

"Beginning in the spring of 1942
U.S. authorities raised the ? of
the security of the Con Nat
Railways along Japanese camps
were located at a # of pts
To minimize the threat of
sabotage Cda closed certain
of the camps and took add'l
police measures at others!"
P284. Stanley W Dziuban

U.S. Army in WWII: Military
Relations Between the U.S. & Cda
1939-1945.

MG 30 E 101
file 20
U.S. opinion of
Cdn War Effort
file 21 - Report 9/3/42
Apr 1942

Copy No. 2.

March 9th, 1942.

SECRET.

In accordance with an invitation from the President of the United States, I went to his office with Mr. McCarthy, arriving about 12:05 p.m., and after some short talk with his aides, Major General Watson and Admiral McCrea, we were shown into the President's private office at 12:15 p.m. precisely. The conversation continued until 1:05 p.m., when the American Minister to Spain was shown into the room by General Watson and the President, with obvious regret, broke off his conversation with us and said goodbye.

The President opened the conversation by saying that for purposes of the strategical operations of the Allies, the world fell into three general areas, as follows:

1. The Pacific, including New Zealand, Australia, the Dutch Indies, and the Malay States.
2. The Mediterranean Basin, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, India, and the Indian Ocean.
3. The North Atlantic lines of communication, the United Kingdom, and Northwestern Europe.

He said that in the first area - namely, the Pacific - he considered that strategical direction should rest with the United States Government at Washington, in consultation with Australia and New Zealand, and he went on to say that already some hundred thousand or more American soldiers were in process of despatch to reinforce Australia and New Zealand. Of these, it was intended that a full Division would be placed in New Zealand. He spoke of a step-by-step advance from the coasts of California southwesterly through the various archipelagos to secure firm control

of/

of various bases along the route from Honolulu to Australia and New Zealand which could be used eventually for the transfer of bombing aircraft. He pointed out that strength developed in these various archipelagos flanked the main Japanese thrust southwestward from Japan through Thailand, Borneo, and the Malays. He seemed confident that the resources available to the United States were quite adequate for the purpose in view. Discussion turned particularly to the northern approaches to the North American Continent via the line of the Aleutian Islands and Alaska, and reference was made to the weather difficulties and hazards in this area. The President did not seem to think that Japanese penetration along this line could be very effective because of the lack of vital objectives and the great distances they would have to go. However, even if there were no real immediate danger to the United States or to Canada from advance by Japan by way of Alaska, the President said the occupation, or even an attack on the naval base at Dutch Harbor or on other U.S. bases in the Aleutians, would have an immense effect on American public opinion, particularly on the West Coast, which would demand and probably compel the holding there of large forces which should be used elsewhere. I agreed that in all probability there would be a similar result in Canada. He went on to say that one of his purposes in sending United States forces to Australia and New Zealand was to compensate them for the Divisions now in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria, and he hoped that these Governments would recognize the advantage to them both of direct American support and of not wasting the shipping effort which would be involved in the movement of Australian and New Zealand forces in the Middle East

back/

back to their own countries.

As regards the second area, the President indicated that he thought the strategical direction of operations should lie exclusively with the British Government in London. If this were so, the United States would not expect to send appreciable armed forces into this area, but that they would continue to supply aircraft and material on the same scale as presently agreed. He wondered whether strategical direction in this area was not pretty well up to the limit of what would in fact be possible for the British Government, having regard to the reverses which they had suffered and the loss of mobile troops.

Note:

It was subsequently learned that the number of Divisions is to be 4, of which 1 is to be an Armoured Division.

As regards the third area - namely, the North Atlantic lines of communication, the British Isles and Northwestern Europe - he said that three American Divisions with ancillary troops totalling some 110,000 were in process of arrival in Northern Ireland, and he hoped that some of these troops would go to England for experience in the more forward areas. He said that the strategical direction in this area was a matter for the Government of the United States, the Government of the United Kingdom, and the Government of Canada, working in co-operation. At this point, in answer to an enquiry, I briefly outlined the plans which had been made for the formation of a Canadian Army in the United Kingdom comprising two Corps and including three Infantry Divisions, two Armoured Divisions, and two Army Tank Brigades, as well as the required complement of Corps, Army, and L. of C. troops, also the plans for a Canadian Air Force component. I told the President that the purpose of this force was two-fold: first, that/

that in the present period it was desired to contribute as well as we could to the security of the United Kingdom, which we considered to be under-insured, and to the maintenance of our foothold for an eventual attack on the Continent of Europe; secondly, that we never lost sight of the fact that we were part of an important strategical reserve, for which sooner or later there would be an opportunity to employ against Hitler, and even in the meanwhile its very presence in England would continue to tie down German Divisions perhaps of greater total strength. In reference to the attack on Germany from the United Kingdom, the President gave an example from his own personal experience (as a boy at school there when he had had a succession of fights with a boy far larger than himself) which indicated that German morale would fall under repeated attacks and that this failure when it came would be sudden and complete.

In this connection he quoted the views of General Arnold as to what might be accomplished by repeated bombings, particularly if this was directed on a multiplicity of objectives, so that the civilian morale would be affected in every hamlet of over 100 houses. He said General Arnold thought that this widespread harassing bombardment, if continued on the scale which it was now possible to develop, might prove decisive, whereas the present policy of heavy attacks on a limited number of objectives, however important, was not proving to have any great value. He said that General Marshall did not altogether agree with General Arnold, in that he thought attack by ground forces would also be required. I said I agreed with General Marshall, and I indicated my observations that the effect of bombing in Britain had been to paralyze rather than to
destroy/

destroy and that this paralysis passed off very quickly; also, that people soon got used to bombing, and after a time they ignored it and went about their business in the ordinary way. I instanced our experience in 1916 and 1917 with artillery in France, when, with a tremendous volume of fire available, some of the Commanders had thought that artillery could by themselves win battles. This had been found to be a fallacy, and later we had gone back to a recognition of the fact that the advance of the infantry was necessary and that the proper use of fire power was to help them by the most intimate co-operation. I said I thought the same considerations applied to bombing and that we were not within sight by decimal points of sufficient bombers to expect decisions by bombing alone. This meant that we had to plan for the employment of our ground forces on the Continent when the appropriate opportunity would come.

Conversation then turned briefly to Russia, and the President emphasized the pressure which Stalin was exerting in order that another front should be opened against Germany at the earliest possible date. He emphasized the political importance of doing this as soon as possible in order to encourage the Russians and to keep them in the war, for he said that there was always a grave danger that Hitler might make most favourable offers to the Russians for peace, going so far as to say that Germany might return to Russia all lands up to the old frontier. He thought that such an offer might be very tempting to the Russians, in whom he had not too much faith. His repetition of this point several times during the course of the conversation showed the immense importance which he attaches to it.

In/

In particular, he said that military considerations might well have to give way to the imperative broad political considerations.

The President referred to the difficulty of maintaining morale among the Canadian troops when they had been denied action against the enemy for long periods, and I told him that I had no particular anxiety on this score at the moment nor would I have for some months to come. I told him that this was because the force was rapidly growing, there were ample outlets for promotion, that we had been working the men very hard, that we were constantly changing the scene of our activities, that we had paid attention to education, etc., and most importantly that I thought our soldiers were a highly intelligent body of men, who recognized that they were only there for the purpose of making a definite contribution to the defeat of the Axis. They were just as well aware as I was of the wisdom of deferring action until a proper opportunity developed for their use, because what we wished to do was not to fight for the sake of fighting, but to bring the maximum possible continuing effect against the enemy.

The President enquired for our views as to how proposals for the organization of strategical direction would be received in London, and he said that the substance of them would be communicated to Mr. Churchill in a despatch tonight. I said that I thought the people in authority in England were realists, that they recognized that the United Kingdom was now a potential theatre of operations, and I expected that they might well welcome relief from responsibility for the Pacific zone. The President gave no indication as

to/

to whether these proposals had or had not been worked out with Sir John Dill and his associates, or even if they had been communicated to them.

In the earlier part of our conversation, and after I had presented Mr. King's compliments, the President alluded to his satisfaction over the completion of the agreement for the construction of the Alaska Highway, and we had some short discussion in respect to the advantages of the more easterly route which had been selected, pointing out that in general it lay over passes of lower altitude and that it followed the chain of air stations which were now under construction. The President thought that along the route itself other intermediate landing fields might be developed by widening the road, so as to give places for planes in trouble to land. He pointed out also that when road communications were required to places on the coast, it was far easier to do this along the line of the rivers than by roads which paralleled the coast at close distance, because in this case the engineering difficulties of tunnels and bridges were almost insurmountable. Further, he said that he thought the route selected could be constructed in a very much shorter space of time than any other and that this was particularly important at this juncture. The President said that while this road would be closed by bad weather for several months in the year, nevertheless it would be most valuable for the movement of troops and stores required for use in the defence of Alaska.

Towards the close of this discussion, Mr. McCarthy referred briefly to the views which I had been expressing in Canada as to the importance of continued progress in weapon development, and I told the President briefly what had been arranged in reference to our new

Board/

Board of Development, and expressed the hope that this Board might be a suitable means for bringing Canadian industry into co-operation with the United States in these matters.



Four copies, for distribution as follows:

- Copy No. 1, for Mr. McCarthy, to send to the Prime Minister of Canada.
- Copy No. 2, for record at the Canadian Legation.
- Copy No. 3, for Major General Pope, to send by safe hand to C.G.S., Ottawa.
- Copy No. 4, for General Pope's files.

oE/01
July 20

Confidential

U. S. OPINION ON THE CANADIAN WAR EFFORT

IN APRIL, 1942.

Complaint in Canada over the lack of effective Canadian publicity in the United States has recently revived, after a period during which not much was heard on this subject. The reason for its revival is the obvious one - there has been a fresh wave of criticism in the United States of the Canadian part in the war. It is, indeed, apparent that in so far as the ordinary public in the United States pays any attention to the Canadian war effort, their impression of it is uninspiring. The purpose of this memorandum is an attempt to set down the reasons for this sour state of affairs. This unwelcome attitude towards Canada is held not only by ignorant people, but also by many who are well informed, including numerous Canadians resident in the United States.

I. Because of the military reverses experienced by the Allies, we are in an era of disillusionment common to all Allied countries. Inevitably this tends to produce public inter-Allied recrimination, since if one feels that one is doing badly oneself, it is satisfying to claim that one's associates are doing still worse and are responsible for one's own mishaps. In the United States the British Government has been the main target; perhaps some of the criticism of Canada derives from Canadian membership in the British Commonwealth. This search for scapegoats provides a good field for Axis propaganda. There is a good deal of skilful exploitation of it in the United States. It is also welcomed by the former isolationist press, which is turning towards hemispheric imperialism as the new line. The effects on Canada of neo-isolationism of this sort are mentioned later in this memorandum.

The/

The only sure cure is military success. Until the tide of battle begins to turn, many people will be more ready to believe that they have been let down by their Allies than by faults of their own. A piecemeal response can be made to individual slurs of a type open to refutation, but the critics at home, stimulated unconsciously or consciously by the Axis propaganda machine, will find new slurs so long as the public is ready to accept them. Canada is a comparatively unimportant object of this type of criticism, which is currently being directed mainly against Great Britain, but also against the Dutch and other countries.

- II. In the case of Canada, however, the lack of military achievement by the Canadian forces in the field is a special factor. In the last war, after the second Battle of Ypres the valour and competence of the Canadian troops was not seriously open to question; an impression had been implanted which could not readily be removed. Through no fault of Canada there has been no comparable military event in this war; the Canadian record includes no stirring drama on the great scale, such as does the record of the Australian forces. However great the achievements of Canadian airmen, their victories are regarded as individual rather than national successes. It is worth noting that on the civil side the boldest policy adopted in Canada, universal price control, has attracted more notice and received more general praise, than any other Canadian action.

III. On the top of this, the absence of conscription in Canada for overseas service and the reactions in the United States to the controversy on this subject in Canada have undoubtedly had a widespread effect. A malevolent but not uncommon type of criticism may be illustrated from
the/

the following quotation from the TULSA DAILY WORLD of
March 26th:

"If the thought has just passed through our minds once or twice that for a country two years at war she was acting mighty calm about it and not getting out of breath exerting herself we let it pass. And just now, when we had begun to fear Canada was all in, of a sudden she starts a program of what is, for her, one of the world's great spurts to all-out effort.

"What do you think Canada's done?"

"Started drafting men for overseas service?
Huh uh.

"Begun registering boys, older men and women for home defense to release soldiers? Nope.

"Introduced universal conscription of her man power? Wrong again.

"None of these. Canada has gone to the unprecedented effort of proposing to conscript all men BETWEEN 21 AND 30 FOR military training and subsequent HOME DEFENSE DUTIES. Up to now only men between 21 and 24 were eligible. Now this is not a law yet, so don't get your hopes up. Prime Minister Mackenzie King has proposed it to the Canadian House of Commons, who may not like it.

"Dear Canada, we have loved you so long and well. But what did you do in the Great War, daddy?"

Here we encounter one of the few subjects on which there is a definite cleavage of public opinion between Canada and the United States. There is no disposition in the United States to praise the virtues of the voluntary system; since the imposition of universal conscription as soon as the United States entered the Great War the people of the United States have been convinced that this was the only fair and democratic means of raising an army in wartime. To refute such caustic comments the repetition of figures showing the volume of voluntary enlistment in Canada has little effect. One response is that if so much can be done by voluntary enlistment, how much more could be accomplished by universal compulsory service. The translation of the figures of the Canadian war/
war/

war effort into terms of a comparable effort on the part of the United States, which once was a useful device, is now at times proving an irritant and meeting with replies such as: "After all, you have been at war over two and a half years and we have been fighting only four months."

IV. Another factor affecting Canada is that no Canadian has attained a wide reputation in the United States as a war-time leader. This is, of course, mainly because the Canadian Army has not been in action. Thus the picture of Canada at war is not personified in any individual or group of individuals with widely known reputations. There is an almost pathetic American demand for heroes to worship, but we have done little to feed the insatiable appetite of the public for human interest stories.

V. There are more subtle reasons for the low appraisal in the United States of Canadian achievements. There is still a great deal of misunderstanding of the status of a Dominion within the British Commonwealth. (I should like to see the phrase formally abolished, so that the collective description would become "Member States of the British Commonwealth" or some such form of words.) The current controversy over the position of India, which has attracted great interest in the United States, tends to deepen the misunderstanding, since it implies a distinction between Dominion status and complete autonomy for India. The outspoken and at times impetuous declarations of the Prime Minister of Australia in recent weeks have perhaps done something to remove the conception that the Dominions are still controlled in the final analysis from London. The absence of vigorous assertion of leadership from Canada in external war policy has seemed, however, to put Australia in a special class among the Dominions.

VI. The/

VI. The effect on the estimation of Canada of the hemispheric conceptions of policy which have been so widely spread abroad in the United States must also not be underestimated. The neo-isolationists seem to be moving into a position in which they envisage a world split in twain, with the United States dominating the two Americas and isolated from the other great land masses. For protection, according to this concept, the United States must control the approaches to her territory. For them the position of Canada is altered from a good neighbour with a lauded undefended frontier to a menace to American security whose territory must be protected by the United States in her own interest. Some of the former isolationists now seem to look on Canada almost as an undeclared colony of the United States. The logic of this imperialism is that, if Canada will not freely let her destinies be controlled from Washington, she must be made to do so; failure to meet any demands from the United States becomes a sort of rebellion. These views are now held only by a small minority, but should the war not end in complete victory, they might well become the opinions of a majority.

* * * * *

There are evidently many contradictory strains which go to compose the depreciatory attitude of mind towards Canada. However confused and unsound their reasoning may be, to many people in the United States Canada appears to be timid, tired, and dependent, instead of bold, vigorous, and free. The Canadian war effort is underestimated mainly because it has been unspectacular and because of the difference between the national policies with respect to conscription.

Some of the achievements of which Canadians
have/

have every right to be proud no longer impress the people of the United States, because they are now themselves making the same sort of effort and because they are alarmed over the course of events and critical of their own achievements. Canadian financial sacrifices look small in comparison with the vast appropriations which have been voted by Congress. Tax legislation now under consideration will impose a comparable fiscal burden on the people of the United States. In the military field, the great air training schemes of the United States Army and Navy distract attention away from the Joint Air Training Plan. The despatch of American forces to the United Kingdom and Australia reduces interest in the Canadian Army in England. The rapid mobilization of industry for war eclipses the achievements of Canada as a producer of munitions for the United Nations. It is less easy now than it was before Pearl Harbor to secure attention in the United States for the accomplishments of Canada as a belligerent country.

The general position is that not much is now being said about Canada in the United States, but a proportion of what is being said is derogatory. It is not a very high proportion, but, with the military situation what it is, it is more readily believed than before. Placing the facts of the Canadian war effort more fully before the American public will not do much to improve matters. What is required is dramatic achievements. The most competent and comprehensive machinery of publicity would not do a great deal to set the position right.

Undoubtedly, however, our publicity machinery can and should be strengthened. The Canadian record in the war is much more impressive than the common American appreciation of it. More can probably be done by improving the quality and presentation of Canadian news than by increasing the

volume/

volume and distribution of material of a factual nature for the use of the press and radio in the United States. If the censorship will permit, more might be said of the work overseas of the R.C.A.F. R.C.A.F. bomber and fighter squadrons are participating daily in the air operations against the European continent; yet the press reports of the recent large-scale raids often give the impression that the R.A.F. alone has been involved.

It has been suggested that a closer relationship should be established with the United States organizations, particularly the Office of Facts and Figures, which are concerned with public information in the United States. I find it difficult to make specific proposals in this respect, particularly since the United States set-up is now in process of being re-arranged. The publicity arrangements in Washington are very complicated and lack central direction. The Co-ordinator of Information (Donovan) is concerned with propaganda in Europe, the Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs (Rockefeller) with propaganda in Latin America, and the Office of Facts and Figures (MacLeish) with the home front. Every Department and agency, however, has its own public relations officers, and the Office of Government Reports (Mellett) also includes a large Bureau of Information for domestic purposes. The task of press and radio censorship under the Director of Censorship (Price) is completely separated from the emission of news. It looks as though a considerable simplification would shortly take place, and until more is known about what will be done it would be premature to make recommendations for improving Canadian contacts by attaching Canadians to the United States organizations or by other means.

The work of keeping in touch with the official
publicity/

publicity agencies is more than can be accomplished by a single Press Attaché at the Legation, who can only give a small part of his time to it. Whether or not other officers concerned with public information are stationed in the United States, the Press Attaché's office should be reinforced and the work therein divided. There ought also to be greater cohesion between the authorities in Ottawa concerned with public information and the Canadian Legation here. The Legation receives very little information about the activities and plans in the United States of the Bureau of Public Information. Finally, there ought to be a prompt and fairly comprehensive method of collecting and analyzing comments in the press and radio concerning Canada. This could be done by setting up in the United States a Canadian office for this purpose, or by providing the Legation with the necessary staff to undertake the work, or by reaching an arrangement with the British Press Service whereby they would prepare frequent special reports and furnish clippings respecting Canada. The British Press Service already has a staff engaged effectively in work of this nature; if we wish to use their services, we should have to make a contribution towards the cost.

Int. Bureau

April 7th, 1942.