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TWO YEARS OF JAPANESE EVACUATION IN CANADA

BY FORREST E. LAVIOLETTE

EDITORIAL NOTE: Never has the contagious nature of ethnic prejudice been more clearly illustrated than in the recent sweep of hatred for Americans of Japanese ancestry. Whether the United States Government could and should have stood out against public opinion and insisted on protecting the rights of all citizens provided for in the Constitution, may be a moot question. That it did not do so but permitted the obvious distinction between a group of enemy aliens and a minority of citizens to be obscured, is a historic fact. The question has been raised whether the corresponding national minority in Canada has fared better. Did the Dominion succeed in rendering harmless the alien enemies in its midst without frustrating the acculturation already so largely achieved by its national minority of Japanese ancestry? Professor LaViolette here gives us his preliminary findings on this question. Information now available, while incomplete, seems to point to the conclusion that owing to the presence of certain factors peculiar to the United States, Japanese-Americans have fared somewhat better than Japanese-Canadians and that the prospects for a constructive long-term solution are somewhat better in the United States. Japanese-Americans are permitted to serve in the armed forces; property rights appear to be somewhat better protected in the United States, and greater opportunities for resettlement exist than in Canada. On both sides of the border, however, lack of security and uncertainty as to their future status outweigh, in the minds of citizens of Japanese ancestry, the care with which, after the first lamentable emergency shifts, their physical needs have been provided for. In both countries, popular prejudice has made it difficult for government to deal with the problem in a rational and constructive manner. — M. S. F.

After two and a half years of war the problem of Canada's Japanese minority seems as far as ever from solution. The prewar communities have been broken

Professor LaViolette is a sociologist at McGill University, Montreal. He has done extensive field work in relocation centers, and is preparing a comprehensive study for the I.P.R. on the Japanese in Canada.

up, and Japanese-Canadians are being slowly demoralized by uncertainty as to their future.

A preliminary report on evacuation in Canada was published in this magazine prior to the complete removal of the Japanese from the restricted area in western British Columbia.⁽¹⁾ Removal or detention was completed in this province by October 1942, except for 79 people, later increased to 94, of mixed marriages, with about 100 children, and institutionalized mental cases who will remain in the restricted area. Upon completion of its work, the British Columbia Security Commission reported that on November 14, 1942 the evacuees had been distributed as shown in the following table:

⁽¹⁾Far Eastern Survey, July 27, 1942. The bibliography on this subject is very brief.

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Attempts to solve this minority problem have so far met with little success. The insecurity of the Japanese-Canadians has been intensified, and prejudice against them has led to limitations justified neither by reasons of security nor by Canada's democratic traditions.

HOLLANDIA SETS A PRECEDENT

by Shirley Jenkins

The return of Dutch authority to this island area in the Pacific illustrates one aspect of Allied policy toward former colonial possessions from which the Japanese are being driven.

Sugar beet projects in Alberta, Manitoba and Ontario	3,991
Road camp projects in British Columbia and Ontario	945
Interior housing projects in eastern British Columbia	12,029
Self-supporting projects in central British Columbia	1,161
Industrial projects in several provinces	439
Permits to approved employment in various areas	359
Repatriated to Japan	42
Internment camps	699
In detention—Vancouver	111
T. B. cases to be moved to New Denver hospital	105
Total evacuated	19,881

In addition to the above number, there were 2,428 Japanese outside of the restricted area prior to evacuation; 203 returned to Japan in 1941, thus making a total of 22,512 registered by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in British Columbia. In registering, parents claimed 1,500 children resident in Japan.

Self-supporting Projects

Road camps were developed as a part of the national defense scheme. The basic wage is 25¢ while skilled workers and foremen are paid 30¢ and 40¢ per hour. From wages earned \$1.00 is deducted for medical fees, \$20.00 for assignment to dependents, and \$22.50 for room and board. Data are lacking for an appraisal of the road camps, but there have been many complaints from the evacuees — objections to the low wages, hostility about separation from families, and protests about various regulations. A few rumors about the camps have circulated to other parts of Canada, especially about the “Japanese refusal to work.” If men wish to leave road work for other employment, they may now do so as the camps are of less importance than they were when first organized. By April 1, 1944 there were about 400 men left in the road camps, which seemed to be running smoothly.

At the time of evacuation, a number of the Japanese felt that they wanted to be entirely free of government support. Those who could afford it were settled in central British Columbia. In the self-supporting projects, they have had an opportunity to do gardening for themselves and for market and to engage in wood-cutting on a contract basis. In one section a sawmill was taken over.

Two years have gone by, and what work has been available has apparently not been sufficient for these evacuees to maintain themselves as they had expected. Gradually their assets are becoming smaller as the duration of the war is longer than they had antici-

pated. Again they are unable to provide educational facilities from their resources, and since they have been so far of little expense to the government, a plea is being made for assistance in that respect. Preliminary reports indicate that these communities are rather highly organized on a cooperative basis, a “little socialist state” as one informant termed them. On the whole it appears that there has been less restlessness and anxiety in these settlements than in the others. A small number have left for the east. Further problems may be expected as family resources become depleted.

By the spring of 1942 considerable labor had migrated from Alberta to the higher wages of war industries on the coast. To avert a serious shortage of labor in the production of beet sugar, the Commission decided to move evacuees to the beet areas of Alberta, Manitoba and Ontario. When it was first proposed that Japanese be used for this work, there was little response among the prospective evacuees, but the Commission explained that complete families would be moved. The Japanese now claim that this was “bait,” for they later discovered that they could move into the Interior Settlements (see below) without breaking up their families. They now claim that if they had known this, they would not have offered to move in family units to the beet sugar areas, for as one informant said, “They appear to be serfs on the soil.”

By 1943 problems of housing and wages had been partially ironed out, and it was possible to add an additional 700 people to sugar beet work. Sugar production has been fairly well maintained as a result of the evacuees contributing about 50% of the hand work required in the three provinces.

Low Wages in Beet Areas

The first reaction of evacuees to beet work was one of disillusionment and discouragement. Apparently the work of a complete family was not enough to provide sufficient income, and so other seasonal work was needed to round out wages for a year. Some of the people have gone into cities or lumber camps for periods between field work. Such a combination has been difficult for ex-fishermen but farm families have adjusted to it fairly well. In some instances truck gardens were started, but the whole mode of life is contrary to the pattern of living which the Japanese had developed on the Coast. There a man usually worked as a transient laborer in fishing or lumbering until about forty years of age, then used his savings to purchase a small piece of land, marry and establish a home. The farm and children provided security against old age. The sugar beet scheme is unpopular. Furthermore, the Department of Labor signed a contract with the Province of Alberta, requiring removal of the Japanese six months after hostilities cease if so re-

quested. Arrangements with Manitoba and Ontario are less rigid and allow more flexibility for future final disposition.

For the 4,700 evacuees involved in this work, there is no way that they can feel secure from economic or political problems through their own efforts or those of the agency which has jurisdiction over them. Because of this, the type of work and the fact that evacuees cannot buy land, it may be expected that they will make determined efforts to avoid becoming permanent migratory or seasonal workers, even if they are acceptable to the beet growers. In April the beet workers petitioned the Minister of Labor to move them out of this type of work and resettle them under the same policy as the evacuees who are in the ghost towns. They said that they were "unwanted" and that the growers did not care what happens to them. This petition was precipitated by failure to settle to their satisfaction the issue of giving them right to transfer to other farms if they wished and the right of their children to go to high school without paying additional fees. They also claim that the whole of the province is unpromising for future adjustments, and hence they wish to leave.

Interior Settlements

Of the various projects established by the British Columbia Security Commission, those located in the southeastern corner of British Columbia are undoubtedly after two years of evacuation the ones of most concern to the government as well as to the Japanese. Rehabilitated hotels, houses and other buildings, some newly constructed, give these ghost mihing towns semblance of renewed normal life. The completely new town of Tashme, 100 miles east of Vancouver, might make one think another boom was under way. But although the Kootenay Lakes district is one of the most beautiful in Canada, and from this point of view the Japanese like it, the evacuees are profoundly unhappy people in spite of the absence of barbed wire fences, guard towers or military police to remind them constantly of their status, although entrance or exit to the general area is controlled.

In these centers all of the Japanese are provided with housing, fuel and light, schooling, and, unless they have ample assets for paying for their own, medical care and hospitalization. A few work projects, such as wood-cutting, have been operated and these along with necessary work of the Commission and private employers have kept a good number on a self-supporting basis. The Commission expects the able-bodied to work and so "maintenance" is provided only for the unemployable and families of internees. The Commission does, however, guarantee a minimum income, using the British Columbia provincial relief rates as

a scale for determining allowances. On January 1, 1944, there were 11,365 people, of whom 8,522 were Canadian citizens by birth or naturalization, living in this relocation area. Of this number, 2,072 persons (822 families) were living on this scale of income:

<i>No. of Persons in Family</i>	<i>Monthly Allowance</i>
1	\$12.00
2	23.00
3	29.00
4	34.00
5	39.00
6	44.00
7	49.00
8	54.00

Add \$3.00 for each additional person beyond eight.

This scale is slightly higher than that of the City of Vancouver for Orientals. At the same time, there were 2,117 persons (385 families) who required supplementary maintenance so as to bring their income up to the minimum, and 7,176 persons (1,526 families), who were self-supporting because their incomes were over the guaranteed amount.

Such a scale of income is expected to be adequate for food, clothing and incidentals of living. Yet this has given rise to a great number of complaints in the form of petitions to the Department of Labor and to the Spanish government, which has charge of Japanese interests. There have also been complaints about housing, especially with respect to congestion and heating. The complaints became so numerous that the government finally appointed a Royal Commission to investigate the welfare of the evacuees. Its report was released in the latter part of March and offered no important criticisms of the program. In view of the fact that the Royal Commission limited itself to a strict interpretation of "welfare" as used in its instructions, the report is not an overall review of policy and program. If the instructions had been broadened both the Department of Labor and the evacuees would have benefited.

Anxiety about Future Status

Objective evidence indicates clearly that the health of the Japanese is not suffering because of food or housing. The number and nature of complaints, and the intense demands made upon social workers of the Commission, indicate very clearly that the anxieties of the evacuees have become centered around problems of personal and family health, food, clothing and the everyday small things of life. The anxieties are derived chiefly from problems of education, from the order to liquidate property registered with the Custodian of Enemy Property, and from problems of resettlement. It is clear that all of these are tied up with the Japanese' anxiety over their future legal and economic status and with a subtler psychological inse-

curity arising from uncertainty as to whether they will be accepted or rejected by the Canadian nation.

Shortly after 1870 in Japan, education became a means of securing a higher position in the new economic system. This strengthened the traditional respect for learning which Japanese have had for centuries. Education had prestige; it aided economic advancement. The immigrants brought these ideas with them. Finally, because of intense discrimination against the Japanese, education became important as a means of survival. Today the parents in the Interior Settlements see concrete evidence of the latter, for it is the younger, better educated group which finds it possible to resettle in the east. They are the ones who do not have to accept work as menials, and as informants say, "They can make a go of it."

Lack of Adequate Education

At the time of evacuation the Province of British Columbia disclaimed any responsibility for the education of the children of any age group. The Provincial Department of Education continues to state that it is already short of teachers and that no district can be expected to be saddled with extra expense due to the dislocation of the Japanese. The Commission has attempted to provide grade school training in the Interior Settlements but not high school work. Both of these in certain areas are provided by local authorities, and in others secondary education is provided by some of the churches or by correspondence. Because of the desire of the Commission to resettle people in areas where labor is needed and its continual emphasis upon the fact that the whole program is only for the duration, the Commission has not gone into any extensive building program for schools, but it has provided teachers through making use of *nisei* who are either trained or able to qualify quickly. It is estimated that the costs of education for the coming year will be about \$100,000. The shortage of equipment and qualified teachers has been difficult for the evacuees to accept, and they consequently feel unjustly treated. Only a few students attended universities in 1943-44.

Although there is considerable concern among the Japanese about educational problems, the desire for improved facilities has not moved many parents or children to resettle. The economic problems are too great to overcome easily; and the parents want to keep their children close to them.

It may be expected that the Provincial Department of Education will stand firm in its present policy. It is consistent with the general demand that the present opportunity be seized to exclude forever all Japanese from British Columbia. Some improvements might be facilitated by the Department, but on the whole British Columbians feel that the Japanese are now the full

responsibility of the Commission. Until the Japanese are settled permanently, education will continue to be a major source of anxiety for the parents and older children, although significant improvements have been made since September 1943.

A second, and probably the most important, source of insecurity and anxiety is that of the liquidation of property. The details of the property problem are numerous and complicated. In February 1942 the government prohibited the Japanese from acquiring property, but it did not prevent the disposal of holdings. When complete evacuation was announced, the Custodian of Enemy Property was given control of Japanese property as "a protective measure only." Full power was given the Custodian to administer the property for the "benefit of all interested persons." In order to do this the property of Japanese was defined as belonging to the enemy within the meaning of the Consolidated Regulations Respecting Trading with the Enemy of 1939.

In leaving their residences, the evacuees left their chattel goods locked in their houses, stored in halls, or in the basements of empty houses, some of which were forwarded later upon request. Since then there has been vandalism and considerable loss from damage by rodents. If there had not been so much confusion at the time of leaving, this loss could have been reduced. In view of these conditions, the Custodian decided last summer to dispose of the chattels at auction as this was the only way to protect the interests of the Japanese.

"Protection" vs. Liquidation of Property

At the time the evacuees registered their property with the Custodian it was their understanding that it was to be "protected" and "administered." In June 1942 the people had a suspicion that more than "protection" and "administration" might follow. A report of the Minister of Mines and Resources and the Minister of Pensions and National Health indicated that a survey had been carried out and an appraisal made of present value so as to consolidate the control and disposition of agricultural lands in particular. At this point it was arranged that in order to acquire or lease property which formerly belonged to a Japanese, it was necessary to have the approval of the Director of the Soldier Settlement Board. In such transactions negotiations were made between the buyer or lessee and the Director without any contact with the owner. Credits were accrued to the account of the owner in the office of the Custodian.

The survey of Japanese properties showed clearly that from a business point of view, a greater number of assets were of the wasting type than had been anticipated. Furthermore, a shortage of labor and the lack of interest in permanent farming at that time by Cauca-

sians meant that the crops would be lost and the berry or other plants ruined. It is not difficult to realize that a government office cannot function effectively as an operator of farm or business properties. In view of the fact that a seller's market has existed for several years, the Custodian decided to liquidate the properties. On February 6, 1943 *The New Canadian*, the only Japanese paper in Canada, headlined the fact that "Ottawa Order Authorizes Sale of 'Seized' Property." It was the realization of fears which the Japanese had felt for eight months. Because of their experience with the disposal of fishing boats and sale of automobiles, the evacuees felt that forced liquidation would mean sales at fictitiously low prices. And immediately the politicians on the Coast felt that property liquidation would be an additional argument for postwar exclusion.

Although a committee with Japanese representation had carefully considered property problems before recommending liquidation, the evacuees organized the Japanese Property Owners Association in order to collect funds and initiate legal steps to change the policy. A year later the case was supposed to go to the Exchequer Court in Ottawa. It was claimed that a decision would be made early in April 1944. By the latter part of that month, it was not certain that this court had jurisdiction over the case, but it is now scheduled for May 29. The Japanese feel that there is intentional stalling, for in the meantime liquidation of their interest in 1,500 to 2,000 pieces of property is continuing. Seven hundred and sixty-nine pieces of farm land were transferred to the Director of Veteran Settlement to be used for settling demobilized men.

Procedure for Sale of Goods

When any property is sold, a credit is set up in the office of the Custodian. Against this the creditor is allowed to draw. If the money is to be used for resettling purposes, the full amount may be withdrawn. If an individual lives in the Interior Settlements, only limited amounts may be withdrawn with permission, and at least \$260 for a single person or \$520 for a married couple plus \$50 for each child must be left for resettlement purposes. If a person in the Interior Settlements has no assets beyond these amounts, he is entitled to go on maintenance.

The government looks upon liquidation as good administration. The Japanese look upon it as a breach of faith. They suspect that the government has given way to political and economic pressure groups. Available evidence does not indicate conclusively the factors on which the decision was based.

In view of the strong drive among the Japanese to acquire property and maintain a savings account, this is one of the most serious frustrations that they have

experienced in the evacuation program. Unless one is well acquainted with the Japanese mode of life prior to evacuation, it is difficult to convey how much they felt at home in British Columbia. To be evacuated for the duration was a profound crisis. But when they learned of their farms, residential and business properties being sold and their chattels auctioned, all of their accumulated grievances were summed up in one conclusion: the purpose of this is to move us all out of the province permanently. Prior to the property liquidation, it might have been possible for the Commission to allay the distrust which had developed. But now the evacuees feel that the government and its agency, the Commission, have become an enemy of the Japanese, so that they now respond to the program with passive resistance, a feeling of complete helplessness, and deep hostility. Members of the staff have become, for example, *commissionu-inu*, "commission dogs," which in both Canada and the United States appears to be the most derogatory word that evacuees have coined for people whom they hate.

Although liquidation has served to organize fears and feelings of hostility against the government, it is possible for the policy to work to the advantage of the evacuees if the government finds it feasible to sell at good prices and to locate the Japanese so that they can use their assets in resettlement.

Control of Movements

Under an Order-in-Council passed on February 5, 1943 the Minister of Labor has complete control of any person of the Japanese race resident "anywhere in Canada." The government can prohibit a Japanese from engaging in any kind of activity or "employment or business," from moving or traveling anywhere in Canada, from residing anywhere in Canada, or from "associating or communicating with any persons." All of these activities are regulated or watched by the Minister at present. Thus a Japanese cannot cross provincial boundaries without a permit from the police. If a resettled Japanese, of Canadian birth, wishes to change residence from Toronto to Montreal, he can do so only at the will of the government. When a Japanese in British Columbia resettles in the east, there is no change in these restrictions. It brings only additional worries, for if he does resettle, there is no assurance of permanency even though he may work hard and prosper.

The lack of security comes essentially from government regulation of property contracts and the previously mentioned arrangements for removal after hostilities. Should a Japanese wish to open a restaurant or take over a farm, contracts can be made for one year only. Exceptions may be approved by the Min-

ister of Justice, but of the permits applied for, almost none have been approved. This, very likely, is tied into the political problem, for the Minister of Justice probably refers the applications to the provincial minister involved. If this were not done, the Dominion Government could be challenged by the provincial governments concerned for exceeding its authority and breaking the working agreement which was arranged at the time of evacuation. Such restrictions as well as the opposition of the Canadian Legion and children of other immigrants are major obstacles to resettlement.

Another factor making up the resettlement complex of attitudes is the kind of work and wages which Japanese can secure. Ontario and Quebec provide jobs mainly for skilled laborers, domestics or farmers. Evacuees realize that if they were qualified, there might be less difficulty in making sufficient money to support their families, for which Montreal and Toronto residents claim that about \$130 per month is required. The wages which most evacuees can earn are inadequate without supplementary income. But even with an adequate income, they are unwilling to risk the move because of government regulations. Those who have resettled are usually better qualified, unmarried people, or the wealthier ones who can afford to take chances.

Seek Work Opportunities

But the factor of income alone does not explain their resistance to resettlement. The Japanese are struggling to avoid menial work. They do not want to become migratory seasonal workers, and they want wider opportunities than domestic work, which, among the Japanese, has been heretofore a means of getting an education. These attitudes are still effective among the West Coast Japanese. Hence low pay and lack of jobs offering opportunities for future advancement are serving to block their eastward movement. This also means that these two factors determine where one will accept work if resettlement is attempted. There is a strong preference for the largest cities, Toronto and Montreal, preferably the former because it is in a region of higher wages, and an almost frantic desire to avoid smaller cities and rural areas. This latter factor is a complex motive made up of a desire to get into work with a "future," to be relatively inconspicuous, and to go where friends are already located. Since the first opportunities came in the large cities, friends are usually there. Whether there will be a later moving away from the eastern cities cannot be foretold.

Opportunities for domestic work are chiefly in Ontario and Quebec. So far the Commission has been unable to resettle many people into this work, owing

mainly to the fact that parents refuse to permit their unmarried daughters to leave home. In parental thinking, it is recognized that the daughters have not been trained to take care of themselves as have other Canadians. The parents are afraid of the girl's possible demoralization and of their inability to find a husband for her if she leaves them. They also fear that should she marry without their assistance, she might choose a non-Japanese. This group of unmarried young women will continue to be a difficult problem for the Commission until family resettlement is possible.

Religious Differences Noted

Resettlement statistics by religious groups are not yet available. Informants familiar with the resettlement movement agree that Christians respond more easily than Buddhists. The former have organizations active in the camps and in the east, attempting to facilitate dispersal and readjustment, while the latter have no connections in the east and tend to remain in the camps. Since the Buddhists represented roughly 65% of all religious affiliations prior to evacuation, they are of course a major group which presents very difficult problems of resettlement.

Several years ago National Selective Service was organized in Canada in order to distribute workers according to priorities. Before new jobs can be accepted, permits are required. In the latter part of September 1943 it was decided that in order to expedite resettlement, the rules of N.S.S. would be applied to single Japanese males of Canadian citizenship. Hence a few men were transferred to lumber camps in northern Ontario, but by December the rules were suspended because of resistance based, mainly, upon the fear of breaking up families. Family sentiment has been strengthened by evacuation, and for evacuees even the sending of a single son or daughter away to work is looked upon as "breaking up the family." Later in February, it was decided to enforce the rules again, and after the Royal Commission report, completed in January, it was decided to suspend all able, single people, numbering about 125, who were working on the Commission staff and urge them to resettle.

Local work in resettlement areas is carried on by a special officer of National Selective Service, a branch of the Department of Labor, but under the Deputy Minister of Labor who also has responsibility for the Japanese. In addition to assigning evacuees to jobs according to priorities, an officer has to see that the regulations of the Security Commission are carried out. Because of restlessness, anxieties and health problems, the officer has social work as well as public relations functions to fulfill. In eastern cities the Y.W.C.A. has assisted with this phase of the work.

In the application of the rules of N.S.S., the Commission has found it desirable to follow an intermediate rather than a strict enforcement. Penalties have been imposed in several cases for infraction of the rules. Because of anxieties, restlessness and the purposelessness of life at present, it is difficult to settle evacuees so that they will not quit jobs and thus gain a bad reputation as workers.

The application of these rules to Canadian citizens of Japanese descent has made them feel further discriminated against as compared with Japanese nationals. Because of international conventions, enemy nationals are not "forced" to take work. It has been pointed out by numerous Japanese who are Canadian citizens that the Japanese nationals enjoy greater privileges. At the present time about the only way a Canadian of Japanese ancestry is free to contribute to the war effort is by accepting work which by its nature, location or conditions is usually distasteful to him, or by investing in Victory Bonds.

The confusion regarding resettlement, and particularly the rules of National Selective Service, point to the problem of communication within the Interior Settlements. This is due in part to the fact that the evacuees have no adequate way of resolving their resentment, they do not have access to information, and through the stereotyping process of forming opinions, they maintain their attitude of enmity toward the Security Commission. Furthermore, they believe that National Selective Service is a means by which they are forced into an even more insecure position.

Numbers Few But Problem Significant

The Japanese in Canada have never been numerically important, for steps were taken to prevent that. In a total population of 11,500,000 certainly the 19,881 evacuated Japanese, requiring an annual expenditure of about .001% of the national budget, do not loom large. Yet as it bears on the efforts of a democratic people to solve a domestic problem of international significance, on the problem of working out relations between federal and provincial governments, and of negotiating a peace treaty and resuming relations with Japan, the Japanese problem is of first-rate importance to Canadians.

On the whole Canadians have assumed that evacuation was necessary and that the plan followed was the only solution to the "British Columbian problem." They have assumed that whatever British Columbians have claimed about the Japanese is true. Since the policy of the government has been to avoid publicity regarding the nature and progress of the program, there has been virtually no discussion of the eventual disposal of the Japanese except in British Columbia.

Also, there have been no Fair Play Committees which have developed spontaneously although some *nisei* sponsoring committees have been organized in resettlement areas. The apparent lack of concern about the solution of this domestic and international problem is due largely to the fact that Canadians are not highly sensitive to problems of constitutional rights and that the Dominion is not tightly bound together through well developed channels of communication.

Attitude of Canadians

On February 16, 1944 the Gallup Poll published its second report on attitudes toward the Japanese problem. Experts do not agree upon the significance of these polls, but at least this one, like the others, is quoted throughout the Dominion.

	Japanese Nationals per cent	Japanese- Canadians per cent
Send back to Japan	80	33
Allow to stay in Canada	14	49
Undecided	6	8

The most important item regarding this poll is the fact that the Province of British Columbia did not differ significantly from the other provinces. This confirms the impression that across the whole of the Dominion there is a surprising amount of homogeneity in attitudes toward this problem. Should this continue and on the basis stated by the poll, it is a favorable sign for both the government and the Japanese.

In the past two years numerous organizations have passed resolutions regarding postwar disposition of the Japanese. These cannot be appraised accurately at present. They do, however, range all the way from deporting all Japanese to Japan or to formerly Japanese-owned islands to dispersing them throughout the Dominion on a quota basis, and from complete prohibition of owning land and fishing licenses to giving full citizenship rights.

The Minister of Labor has received letters from the areas where the Japanese now are, asking for their removal after the war. It has been his policy not to make any commitments to local groups. In the early part of January the Board of Trade at Nelson, B. C., in the area where the Doukhobors have created so much trouble recently, requested that the Japanese be removed from the Interior Settlements. In reply the Minister of Labor stated that the only pledge which the government has made in handling the evacuation program was that "British justice will be exercised." When correspondents have demanded removal from eastern resettlement areas, the Deputy Minister has not been hesitant in pointing out that such individuals have been investigated by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which is always reassuring to most Canadians;

that such people are contributing their labor to the war effort; and that the war is being fought for principles which include tolerance toward minority groups. But since it is a departmental policy to shun publicity, not even the Japanese know to what extent the Department of Labor is responsible for stating their case.

Proposals for ultimate solution come mainly from British Columbia. It is not clear at this writing how strong and widespread are the demands there for permanent exclusion. There is no formal organization which is agitating for permanent removal, but it would not take long for such an organization to appear if the Japanese were free to return to the restricted area. A large number of residents on the Coast feel that to prohibit the Japanese from returning is a reactionary step, setting a very dangerous precedent.

When discussing the program the newspapers say that "Japanese will not be permitted to return to B.C." Yet there are about 16,000 in the province. What do they mean by "return"? This is, apparently, a way of keeping the issue alive and of building up latent attitudes gradually.

Political Issues Involved

The demand for permanent exclusion is very definitely a color prejudice. While the Provincial House of Commons was in session during February and March, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation gave notice that it intended to submit an amendment to the Provincial Election Act, giving East Indians the right to vote. In view of the circumstances this is undoubtedly the most courageous act which any political party has undertaken on behalf of minority groups in Canada. Upon being questioned, Mr. Lefebvre, the mover of the amendment, explained that this would extend the franchise to Chinese and Japanese as well as to East Indians. Mr. Pearson, the Minister of Labor, proclaimed the East Indians to be "unreliable, dishonest, deceitful and non-cooperative." The East Indians demanded that the Minister make a public apology, which he later did. Chinese and East Indians from British Columbia who are serving in the armed forces, chiefly Chinese who are not drafted but are permitted to volunteer for the Army (though not the Air Force), are not allowed to vote. Recently Saskatchewan repealed its restriction against Chinese voting. Hence in no other province but British Columbia is the franchise for Orientals an issue. The progress of the amendment, which was ruled out of order by the Speaker, in the provincial legislature shows clearly that politicians in British Columbia use the franchise issue as a vote-getting device even though East Indians are members of the British Empire, the Chinese are our allies, and 75% of the Japanese-Canadians are citizens.

Members of Parliament from British Columbia are pressing the Federal Government for definite commitments for eventual solution of the problem. They are facing an election this fall at home, and they are also displeased with the fact that there has been no forthright declaration on the part of leading officials. These gave rise to a very bitter debate in the House of Commons on May 5, in which all of the traditional stereotypes and invectives were used with considerable vehemence. Acting Prime Minister Ralston finally closed off the speeches by saying that before long the Government would make a statement. Quite obviously after two years the subject is still a political football.

Available statistical evidence indicates clearly that resettlement is going very slowly. All well-informed Japanese and government officials realize the great desirability of achieving a more permanent solution before the end of hostilities. It is clear that the attitudes of the Japanese and the present policy as implemented have come to an impasse, and that breaking it will require a thorough overhauling of existing regulations and restrictions. By removing travel restrictions, by making Canadian citizenship more privileged than Japanese, and by encouraging native Japanese leadership to assume greater responsibilities in the carrying out of new policies, the Japanese themselves can be aided to work out a new mode of life. Finally, their adjustments will be more satisfactory if means are found for enlisting the cooperation of a greater number of Canadians in a liberalized program of resettlement.

HOLLANDIA SETS A PRECEDENT

Allied policy on liberated areas is being clarified. For example, immediate civilian administration by the legal prewar government has been arranged in the recent pact between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, and the pattern is being followed in agreements between the United Nations and Holland, Belgium and Norway. For Europe this appears to be a shift away from the earlier plan for Allied military control in liberated areas. The policy in the Pacific theater, however, has always provided for the immediate restoration of the former Allied governments as the sole administrative authority.

A preview of the policy in operation was seen last month when Netherlands government officials landed at Hollandia in northwest New Guinea alongside the Allied invasion forces. This was the first administrative restoration in the Pacific for the Dutch, a regime

which is not providing the military force to evict the Japanese. The Hollandia settlement at Humboldt Bay is a small and relatively insignificant part of the Dutch colonial empire, but the precedent established there will be important.

Over one hundred Netherlands Indies officials, Javanese native police, guides and interpreters went ashore with the American Army on April 22. Their first act was to run up the flag of the Netherlands and reclaim the territory for the Dutch Empire. The group included Dutch and Indonesian officials, and was led by Major David Schermer, with Colonel Conrad Giebel serving as liaison to the American command. Their administration is strictly civil in nature and operates under the Netherlands Government. The immediate purpose is to reconstruct the Hollandia area, secure native labor to assist the American forces, and promote agricultural production. All of the men have had both training and experience in phases of administration. Their readiness to assume control is the result of considered planning on the part of the Netherlands Indies authorities in Australia.

School for Administrators

The internment of the civil officials in Dutch New Guinea after occupation by the Japanese made it obvious that a whole new corps of administrators would be needed. Last summer the Commission of the Netherlands East Indies established a civil service school to train such officials in Melbourne. The initial class included about forty young volunteers, both Hollanders and Indonesians. They underwent an intensive six months' training course in practical problems of administration. Included in their studies were such subjects as constitutional law, taught by Dr. Jacob van Hoogstraten, and Islam, taught by Dr. Charles O. van der Plas, N.E.I. Chief Commissioner. Jungle trip experience was taught by a former Timor guerrilla fighter. Language instruction in Malay as well as knowledge of the religion, customs and history of the areas were emphasized.

Actual experience in administration was secured in Southern Netherlands New Guinea, which, although unoccupied by the Japanese, has faced problems of reconstruction because of repeated bombardments. Last summer Dutch officials went to Merauke, seat of the Government, to organize the handling of military and civilian goods. A program of civilian conscription was instituted, and reconstruction of bombed towns begun. Men who received this practical training in Merauke were with the Allied forces in Hollandia. Their authority will eventually extend to all recaptured Dutch territory in Malaysia. A Netherlands agency to supervise and control exports from the

islands for a limited time has already been established.

The prompt turning over of liberated territory to the former metropolitan powers illustrates clearly Allied policy; that of restoring the *status quo ante* for colonial areas—at least until final victory is achieved.

SHIRLEY JENKINS

BOOKS ON THE PACIFIC AREA

WINGS AFTER WAR: The Prospects of Postwar Aviation. By S. Paul Johnston. New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1944. 129 pp. Diagr. \$2.00.

In this little volume, a well-known popularizer of aviation facts and figures deflates exaggerated expectations of the role which air travel and transportation are likely to play after the war. There will be no great immediate development, he finds, of personal uses of inexpensive planes. To keep in practice the 300,000 or more pilots coming back from the war theaters will be impossible, even with Government-subsidized flying and with a mass production of planes kept going by government orders.

Transportation of goods by air will continue to be limited by the lower cost and greater practicability of other forms of transportation for most purposes. In Russia and China, more urgent tasks of internal transport development will for some time prevent a very active participation in the international competition for air transportation. Before there can be any great expansion, there is need for international conventions and agreements. Pacific air travel and transportation of mail will not soon be more than about one third of that which flies over the Atlantic.

With its admirable charts and lucid explanations, Mr. Johnston's realistic forecasts — given in some detail for different types of planes and plane-uses — are more inspiring than the fantastic pictures with which some magazines of large circulation have tried to amuse their readers. He manages to convey a sense of solid beginnings. It will take political foresight, commercial enterprise and the ingenuity of engineers to place the war-time experience of aviation into the service of global civilian communication.

B. L.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMODITY CONTROL AGREEMENTS. Montreal: International Labour Office, 1943. 221 pp. \$2.00, paper.

Disagreement registered at the Philadelphia Conference of the I.L.O. concerning the scope of the I.L.O.'s operations might well have taken this excellent compilation for one of its concrete issues. International agreements on measures to promote full employment, which most of the delegates accepted in principle as a desirable aim, it might well have been contended, are futile if they must limit themselves to technical questions of labor conditions. "Interpreted in terms of human suffering," states an earlier report quoted in the Introduction, the violent swings in the prices of certain basic commodities "meant that farmers in many areas were unable to purchase clothes or boots, were unable to send their children to school for lack of them, were unable to obtain food other than that produced on the farm . . . the plight of the paid labourer on the farm or in the mine was often such as to make the incomeless farmer seem fortunate."

The intergovernmental control agreements relating to wheat, sugar, tea, coffee, beef, tin, and rubber, described in detail, have

for the most part grown out of earlier producers' schemes and have led to the adoption at various world conferences of certain guiding principles. These are set forth in full recognition of the special considerations that must govern their application in the case of particular commodities, so as to insure that the administration will be in the public interest. This is particularly important with respect to those schemes which influence the prices of materials that enter directly into the consumption of the economically weakest classes of the population over a large part of the world. These same commodities — sugar, tea, coffee, rubber, for example — may also pay so little in wages that a serious reduction in prices threatens the very livelihood of the unorganized and defenseless workers who produce them.

The report, well indexed and easy to use, offers a convenient starting point for the discussion of post-war commodity agreements of a more far-reaching character, whether under I.L.O. auspices or any other.

P. T. S.

ARCTIC MANUAL. By Vilhjalmur Stefansson. New York: Macmillan, 1944. 556 pp., ill. \$3.00.

The manuals written by American scholars at the request of the War or Navy Department usually are of pocket size and intended to be used on the spot. When it came to the preparation of an Arctic manual for the Air Corps, the authorities and the only person who could write such a manual decided between them that it was better to produce a book so interesting that the reader would remember the relevant information in an emergency, than to trust to the adequacy of the few printed pages which the aviator could carry in his pocket. The result is a book still as condensed as pemican but with an intriguing flavor in addition to its high nutritive qualities.

The layman who tries to follow wartime events in the Arctic or to anticipate postwar developments there finds in this book a number of surprising facts — surprising, that is, if he has shared many of the current prejudices. For example, both the coldest and the warmest spots on this globe are in the temperate zone; there is no polar icecap in the accepted sense; in late August about four-fifths of all land north of the Arctic circle is free of snow; life, mostly in an advanced form, exists in almost every part of the Arctic Ocean; that ocean is only one-seventh as large as the Atlantic and one-thirteenth as large as the Pacific; humidity and insects make the summer climate unpleasant in those low-lying and swampy plains that cover much of the land area; but the average snowfall of the Arctic is less than that of Iowa.

Another paradox is that a manual produced by a man eminent as a geographer and an anthropologist contains no map and tells nothing about the people of the Arctic region.

B. R. F.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON CONSERVATION OF MARINE RESOURCES, with special reference to the North Pacific. By Jozo Tomasevich. Stanford University; Food Research Institute, 1943. 297 pp. \$3.00.

This survey admirably rounds out previous studies of pelagic conservation, including those made under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Seals, halibut, and whales, as well as salmon, have been in danger of serious depletion through ruthless exploitation. Japan's aggressive disregard of the international interest in this matter has contributed to her bad repute as a neighbor; and there is little doubt that restraints will be imposed upon her in this connection when the peace terms are written.

Dr. Tomasevich is concerned more with the history and results of international regulation than with the technical questions of breeding and protection. Nevertheless, the greatest ad-

vantage thus far derived from the various international conventions probably is the impetus they have given to the scientific study of the subject. Within the limits of their operation, the agreed measures of conservation have been successful, he finds; but these limits have been far too narrow. To restore the productive capacity of Pacific marine life will require a more inclusive rationalization of the fishing, sealing and whaling industries and if necessary an element of compulsion if any nation should still desire to poach on the common reserves.

B. L.

A MODERN FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES.

By Joseph M. Jones. New York: Macmillan, 1944. 94 pp. \$1.35.

In this sensible and constructive little volume, in part reprinted from *Fortune*, Mr. Jones raises questions that are fundamental in United States foreign policy. Many of the concepts on which that policy has been based in the past — such as avoidance of alliances, idealism unbacked by force, non-intervention in other countries' domestic affairs, neutral rights and freedom of the seas, self-determination, reduction of armaments, commercial non-discrimination — he finds either obsolete or inadequate today. He advances four new concepts: (1) a nuclear combination with the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union and China; (2) international control over civil and military aviation, and international mobilization of air power against possible aggressors; and as basic objectives, (3) the extension of democratic liberties throughout the world; (4) expansion of economic activity to promote a rising standard of living.

For the effective carrying out of such policies Mr. Jones finds the State Department as it exists today a clumsy instrument, geared to the nineteenth century and unresponsive to the needs of the twentieth. The fault, he believes, lies partly in an inefficient departmental organization, partly in an atmosphere of routine and protocol which discourages initiative and imagination, partly in certain personnel who have been unable to move with the times. There is, moreover, in the author's opinion, urgent need for a closer relationship between the agency which carries out our foreign policy and the ultimate source of that policy; the people, and their representatives in Congress. The scope of foreign policy, he points out, has broadened to the point where it covers matters of the most immediate personal interest to every citizen. While suggesting certain concrete steps in this direction, he emphasizes that the essential thing is recognition by officials in charge of foreign relations of the necessity for taking the people into their confidence. While the recent reorganization of the State Department and its new public relations policy do not go all the way to meet Mr. Jones' demands, he regards them as encouraging steps in the right direction.

M. S. F.

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