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This short history is one of the first steps towards accomplishing the writing of a book-length national History of the Japanese Canadians. As such, it is only a factual account of Japanese Canadians in British Columbia and does not attempt to relate or analyse all of the many events that have occurred. The National JCCA hopes to publish a comprehensive History combined with first person accounts of some of the episodes in the near future.

PREFACE

Home to those immigrants who settled down, and the children who were born to them, was this evergreen province with its infinite variety. Home was the silent lakes, the brown, rushing rivers, the small manicured strawberry plots, the smoky woods, the rock-strewn defiles of the mountains, the rain and fog of the cities nestled along the Pacific. Their hopes and dreams were bound up in British Columbia.

But the promise of a brave new world was not theirs to be fulfilled. True, there were goodly people, but the white foam of discrimination and mistrust bubbled about them. And to sink their roots, to quell the scalding cry of the spirit, the agony of their souls, was not easy.

Then there was the evacuation, surely one of the most turbulent periods in the history of the province. And it was sad and bitter to be pushed out like troublesome boarders as if they were not part of the country. Whether the results achieved justified the tremendous expenditure of governmental effort, the taxpayer's money, and the large cost in mental anguish and economic loss of so many people, can best be judged for oneself. This wholesale unrooting and its aftermath is not one of the brighter chapters in the province's history; but it is one that cannot be erased or whitewashed.

The story of the Japanese in British Columbia, of all the groups in the province, is easily the most dramatic, and disturbing in its ramifications. It would take a rather fat volume to tell all the stormy story, a story that is unparalleled in Canadian history. No attempt is made here to cover all the details; in this brief length, this is but a study of broad movements and developments. No attempt, too, is made to raise moral judgments; the facts, as given here, should stand up.

The story of British Columbia's Japanese Canadians is unique. Withal, they have had their loves and lusts, their strengths and weaknesses, their long days of loneliness and fear. Many have gone eastward after the storm, never to return; others have come back. But for all, the roaring sound of rivers, the rustle of autumn leaves underfoot, the strange music of an embattled street, the giant timber reaching skyward presaging a promise, remain in the mind's eye. The memories of the long years are both good and bad.

I THE BEGINNINGS

1. The Arrival

The story of the Japanese in B.C. begins with the arrival of a small number of immigrants, following upon the emergence of Japan into the modern world from its feudal cocoon in 1867. Around 1884, small numbers of Japanese began to arrive in B.C., though for a decade, only about 1,000 Japanese were in Canada. It was from 1896 onwards, that immigration began on a significant scale, and they came in ever-increasing waves until by the turn of the century 4,738 Japanese were in Canada, 97 percent in B.C.

What attracted the Japanese to B.C.? Like any other immigrant group, the Japanese were drawn by the prospect of plentiful work and quick returns. The province was going through a period of economic expansion and development in which they could find easy access to employment. This prompted the immigrants to seek a quick fortune in B.C., and after this hope was grounded, to make a permanent home there. Again, the proximity of Japan to B.C. and its agreeable mild green climate made them settle in Canada's westernmost province. Only a negligible number resided outside of B.C. from the early days up to 1941.

It is generally accepted that the first Japanese to reach Canada was a highly enterprising and energetic sailor, Manzo Nagano. Nineteen when he arrived at New Westminster in 1877, Nagano was to spend the greatest part of 46 years in B.C. until finally he returned to Nagasaki in 1923. On his first trip to B.C., Nagano remained ashore, and with an Italian partner, spent two years in fishing on the Fraser River, the first of many Japanese to make a livelihood in this industry. In 1880 Nagano went on to Vancouver -- or Gastown as it was more commonly known -- where he worked as a lumberman.

He returned to the Orient, coming back in 1884 on a ship which was transporting 500 Chinese laborers from Hongkong to Port Moody. Nagano continued his itinerant life, touching again at New Westminster where he found about seven or eight Japanese engaged in fishing, and passing through Steveston where there were five Japanese living. He went to Seattle, and established a cigarette stand and restaurant; but again returned to Japan after a few years. In 1892 he was in Victoria where he opened a store dealing in Japanese novelties and goods. A few years later, he occupied himself in salting salmon and exporting it to Japan, especially to Hokkaido where the demand was great, realizing a tidy profit. Eventually, he brought a wife from Japan to Victoria, expanded his novelty store, opened a hotel, and organized a Japanese social club. During World War I when the Japanese warship "Izumo" docked at Esquimalt, Nagano presented some Canadian trees to the captain to be planted in Japan.

Thus Nagano's activities in B.C. indicate the peculiar kind of enterprise and industriousness for which the Japanese soon became noted, and for which they came to be feared. The later settlers, however, were neither as nomadic nor as successful as Nagano. For most of them, hopes of a quick fortune were soon dissipated, and they had to adjust themselves to the new life, gradually to sink roots deeper into the new soil. They

were a hardy lot, these early pioneers, hard and strong and vital.

Another early arrival, Yasukichi Yoshizawa, became closely associated with the native Indians of the northern coast of B.C., and spoke their language freely. He is credited with opening up fishing for the Japanese in northern waters because he was the first to go as far north as the Skeena to investigate fishing conditions there. He set out in April 8, 1891, in a small boat, after quitting his job with the Hastings Lumber Mill in Vancouver, to take a look at the Northern coast. It took Yoshizawa and four others 42 days to reach the mouth of the Skeena, and they were met with amazement by the local inhabitants who had never seen a Japanese before. They found jobs in a cannery, and encouraged other Japanese to the district. Almost all of those early pioneers are dead; but what stories they would have had to tell.

During the turn of the century, new rail lines surged through the Rockies, and the rich resources of the coastal areas - the salmon, the minerals, the timber, and the land - were being tapped. The demand for manual labor in B.C. could not be met by immigrants from the remote Atlantic seaboard; the countries across the Pacific alone could provide sufficient manpower. Large Canadian concerns induced the immigrants to come under contract from the Orient. Two of these were the Wellington Colliery Company and the Canadian Pacific Railway. And so it was that there was the curious sight of Japanese immigrants working on the CPR, some of them wearing frock coats and top hats, shovel in hand. Such incongruity could only make them conspicuous, and consequently, one immigrant wryly relates "they couldn't be lazy".

At any rate, the contribution of these immigrants toward the early economic development of B.C. was noteworthy. A large number of them, however, remained in Canada only a short time: some moved on to the U.S. before 1901, some had come only as seasonal workers, many returned to Japan in disenchantment because of the rising tide of hostility and prejudice directed against them. As early as 1891, an attempt was made to introduce an anti-Japanese measure in the Legislature of B.C. by an amendment to a motion to increase the Chinese Head Tax from fifty to two hundred dollars and extending it to include the Japanese. This was only the first in a series of legislative attempts to enact laws of a restrictive nature, reflecting the sentiment of public unrest and fear, the flames of which were being fanned higher and higher until the climactic outburst in 1941. The proposal, however, was not given much support, the Dominion Government disallowing such acts lest they should damage relations between Japan and Canada. But an early legislative attempt that did succeed was the 1895 extension of the provincial election act clause which deprived Chinese of the franchise to deprive the Japanese as well. It was to prove an important restriction.

Hostility continued to increase as the Japanese immigration question became increasingly difficult because in the last few years of the 19th century, the Japanese population began to increase rapidly. Mr. Carter-Cotton, provincial minister of finance and agriculture, pointed out, in February, 1899, "it is unquestionably in the interests of the Empire that the Pacific province of the Dominion should be occupied by a large and thoroughly British population, rather than by one in which the number of aliens largely

predominated and many of the distinctive features of a settled British community were lacking". And the Royal Commission which had been appointed in September 1901, to investigate Oriental immigration in B.C., reported that the economic rivalry that existed between the Japanese and Occidental workers was "creating a feeling so pronounced and bitter among a large class of whites, as to endanger the peace and be a fruitful source of international irritation". It further pointed out that the Japanese controlled the boat-building industry and were engaged in lumbering, mining, railway work, and to a more limited extent in other operations. Already, little attempt was being made by the British Columbians to understand the Japanese.

Japanese immigration to B.C. grew after 1905; in the first ten months of 1907, for example, over 8,000 came in. Extreme discontent was felt over this influx. Indeed, anti-Oriental feeling was rife all along the Pacific Coast -- from B.C. down to California -- and it was not long before an Asiatic Exclusion League was formed in Vancouver. At its organization meeting, the members passed unanimously a resolution declaring that the Japanese were extremely aggressive and unless checked would ultimately control B.C., and that thus an alien race would secure a foothold in Canada dangerous in time of war. It was maintained that wage standards were being lowered by the Oriental influx and that the province's industries were passing in large part into the hands of the Japanese.

This influx in 1907 was partly a result of an American regulation prohibiting Japanese immigrants to Hawaii from securing passports to go to the mainland. Since it was no longer possible to get into the U.S. by way of Hawaii, immigrants then in the Islands turned to B.C. as an alternative. The S.S. Kumeric, for example, carried 1,177 Japanese immigrants in one voyage from Hawaii to Vancouver in that year. Most of them had heard rumours that Canada was full of rattle-snakes and offered low wages, but they reasoned that they could easily go over to the U.S. once they got on Canadian soil. The Kumeric passengers almost starved enroute when the crossing took several days longer than expected, and upon reaching Vancouver, so anxious were they to get off the ship that dock officials had to play hoses on them in order to disperse them. Some 800 spent the first night in Steveston huddled under old canvas in a cannery net warehouse.

The Kumeric immigrants formed only one of boat-loads of Japanese that continued to arrive; and as condemnation from press and platform increased, the matter fermented into the angry rioting that broke out in Vancouver on September 7, 1907. The rumoured arrival of some 2,000 or more Chinese and Japanese in the city sparked the outbreak. W.J. Bowser, a rising Conservative, had drawn up the "Bowser Natal Act", based on the Australian language tests designed to exclude Orientals from that Dominion, but Lieutenant-Governor Dunsmuir had refused to sign it, though it had been passed by the Legislature.

A civic mass meeting in Vancouver was organized by the Asiatic Exclusion League, and a mass parade was to march from Cambie Street grounds to the city hall. Early in the morning some 2,000 poured out of Cambie Street grounds with banners flying, and by the time the procession reached Hastings Street, the mob had increased to 5,000. At the city hall where an effigy of Dunsmuir was burned, at least 8,000 men gathered around.

Inflammatory speeches were made by the leaders, hotly-worded resolutions were passed attacking Dunsmuir and calling for the resignation of Premier McBride. Outside the city hall, impromptu orators climbed telephone poles to harangue the crowd. Some 15,000 then began to march towards Pender Street, Chinatown's "main" street.

A stone tossed through the window of a Chinese store started the action; and considerable damage was done in Chinatown. But in the Japanese quarter, the mob did not fare as well. Armed with knives, broken beer bottles, clubs, the hardy Japanese beat off the mob until it dispersed. The Japanese then formed patrols, and no rioter could dent this protective cordon. They were beaten back if they tried. Under these conditions the mob could do little and the trouble subsided. A Royal Commission, under W.L. Mackenzie King, investigated the riot and set the total amount of damages to be paid to the Japanese at \$9,175.00.

The riot of 1907 resulted in the first concrete restriction of Japanese immigration. The political storm in Canada aroused by the riots continued. In Vancouver, Conservative party leader Robert Borden declared two weeks later, "B.C. must remain a white man's country .." In 1908, the first Gentlemen's Agreement was announced. Japan agreed to permit only four classes of people to emigrate to Canada: first, returning immigrants and their wives and children; secondly, emigrants specially engaged by Japanese residents in Canada for bona fide personal or domestic service; thirdly, laborers under specifically-worded contracts approved by the Canadian Government; and fourthly, immigrants brought in under contract by Japanese resident agricultural holders in Canada. A total annual quota of 400 persons was fixed for all but the first group. In 1924, the agreement was modified to reducing the quota to 150 persons; and in 1928, a further limitation was introduced to include the wives and children of Japanese residents in Canada within the quota limitation.

After 1907, then, the total volume of immigration was substantially limited, but an even more significant change took place in the character of this immigration. Prior to 1907 the movement to Canada had consisted mainly of adult males. But following the first Gentlemen's Agreement, the number of female arrivals exceeded that of male immigrants in almost every year up to 1940. There were few females in B.C. before 1907. The first one, Mrs. Washiji Oya, landed in 1887 at Vancouver. Mrs. Naka Sekine, who came to Canada in 1890 when 14 years old, was another early arrival. Indeed, Mrs. Sekine was one of the longest to reside in Canada, for she died in March, 1958, in Hamilton, Ontario, at the age of eighty-two. But these, and a few other women, were exceptions. In 1901, in the over 4,000 Japanese in Canada, nearly all were male; but by 1921 there were 10,500 males and 5,300 females, and of the total number, 4,300 were children born in Canada. By 1931, these figures changed to 13,000 males and 9,200 females.

The Japanese problem still festered despite these agreements. For example, in the autumn of 1908 in B.C., one of the chief issues of the federal general election was Oriental immigration. Conservative party candidates made capital of the unrest in B.C. by making a special bid for anti-Oriental votes with a "White Canada" slogan, and the election resulted in a severe reverse to the Liberal party in the province. Indeed, agitation for the exclusion of the Japanese was part of the general anti-Oriental movement in

B.C., and the movement became more intense during the depression years since 1929.

British Columbia MPs and MLAs also alleged that hundreds of Japanese were being smuggled into the country each year. But the Board of Review headed by Dr. H.L. Keenlyside which conducted extensive inquiries in 1938 reported that "it was generally agreed in official circles that very few Japanese had entered Canada illegally since 1932". After checking the allegations of illegal entry, the Board was convinced that these were without foundation.

One of the main reasons for the discontent in the province was the increase in native-born population. At first, migration of Japanese into Canada had been primarily of adult males, hoping for a quick and easy fortune. Thousands who came to Canada remained only briefly when they learned the actual conditions, but those who remained did so with serious intentions of permanent settlement. The immigration of the high percentage of women, and the establishment of family and home, meant that the movement now became one of immigrants arriving in B.C. with the intention of remaining, and perpetuating the continuing existence of the Japanese as a minority of importance in the life of the province.

2. Economic Expansion

Before 1941, over three fourths of the Japanese settlers in B.C. were clustered within 75 miles of Vancouver. The vast majority were in the city of Vancouver, in the villages of the Fraser Valley, and the coasts of Vancouver Island. Vancouver alone had over 8,000 of the 22,205 Japanese in the province. The majority of the remaining Japanese settled down in the Okanagan Valley, and along the fishing and lumbering centres on the mainland coast. It was this high degree of concentration in certain areas that led critics to point out that it was evidence of a sinister central control of their activities. Together with their rapid economic expansion, this contributed greatly to the stormy history of the Japanese.

The rapidity of their expansion into the economic life of the province can be seen when one notes that in 1893 they were in six occupations; four decades later, these occupations had enlarged to over 60. In the early years, the Japanese were occupied in the major industries such as lumbering, fishing, mining, and railroading; but they gradually moved out of these industries into farming and occupations of a commercial nature, such as the proprietorship of stores and restaurants, and businesses and professions. This shift occurred mostly in the twenties when general expansion came to an end in these major industries. Also, the restrictions against the Japanese in these industries, and their search for better living conditions and a higher social status in the community made them seek occupations in which they could exercise a greater measure of independence.

By 1931, then, the Japanese had entered every industry, and most of the occupations in the province. One critic, for example, wrote: "The Japanese produce most of the strawberries, and about half of the raspberries . . . The situation is steadily growing worse, but it is when one looks into

the future that its true seriousness is most apparent".

The case histories of hundreds of Japanese families follow a fairly common pattern. First, the Japanese entered the economic life of the province as unskilled laborers, floating from job to job, receiving the lowest wages. Then, as they gained skill and knowledge, they were able to command higher wages and accumulate capital. This was followed by an initial investment in some kind of productive resources -- such as small farms, urban mercantile or service businesses - and establishment of permanent homes. Their struggle for status and the discrimination to which it gave rise, made them branch out into new fields, particularly that of agriculture. In general, the story is that of an upward struggle for economic stability or self-sufficiency - an economic independence offering in some degree protection from discrimination and the vagaries of employers.

Ever since they immigrated to Canada, the Japanese have been associated with fishing. The fishing village of Steveston, for example, by the turn of the century had about 2,000 Japanese. And later they were to be found on all the important fishing areas of the coast - from the Fraser River up to the northern boundary of the province. Bringing valuable experience from the homeland where many had been fishermen under Fujiyama's shadow, the Japanese were an important factor in the development of this industry in B.C.

The fishing industry soon became the scene of an acute struggle for supremacy in the competition between the Japanese and the Occidentals and Indians. By 1901 the Japanese held over 2,000 fishing licenses, and it was estimated that over 4,000 Japanese were engaged in this industry. Indeed, complaints were made that they were driving others out of the industry; and, as a result, successful attempts to reduce licenses to the Japanese were made during the twenties so that by the period just before World War II, less than 15% of the total number of licenses were held by the Japanese. Nonetheless, they continued to be an important factor in fish production. Then, too, they were credited with the development of herring and dog salmon fishing, salt herring industries, and developing new markets for fish in the Orient.

Lumbering also has been closely associated with the Japanese. The more important communities where they were employed were Vancouver, New Westminster, Fraser Mills, Mission City, Woodfibre, Ocean Falls, Port Alice, Alberni, Royston, Fanny Bay and Courtenay. In Ocean Falls, for example, Japanese laborers helped in the clearing of land for the first sawmill in 1906. By 1900 they were in all branches of lumbering; again, this situation evoked the animosity of the white laborers. Every effort was made to drive them out of the industry; operators on provincial lands were threatened with the loss of their licenses if they employed Japanese, and Japanese operators were unable to retain their licenses or get new ones in the period just before World War I.

As in the fishing industry, restrictions were made against the Japanese until the numbers of those engaged in lumbering showed a serious decline. Yet some of the forest workers eventually became fairly large logging operators, and by 1933 there were some fourteen such operators in the province. The others continued to work as wage-earners in Vancouver or in the company towns on the mainland and on Vancouver Island.

By 1941, agriculture came to be the most important occupational endeavour of the Japanese. A great number of the immigrants had originally been farmers in Japan, and once they had accumulated enough capital, they bought or leased small farm lands. Also, they turned to farming because in other industries restrictions and agitations made it difficult to secure a livelihood with any degree of security.

Since they had only limited resources, they were unable to acquire developed farms in well-settled areas. They therefore took up uncleared lands and developed them into fertile farms of high productivity. Pioneering in the bushlands, they built up a thriving industry. Through hard work, irrigation, and perseverance, hundreds of acres of tomatoes, berries, and other vegetables and fruits grew in the Fraser Valley. On the shores of the Okanagan, apples and pears glistened in the sunlight. Lord Aberdeen's Coldstream Ranch in Vernon was the scene in the early 1900's where many Japanese learned the art of fruit farming. In 1927, for example, it was estimated that the total agricultural acreage owned by Japanese in B.C. amounted to almost 10,000 acres valued at \$1,252,063.00. The greater number were engaged in mixed farming or soft fruit growing. Indeed, in berry growing, which was the chief branch of agriculture in which they engaged, they came to assume the dominant position among farmers. A secondary concentration occurred in the greenhouse industry, while individual operators built up important and substantial poultry farms, market gardens and nurseries.

The Japanese were also prominent in two major industries: mining and railroad construction. From the early nineties on, Japanese laborers were brought to work in mines under contract basis, until agitation eliminated further importation, and the number of workers steadily declined. They entered the railroading industry as early as 1899, and in 1907 the CPR contracted to import 1,000 laborers, though only 370 were actually brought because of protests. But just as in mining, the number of workers declined until it became negligible.

The early immigrants had looked for employment in the basic industries, but soon there was a trend towards settling into urban communities where they started modest retail and service establishments, especially in Vancouver. Again, as the majority of Japanese settled in one part of the province, so too in Vancouver, the majority tended to concentrate in three or four districts. "Little Tokyo", the main district, came to be located on the eastern outskirts of the business centre of the city. The principal thoroughfare was Powell Street, between Main and Campbell Streets, where they were located the commercial enterprises and community gathering places. But as more came to be able to afford it, they began a slight exodus into the better residential areas of the city.

In 1931, when the Japanese in Vancouver totalled 8,328, there were 858 trade licenses issued to Japanese; in other words, a license was issued to one out of every ten Japanese, whereas there was only one for every 21 non-Orientals. Consequently, there was talk of restricting the number of such licenses to the Japanese.

Thus the immigrants had started at the very bottom of the Canadian economic ladder -- as section workers on the railroads, domestics in the

homes of the well-to-do, hired hands on farms. But by years of hard work and frugal living, they had acquired a stake in the land, ownership of their own fishing boats and equipment, or a small business in the cities, and a few had risen to positions of prominence and wealth.

3. The Rising Tide of Discrimination

Up to the years before 1941, then, the Japanese Canadians in general had become established economically, and the future held some hope despite the hostility that surrounded them. Immigration, too, had virtually ceased; the numbers still arriving were just a trickle. But life for the Japanese was a continuous struggle for a better standard of living and a higher social status. This naturally involved them in contact with the Occidental population. And their history evolved into a continual struggle to survive against the odds of discrimination.

The contacts of the Japanese with the Occidentals were virtually confined to the occupations in which they worked together. And when competition existed, the result was conflict. This conflict broke out into the open with such incidents as the 1907 riot, flared up after World War I when returning veterans found their jobs occupied by the Japanese, and gradually spread out from the few industries in which it arose. Public sentiment, too, became swayed by the grievances and accusations of the small minority of Occidentals who met and dealt with the Japanese in occupational situations.

Organized labor, in the early years, agitated strenuously against the admission of Japanese immigrants because they enjoyed unrestricted competition in the major industries. But later, labor realized that the solution to the problem was to invite the Japanese to become partners in its fight for higher wages and a shorter working week. They hoped to reduce their advantage in competition by raising the standard of living. The early antagonistic role of organized labor, however, was quickly filled by others, such as the farmers, fishermen and small business men who bore the brunt of competition as the Japanese gradually moved out of the class of laborers and assumed proprietorship, owning their own fishing boats, farms, and small businesses.

Nothing short of wholesale discrimination seemed to be the object of the agitators. The White Canada Association became the most militant of the groups together with such patriotic organizations as the Native Sons of B.C. and Native Sons of Canada. They were among a long line of similar organizations which played a prominent part in the anti-Japanese sentiment in the province. From the early days until after World War II, the province was never without at least one of these zealous groups which agitated against the Japanese. There were, of course, groups which sympathized with the Japanese. These included the financial and industrial leaders of the province who were friendly to the Japanese, mainly because of their commercial interests in the Orient, and a small group of educators and clergymen. The agitators, however, were the more vocal and aggressive group.

In 1902, the Legislature of B.C. passed a measure disenfranchising

British citizens of Asiatic origin in the province of B.C. Those born in Canada and Japanese from Japan alike ceased to have the right to vote in B.C., though they could vote in the other provinces. Even those veterans who served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force in France (197 Japanese enlisted, of whom 54 were killed in action) were not granted permission to vote provincially or federally in B.C. until 1931. And only by a margin of one vote did the provincial legislature allow this exception.

What did this disenfranchisement mean? It meant exclusion from a whole series of activities in the political and economic life of the province. The Japanese Canadians could not become candidates for election to the Legislature, municipal councils, or the school boards; they could not vote in federal or municipal elections. Also, exclusion from the voters' list made them ineligible for certain professions such as pharmacy and law.

The Vancouver Province stated editorially in September, 1940: "Though of an alien race, they are our people. They are Canadians . . . The main trouble in B.C. is that those Canadian-born people are refused the provincial franchise -- which automatically also deprives them of Dominion franchise. Thus they have no votes. If they could vote, they would be treated fairly by politicians; they could protect themselves in a measure. As it is, they are at the mercy of any demagogue who wants to make capital out of prejudice against the Japanese".

Then, too, there were other restrictions against their earning a living. They were excluded by law from employment on timber leases, from obtaining licenses as hand loggers, from employment by a Government contractor. It was a general policy to exclude them from employment in provincial or municipal services or as school teachers. And a large number of Japanese had been eliminated from the fishing industry by reduction in the number of licenses granted to the Japanese. And so it went on. These restrictions presented a kind of legacy to the children of the immigrants born in Canada.

Then there were the occasional outbreaks of physical violence. In the Hallowe'en celebration of 1939, for example, a mob of some 300 Occidental youths invaded the Japanese shopping district on Powell Street, and caused several hundreds of dollars' damage to property. They smashed plate glass windows and looted stores, before a call to police headquarters brought sufficient officers to disperse the mob.

The Japanese, probably more than any other immigrant group in Canada, took full advantage of the educational institutions. They were very eager to give their children an education. Many of the second generation (the Nisei) went on to the more advanced schools; and the percentage of Nisei who entered university was not much below the percentage for the whole province, which was remarkable considering the economic standing of the parents. In the years 1916-1939, 55 Japanese students graduated from the University of British Columbia, entering into many fields. In scholarship, the second generation were considered generally equal, if not superior, to other school children. Then, too, their juvenile delinquency rates were conspicuously lower than those of other groups. Indeed, statistics have shown that the Japanese were among the most law-abiding citizens in the country.

Much criticism had been levied against the presence of Japanese language schools in which reading, writing, dictation and composition were taught for about two hours daily. Critics pointed out that they conflicted with the programme of the public schools, taxed the strength and injured the health of the children. They also resented the existence of the language schools as an indication of the natural loyalty to Japanese culture by adult members. But to the parents, the language school was a means by which they might lessen the distance between themselves and their children. They also felt that ability to read and write Japanese was a necessary adjunct because racial discrimination lessened job opportunities in the open market. As the international situation became more acute, however, the school issue was often used as a means of stirring up suspicion.

Life for the adolescent Nisei was pleasant enough in the schools where they cultivated friendships and won respect, but after high school, it became a succession of closing doors. Bewildering incidents such as segregation in theatres, and exclusion from public places such as the Crystal Pool in Vancouver, were commonplace. But despite the closing wedge of unfriendliness, the Nisei lived to a large extent like their white contemporaries. In music, sports, literature, and amusements, their interests were predominantly Western rather than Japanese.

It was when they began to seek employment that the full brunt of animosity was felt. Discriminatory measures, especially in occupational activities, were levied against them, though they were born in Canada. Educated in the schools of the province, brought up in its churches, denied the right to vote, they were aliens in the land of their birth, citizens without the basic rights of citizenship. Free social intercourse was closed to them because of economic differences which in turn were caused by inequality of vocational opportunities. As the Nisei were so limited in the field of employment, they often found themselves engaged in work with other Japanese, and consequently their personal daily contacts were largely confined to members of their own group. But through perseverance the Nisei hoped to gain acceptance and their rights as citizens. With restrictions barring his path on every hand, either because of popular feeling or because of law, the average Japanese found only a few lines of economic activity open to him. And these lines, practically without exception, were the least lucrative, the least promising, the most despised lines of economic servitude. For the Japanese Canadians, there existed no comfortable and lucrative jobs.

4. The Society

Like any other immigrant group, the Japanese partook of two worlds: the one which he shared with his fellow immigrants because it was a link with their past in Japan, and the other which he had in common with the other groups in the Canadian community. Then, too, there came to be a tremendous difference between the generation born in Canada (the Nisei) and the first generation of immigrants (the Issei), as the former came to be rapidly assimilated in the ways of the larger community.

Japanese Canadian society in the period before World War II was generally determined by the patterns of behaviour brought to Canada from

Japan. Foremost of the ties were those associated with the family as the basic social unit. In brief, it was this: the men were looked upon as the backbone of the family, with the father as the supreme authority; the women were in the position of complete obedience as were the children; and the selection of mates was controlled by the parents. This was the traditional pattern. So naturally there were conflicts as the children born and educated in Canada grew up, and rebelled against this rigid authoritarian system. It differed in almost every respect with the typical Anglo Saxon ideas of the family unit.

The break between the two generations, Issei and Nisei, tended to get wider as the Japanese became more settled. The children went to school, learned English, and acquired Western habits and cultural traits -- different from those their parents knew. Most the Issei felt themselves unable to change or reconcile themselves to the change in the Nisei as the latter grew to become more and more independent. Yet, the second generation, compared with other children in the communities in which they lived, were thought to be models of propriety. Although becoming more assimilated, they still displayed the qualities of perseverance and industriousness which enabled their parents to succeed. In the educational institutions of the province, for example, the Nisei made enviable reputations for themselves.

But the lot of the second generation was not entirely happy. On the other hand, they were criticized by their parents for adopting the habits of the Occidentals -- they were accused of lacking industry and thrift and determination; on the other hand, they were attacked by Occidentals because they retained the physical characteristics of their parents. The lot of the second generation was bewildering. As the products of Japanese culture, the parents remained devoted to the old system; the children, on the other hand, became advocates of the new. This, no doubt would be true of any immigrant group, but in the case of the Japanese, the issues were more pronounced because of the provincial discrimination and restrictions practised against them.

The majority of the immigrants were Buddhists, but the development of an organized Church was slow, particularly because of the antagonism of Occidentals who felt it was another manifestation of Japanese imperialism. The first Buddhist temple was opened in Vancouver in 1905, and a priest brought over from Japan. In 1934, the Buddhist Church in B.C. consisted of five missions and six branches, with a total membership of about 1,500. And though the organization of the Church improved, the hold of Buddhism greatly declined, though nominally it was the largest group with 14,707 being listed as Buddhists.

Christianity, on the other hand, experienced unusual progress in the first four decades since the Japanese first settled. In 1931, there were 7,239 Japanese Christians in the province, almost one-third of the total population, with the United Church of Canada the most popular Christian denomination. One of the reasons for conversion to Christianity was the fact that the Christian Church was the first, and perhaps the only, important institution that aided the Japanese in the early years.

One of the remarkable growths among the communities was the development of organizations; in 1934, there were about 230 units of religious and secular organizations, 84 of them in Vancouver alone. Indeed, the Vancouver community

was in nearly all respects the focal centre of all the communities in the province the centre of activity and influence. These were such groups as the "ken-jin-kai" or prefectural associations, whose membership was made up of immigrants from the same prefecture or province in Japan. Then, too, there were many specialized groups such as trade associations, barbers, rooming house proprietors, gardeners, dry cleaners, etc., as well as educational, cultural, and political groups. One of the most influential was the Canadian Japanese Association, organized in 1897, which aided many immigrants to find positions, learn English maintain a high moral standard, encouraged immigrants to become naturalized, and combatted discrimination. The CJA, which claimed to represent the entire Japanese community, had a pronounced nationalistic basis, having close associations with the Japanese consulate. Its leadership was in the hands of the more wealthy businessmen. The Camp and Mill Workers' Union, which presented a challenge to the CJA's authority and prestige, advocated co-operation with the Occidentals; rather than the separatist tendencies of the CJA. Its leaders represented a bloc of younger Issei, some with a broader education and a white-collar background. It was organized in 1920 for the purpose of promoting trade unionism among Japanese, and attempted to educate immigrants to Western standards and customs. Thus it believed that the future of the Japanese in Canada depended upon co-operation with Occidentals and that prejudice could be overcome by a positive approach. In 1931, it was instrumental in having the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada endorse the request of the Nisei for "equality of treatment and full rights of citizenship". It even published a daily newspaper in Japanese, one of the three vernacular dailies in Vancouver.

In some of the smaller communities, the trade organizations, such as fishermen's associations, served to protect the occupational interests of their members, combat restrictions, and function generally in the interest of the Japanese community, giving financial and moral guidance and leadership. To the suspicious, however, these organizations gave rise to the belief that they were under some kind of central control, that some kind of national genius directed the "peaceful penetration" into Canada of people of Japanese descent.

Up to 1941, the first generation immigrants still dominated the community to a large extent. But for ten years, the ferment of independence had been brewing within the Canadian-born second generation. The challenge to traditional community authority had reached by the time of World War II, the stage of scarcely disguised defiance. The Nisei citizenship movement culminated in the Japanese Canadian Citizens League, organized in spring of 1936, with chapters located in various parts of the province. The JCCL was in essence the institutionalized medium of a political rebellion. It was the first organized stage in the evolution of the second generation who had come to realize their unique status in the national life of Canada. The JCCL made repeated attempts to secure the united support of all Nisei organizations, tried to provide for the social requirements of the second generation, attempted to aid in development of new leaders through the sponsorship of oratorical and essay contests, and held forums to provide open discussion of various problems. They took part in various congresses of youth groups and took every possible opportunity to interpret the aims and aspirations of the Japanese Canadians to the public.

Thus since about 1930, the change in community structure was taking place with the emergence of the second generation as a growing voice in the community. And by the time the evacuation came in 1942, the shift from

the dominance of the old generation to the new was well under way. The second generation began about the mid-thirties to appeal vigorously for the removal of discriminatory restrictions, the right to vote; in short, to be given the rights of Canadian citizenship. In 1936, a delegation appeared in Ottawa before the Special Committee on Elections and Franchise Acts of the House of Commons to request a revision of the legislation which prevented them from voting. This was the beginning of their formal agitation for the franchise.

An important event in this shift was the publication of The New Canadian, which first appeared on November 24, 1938, and was the only newspaper to continue publishing through the wartime period. The newspaper, through the efforts of editor Thomas Shoyama who guided it through most of the trying years, continually agitated for unconditional acceptance in Canadian life for Japanese Canadians and provided an organ for the articulate members of the second generation to voice their opinions not only to their own group but to the Canadian public at large. The Nisei, too, were beginning a period of self-scrutiny: a few were looking to resettlement in the eastern provinces for better economic and social opportunities; others advocated the assumption of pioneering in the whole field of human relationships by meeting the hard facts of life and trying to overcome them.

Life in the Powell Streets of B.C. cannot really be relegated to a set of statistics, nor did it consist of sombre incidents alone. There was laughter, too, though behind it was inescapably the hint of tears; their life was shot through with sunlight and shadow. There were idle, carefree chatter, friendly happy faces, the sound of merry tunes, the echoing noise of ball on bat, the strange mingled smell of burnt toast and sukiyaki. The Powell Streets were much more than streets; they were, as one of their young poets put it, their main streets, dream streets, park avenues, wall streets, and for the second generation they were "the nucleus of a grander scheme", a brave new world to come.

II PEARL HARBOUR AND EVACUATION

1. The Established Notions

Then came December 7, 1941, when the bombs fell at Pearl Harbour and sundered the Canadian and Japanese nations violently apart. The 20,000 Japanese Canadians became helpless victims as tensions and prejudices flared up in the Pacific coast province.

There had been many charges hurled against the Japanese in the years when the prospect of the war spreading to the Pacific area loomed large. So acute was the war agitation that late in 1940 the federal government had undertaken to ease the situation by appointment of a special committee of inquiry. In January, 1941, Prime Minister Mackenzie King tabled the report of the Committee which urged the importance of checking irresponsible attacks upon the Japanese in B.C. as "an integral part of civil security and national defense". It was also announced that a special registration of all persons of Japanese ancestry would be immediately undertaken by the federal police as a key supervisory measure. It is noteworthy that the Prime Minister agreed with the Committee's report: "After careful study of the entire question, it is the opinion of the committee, and in this the government fully shares, that the most serious danger in the B.C. situation is that arising from ill-informed attacks against the loyalty and integrity of the Oriental population."

Before Pearl Harbor, there had long been a fear of invasion of the coast, and there had also been a long established desire to expel the Japanese Canadians from the province forever. Pearl Harbor created the immediate possibility of the first, and gave an opportunity for the second. What followed December 7, 1941, was the complete disruption of the Japanese Canadians from their normal tenor of living: a programme of complete evacuation, resettlement, and an attempt at deportation.

Even before Pearl Harbor, the people of the province had been persuaded to look on the Japanese Canadian residents as a menace. Almost every conceivable device was used to create a mounting impression that all people of Japanese ancestry were sly, sinister, unprincipled, biologically more fertile than the white man, and incapable of loyalty to Canada.

One of the major charges levied against the Japanese was that they were satisfied with a low standard of living and thus were disinclined to become Canadians in the full sense of the word. The agitators looked at the run-down Powell Street settlement of Vancouver and the fishing village of Steveston, and decided that the Japanese were a threat because of a low standard of living. Yet, it was attributable to racial discrimination that the Japanese were forced to remain in such conditions: people were not eager to sell or rent to Japanese Canadians in the better areas, legislation also made it difficult for them to raise their standards of living and occupations. Then, too, many Japanese had improved their homes; the group as a whole was blamed for the more conspicuous poorer ones.

The "inassimilability" of the Japanese was another well-worn theme; it was presented as enough reason to send all Japanese Canadians to Japan. A low standard of living, the existence of Japanese language schools, the self-sufficient communities -- all these, and more, seemed to the agitators to be enough reason. The catch phrase, "peaceful penetration", was also aired, pointing attention to what was thought of as an insidious infiltration into Canada by the Japanese immigrants. In short, the agitators felt that all activities were controlled by the Government of Japan; for example, that Japanese fishing was an attempt to learn and occupy strategic positions for eventual military operations. It was a thoroughly digested notion that the fishermen could not be trusted. Another was that the Japanese government supplied the capital for the establishment of businesses. Agitators could not, nor did want to, distinguish between the people of Japan and the Japanese Canadians. Some extremists had political careers resting in a large degree upon their opposition to the Japanese.

The dawn attack on Pearl Harbor could only precipitate these and other established notions which had been nurtured for such a long time. If there ever was a chance to realize the wish of ridding the province entirely of its Japanese, this was it. Only a small minority of individuals and groups, such as the Vancouver Consultative Council and the CCF Party, which lost many a vote by its stand, tried to understand the situation rationally. An incredible network of organized propaganda by interests willing to use any bludgeon to gain their ends had been in existence, and sprang into action.

One incident demonstrates the tactics used. Long before the war, in 1937, the brother of the Emperor, Prince Chichibu, had visited Vancouver. After his departure The Vancouver Sun received a letter, signed with five Japanese names, protesting that this city had not shown proper respect for the Prince. Needless to say, it roused the anger of the city. A group of Nisei were convinced that the letter was bogus, written only to arouse feeling against the Japanese community. They investigated, found that no Japanese existed with the names on the letter, and reported to the Sun which readily agreed that the letter was a fake. Yet after the wartime agitation began, this letter was dramatically used by apparently reputable interests and reported in the Sun, to show that the Japanese had close and mysterious links with Japan. And those interests knew that the letter was a fabrication. Lacking the franchise, and with the attack led by politically important groups, the Japanese Canadians became victimized in the succession of events that followed.

2. Pressure and Policy

The Japanese, foreign-born and native-born alike, were re-registered on a voluntary basis by the Standing Committee on Orientals in January, 1941, but after Pearl Harbor this was made compulsory. This was the first in a series of official acts which set aside privileges of citizenship. Letters to the editor of British Columbia newspapers urged, increasingly, that all Japanese be removed and held in detention; no effort was made to discriminate between citizen or

non-citizen, loyal or disloyal. Cooler heads suggested that consideration be given to them, but the pressure of ingrained hostility fermented by war-produced emotionalism soon prompted the evacuation.

The advent of war meant more to the Japanese than any other single group in Canada, for they were caught between their feelings of loyalty to Canada and the distrust of the Occidentals who would not let them be Canadians. The New Canadian immediately after Pearl Harbor stated editorially: "There must be now, just as there has been in the past, complete, unswerving loyalty to the country that has given us birth, protection and sustenance ... This tragic conflict will set back, but it must not destroy our hopes and aspirations to walk with honour and with equality as Canadians among all Canadians". In spite of it all, among the people "there is an air of confidence, a continuing belief that they need not despair." But it was not to be.

This "air of confidence" was destroyed in the swift weeks that followed as the Japanese were branded as "enemy aliens". Few British Columbians had reduced the question of defense to a purely rational basis, where they could distinguish between resident immigrant Japanese and those now become enemies. Unemployment faced the Japanese on a large scale, and day-to-day routine became upside down. Rocks were thrown through some grocery store windows, saw mill hands were laid off in Vancouver, arson was attempted at one rooming house on Alexandra Street. A mingled fear and strain settled over Powell Street and all the other communities in the province.

There was little doubt that the Pacific Coast was suffering from the worst attack of war nerves in its history. And the Japanese community, which was attacked so flagrantly even in times of peace, was taking the worst beating since the riots of 1907. Fishing boats were impounded, and later brought down under naval escort from Steveston, Nanaimo, the upper Fraser, the gulf islands, and up coast, to be anchored at the New Westminster breakwater. Eighteen hundred fishermen, their wives, and children were affected. Some vessels were sunk after clumsy collisions in the heavy seas and fog, others allowed to drift up on the beach, and many delicately tuned engines were mishandled so that they were practically ruined.

There were a few weeks of relative calm immediately after Pearl Harbor, but by the end of the year, Members of Parliament from B.C., local Conservative and Liberal Associations, City and District Councils, labour unions, veterans associations, and community service groups, all moved towards demanding the removal of all Japanese "east of the rockies". Alderman Halford Wilson of Vancouver was one of the most vociferous in the crescendo of demands. Thomas Reid, who with other MPs such as Ian Mackenzie, A.W. Neill and Howard Green, were among the most outspoken anti-Japanese political leaders, told the East Burnaby Liberal Association on January 15, 1942: "Take them back to Japan. They do not belong here and there is only one solution to the problem. They cannot be assimilated as Canadians for no matter how long the Japanese remain in Canada they will always be Japanese". In the interior cities such as Vernon, Kamloops and Kelowna, anti-Japanese agitation was also moving quickly in time and tempo with that of the coast. All of these individuals and groups, then, kept up a sustained drive for

eleven weeks, until Mackenzie King's announcement of complete evacuation on February 26, 1942. Spring was an impossible dream for the Japanese Canadians.

Thus the wholesale evacuation was never conceived as a conscious policy from the beginning by the Federal Government; rather it was forced upon the government by pressure from B.C. The initial action of the Government was basically of a precautionary nature. Some forty Japanese nationals allegedly dangerous to the security of the state, were detained on December 8, 1941, under the Defense of Canada regulations, most of whom were cleared and released from custody within a year's time. Under advisement of police, the 59 Japanese language schools and three vernacular newspapers closed down voluntarily to avoid, as the RCMP put it, "misunderstandings or ill-feelings on the part of the whites who might resent the existence of newspapers printed in the language of the enemy".

On January 14, 1942, partial evacuation was announced. A "protected area" was established from which "all enemy aliens" would be excluded. Strict surveillance of all Japanese nationals was to be continued, with prohibitions on use of short-wave radios and cameras. It was proposed that the exclusion of Japanese Canadians from the Armed Forces should be continued. And on February 5, 1942, the Minister of Justice ordered all male enemy aliens of 18 to 45 years to leave the protected coastal area, before April 1. The "protected area" was a narrow 100 mile wide strip bounded on one side by the Pacific Ocean, the other by the Cascade Range, reaching from Alaska and ending at the U.S. border. It contained practically all the Japanese communities in the province. The first contingent of 100 Japanese male nationals left Vancouver to disembark February 24 at Rainbow and Lucerne, B.C., deep in the snows of the Canadian Rockies - the vanguard of some 1,700 male nationals who were to be removed from the coast and placed on federal road projects for the duration.

But this moderate policy was a failure as pressure and impatience over the inaction of the Government increased. Singapore, after all, had fallen on February 15. In quick order, a whole series of repressive measures, unlike anything before in the history of the nation, were authorized. The new orders, in effect, uprooted completely some 20,000 men, women and children, and reduced to nothing the concept and value of Canadian citizenship. On February 26, Orders-in-Council announced that all prohibitions with regard to a number of special articles such as radios and cameras, and automobiles were extended to Canadian citizens of Japanese descent in B.C. as well. RCMP officers were authorized to search without warrant any house or premise and to seize any of the special articles. A curfew regulation was introduced confining everyone to their homes between sunset and sunrise. And finally, every person of Japanese race, citizen and alien, was ordered "to leave the protected area forthwith." These were restrictions amounting in sum to a practical application of martial law.

3. The Removal

The rules of a shattered world crumbled faster and closer around 20,000 bewildered people in the first week of March, as governmental

machinery moved on with its work. By early spring of 1942, the 20,000 Japanese had reached what was probably the lowest status that any group of comparable size had ever experienced. They had been removed from their homes by governmental fiat. They had lost all freedom of movement and practically all opportunities of engaging in private employment and earning anything more than a subsistence livelihood. Jobs of long years' standing had gone, businesses and homes, farms and stores, built up with years of toil were gone. The fruit of struggle and labor, that an aging generation had hoped to enjoy in its old age, was snatched away. The hopes and ambitions of a rising generation of Canadians were dashed to the ground. Family ties, between husband and wife, father and children, brother and sister, were torn apart. The Japanese were a lonely crowd, hemmed in by the masses of indifferent or hostile Canadians, with only a handful of people believing in them.

That there was no evidence, based upon military information or upon the practical results of measure already taken, which justified the removal of the Japanese, was ignored. On March 4, the B.C. Security Commission was created for carrying out the tasks of removal. Punishment of any person contravening or failing to comply with the regulations was set: maximum fine of \$500.00 or a prison term of twelve months. Six months in jail with hard labor was the sentence imposed by a Vancouver magistrate on Sotaro Saki, 66, who was found violating curfew. The Commission, on the basis of the War Measures Act, had been given complete authority to regulate completely the life of all Japanese, regardless of citizenship.

The actual evacuation took nine months, from early February through October of 1942. The first stage for those living outside Vancouver was from their homes to Hastings Park Clearing Station, and the second from the Park to interior B.C. Two buildings used for the annual exhibitions, the Women's Building and the Livestock Building, were leased for four months. Both of these buildings underwent almost complete renovation as civilian workers and soldiers installed wash basins, toilets and baths. And a new experience in communal living began for the evacuees.

At the peak of its population, on September 1st, there were 3,866 in the Park, and though people left for interior points each day since the first evacuees entered the Park on March 16, it was not until September that large numbers were evacuated daily. Also, some families went directly to the sugar beet projects in Alberta or to other employment, and the majority of the Vancouver residents were moved directly to interior points.

There was great confusion and disorder both in the orders and the carrying out of the first stages of evacuation. Some people living in remote places received as little as 24 hours' notice. One resident of Hyde Creek could do nothing with his household and real property because he was given only two hours' notice to vacate. Persons in Cumberland were given a week's notice to move to Hastings Park, and were told that one suitcase and one clothesbag were the only baggage allowed. This situation was repeated in numerous cases; many people departed with only the barest necessities and could make no arrangements for the care of property or household goods because of the precipitate nature of the

A report published by the B.C. Security Commission on April 6, 1942, stated 20,000 would be moved to one of four projects: male nationals chiefly to roadwork in the province; the majority of the second generation to Ontario roads or industry; farming and fishing families to Southern Alberta and Manitoba; thousands of women and children to "ghost towns" in the interior. Evacuation of Canadian-born males of Japanese origin out of the protected area had gotten underway on March 27, 1942, when 133 men left for Schreiber, Ontario. But husbands and fathers were loathe to leave for work elsewhere since they had no definite knowledge as to what would happen to their families.

It was expected at first that 4,000 men would be moved to road camps to work on the miles of new highways that the province needed so badly to join inland areas to the coast. The Japanese would provide cheap labor, and it would be possible to keep them under strict guard. And since many communities and provincial governments indicated that they did not want the Japanese to be moved into their regions, it was thought that sending the males to road camps and the women and children to ghost towns would solve the problem. But cheap rates of pay -- a basic 25 cents an hour rate with deductions of \$22.50 for board, and in the case of a married man, a deduction of \$20.00 for the family, -- meant that a pittance of \$7.50 would remain per month for clothing and incidentals. Insecurity, separation from family, anxiety over the disposition of property at home, harassed the men.

But many of the 26 different road projects which the Security Commission listed were located where there was possibility of sabotage; consequently, the Department of National Defense objected. Also, a number of men objected to going such a long way to places such as Schreiber, Ontario, and thus become separated from families. These difficulties, therefore, made the Commission revise its policy slightly, and make plans for all married men to rejoin their families "before winter" of 1942.

Family groups at this time also moved to sugar beet growing areas of Alberta, Manitoba and Ontario. These agricultural areas took on new importance during the war when sugar became scarce, and such a project allowed the Japanese to be moved in family groups. Thus by June 25, 1942, beet projects had taken 3,879 persons from B.C.'s "protected area".

4. The Ghost Towns

Settling down in the ghost towns of southeastern B.C. in the Kootenay Lake and Slocan Valley areas - Greenwood, Slocan City, New Denver, Kaslo, Roseberry, Sandon, Lemon Creek, - plus the Hope, B.C. centre, and Tashme, was marked by confusion and hardships for the 11,964 evacuees. These towns were former mining towns renovated to receive the influx of evacuees, and, in the case of Tashme, a newly constructed camp. Ghost towns partially solved the problem of the shortage of construction supplies; the movement of evacuees would also stimulate business for local residents. But the houses, whether renovated or newly built units, were mostly congested. Small hotel rooms, about 12 by 14 feet, sometimes housed as many as seven occupants. Most of

the "new" houses were hastily built, tar-papered three-room frame structures. In the early months, some of the men in the Slocan project even lived in tents. A semblance of normal domestic life had to be hewn out of crude surroundings. Families had to adapt themselves to the routine of lamps and candles, water from outside taps, double-decker beds, community baths, and primitive sewage facilities. And it was a long time before electricity, sewage and running water taps were installed in some of the towns.

For most of the evacuees who had lived for years in the temperate coastal climates, the heavy cold and snow of the first winter proved to be a hardship, especially as the houses and the green firewood hardly provided protection against the elements. Congestion also meant that families had to share cooking facilities; as many as fourteen families had to share one large stove in some of the old hotels. Most of these evacuee centres afforded lovely vistas: Slocan City, for example, was nestled beside a lake, sheltered by mountains, and full of houses that were relics of a romantic and flamboyant past. Indeed, a sense of the past made itself felt in these ghost towns with their old hotels and buildings, the exciting days of the mining booms. But the evacuees were more conscious of the delapidation, leaky roofs, rough slivered floors and frozen water pipes.

Yet, because the Canadian government did not wish to cause any international incident -- or any reprisals by the Japanese government on Canadians living in Japan or any of the conquered areas -- by having a Japanese Canadian die from medical neglect, medical care and treatment were adequate in these interior settlements. The Jackson Royal Commission which investigated these towns in March, 1944, stated that they were "reasonably adequate", insofar as they were "temporary means of meeting an emergency". But the Commission also confirmed the indictment of the provincial government in refusing "to take any responsibility for the education" of the children.

Indeed, in the matter of education for the evacuated children, the provincial Department of Education evaded any kind of responsibility. It refused to be liable for any part of the cost of educating them. Thus the federal government had to assume the task, though it was not until December, 1942, that the schools became ready for operation. In the Bay Farm and Lemon Creek centres in the Slocan Valley, they were not ready for 1,200 children until April, 1943. In the self-supporting projects such as Christina Lake, Minto, Bridge River, and East Lillooet, arrangements were made with local school boards as few children were involved. But in the case of the large centres, most of the children lost a year of education before the makeshift schools became ready. Even at that, the Security Commission arranged only for public school education; kindergarten and high school work were carried on by the churches, and correspondence courses in high school work had to be undertaken by the student at his own expense.

Providing sufficient and competent teachers was also a problem. In the settlements, there were only two trained teachers since a teaching career was not possible among the Japanese Canadians before the war. Thus the bulk of the teaching had to be done by volunteers among the ranks of university and high school graduates. But with poor facilities and

environmental conditions, the system was not all that could have been desired. Most of the schools even lacked blackboards, an obvious necessity, as well as an adequate supply of textbooks. In Tashme, for example, the school was a barn divided into rooms by part-way partitions which created difficulties in terms of discipline and acoustics.

5. Nisei Enlistment

It was not until early 1945 that the bars against Nisei enlistment in the Canadian army were lifted after five years of struggle against official discouragement. In the years before the war, the official policy of excluding Japanese from service was rooted in anti-Japanese feeling. After Canada made its historic declaration of war when Hitler let loose his legions upon Poland, a group of Nisei offered their service and pledged their loyalty in a telegram to Ottawa. It was not long before Nisei throughout scattered parts of the province were volunteering only to be rejected.

New agitation was rising, too, about this time as the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis began to assume clearer shape. And when the National Resources Mobilization Act became effective in the latter part of the summer of 1940, the question of service for Japanese Canadians became acute. A number of Nisei received official notices ordering them to report for medical check-up in connection with military service. Medicals were completed, but no calls came. The Vancouver City Council requested the Dominion Government not to call up the Japanese if it meant giving them the Dominion franchise. And in December, 1940, the special elections committee of the B.C. Legislature decided, despite opposition by CCF members, that Canadian-born Orientals, even though they served would not be entitled to vote at the next provincial election.

In January 1941, Prime Minister King stated that in accordance with a recommendation of its investigating commission, it had been decided for the time being that Canadian-born Orientals would not be drafted. This decision was assailed by representatives of 25 Nisei groups, who asked for the same treatment accorded to all Canadians. This exemption had set the Japanese community further apart from the rest of the country.

The Commission's report had declared emphatically that there was no evidence of disloyalty, and it denounced the racist campaign against the Japanese. It stated that hostility towards "the Japanese had been deliberately influenced by certain individuals .. for personal political advantage". But since the situation in B.C. might further be complicated by acts committed outside of Canada, these might provoke action against the Japanese, and if there were Japanese in the armed forces of Canada, these might be in danger of attack by "less responsible elements among their comrades".

But it was plain to the leaders of the Nisei that Japanese Canadians in uniform would be the most powerful factor in influencing public opinion for the good. A suggestion of an all-Nisei unit was turned down. One Nisei even rode the freights to Calgary hoping that anti-Japanese prejudice would not deter him from enlistment east of the Rockies, but to no avail. Pearl Harbor spelled finis to their struggle for enlistment, at least for a while.

But by 1943, the need for linguist personnel in the war against Japan was urgent, and only in Canada was there any large number of personnel who could be trained for the job. And as the focus of war moved closer to the Pacific, the need became more urgent. Thus the Intelligence arm of the Pacific Command urged enlistment of Japanese Canadians who could qualify for overseas service after a short course at S-20, the Japanese Language School in Vancouver. Forms were provided for Nisei in eastern cities; while in B.C., RCMP officers toured the ghost towns in search of men who would be interested in volunteering for special service -- not with the Canadian Army, but with the British Army. Finally, in February, 1945, a number of Nisei were to proceed to London for service with Lord Louis Mountbatten's South East Asia Command. But they were expected to cross the Atlantic in civilian capacity, and to enlist there in the British Army. The Canadian Army still would not accept them.

A sudden change in Canadian policy allowed this first group to be inducted into the Canadian Army. Without benefit of training, they embarked for India, on loan for special duties with the British Imperial Forces. The recruiting of Nisei volunteers began immediately after; by the time V-J Day came, Nisei were entering the service at recruiting depots across the country. About 150 were finally in uniform almost all of them evacuees from the B.C. coast. Some of them aided the Allies in liaison work in the occupation of Japan, and others acted as interpreters and translators in India, Burma, Malaya and other far flung South East Asian areas.

III AFTER THE EVACUATION: THE ISSUES

1. Dispersal and Relocation

In his speech of August 4, 1944, Prime Minister King stated that it was desirable for the Japanese to be dispersed across Canada. Since this could be done by persuading the Japanese in B.C. to take work in the eastern provinces where there had been labor shortages, it was hoped that many of them would take advantage of the Commission's offer to pay rail fare, a small meal allowance, and a resettlement allowance to settle permanently.

Since the men who first went east in 1942 were successful in providing for themselves, the Department of Labor had begun to consider the possibilities of a larger-scale movement eastward. But the resettlement program was never formulated as a policy until after the evacuation was completed. Rather, it emerged out of the relocation program of temporary residence outside the "protected areas", which was all that had been thought possible when evacuation was carried out in 1942. Prior to 1946, however, resettlement did not mean the restoration of any of the pre-war rights of citizenship or the sense of freedom that the evacuee might have had. No resettled Japanese, for example, could acquire or hold land, grow crops in Canada, or buy houses. And some local councils, as in Toronto, refused to issue trade licenses. For those still in B.C., resettlement in the east imposed a difficult problem, especially since in the spring of 1945 all Japanese over 16 years were asked to declare themselves either as "repatriates" who would eventually go to Japan, or if unemployed in B.C. as resettlers willing to go "east of the Rockies".

Ontario and especially Toronto became the focal point of resettlement. At first about 700 were allowed to enter the city as residents and workers. But in the latter part of 1943 Toronto was made a closed city by the Board of Control. To many of the evacuees still in the evacuation camps, then, the east came to be known as an "unfriendly" area due to reports of the restrictions and spasmodic cases of race prejudice that occurred.

The decision to resettle in the east was one that assumed major proportions in the life of the evacuee still in B.C. It involved the taking of risks, breaking up the family unit in most cases, lack of training for new kinds of work, fear of the reported racial discrimination, and the general lethargy resulting from life in the ghost towns. Of the 15,610 Japanese in B.C. at the end of 1944, over 10,000 were living in ghost towns. And for these people, after the traumatic experience of the forced evacuation and the many painful experiences they had undergone, their confidence was low. And the future was uncertain and unclear. Moving once more would involve more insecurity and risks. The average evacuee disliked the crude discomfort and boredom of his interior B.C. abode, but feared and mistrusted the distant horizon more. A kind of dry rot had set in. In the early stages, it was only the more enterprising of the evacuees who did move eastward in an effort to establish themselves independently.

And although life in the interior settlements had many undesirable aspects, it did present a kind of haven from being bundled here and there by the government, and from rejection by Canadian society. Work, too,

was available in interior B.C., and this was another temporary security that tended to hold the Japanese back from re-settlement. In spite of efforts to get people moving in a second eastward evacuation, volunteers were few; the majority preferred to remain where they were. Thus by the summer of 1943 resettlement was going very slowly, and by 1944 it had almost ceased.

Efforts were made by the federal government to enforce re-settlement. Extensive slashes in payroll in all interior towns were made so that no able-bodied men would be employed "except where absolutely necessary". Early in 1943, it was decided that unmarried Canadian citizens, males 18 to 55 years, who were unemployed would be subject to National Selective Service as would any other Canadian citizens. The evacuees reacted unfavourably to this because they had been evacuated on a basis of race rather than citizenship. And groups at New Denver, Kaslo, Lemon Creek, and Slocan sent protests and petitions to Ottawa. At the same time, because of the wartime labor shortage, various lumber concerns in the Kootenay area, and orchard owners in the Okanagan Valley asked that evacuee workers be kept in the area until the end of the war.

But although the compulsory feature of the Selective Service was abandoned, and single males were once more allowed to take jobs in B.C., opposition was still raised against the newer plan of inducement; and often, people suspected of accepting eastern jobs were ostracized by others. Not until the segregation program was put in effect in April, 1945, was there any great change in the increase of the number of resettlers. As a result of that program, about two-thirds of the Japanese in Canada had moved outside B.C. by the end of 1946.

2. The Repatriation Issue

Probably the most important step taken by the government to settle for once and for all the problems of the rootless evacuees was the segregation program. Announced in 1944, it was started in March, 1945. In 1944, the anti-Japanese elements in B.C. had been unhappy with the lack of government pronouncements about the final disposition of the problem. The whole thing seemed to hang in the air. Several of the anti-Japanese MPs expressed their disappointment in the House of Commons, and they pressed for complete deportation of all Japanese, regardless of citizenship as the best and final solution.

On August 4, 1944, Prime Minister King stated that none of the Japanese in Canada, even the non-citizens, had been guilty of any offense against the security of Canada. But, he added, it would be desirable to try to determine the loyal and disloyal, and this latter group would be sent to Japan after the war. Mr. King's statement was an obvious compromise to the extreme demands voiced by the anti-Japanese agitators and the groups such as the CCF Party and the church bodies who wished to see justice and fair play prevail even in the emotional climate of wartime.

In B.C., the 1944 federal election campaign was organized partly around this issue. Led by John Bracken and Howard Green, the Progressive

Conservatives demanded complete expulsion of the Japanese from the province, whereas the CCF campaigned for rights of citizenship, and dispersal. Veteran Affairs Minister Ian Mackenzie headed the demand of the B.C. members of the Liberal Party for complete expulsion. He declared that he would forfeit his political life if the Japanese were allowed to remain in B.C.: "If the Japs are in, I'm out". Also, anti-Japanese groups such as the Richmond Japanese Repatriation League, made up of representatives of fishing and farming industries, took an active part in the campaign for repatriation. Another group, the Union of B.C. Municipalities, composed of representatives of every municipality in the province, resolved that every person of Japanese ancestry should be sent to Japan.

In early Spring of 1945, notices were posted in all interior settlements regarding "application for voluntary repatriation to Japan". Those who wished to remain in Canada were to re-establish themselves east of the Rockies as "best evidence of their intentions to co-operate with the government policy of dispersal. Failure to accept employment east of the Rockies was to be regarded as lack of co-operation with the interior centre. All persons over 16 were asked to appear individually before the officers and state their intention. These first steps were met with what amounted to jubilation by certain groups. Among these were the Federated Growers of B.C. and the Indian organization, the Native Brotherhood of B.C., who now felt that the Japanese could no longer threaten their new-found security in the farming and fishing industries.

Decision for most of the evacuees had little relation to any question of "loyalty" or "disloyalty" to Canada. Rather, it was based largely on personal circumstances and psychological factors fermented by their wartime treatment. There was evident a disbelief in the government and its policy, inspired and developed by experience since the evacuation. And there was the unhappy feeling that no matter where one may go in Canada, pronounced anti-Japanese feeling would manifest itself. Decisions of relatives and friends, family heads and family circumstances were determining factors in many cases. The majority of those who signed for repatriation signed because they were not prepared to accept the alternative of being forced to move east at the earliest possible date. They signed not because they wanted to go back to war-ravaged Japan but because even that seemed less repugnant than the prospect of trying to re-establish themselves in Canada in the face of existing restrictions, discriminations, and hostility. Repatriation meant at least relief from unnecessary anxiety. In effect, then, the Japanese were given the alternatives of deportation to a land the majority of them had never seen, or settlement in a strange and hostile neighborhood, on pain of being judged disloyal.

During the war, few Occidentals were concerned about the citizenship rights of the Japanese Canadians; indeed, as the Japanese attempted to resettle in the eastern provinces, there were few sustained protests against the restrictions that hampered them. The Japanese were largely left to themselves. After V-J Day, September 2, 1945, however, the tide turned, and protests were made in all parts of Canada against the repatriation program which was still in process. The program came to be defined as a threat to civil liberties and rights of citizenship.

Some 6,000 forms had been signed by those who signified their intention

of going to Japan, involving 10,347 persons, the majority of whom were Canadian citizens. In September, 1945, it was announced that plans were under way to transport the first of the 10,000 people to Japan. At that time the government introduced Bill 15 which contained a clause giving the government power over "entry into Canada, exclusion and deportation and revocation of nationality". The purpose of the Bill was to provide the government with transitional powers so that some of its wartime authority could be continued after the war had been declared as legally ended; that is, to provide the government with the legal basis for completion of its program.

During October and November of 1945, the protest movement against this government action by the Japanese Canadian Committee for Democracy and Occidental groups gathered steam in the East. The rights of the Cabinet to issue an order-in-council for the cancellation of citizenship went too far for some Canadians who had awoken to the issues involved in the entire government policy. It was also put forth that the Japanese Canadian had a right to cancel his previous written declaration of intention of going to Japan. The government, after all, was seeking powers to revoke nationality and deport any citizen, loyal or disloyal, with or without consent, without right to appeal.

Of the total of 10,347 involved, 6,844 actually signed requests; the remainder were dependent children under 16 years of age. Those signing included 2,925 Japanese nationals, 1,451 naturalized Canadians, and 2,460 Canadian born. One-third of those facing deportation, therefore, were children born in Canada, and three-quarters of them were Canadian citizens. Prior to the surrender of Japan, some of them had sent in requests to Ottawa for cancellation, and after September 2, the requests had become more numerous. Minister of Labor Humphrey Mitchell announced on November 21 that the government would not permit cancellation of requests by Japanese nationals, but would permit cancellation of requests of the naturalized if made prior to September 2, and review the Canadian-born cases. In short, if one had applied for cancellation before September 2, he was regarded as "loyal" to Canada; if he had signed after September 2, he was "disloyal". The government was therefore preparing to deport a large number of people against their wishes.

As a result of continuing and vociferous opposition from interested portions of the Canadian public, however, the offending clause was omitted. But this, in effect, meant nothing as Prime Minister King simply tabled orders-in-council to do what the clause had intended to do; that is the government had the power to enforce deportation and to revoke nationality. In the debates of December 17, reaction in the House was bitter. Angus MacInnis (CCF Vancouver East) stated that the Japanese "were no more responsible for military aggression of the Japanese Government than any other citizen of Canada", and despite "the way we treated them, despite the fact that we uprooted them from their homes; despite the fact that we denied them the rights enjoyed by every other citizen in the country, regardless of racial origin, not one disloyal act has been committed by any Canadian-born Japanese". He also pointed out that the treatment of the Japanese had "violated every democratic tradition and every Christian principle". MPs Thomas Reid and Howard Green, however, re-stated their anti-Japanese arguments, the latter even suggesting that the evacuees be re-settled in some area in the Pacific Ocean. Thus the future of the Japanese in Canada again became an acute political issue.

The three "repatriation" orders-in-council provided for the deportation of five different classes of people: Japanese nationals who signed requests for repatriation; naturalized persons who signed requests for repatriation and did not revoke them before September 2, 1945; Canadian-born citizens who did not revoke the request before the making of orders for deportation; wives and children under 16 of any to be deported; and Japanese nationals or naturalized persons recommended to be deported. Canadian nationality status was to be removed from these people.

Already in December, it was announced that the first 900 were to be sent to Japan on January, 1946. The Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians, which represented some 40 separate Occidental organizations concerned with safeguarding the rights of loyal persons of Japanese descent, directed its argument towards proving that the orders-in-council were "invalid, illegal, and beyond the powers of governor-in-council". It prepared for legal battle. The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada was not clear cut. A majority of the judges ruled that the orders-in-council were partially valid simply because the government had the power to do practically anything under the War Measures Act -- and the government had rushed them through several months after the war was over, and only a few days before the Act expired. A majority also ruled it was illegal to deport the wives and children of the men being deported. Two of the judges further held that other parts of the scheme were invalid insofar as they applied to Canadian-born and naturalized citizens. This meant that the government could deport any person, but his wife and children would be left on the government's hands. And although the fight was carried to the last court of appeal, the Privy Council in London, this decision was sustained.

Yet, the sustained protest made the government decide upon an almost complete reversal of policy. On January 24, 1947, Prime Minister King announced that the orders-in-council providing for deportation had been repealed. Now, it meant that no one need go to Japan unless he wanted to, or if he was found guilty of disloyalty. Some 3,964 Japanese, however, voluntarily sailed to Japan; that is, only a little more than one-third of those who signed up actually went to Japan.

3. The Property Problem

One of the chief problems arising out of the enforced evacuation was that centering around the property of the evacuees. What was to happen to the boats, farms, machinery, tools, homes, furnishings, and personal possessions which they had to leave behind? That the government did not take adequate steps for the protection and preservation of property can be explained only in the light that the evacuation was a precipitate move, not one initiated on a broad plan nor as a permanent movement. The government provided no facilities for the protection of property while the evacuees remained in the "protected area"; other than the formality of voluntary registration. The first instructions given the Custodian of Alien Property in March, 1942, were to assume management and control of property "as a protective measure only". That the removal had assumed permanent aspects came when the "protection only" was abandoned, and on June 29, 1942, with mass evacuation underway, powers of disposition by "sale, lease, or otherwise" of agricultural land was authorized, and again on January 19, 1943, such powers were extended to all Japanese properties. Thus all Japanese property, real or personal, was

to be sold, although this property, stored with the Custodian, had been entrusted to him by the owners on the belief that he was to exercise protective control only.

Since the evacuees generally assumed that they would be permitted to return to their homes as soon as permitted, they resorted to makeshift arrangements for storing possessions. Some resorted to quick sales or to leaving their goods in community halls or churches. In many cases, only very brief notice to move was given, necessitating hasty action. Possessions could not be taken with them since restrictions were placed on baggage permitted for transport out of the "protected area".

Substantial losses were suffered. Theft and vandalism were common. The minimum amount of baggage, which the evacuees were allowed, consisted only of bare essentials for survival; the accumulated possessions of many years had to be left behind. Many articles were stolen from fishing boats while impounded; automobiles left at designated points were stripped of tools and even inner tubes and tires were replaced by those of poorer quality. Losses, then, included loss from income, loss due to sale price being lower than the appraised price, loss from items lost, stolen, or destroyed. Indeed, the list grew long.

First, fishing boats were disposed of without consent of the owners. Then the Director of Soldier Settlement took over 769 Japanese farms for the purpose of securing good, proved farm lands at a bargain price. This was done at a cost of about \$893,390 in the face of assessment values totalling \$1,250,000. Yasutaro Yamaga of Haney who had been appointed in April, 1943, to the Advisory Committee on Rural Japanese Property, resigned in protest over this action. And as he later inspected the farms in the lower Fraser Valley, it seemed to him that a million-dollar industry, the result of 35 years of slow work, was a thing of the past because of the neglect in the interim. Farm land sales did not proceed with a view to getting the owners a fair price. Sales of this type were unprecedented; there was no recourse to arbitration, nor any appeal to the courts as provided under the War Measures Act in case of expropriation by the Crown. Thus these sales gave opportunity for economic profiteering: it meant newly created business opportunities and unexpected possession of properties and chattels for many. Chattels such as radios and merchandise were auctioned, and under conditions of forced liquidation, the sales resulted in low-bidding and low prices. Boats and gear, real property, businesses and equipment, all suffered a similar fate.

Since the Japanese had gradually and painfully built up their material resources in the years before the evacuation, the liquidation of their assets proved to be a central problem. It was natural that they would protest. Numerous letters were sent to the Custodian in Vancouver, and to departments of government in Ottawa, but these were ineffective. In April, 1943, the Japanese Property Owners Association started to organize, received subscriptions from about 600 people in order to bring three suits against the government, one each for a Japanese national, a naturalized citizen, and a native born citizen. Most felt that they had no chance of a fair hearing, but thought that at least one legal test should be made. Petitions of Right were filed with the Exchequer Court in October, 1943; and the case was scheduled to be heard on May 29, 1944. But it was not until September, 1947, that a decision was made public by Justice J.T. Thorson. He simply announced that the cases were dismissed.

While waiting for this decision, the Japanese Canadian Committee for Democracy after securing 200 claims from former evacuees in the Toronto area, announced on January 24, 1947, that evidence indicated about 75 percent losses. Properties estimated to be worth \$1,400,395.66 had been sold for \$351,334.86. Thus losses incurred totalled \$1,031,732.89. About this time, it was evident that the government had no intention of investigating the whole question of property claims; it refused to recognize that any wide scale injustice had been done, and was prepared to make only minor adjustments. But the newly formed National Japanese Canadian Citizens Association and the Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians pressed for more action. Finally, a claims commission was set up by the government. Some 1,300 claims amounting to over four million dollars were drawn up for the government to review.

But it was not until the Spring of 1950 that Justice Henry Bird of the Property Commission completed the hearings. The Commissioner found that the amounts paid to the Japanese for their land and chattels were substantially less than the fair market price. He recommended payment of an additional \$1,222,929. The greatest undervaluation of real estate had occurred in the Fraser Valley farms; and former owners received additional payments averaging 80 per cent of the original price. In other areas, the additional payments did not rectify the losses incurred. The highest payment was \$69,950 to a central Vancouver Island Lumbering Corporation, and the lowest was \$2.50 for a motor vehicle claim. Although the payments were considered "rough justice", they were, on the whole, inadequate in view of all the factors involved.

IV RETURN AND RE-ESTABLISHMENT

As repatriation ships left Vancouver bound for Japan, and eastward resettlement gained momentum, the ghost towns in interior B.C. began to depopulate rapidly during 1946. Once again they resumed the deserted air they had four years before when the first evacuees stepped bewilderedly on the dusty streets. The Department of Labor set November 15, 1946, as the deadline for closure of the housing projects in the Slocan area and Lemon Creek. Other centres -- Sandon, Greenwood, Kaslo, Tashme and Roseberry - had already been closed. A sad chapter in the story of the Japanese Canadians was drawing to a finish as 1946 waned.

The end of the war did not mean that Japanese Canadians could return to the coastal area from whence they had come, nor did it mean that prejudice was disappearing. Indeed, officials of the Department of Labor, the office of the Custodian, and the RCMP expressed fear that a large movement of Japanese back to their former homeland might stir up the whole anti-Japanese feeling anew. The Vancouver Sun in December, 1946, said, "If they are to live in peace in Canada they must not revive any idea of re-establishment of a Pacific Coast colony . . . We must have ample assurances from the government that Powell Street and Steveston are to remain white". And in February, 1947, the annual convention of the Army, Navy and Airforce Veterans of Canada urged extension of government controls over the movement of Canada's Japanese for ten more years. It said, "The return of this centrally-controlled dual citizenship foreign bloc would operate as an insidious menace to all citizens in this area, particularly to our war veterans now seeking re-establishment in farming, fruit-growing, fishing and small business". Prejudice was dying hard.

On the other hand, the situation led Professor H.F. Angus of U.B.C. to say that the government's exclusion of the Japanese from the coast was "an abuse of constitutional powers. The Japanese have been accused of no crime by any responsible authority, nor have they been wrong-doers like deserters, or reluctant citizens like those who evaded conscription . . . The defense zone is in fact being used to force them to settle down in other parts of Canada -- an operation more like the house-breaking of so many dogs".

But the time did not appear ripe for the return of the Japanese. As Jack Scott, Vancouver Sun columnist, said in January, 1947, "Even today the writer who defends the rights of those citizens of Japanese extraction can count on a flood of vitriolic, hysterical mail".

Yet, in general, it appeared that the end of B.C.'s Japanese "problem" was in sight. Left in B.C. were about 6,750, mostly scattered in the interior. There were about 700 persons, mostly aged persons and invalid, at New Denver; and most of the remainder had been continuously self-supporting since evacuation in 1942. The mass exodus east of B.C. and repatriation had taken the others. The great majority of those who moved east were relatively well established and were spreading out into an unprecedented variety of jobs, businesses and professions.

In April, 1947, the B.C. Legislature passed a new elections bill giving the vote to Canadians of Chinese and East Indian descent, but still barred

Japanese Canadians. Thus B.C. still remained the only province where such a disqualification remained in effect. Harold Winch, CCF leader of the opposition, attacked the bill in his demand that all race discrimination in the law be removed. "The bill shows", he said, "this government agrees with the Fascist idea of making people second class citizens because of their racial origin". The denial of the vote -- an important political disability -- meant that discrimination in economic activities would still be permitted and encouraged. But because the Japanese in B.C. were no longer grouped as competitive economic blocs inviting the attacks of Occidental competitors, the way to the franchise seemed more hopeful.

Labor Minister Mitchell announced on April 23, 1947, that restrictions on travel inside B.C. would still remain. Thus no persons of Japanese descent could enter the coastal area, including World War I and II Veterans, unless they had special permits from the RCMP. All restrictions on movement of Japanese living east of the Rockies, however, were lifted. Two Japanese Canadian veterans, Buck Suzuki and Kingo Matsumoto, at this time were refused licenses to fish in B.C. waters. The reason? The Department of Fisheries stated that an emergency wartime order restraining the issues of licenses was still in effect.

In its Christmas Issue of 1947, however, The New Canadian reported, "Situation Almost Normal -- Six Years After Evacuation". Indeed, at that time, the compulsory deportation threat had been removed, and the evacuation property loss indemnification plan was an indication that the government intended to repay a part of the wartime losses. And a certain sense of security and achievement was created when delegates from B.C. to Quebec gathered at Toronto and organized the National Japanese Canadian Citizens Association to fight through organized effort for equal citizenship rights. The National body was to co-operate with its chapter in B.C. in the fight for enfranchisement and meeting employment problems in the province.

And there were lingering problems. Only a few weeks later, on January 27, 1948, it was announced that 800 Japanese loggers and sawmill workers of interior B.C. were to be placed in unemployment with the lapse of federal wartime regulations permitting the employment of Japanese on crown timber lands. Thus a 35-year-old law was to come back in effect; and a "war of attrition", as the Vancouver branch of the Canadian Civil Liberties Union phrased it, was still being continued, striking at the principal means of support of the Japanese still in B.C. But a storm of protest forced the provincial government to suspend its order, revealing somewhat dramatically the change in B.C.'s public opinion toward the Japanese. The B.C. Japanese Canadian Citizens Association, too, had swung into action, and after gaining support from timber operators, lumber mill owners, Occidental organizations and individuals, representatives met with members of the provincial cabinet, obtaining from this body an assurance that the B.C. Crown Timber Act employment disability would be temporarily suspended.

This suspension was an extraordinary achievement. Before the war the thought of allowing Japanese to work in Crown forests had been intolerable and politically impossible. Thus more progress in solving the problem of race and color was being made during the last few years since the removal from the coast than in the previous half century.

Revocation of all special wartime restrictions still affecting Japanese in B.C. was urged in a brief submitted on March 8, 1948, to Prime Minister King and members of the cabinet by the National JCCA. But the government revealed four days later that federal restrictions which prohibited Japanese from moving freely into the Pacific Coast areas, or going into the fishing industry, would be continued until April 1st, 1949. In April, 1948, two Nisei representatives were busy in Victoria in an attempt to secure action that would lift the ban on Japanese employment on crown timber lands, and to extend the vote to Japanese Canadians. They were George Tanaka, executive secretary of the National JCCA, and Hideo Onotera, president of the B.C. chapter. During his tour of Western Canada, Tanaka reported that the Japanese found themselves happier and better off economically in other provinces in Canada than they were in B.C. "Those who do return to B.C. probably will be very disappointed", he said. This seems to have been the general opinion.

In June, 1948, there was good news, for the House of Commons passed Bill 198 which enfranchised Canadian citizens of Japanese race living anywhere in Canada after March 31, 1949, without any outcries of protest from the B.C. members. But behind this somewhat easy winning of the federal franchise lay many years of heart-breaking toil and campaigning, stretching back 20 years or more. The removal of the franchise bar in the B.C. Elections Act loomed within reach.

The welfare and status of the Japanese in B.C. were improving steadily since the dark winter of 1945-6 when deportation had threatened. However, among the over 14,000 former evacuees now in the east, there seemed little likelihood that any great number would return even when restrictions were lifted. A new world of opportunity had opened to the Nisei in Eastern Canada, far different from the cramped life they had led in B.C. That the tide was swinging away from the fevered anti-Japanese agitation in the coastal area was exemplified when the Vancouver City Council moved to extend the vote to Orientals on January 17, 1949. The motion was passed by unanimous vote despite the fact that onetime foes of the Japanese such as the former Mayor J.D. Cornett and veteran Alderman H.D. Wilson were members of the council. The voices that were still being raised against the lifting of the coastal exclusion were those of people who feared direct competition from the Japanese. Said the Native Brotherhood (Indian) Organization in February, 1949, "We flatly do not want the Japs back in our coastal region". In the Fraser Valley, too, the Maple Ridge Board of Trade reflected the alarm of local farmers who feared the thought of Japanese coming back to the berry-growing industry.

Finally, on March 7, 1949, B.C.'s Japanese Canadians won the franchise as the legislature introduced an amendment to the Provincial Elections Act. This was without doubt one of the most important milestones in the Japanese Canadians' quest for equal citizenship rights. The stigmata of disenfranchisement was at an end. And with it, the "de facto" color bar which automatically shut them out of the more desirable occupations. A whole list of political and economic discriminations was washed away. It was a historic occasion.

Then seven years after the federal government in a series of orders-in-council imposed drastic restrictions on its West Coast Japanese, and

almost four years after the end of the war, these restrictions were allowed to lapse on April 1, 1949. The Japanese could now return to the Coast. It was another day of sweetness and light. But it was a long time coming.

There was only a trickle of Japanese moving back to the Coast, however, and these were a few fishermen and gardeners returning from the interior. When the fishermen did settle back in Steveston and other fishing towns, relations with others in the industry were in general fairly good, though the Skeena Indians still protested vehemently. And the Japanese who now returned to Vancouver experienced only a few instances of discrimination. Most of them were employed in the City's sawmills during that year. But even one year after restrictions were lifted, April 1, 1950, only a few hundred of the original 22,000 had returned to the coast, and by another year, 1951, less than 2,000 had returned.

Thus there was no heavy back-to-the-coast movement by the evacuees. The idea of returning to the Coast appealed to only certain people: most strongly to those in interior B.C. and in Alberta than those who had moved farther east. But even among these people the actual number of persons who decided to return never reached a sizeable figure as to create a second Japanese "problem". At any rate, returning to the Coast was not like "going home".

The 1951 census returns showed 7,169 Japanese in B.C., representing one-third of the total Japanese in Canada. This was a startling change from the census ten years ago when the Japanese in B.C. comprised 95.3 percent of the total in Canada. The 1941 total of 23,149 Japanese in Canada had also decreased ten years later to 21,663. And Vancouver, once home of the largest Japanese community with over 8,000, now only had 873. Thus the effects of the dispersal and resettlement had been widespread.

By 1958, about 8,300 Japanese were estimated to be living in the province. Vancouver's population, still the largest, had grown to 2,500, followed by Steveston's 1,200, and the Okanagan district's 1,000. And it is unlikely that these figures will change greatly since the situation, seventeen years after the evacuation, has definitely regained normalcy. It is also noteworthy that many of the former evacuees who were moved to interior B.C. have settled there permanently. Where there had been only a scattering of Japanese in interior B.C. before the evacuation, this region has become the permanent home for a considerable number. Slocan City, Greenwood, Kamloops, Revelstoke, Nakusp, Lillooet, Kelowna, Vernon, and so on, now can count Japanese Canadians among their residents.

Today, a 1958 survey shows that the lumbering industry attracts the most workers among the Japanese in the province. This is followed by farming, industrial plant work, railroads, gardening, fishing, manual labor, government and clerical work, engineers, teaching and other professions, retail and wholesale businesses, small commercial enterprises. The public field is also open to them; not long after the lifting of restrictions, Dr. Masajiro Miyasaki of Lillooet was elected to a seat on the village council as commissioner. The Japanese are still rather proficient in strawberry growing: in 1942, Kaemon Shikaze of Dewdney was crowned as the Fraser Valley's "Strawberry King". And there have been other achievements since

the return and re-establishment. The Vancouver Japanese Language School, first opened in 1905, was also reopened in September, 1952, with classes open to Occidentals. This time there was no attempt to re-introduce the old, almost compulsory, day school for primary students. And since there was a greater contact with the Orient, especially in relation to import-export business, leaders felt that a more general knowledge of the Japanese language would be beneficial. As an ironic comment on the changed times, one of the chief reasons for re-opening the school was to help enable Japanese Canadians to "bridge the gap between Japan and Canada".