra vires of the Governor in Council 1945, Are the Orders in Council dated the 15th day of December, 10110WS: P.C. 7355, 7356 and 7357, ultra vires of the Governor in Council being provide or in part and, if so, in what particular or particular or particular tent? Are una 7355, 7350 and 1507, uttra vires of the Governor, 1945, being P.C. 7355, 7350 and 1507, uttra vires of the Governor, 1945, being in whole or in part and, if so, in what particular or particulars and either in whole or in Council what extent?

what extent. In my opinion all of the Orders in Council are intra vires In my opinion and of council, with the exception of para.

(4) OI -I hereby certify to His Excellency the Governor General model that the foregoing are my reasons for the control of th I hereby certify to the Governor General in Council that the foregoing are my reasons for the answer in question referred herein for hearing and consist in Council that the referred herein for hearing and considera-

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there discussed, in my opinion this Order in Council is valid.

The third Order in Council, P.C. 7357, sets up a Com-

mission of three persons:

* * * To make inquiry concerning the activities, loyalty and the extent of co-operation with the Government of Canada during the war of Japanese nationals and naturalized persons of the Japanese race in Canada in cases where their names are referred to the Commission by the Minister of Labour for investigation with a view to recommending whether in the circumstances of any such case such person should be deported.

The authority of the government to order such an inquiry cannot be questioned. The power of Parliament to legislate with respect to Japanese nationals and naturalized persons of the Japanese race has already been discussed when dealing with para. 2(1) and 2(2) of P.C. 7355. In any event, this Commission is but a fact-finding body with power to recommend to the Minister. Any order for deportation as a consequence thereof is upon the recommendation of the Minister, and the Governor in Council may pass such under para. 2(1) or 2(2) of P.C. 7355.

In the second paragraph thereof the Commission has power to review the case of any person of the Japanese race who was naturalized in Canada and who made a request for repatriation notwithstanding the provisions of Order in Council P.C. 7355. This is obviously but providing an opportunity for the reviewing of the case of one who has been ordered to be deported as a consequence of his request, and notwithstanding that he did not withdraw same before the 1st day of September, 1945.

In my opinion these Orders in Council, except with respect to one group dealt with in para. 2(4) of P.C. 7355, are as passed within the competency of the Governor in Council under the War Measures Act; that para. 2(4) of P.C. 7355, being as passed invalid, does not affect the validity of the other provisions of the Orders in Council. In my opinion with respect to the different groups the provisions of these Orders in Council are severable. Brooks-Bidlake and Whittall, Ltd. v. Attorney-General for British Columbia (1).

(1) [1923] A.C. 450; 2 Cam. 318.