

SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON JAPANESE CANADIANS

VOLUME TWO

If you want copies of these documents please contact:

Ann Sunahara

SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON JAPANESE CANADIANS

VOLUME TWO

If you want copies of these documents please contact:

Ann Sunahara

JANUARY CONF

The Decision to Uproot Japanese Canadians

The January Conference

Conference on Japanese Problems, **Minutes**, p. 6, Dept. of External Affairs File
773-B-40C, E.A.A.

Conference on the Japanese Problem in B.C., **Report**, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG2711B5,
Vol. 32, file x-81, P.A.C.

This Conference, held in Ottawa on January 8 and 9, 1942, was attended by representatives of the military, police, civil service, the Standing Committee on Orientals which included two very anti-Asian politicians, the Provincial Secretary of British Columbia and four Cabinet Ministers included Ian Mackenzie who chaired it. These Minutes were prepared by the Department of External Affairs and are a better reflection of what occurred than the official report submitted by Ian Mackenzie.

January 10, 1942.

CONFERENCE ON THE
JAPANESE PROBLEM IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

January 8 - 9, 1942, Ottawa.

MINUTES

I. The meetings took place in Room 123 of the East Block of the Parliament Buildings, Ottawa. Three meetings were held: the first meeting from 2.30 p.m. to 6 p.m. on January 8; the second from 9.30 a.m. to 12 noon on January 9; the third from 3 p.m. to 4.15 p.m. on January 9.

II. The following participated in the Conference:

* The Honourable Ian Mackenzie,
Minister of Pensions and National Health. CHAIRMAN

The Honourable J. E. Michaud,
Minister of Fisheries.

* The Honourable G. S. Pearson,
Minister of Labour, and
Provincial Secretary of British Columbia.

Standing Committee on Orientals in British Columbia

* F. J. Hume, - Chairman, and Mayor of New Westminster, B. C.

* H. F. Angus, - Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.

* F. J. Mead, - Member of Special Committee on Orientals in British Columbia (1940); and Assistant Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

* Lieut.-Col. Macgregor Macintosh,

* Lieut.-Col. A. W. Sparling, - Chairman, Special Committee (1940).

* Sergeant J. K. Barnes, - R.C.M.P. Secretary.

* N. A. Robertson, (first meeting only) Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.

J. E. Read, - Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs.

- * H. L. Keenleyside,
 - Chairman, Board of Review (1938).
 - Member, Special Committee (1940)
 - Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.

- Escott Reid
 - Department of External Affairs.

- Major-General L. R. LaFleche (second meeting only)
 - Associate Deputy Minister of National War Services.
- * Brigadier S. T. Wood, (first meeting only)
 - Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
- * T.W.S. Parsons,
 - Commissioner, British Columbia Provincial Police.

- * Commodore H.E. Reid,
 - Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff.

- * Commander J. McCullough,
 - Officer in Charge of Auxiliary Vessels, Pacific Coast.

- * Paymaster Lieut.-Commander R. Pennington, (first meeting only)
 - Secretary of the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff.

- * Commander E. Johnstone
 - Assistant Director of Naval Personnel.

- * Major-General Maurice Pope
 - Vice-Chief of the General Staff.

- Lieut.-Col. J. E. Lyon,
 - Acting Director of Military Operations and Intelligence.

- * A. J. Whitmore,
 - Director Western Fisheries, Department of Fisheries.

- * W. J. Couper,
 - Department of Labour.

- R. W. Baldwin,
 - Office of the Press Censor.

- * Present or past resident of British Columbia.

III. Introductory Statements.

1. At the first meeting the Chairman made an opening statement on the purpose of the Conference. He said that the Government had received numerous representations concerning the problem of persons of Japanese racial origin in British Columbia. One particularly important question was whether fishing licences should be issued to persons of Japanese racial origin. The chief purpose of the meeting was to allay apprehension in British Columbia. This must, however, be done in such a way as to minimize the possibility of retaliation by the Japanese against Canadian prisoners of war and against the coast of British Columbia. The Chairman paid a tribute to the work done by the various committees appointed in the past few years and to the work of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

2. Mr. Angus outlined in the sense of Section 1B of the Agenda the peculiar position of the Japanese population in Canada which is unlike that of the German and Italian population in several ways.

3. Mr. Keenleyside summarized the steps which had been taken by the Federal Government in recent years to deal with the problem. He went back to the riots in Vancouver in 1907, the subsequent establishment of the Japanese immigration quota which was gradually reduced until by 1930 it was limited to 150 persons of special categories. He pointed out that in recent years the quota had been ~~more than~~ filled so that the problem, even before the outbreak of war with Japan, was not one of immigration but of working out satisfactory relations between the permanent Japanese residents of Canada and other residents of Canada. This had become more difficult ever since 1931 because of the constantly widening area of Japanese aggression. An Interdepartmental Committee under Dr. Skelton had been constituted in 1937 and in the following year a Board of Review had been set up to investigate illegal entries. The Board had found that there were a very large number of illegal entrants in the early 20's, but that by 1933 very few illegal entrants remained in British Columbia, and that since then entry had been carefully controlled. Public opinion, however, in British Columbia remained disturbed, especially after Japan entered into an alliance with Germany and Italy in September, 1940. A Special Committee was therefore appointed on October 1 of that year. Mr. Keenleyside drew attention to its report which had been published in December, 1940, and especially to the summary and the recommendations. The recommendations had been approved of by the Canadian Government and had largely been the basis of the Government's actions since. Under recommendation 7 a registration had been made and under recommendation 8 a small Standing Committee had been set up in British Columbia under Mayor Hume to supervise the carrying out of those recommendations of the Committee which were adopted by the Government.

4. Mr. Keenleyside outlined in the sense of Part 3 of the Agenda the basic principles on which Canadian policy has been and should be based. He drew particular attention to the fourth principle, "the coordination of Canadian and United States policies". He said that the Permanent Joint Board on Defence had recommended that the two governments should do their utmost to synchronize their policies since their problems were almost identical. He referred also to the statement made by the Prime Minister in his broadcast speech made on the day following the outbreak of war with Japan. A somewhat similar statement had been made by President Roosevelt in which the President had appealed to employers not to discriminate against aliens and foreign born citizens. He also referred to a statement by the Attorney General of the United States on the necessity of showing tolerance to enemy aliens resident in the United States. On the whole the actions taken against persons of Japanese origin, even in Hawaii, had been less rigorous than those taken by Canada.

5. Mayor Hume then reported on the activities of the Standing Committee which had been appointed almost exactly a year ago. He said that the Japanese had been re-registered and that while re-registration was being made a considerable number had left Canada. When war broke out with Japan the Committee recommended:

1. That Japanese newspapers be closed down. As a result of this recommendation the Royal Canadian Mounted Police suggested to the Japanese that this be done and the Japanese agreed.
2. That Japanese language schools be closed. *This was also done by agreement.*
3. That the Royal Canadian Mounted Police pick up disloyal Japanese.
4. That the Japanese fishing fleet be laid up.

The three last recommendations had been made effective. Mayor Hume concluded by saying that the public in British Columbia was demanding that the Japanese be removed from the coastal area.

6. Assistant Commissioner F. J. Mead of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police made a report on the existing situation. He said that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police had received excellent cooperation from the leaders of the Japanese population. These leaders had cooperated in the registration and since the outbreak of the war with Japan had pointed out to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Japanese who should be interned as dangerous. As evidence of the excellent attitude of the Japanese population he read three paragraphs from an operative's report of a secret

meeting of Japanese fishermen in Vancouver which had taken place recently. The fishermen at the meeting had stated that they realized that the seizure of the Japanese fishing fleet was inevitable under war conditions. Since the outbreak of the war it had been necessary to intern only one Japanese because of disloyal remarks.

IV. Discussion on general principles set out in Item 3 of the Agenda and discussions of the application of those general principles to specific problems as outlined in the Agenda.

A full and frank discussion took place at all three meetings of the Conference. The result of these discussions is embodied in the report of the Conference. In addition to the matters mentioned in the report the following matters of special interest were brought up in the discussion:

1. Commissioner Wood and Assistant Commissioner Mead of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police reported that they had recently been in touch with Mr. Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who reported that the F.B.I. had received no evidence of disloyalty by the Japanese in the United States, Hawaii or the Philippines; espionage had been committed only by persons attached to the Consulates; there was in the United States no important demand that Japanese residents should be moved from the coast.
2. Mr. Whitmore of the Department of Fisheries stated that if fishing licences were refused to the Japanese he did not expect that there would be an influx of many new fishermen, though a few more Indians would probably take out fishing licences. The explanation of this was that in the past the fisheries had been over-staffed. If not enough fish were being caught the Department could take steps to remedy the situation, as, for example, by reducing the weekly closed period or by permitting the use of a different type of fishing gear. He warned, however, that there would be a temporary local shortage of certain types of fish.
3. Mayor Hume reported that the Fishermen's Union had stated to him that they would guarantee that they could get the required amount of fish even if the Japanese were not issued licences and that the canneries had informed him that they could manage without Japanese in the canneries. The canners had also said that they would be willing to buy up the Japanese rights in the fishing boats. The Conference, however, agreed that it would be undesirable to permit the canneries to monopolize ownership of the fishing boats.

4. It was clear from reports by members of the Conference who had recently come from British Columbia that a serious unemployment situation was being created in British Columbia among the population of Japanese origin. It was not merely a question of unemployed fishermen but persons of Japanese origin in British Columbia were also being dismissed from lumbering, gardening, and domestic service.
5. The members of the Conference who had just arrived from British Columbia found it difficult to accept the assurances of the representatives of the Armed Services and of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that the measures which had already been taken in British Columbia or which were recommended by a majority of the members of the Conference would be sufficient to meet the requirements of national defence and security. Most of them stated that they did not trust persons of Japanese racial origin and that they considered the continued presence of these persons in British Columbia a menace to public safety. They emphasized particularly their fear that virtually all of these residents would commit positive acts of disloyalty if Japan should land forces in British Columbia. Even, however, if the assurances of the Armed Forces and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police were accepted a serious situation would still continue to exist in British Columbia since it would be impossible to persuade the majority of the people of British Columbia that the Japanese residents did not constitute a menace. The people of British Columbia were definitely alarmed by the Japanese menace. There is grave danger that anti-Japanese riots may break out and that it will be necessary to call out the troops to defend Japanese residents from attack by other Canadians. The Assistant Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Commissioner of the British Columbia Provincial Police agreed that there was a distinct possibility of anti-Japanese riots in Vancouver and General Pope stated that General Alexander had reported to Defence Headquarters that public security in British Columbia may be endangered by the feeling of the white population against the Japanese.
6. Mr. Couper of the Department of Labour and other members of the Conference from Ottawa emphasized that if Canada was to make the utmost possible contribution to victory in the war it was necessary to make the most effective use of the abilities of all residents of Canada including persons of Japanese racial origin. They based their contention on the impending labour shortage in Canada and argued that racial discrimination was not only unjust but inefficient and thus affected detrimentally Canada's war effort. The members of the Conference from British Columbia found it difficult to believe that there was an impending labour shortage in Canada

since they stated there was considerable unemployment existing at the present time in British Columbia.

7. This difference of opinion over the urgency of the manpower problem in Canada was in part the reason for the difference of opinion between members of the Conference over whether it would be useful and desirable to impress on employers and labour alike throughout Canada the importance, from the point of view of the national war effort, of not discharging or refusing to hire or refusing to work with persons of Japanese origin. Members from British Columbia stated that the public in British Columbia was so convinced that the Japanese were untrustworthy and constituted a menace that white workmen would refuse to work with workmen of Japanese racial origin in spite of any appeal which the Government might make.
8. The possibility of Japan using Canadian treatment of Japanese as an excuse for retaliation against Canadians and other allied nationals under Japanese control was discussed at some length. Mr. J. E. Read, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, pointed out that Japan was not bound by the Hague Convention and that Canadian prisoners of war in Japan did not, therefore, have the protection of that Convention. Apart, however, from the Convention, the experience of the war hitherto was that both sides gave to prisoners of the other, treatment which was pretty well equivalent to the treatment which their own nationals were being given. If Japan believed that Canada was mistreating Japanese nationals it would probably retaliate, not only against Canadians but against other British subjects and nationals of others of the United Nations. Mr. Keenleyside pointed out that the Commonwealth Governments had tried to follow a common policy of treatment of enemy nationals and that should the Canadian Government decide in favour of a policy of wholesale internment of Japanese nationals the Government, before taking such action, would probably consult with the Government of the United Kingdom. He felt that it was likely that the Government of the United Kingdom would urge Canada not to take such action. Japanese nationals in Canada constituted the largest group of Japanese nationals in the British Commonwealth and it was in the interests of the whole Commonwealth that Japanese nationals in Canada should be made use of to the greatest possible extent in order to secure good treatment for British nationals who fall into Japanese hands.
9. At the request of Mr. R. W. Baldwin of the Office of the Press Censor it was agreed that a Standing Subcommittee of the Conference should be established with which Press Censorship could consult. ~~This~~ This Committee would consist of Mr. Angus and of a member nominated by the Defence Departments.

10. The members of the Conference agreed that no publicity should be given to the proceedings or recommendations of the Conference until the Government had dealt with the Conference's recommendations. Mr. Ian Mackenzie stated that he would arrange that they should be dealt with by Cabinet on Monday or Tuesday, January 12 or 13.
11. During the course of the discussions telegrams and letters were read to the Conference from various associations and individuals in British Columbia. Some of these communications were addressed to the Prime Minister, others to individual members of the Conference.
12. While the proposal to remove all persons of Japanese racial origin from the Pacific coast was dropped by general agreement, the British Columbia representatives demanded that able bodied adult male Japanese nationals should be removed. They appeared to be willing to make an exception for those whose applications for naturalization under section 8 of the Naturalization Act were outstanding. In making this demand they emphasized that in their opinion it was the minimum necessary to satisfy the people of British Columbia and prevent riots and it was pointed out that the assurances of the Armed Forces and of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police did not extend to denying the dangers of anti-Japanese rioting.
13. At the conclusion of the Conference, when it was clear that the Conference could not agree unanimously on measures which should be taken to control Japanese nationals in British Columbia, Mr. Pearson, as representative of the Government of British Columbia, stated that he wished to make it clear that if the Government of Canada ignores the views of the representatives of British Columbia they could not expect the Government of British Columbia to be enthusiastic or very effective in trying to "sell" the ideas supported by the Dominion Government to the people of British Columbia. In that event it would be necessary for the Government of Canada to try to sell their ideas to the people of British Columbia. The Government of Canada, however, could be assured that whatever decision it made, the Government of British Columbia would do their best to see that things go along peacefully in British Columbia.
14. At the conclusion of the meeting the Chairman, the Honourable Ian Mackenzie, thanked all the members of the Conference for their participation in its discussions. He thanked especially members of the Conference who had come all the way from British Columbia to attend. In reply Mayor Hume expressed the thanks of the British Columbia members to the other members of the Conference, especially to the Chairman and to Mr. Keenleyside and Mr. Angus.

I

The Conference endorses the following principles which underlie Canadian policy in relation to the Japanese problem and by which, in its opinion, all proposals in relation to this matter should be judged:-

- A - National defence and victory are the first and overriding considerations. ✓

- B - In so far as it may be compatible with the requirements of national defence, Canadians of Japanese racial origin and Japanese nationals resident in Canada shall be treated with justice and consideration. ✓

- C - Every feasible step shall be taken to encourage the maintenance of a calm and reasonable attitude among Canadian citizens generally, and it shall again be made known that the full force of the law will be invoked to prevent anti-Japanese demonstrations and to protect Canadian residents of Japanese race. ✓

- D - No action shall be taken or allowed which would give any possible excuse to the Japanese Government for mistreating Canadians under Japanese control, or which would help the Japanese in their ✓

present efforts to arouse Asiatic
hostility against the white race.

- E - The Canadian and United States
authorities should continue to coordinate
their policies in relation to persons of
Japanese racial origin within their
respective jurisdictions.

II

In accordance with the foregoing principles the Conference recommends that, during the period of the war, for reasons of national defence and security, the Canadian Government should take the following steps:-

- A - Prohibit all persons of Japanese racial origin from fishing or serving on fishing vessels or other vessels operated by Japanese off the coast of British Columbia. ✓
- B - Strictly control the sale of gasoline and of blasting powder to persons of Japanese racial origin, under conditions to be prescribed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. ✓
- C - Prohibit the possession or use by Japanese nationals of short-wave radio receiving sets, radio transmitters and cameras. ✓
- D - Continue intensive surveillance of Japanese nationals. ✓

JK
/ K

P.M.
MacKenzie
Kings
Comments

III

The Conference recommends that, for the furtherance of the Canadian war effort, the Canadian Government should take the following steps:-

A - Accept at once the offers of various groups of Canadians of Japanese race to perform wartime service for Canada.

OK

B - Organize for the foregoing purpose a Civilian Corps of Canadian Japanese to be used on projects of value to the national cause, and take such other action as will make most effective use of the abilities of Canadian residents of Japanese race.

OK

C - Encourage the enlistment in the Canadian Armed Forces, for service outside British Columbia, of Canadian nationals of Japanese racial origin; and call up under the terms of the National Resources Mobilization Act, for service outside British Columbia, all Canadian nationals of Japanese racial origin properly subject to the provisions of the said Act.

?
No
↑

P.M. Mackenzie
King's
Comments

D - Arrange through the immediate establishment of a special office in British Columbia for the sale, lease, requisition or charter, on equitable terms and to suitable persons, of fishing or other vessels and fishing equipment heretofore used or owned by Canadians of Japanese racial origin, and now immobilized on the Pacific Coast. ✓

OK

E - Emphasize to the white fishermen and canners on the Pacific Coast that they must accept responsibility for seeing that the removal of the Japanese fishermen does not reduce the total of fish caught or increase the prices at which the catch is made available to Canada, the United Kingdom and the Allied nations. ✓

OK
if possible

IV

The Conference considered a proposal that all Japanese nationals (or at least all males between 18 and 45) now resident in Canadian territory on or near the Coast of British Columbia, be compulsorily removed to areas lying east of the Rocky mountains. The majority of the Conference did not accept this proposal, for the following reasons:-

- OK
- A - The representatives of the Department of National Defence, National Defence for Naval Services, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police assured the Conference that the requirements of national defence and security can be met by the measures already taken or recommended, and do not warrant such action.
 - B - The acceptance of this proposal would be a contradiction of Canadian and Allied professions of justice and humanity.
 - C - Officers of the Department of External Affairs informed the Conference that in their opinion action of the kind proposed would almost certainly result in cruel retaliation by the Japanese authorities

*P.M. King's
Comments*

against Canadians now in their power; and further that such action at this stage would result in the dissipation of the strongest guarantee now possessed by Canada, and the remainder of the British Commonwealth, of continued good treatment for Canadian nationals and British subjects who have or may come under Japanese control.

- D - Acceptance of this proposal would result in the Canadian Government following a policy wholly at variance with that being followed by the United States Government under similar or more difficult circumstances in the western States and Hawaii.

In spite of the assurances mentioned in A above, the Honourable G. S. Pearson, Minister of Labour, and Provincial Secretary of British Columbia; His Worship Mayor F. J. Hume, of New Westminster, B.C., Chairman of the Special Committee on Orientals in British Columbia; Lieut.-Colonel Macgregor Macintosh, and Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Sparling, Members of the Standing Committee on Orientals in British Columbia; and Mr. T.W.S. Parsons, Commissioner of the British Columbia Provincial Police, all of whom had come from British Columbia to Ottawa for this Conference, realizing that there will be difficulty in satisfying the residents of British

8.

Columbia that there is no need to fear subversive activities on the part of Japanese nationals in British Columbia, agreed on the following recommendations:-

1. That arrangements be made by the Canadian Government for the removal of able-bodied adult male Japanese nationals from the coastal area of British Columbia, and that employment of a suitable character be provided for them under conditions which may be considered reasonable under the circumstances; in areas and under conditions which will assure their removal from any suspicion of possibility of subversive activities.
2. That where the circumstances reasonably permit, women and children be allowed to accompany the head of the family.

OK

OK

↑
P. M. King's
Comments

V

Finally the Conference, recognizing the great anxieties imposed on the people of British Columbia as a result of the dangers created by war with Japan, recommends that the Canadian Government should endeavour to secure the full cooperation of the Government of British Columbia, and should make known to the public the details of its policy in relation to the Japanese problem by the following means:-

- No*
- A - A statement by radio to the people of British Columbia by the Prime Minister of Canada.
- B - One or two explanatory statements over the radio by participants in this Conference in which the various considerations presented and the reasons for the recommendations made, will be clearly discussed.
- This should be first step*
K
- C - Full and complete "off-the-record" discussions with representatives of the press and radio to be held in Victoria, Vancouver and Ottawa, and to be participated in by Members of the Standing Committee, representatives of the Armed Services, and of the Department of External Affairs, with the cooperation of the Director of Public Information.
- This statement of government policy given to the press - but not radio*
K

↑
PM King's Comments

POLITICIANS

The Politicians' Position

Ian Mackenzie to W.L.M. King, January 10, 1942. Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIB5, Vol 32, file x-81, P.A.C.

G. G. McGeer to W.L.M. King, February 13, 1942, P.A.C.

Throwing his political weight behind the position of the minority at the conference; ie. the B.C. politicians who wanted to intern all Japanese nationals, Mackenzie undermines the rejection of that demand by the military and police by quoteing out of context the opinions of the General Officer Commanding on the Pacific Coast, Maj-Gen. R. O. Alexander. The comments on the letter and the report are by Prime Minister King. For a complete copy of Maj-Gen. Alexander's report see the next section of Documents.

McGeer's letter summarizes the public views and stance of B.C. M.P.s.

HRG

CONFIDENTIAL

10th January, 1942

My dear Prime Minister,-

For the last two days we had a committee, consisting of about thirty members, considering every phase of the Japanese problem in British Columbia. The Committee consisted of representatives of --

External Affairs;
The Navy and the Army;
The Provincial Government of British Columbia;
The Mounted Police;
The Provincial Police of British Columbia;
The Department of Labour, and other departments of the Government;
and
The Standing Committee on Oriental Problems in British Columbia (the Chairman of which is Mayor Hume of New Westminster);
with
Mr. Michaud and myself.

It was immediately evident that there was a marked difference of opinion between the Standing Committee from British Columbia, together with the Provincial Government, and the officials of the various departments, including the Services, in Ottawa. We were able to arrive at unanimous conclusions in regard to the question of fishing licenses and fishing boats, radios and cameras, but the real difficulty arose on the question of evacuation.

J. G. W.
J. G. W.
I may say that although the Committee recommended that Canadian nationals of Japanese origin be permitted to volunteer in the Canadian army, and also that they should be called up under the National Mobilization Act, the Committee was rather lukewarm about this recommendation. The Standing Committee was opposed to it and the opinion was expressed that the public of British Columbia were not in favour of it.

Therefore, in regard to that specific recommendation - if you feel inclined to be opposed to it, I would not urge it very strongly on the Government.

The Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
O t t a w a.

Comments in margin by P. M. Wilham.
Lion Mackenzie King.

The real difference of opinion arose, however, in regard to the question of the evacuation of Japanese nationals. There are of these about 3,300. Of these, 1,714 are between the ages of 18 and 45 years, and I would estimate that from about 2,000 to 2,500 are able-bodied, adult males.

You will observe that the majority report did not support, for the reasons stated, a policy of evacuation. On the contrary, Mr. Pearson for the Provincial Government, Mayor Hume and some members of his committee, named in the report, spoke very emphatically in favour of it and, therefore, rather than divide the Committee and cause, possibly, unfortunate consequences, I suggested that both the majority and the minority decisions be referred to Council. I personally have no doubt whatsoever as to what the opinion is in British Columbia -- the opinion of British Columbia is with the minority report.

I believe that under a wise and prudent policy of consideration, these could be transferred either to the interior parts of British Columbia, for useful, constructive work in camps without necessarily being interned but being under surveillance, or to parts outside of British Columbia where they could be very usefully employed on road work in connection with defence. There is a gap in the road between Terrace and Prince Rupert that, in my opinion, should be completed, thus being of great benefit to the defence of the northern portions of the province. There is also, when the weather clears, a gap to be completed in the Hope-Princeton highway which would be of great importance if the bridge on the Fraser Canyon happened to be destroyed.

My suggestion is that you immediately appoint someone possessed of ability and discretion and, if Council decides upon this policy, place him in charge not only of the formation of the Civilian Pioneer Corps recommended, but also in charge of the placement on constructive works away from the Coast of those who could not be absorbed in the Civilian Pioneer Corps. Perhaps the name of Brigadier Foster, who is mentioned as Minister to Tokyo, would be useful in that regard.

OK.

In connection with the disposal of the Japanese boats, seeing that they are Canadian citizens in the main, I would recommend a committee to be set up of, say, three members, to dispose of these boats either by sale, lease or charter. I think possibly one of the committee should be a member of the Japanese who is a Canadian national. I recommend, as the best man to head this committee, Commander S. L. Johnson, now serving with the Navy here in Ottawa, but who could be released for this purpose. He has been in British Columbia for forty-seven years and knows the Japanese situation thoroughly.

3.

The only place where the element of compulsion might have to come in would be in connection with the evacuation of some of the Japanese nationals. As you are aware, the Canadian nationals of Japanese origin have all volunteered to serve anywhere and in any capacity. I enclose copies of three telegrams received from them yesterday.

This is a question of great urgency in my opinion and Council should deal with it either on Monday or give it priority on Tuesday. I have called a meeting of the Reconstruction Committee for Monday afternoon at 2.30. This will take only about an hour and perhaps it might be possible to have Council called after that to deal only with this very important Japanese problem.

What I fear is that, unless we take immediate action, our white people may resort to unwise tactics in Vancouver. The Standing Committee state that they will not return until Council has rendered a decision. They asked that they be allowed to appear before the Cabinet but I replied that Cabinet was not receiving any delegation. Then they asked me if Mayor Hume, who is a very loyal supporter, could see you personally. I said I did not know -- possibly you might see him for five minutes before Council met -- and would mention the matter to you.

That is the situation as clearly as I see it, and I would strongly urge the Government taking immediate action and making its policy public.

Yours sincerely,

MEMORANDUM

1. Speed is essential.
2. See extract from letter from General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Pacific Command.
3. See extract from Navy letter.
4. Remove male population from Coastal area.
5. Organize into units for gainful employment based upon set-up of "Pioneer Units" of last war.
6.

(a) Nationals - Compulsory)	
(b) Naturalized - Volunteer)	
(c) Canadian Born - Volunteer)	Into No. 5
(d) Ex-service men - Volunteer)	

Extracts from Secret letter from Major-General R. O. Alexander, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Pacific Command, addressed to Chief of the General Staff at Ottawa, under date of December 30, 1941

- "2. I fully realize the various angles of the situation and that any action which we might take against local Japanese, which is not completely humane and in conformity with the Geneva Convention, might be taken as an excuse by Japan to deal harshly with our own prisoners. I feel, however, that internment of Japanese males between the ages of 18 and 45, their removal from the coast and their organization into paid units on public works or some similar employment would be advisable.
- "3. I discussed the matter yesterday with the Premier of British Columbia, who entirely concurs in the above views. I have this date also discussed the matter with Lieut.-Col. Sparling, who is a member of the Standing Committee on Oriental Affairs, who informs me that similar views are held by his committee and that recommendations are going forward to the Prime Minister along these lines.
- "6. Immediate action along the lines as suggested above and in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee on Oriental Affairs might prevent inter-racial riots and bloodshed, and will undoubtedly do a great deal to calm the local population."

For full letter see Section on position of Military Police and Department of External Affairs.

Secret

Extract from/letter from Commodore W.J.R. Beech, Commanding Officer, Pacific Coast, addressed to General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Pacific Command; The Officer-in-Charge, "E" Company, R.C.M.P., Vancouver; and The Commissioner, B.C. Provincial Police, under date of December 27, 1941

"9. Public opinion is very much against the Japanese all over the Queen Charlotte Islands and in view of the strategic position of these Islands I would strongly recommend that all the Japanese be removed."

O t t a w a
February 13, 1942.

The Rt.-Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King,
Prime Minister of Canada,
O t t a w a

My dear Mr. King:-

The surprising strength that recent events have disclosed that Japan possesses in the Pacific compels me to supplement my letters to you of November 20th, 1941 and January 10th, 1942.

I for one, as a representative for British Columbia, do not wish to over-emphasize the danger, yet when we realize what has happened to the defences of Hong Kong, the Phillipine Islands, the Malayan Peninsula, Burma, Singapore and several islands in the Dutch East Indies and also Islands of the Australian Commonwealth, it would be absurd for us to blind ourselves to the weakness of our position in Western Canada.

For the purpose of clarification, may I enumerate the existing dangers:

- (1) The Japanese Fifth Column on the Pacific Coast: I do not believe that any member of the Japanese race in our midst can be trusted. Consequently steps should be taken to remove all Japanese from our Pacific Coast and railway areas.
- (2) Our Coastal defences are wholly inadequate. They should be supplemented by air strength, sea power and equipped mobile land forces far in excess of the numbers now on the Pacific Coast.
- (3) Our highways and railways are wholly inadequate to sustain military operations in British Columbia. They should be extended and improved up to the requirements of effective military operations.

Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King - 2.

(4) We are wholly lacking in effective naval bases on the Pacific Coast. Both Esquimalt and Prince Rupert should be improved to overcome this deficiency.

In alying these broad general proposals before you I appreciate the demand that exists for co-operation elsewhere. But I cannot help but feel that it is neither wise nor safe to ignore the danger of leaving the Pacific Coast of Canada in its present pitifully weak condition.

Yours respectfully and sincerely,

C.C. McOBER

MILITARY / CAMP

The Position of the Military, Police and Department of External Affairs

Maj-Gen. R.O. Alexander, G.O.C.-in-C, Pacific Command, to Chief of General Staff, Ottawa, December 30, 1941 and cover letter from Lt.-Gen. Maurice A. Pope, Vice Chief of General Staff, to Dr. H.L. Keenleyside, Department of External Affairs, January 2, 1942, File 773-B-40, E.A.A.

Dr. H.L. Keenleyside, Department of External Affairs, to Lt. General Maurice A. Pope, January 3, 1942, File 773-B-40, E.A.A.

Summary of Memorandum, Vice Chief of General Staff to Chief of General Staff, January 13, 1942, extracted from HQS 7368, vol 1, Defence Records, 322.009(D358), Directorate of History, Department of National Defence.

Memorandum, Dr. H.L. Keenleyside to Ian Mackenzie and W.L.M. King, January 26, 1942, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIB5, Vol. 32, file x-81(2), P.A.C.

Chiefs of Staff Appreciation, February 19, 1942, J.L. Ralston Papers, MGIIIB11, Vol. 37, P.A.C.

Canada, Cabinet War Committee, **Minutes**, February 26, 1942, RG 2/16, vol. 8, P.A.C.

Comr. S.T. Wood, R.C.M.P., to William Stevenson, [British Intelligence, New York City], August 5, 1942, External Affairs Archives.

The first document is the December 30, 1941 report of Gen. Alexander. The reaction of the Vice-Chief of General Staff to this report is found in the third document. The second document records the reaction of the Department of External Affairs.

The fourth document illustrates Keenleyside's ongoing efforts to defuse the demands of the politicians from B.C.

The fifth document is the military appreciation of February 19, 1942, which gives the assessment of the military situation on the Pacific Coast as at 4 days before Japanese Canadians were ordered uprooted.

The sixth document is an extract from the War Cabinet Committee Meeting of February 26, 1942 when the military declined to be responsible for removing Japanese Canadians from the Pacific Coast. It is virtually unheard of in Canadian military practice for the military to refuse to undertake a task requested by the Cabinet. They were able to in this



Department of National Defence

Ottawa, Canada,

2nd January, 1942.

file
cc

SECRET

773-B-40

9 14

Dear Mr. Keenleyside,

With reference to our conversation this afternoon, I enclose for your information copy of a letter received from General Alexander on the Japanese question in British Columbia.

Yours sincerely,

H.L. Keenleyside, Esq.,
Department of External Affairs,
O T T A W A .

~~Ottawa, Canada,~~

Headquarters, Pacific Command,
Victoria, B.C. 30th December, 1941.

S E C R E T

Chief of the General Staff,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa, Ont.

1. The situation with regard to the Japanese resident in British Columbia is assuming a serious aspect. Public feeling is becoming very insistent, especially in Vancouver, that local Japanese should be either interned or removed from the coast. Letters are being written continually to the press and I am being bombarded by individuals, both calm and hysterical, demanding that something should be done. I have been informed that certain sections of the public in Vancouver propose to hold public demonstrations and street parades against the Japanese in the near future unless official action is taken. If these are held, they might lead to very serious inter-racial clashes involving considerable damage, bloodshed and possibly fatal casualties.
2. I fully realize the various angles of the situation and that any action which we might take against local Japanese, which is not completely humane and in conformity with the Geneva Convention, might be taken as an excuse by Japan to deal harshly with our own prisoners. I feel, however, that internment of Japanese males between the ages of 18 and 45, their removal from the coast and their organization into paid units on public works or some similar employment would be advisable.
3. I discussed the matter yesterday with the Premier of British Columbia, who entirely concurs in the above views. I have this date also discussed the matter with Lieut-Col. Sparling, who is a member of the Standing Committee on Oriental Affairs, and who informs me that similar views are held by his committee and that recommendations are going forward to the Prime Minister along these lines.
4. I attach herewith a report that I have received from the Commanding Officer, Pacific Coast, regarding the Japanese in the Queen Charlotte Islands and I concur in the recommendation made in the last para. of his report.
5. Arrangements have already been made for the employment of troops in the Powell Street area, Vancouver, and Steveston immediately a request is received from the police. These are the two main Japanese settlements and the employment of the troops would be for the protection of the Japanese against those who wish to do them violence. In addition a mobile reserve is available for use wherever it may be needed. While these precautions may prove sufficient in the main Japanese settlements, it would be impossible to give protection to scattered elements.

/2.

6. Immediate action along the lines as suggested above and in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee on Oriental Affairs might prevent inter-racial riots and bloodshed, and will undoubtedly do a great deal to calm the local population.

(sgd) R.O. Alexander

Major-General
G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command.

HLK/JG

773-B-40

9 14.

Dear J. Pope
John

COPY TO: Commissioner Wood ✓
(with copy of Gen. Alexander's letter) "

January 3, 1942.

SECRET

Dear General Pope,

Please accept my thanks for your note of January 2nd and for the copy of the letter which General Alexander wrote to you on December 30th with regard to the Japanese situation in British Columbia. I was very sorry to learn of the extent to which hysteria seems to have affected the public mind in some parts of British Columbia.

The point in General Alexander's letter that seemed to me to be most unsatisfactory was his statement that he had been informed

"that certain sections of the public in Vancouver propose to hold public demonstrations and street parades against the Japanese in the near future unless official action is taken. If these are held, they might lead to very serious inter-racial clashes involving considerable damage, bloodshed and possibly fatal casualties."

You will recall that when the Special Committee on Orientals in British Columbia was preparing its report the military and police authorities on the West Coast stated categorically that the situation would be kept in hand and that all necessary precautions had been and would continue to be taken to see that no untoward events could develop. In these circumstances it is now rather depressing to find that the General Officer Commanding on the Pacific Coast appears to believe that public demonstrations and street parades against the Japanese are to be expected.

Major-General M.A. Pope, M.C.,
Vice-Chief of the General Staff,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa.

If I may make the suggestion, it would seem to me to be appropriate for you to reply to General Alexander by saying that, in the light of previous discussions of this matter, it is his duty and that of the Police authorities, to concert together the necessary steps to be taken to block the holding of any such demonstrations and parades. These things should not be allowed to get started and the most severe penalties provided by the appropriate laws should be invoked against any person or persons who insist on going ahead with such subversive and disloyal activities.

I am taking the liberty of sending a copy of General Alexander's letter, together with a copy of this reply, to the Commissioner of the Mounted Police.

As you are aware, we are arranging for a meeting of the Standing Committee on Orientals in British Columbia to be held in Ottawa on January 8th. At that meeting the whole situation can be reviewed and agreement reached as to what further steps, if any, should be taken. In the meantime I hope that you will find it possible to direct General Alexander to cooperate with the Police authorities to whatever degree may be necessary for the purpose of making absolutely certain that no public demonstrations against the Japanese are allowed to develop in Vancouver.

Yours sincerely,

H L KENNEDY-SIDE

6-0-7

HQS. 7368 Vol 1

Japanese - Pac. Coast

13 Jan 47.

On receipt of telegram from Joint Services Committee (PC) (P.C. Tele. 663 d. 12 Jan 47) recommending "from point of view of defence" removal of all Jap and ~~also~~ male aliens between ages of 16-50 from coastal areas of B.C., the VCGS. (Maj. Gen. Pope) in a memo to CGS questioned whether the removal was requested on the grounds of defence, or as stated in the GOC's letter of 30 Dec 41, for the prevention of internal disorder and as a measure ~~for~~ for the protection of the Japanese population against maltreatment by the whites?

The VCGS is unable to agree to such a drastic step, as Vancouver is subject only to bombardment, and the Japanese, of whom 80% are Canadian Nationals, are unarmed. The F.B.I. through the Commissioner RCMP, had advised the Inter-Departmental Committee on Orientals in British Columbia "that the position in respect of Japanese on the West Coast of the U.S. was entirely satisfactory" and that both in Honolulu and at Manila Japanese residents had behaved correctly from a U.S. point of view during the attack on those places.

11-15
January 26, 1942

THE JAPANESE PROBLEM

Throughout the Ottawa Conference on the Japanese Problems a clear distinction was maintained at all times between the principles to be applied in the treatment of the Japanese nationals and those to be followed in the case of the Canadian nationals and British subjects of Japanese race. It was agreed that compulsory evacuation should be enforced in regard to the Japanese nationals but no one at any time suggested - not even Colonel Macgregor Macintosh - that compulsion should be used in the case of the Canadian nationals.

In the memorandum which Mr. John Read, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, presented to Council on January 13th this distinction was further emphasized. Mr. Read wrote:-

"Upon the assumption that there is going to be an evacuation I should like, most strongly, to urge that it should take the following form:

- (a) that there should be no compulsory evacuation or movement of British subjects irrespective of their racial origin."

Council appreciated and accepted the argument endorsed by the Conference and by Mr. Read and the distinction between the two groups of Japanese race was clearly maintained in the statement of Government policy which was issued on January 14th. In paragraph 10 it was stated that --

"It is intended to organize a Civilian Corps of Canadian Japanese in order to utilize the services of the various groups of Canadian Japanese who have indicated their desire to serve."

In paragraph 12 the Government declared that --

"A separate organization will be created to provide opportunities for the employment of adult male enemy aliens outside the Protected Areas"

In paragraph 11 it was stated that --

"Subsequent to a date to be announced all enemy aliens (of whatever origin), except those who possess permits from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, will require to have moved from such Protected Areas in the Pacific Coast as may be defined."

In spite of the clear intentions of the Government there seems to have developed, since the arrival of the British Columbia members of Parliament in Ottawa, a belief that all persons of Japanese racial origin are to be treated alike; that Canadian nationals and British subjects as well as Japanese nationals are to be forced to move out of the Protected Areas unless they obtain Police permits to remain. This is greatly to be regretted as it may give rise to pressure on the Government to carry out a policy which the Government has already considered and, for reasons of the first importance, decided against.

Mr. Read has pointed out the serious implications of the adoption of any proposal to apply compulsion to the movement of Canadian nationals and British subjects. Recent and immediately prospective developments in the Orient have underlined certain aspects of this argument. The Japanese now hold in their power over two thousand Canadian prisoners of war and others. In addition they hold many thousand other British subjects and this number may be increased materially in the near future if present trends continue. Yet in spite of this situation certain persons are pressing the Canadian Government to compel certain Canadian nationals and British subjects to give up their homes and businesses and move hundreds of miles away from their established places of residence and labour simply because they are of Japanese racial origin. No

such proposals are suggested for other enemy aliens although persons of German and Italian descent are much more difficult to distinguish and watch. Any action of this kind based on purely racial grounds would immediately become known to the Japanese. Enquiries have already been made by the Japanese Government - through the protecting power, Spain - as to the meaning of recent Government decisions relating to the treatment of Japanese in Canada. Compulsory deportation of Canadian nationals, based on the colour of their skins, would be used for propaganda purposes throughout Asia, and would certainly be reflected in the treatment accorded Canadian and British prisoners in Japanese hands.

Moreover, such a programme is unnecessary. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police who know more about the situation on the Pacific Coast than anyone else are not alarmed by the terms of the Government's announced policy; on the contrary, they support it strongly. Everyone who participated in the Ottawa Conference is also on record as having approved that policy. If the Civilian Corps is properly handled and enlistment in it made reasonably attractive to the Canadian Japanese it will draw off a very substantial part of the able bodied adult males in this category. Yet to satisfy a few complainants who, though knowing less about the subject than do those who advised the Government in regard to the accepted policy, demand stronger action against the Canadian - Japanese community, it is proposed that the Government should rescind its decision and, to satisfy a relatively small proportion of the people of British Columbia, adopt another policy which, in addition to being inherently unjust, would place our fellow citizens who are now in Japanese hands in the greatest danger. In order to appease extreme opinion in British Columbia the Government is asked to place some two thousand residents of Winnipeg and Quebec in jeopardy.

Ralston
Papers.
MG27 III B11

38A

MOST SECRET

CHIEFS OF STAFF

A P P R E C I A T I O N

19th February, 1942.

OBJECT

1. The object of this Appreciation is to discuss the probabilities and possibilities of attack on Canada.

PART I - GENERAL

PRESENT SITUATION

2. Except in the Russian theatre of war, the Axis Powers are on the offensive. In Russia, the Russian forces have achieved a significant but thus far limited winter success over the Germans along the entire front. The Russian advance is continuing but meeting stiffer resistance.
3. In Libya, following quickly upon a major British success, the Axis forces under General Rommel have taken the offensive and retrieved a large part of their losses. There are indications that the enemy offensive will continue to develop and there would appear to be a serious threat to Egypt.
4. In the Far East - Hong Kong, Guam, Wake, Borneo, the Malay Peninsula, Singapore and numerous islands have fallen. The United States forces are in a desperate state in the Philippines. The Dutch East Indies are under severe attack, and development of operations is in progress in Burma and towards Australia and the intermediate islands. In addition to the southwestern Pacific being dominated by the Japanese, considerable concern is felt over possible enemy action in the Indian Ocean.
5. Japanese sea power is predominant in the Western Pacific. The fall of Singapore has provided Japan with a large and powerfully defended base from which to operate her fleet in that area. The United States fleet, though inferior to the Japanese fleet in the Japanese Pacific, is superior to the Naval forces Japan could bring to bear in American Pacific waters. The main British fleet is engaged in Home waters, the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean.
6. The enemy is now concentrating his main submarine attack in the Western Atlantic.
7. The R.A.F. continue to maintain its offensive on occupied France and on Germany with the object of relieving German pressure on Russia, and as an anti-invasion measure.

.....2

PROBABLE ENEMY STRATEGY

8. Germany -- to defeat or contain Russia, either alone or in combination with Japan.
- to defeat British forces in the Middle East.
 - to increase her activities against shipping in the Atlantic.
 - to contain as much of the main British and United States fleets as possible in Home waters.
 - invasion of British Isles.
- Italy -- to deny the Mediterranean to the United Nations and assist in the Middle East campaign.
- Japan -- to consolidate her gains in the Southwestern Pacific.
- to prevent, by offensive action, reinforcements reaching the Southwestern Pacific theatre.
 - to make ineffective Chinese participation in the war by the denial of the Burma Road and direct attack on Chinese forces.
 - to retain sufficient forces in Manchuria and at home to counter possible Russian attack, or alternatively, to attack Russia.
 - to exploit her gains by extending operations towards Australasia, Burma and into the Indian Ocean thus, in the last case, threatening the British supply lines to the Middle East, India and the Far East.
 - to contain North American forces in America by raids on the North American Pacific Seaboard.

OTHER POSSIBLE ENEMY AIMS

9. Germany -- to include Vichy, Spain, Portugal and Turkey in the Axis orbit.
- to carry out sporadic raids on Defended Ports, cities and defence installations, and to attack selected air targets on the east coast of North America.
 - invasion of the East Coast of North America.

.....3

280

OTHER POSSIBLE ENEMY AIMS (Cont'd.)

- Japan -- to develop operations against Dutch Harbour in the Aleutian Islands with a view to the elimination of a potential threat to Japan.
- to destroy the main aircraft factories and ship repair facilities on the west coast of the United States.
- to damage the Panama Canal.
- invasion of the west coast of North America.

PART II - CANADIAN

10. From the General Appreciation, the Canadian position can be seen in its proper perspective in relation to the broad strategic picture.

11. It will be seen that objectives in Canada are unlikely to be included in the probable main strategical aims of the enemy. They may figure in his lesser aims, but only as an adjunct to his main strategy. In any event, the Canadian position cannot be considered apart from that of the United States, and thus the problem is one which affects the whole of the North American Continent.

12. Under present conditions an invasion on either coast is not considered to be a practicable operation of war. The presence of the British and United States fleets in the Atlantic precludes the possibility of a large scale sea-borne expedition. The immense distances involved and the maintenance of superior United States naval forces in the American Pacific produce a similar situation on the West Coast.

13. Apart entirely from the above considerations, the consolidation and exploitation of her gains in the southwestern Pacific would produce more attractive results for Japan than any diversion of effort towards North America and with far less risk. The area of her present operations has the added advantage of geographical remoteness from the growing strength of the United States.

14. The remaining enemy strategical aims which affect the direct defence of Canada are limited to raids which may include carrier-borne air attack, sporadic naval bombardment, small landing parties for destruction of selected objectives, and submarine activity.

CONCLUSION

15. The sea, land and air forces of Canada and the United States are so disposed as to provide indirect protection for both seaboard and direct protection for the most likely enemy objectives. The existing United States-Canada Basic Defence Plans provide for the utilization to the best advantage of the combined forces.

16. We consider that, taking into account the known and predictable factors, Canadian defence measures - existing and proposed - will ~~be adequate to deal with~~ the forms and scales of attack envisaged in this Appreciation.

provide reasonable insurance against

Ottawa, February 26th, 1942.

CABINET WAR COMMITTEE

A meeting of the War Committee of the Cabinet was held in Room 401, House of Commons, on Thursday, February the 26th, at 4 p.m.

There were present the following members:

The Prime Minister (Mr.King), in the Chair,
The Minister of Mines and Resources
(Mr. Crerar),
The Minister of National Defence (Mr.Ralston),
The Minister of National Defence for Air
(Mr. Power),
The Minister of Finance (Mr.Ilsley),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr.Michaud),
The Minister of Munitions and Supply (Mr.Howe),
The Minister of National Defence for Naval
Services (Mr.Macdonald).

The Under-Secretary of State for External
Affairs (Mr. Robertson),
The Secretary (Mr. Heeney).

Delivery of icebreaker to Russia

1. The Secretary reported that word had been received from the U.K. government that they were deeply concerned by delays which had occurred in the delivery to the U.S.S.R. of the icebreaker "Montcalm", regarding which approval had been given by the War Committee on October the 29th, 1941. The U.K. High Commissioner had asked whether the government would institute an enquiry into the matter, and had asked the earliest possible date on which the vessel could put to sea.

A full report of the facts had been obtained from the Deputy Minister of Transport. Difficulties regarding crew and with regard to bunkers had been the principal causes of delay and the vessel had had to put back to port on two occasions, after leaving Halifax in convoy. The expectation now was that she would be ready for sea by February the 28th.

(Secretary's note, February 25, 1942 - C.W.C. document 99; letter, Deputy Minister of Transport to the Secretary, and attached memorandum from the Director of Marine Services - February 26, 1942.)

2. The Minister of Munitions and Supply said that he had been kept informed of the situation. The basic difficulties had been to obtain a competent crew, and the unsuitability of the vessel for a North Atlantic crossing at this season. The circumstances

The Board's Journal had expressed the view that defence provisions at Sault Ste. Marie should be reviewed. This brought to mind the broader question of policy regarding protection of vulnerable points. The Army could not and should not be asked to undertake this responsibility.

14. The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services observed that the government could not undertake to guard all vital points. Many places in Canada, for example certain railway bridges, were more vulnerable than the Canadian locks at the Sault. At present, the Committee on Vulnerable Points followed the policy of leaving responsibility for protection upon the proprietors. It would be extremely difficult to change this policy for one involving differentiation between the many locations in respect of which protection might be desirable. Consideration might be given to using the National Resources Mobilization Act to call out men for police duty.

15. The War Committee noted the submission of the Journal of the Board for their twenty-fifth meeting; as to the protection of vulnerable points, it was agreed that no change be made in the present policy followed by the Vulnerable Points Committee.

Movement of Japanese from British Columbia

16. The Prime Minister referred to the magnitude of the task of implementing the government's recent decision to evacuate all persons of Japanese race from the protected area on the Pacific Coast and make provision for them elsewhere. A special organization should be set up for this purpose. It would be useless to proceed by piecemeal methods. Justice (through the R.C.M. Police), the Army, or possibly Munitions and Supply might be agencies in which responsibility should be centred.

17. The Minister of Munitions and Supply suggested that temporary accommodation for the large numbers involved might be provided at Banff and Jasper. A local British Columbia Committee, or the Army might provide the organization.

18. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs observed that in the United States the problem was dealt with by the Army, which had the right to call upon other agencies of government for assistance as required.

19. The Secretary drew attention to the fact that the authority of the Labour Department to provide work camps for evacuated persons was restricted to male Japanese nationals. There had, as yet, been no amendment to the Order in Council providing for these camps, so as to correspond to the wider powers

now given to the Minister of Justice in respect of any or all persons within protected areas.

20. The Minister of National Defence expressed the view that the Army could not undertake responsibility for the evacuation. They were already overburdened, and Army personnel in British Columbia were preoccupied with problems of Pacific defence. Possibly they could provide for administration, housing and commissariat as was done with internment operations.

Transportation units for service in the United Kingdom

21. The Secretary reported that the U.K. government had again raised the question of special transportation personnel. A request for certain special units had been made in June, 1941, and postponed, pending clarification of the manpower situation. Some 3,500 men of various categories were involved.

(Secretary's note, February 17, 1942 - C.W.C. document 91).

22. Mr. Heeney said that the Chief of the General Staff was not in favour of the government accepting this commitment. Personnel in these categories were not available. The railways themselves were shorthanded. Transportation troops might have to be provided for the Canadian Army overseas, at a later date. If such formations were to be raised later on, they should be in Canadian units for service with the Canadian Army.

23. The War Committee agreed that this commitment could not be accepted, and that the U.K. government be informed accordingly.

Proposed impregnation of battle dress

24. The Secretary submitted a recommendation of the Minister of National Defence, to provide for the impregnation of battle dress as protection against vesicant gas attacks. The considerations upon which this recommendation was based were similar to those advanced in favour of proposals, submitted to the War Committee on February 16th last, for increased respirator production and for the manufacture of mustard gas in Canada.

The total cost of the proposed programme, including the construction of a plant, was estimated at \$690,000, to March 31st, 1943. An explanatory memorandum had been circulated.

(Departmental memorandum, February 16, 1942 - C.W.C. document 96).

25. The Minister of National Defence for Air again queried the value of gas for defence purposes.

By Safe Hand

Your No. 1087

Ottawa, Ontario,
August 5, 1942.MOST SECRET and PERSONAL

Dear Mr. Stephenson:

Replying to your personal letter of the 9th ultimo enclosing a "Report on Japanese Activities in British Columbia" dated June, 1942, as I intimated to you during our conversation on this subject on the 3rd instant, I forwarded the report to the Officer Commanding this Force at Vancouver, and I now attach a reply submitted by Sergeant J. K. Barnes, in charge of our Intelligence Section there, who has, for a number of years past, been in very close touch with the Japanese situation in British Columbia.

I was naturally very much interested in what your agent had to say and I intend to have the information and suggestions outlined therein followed up. By this I do not mean we should take the action suggested by the agent in arresting these persons mentioned by him as suspects. As many of these people are Canadian citizens, we could not produce the evidence necessary to justify our actions, which, as you know, are subject to a board of review, and the police are compelled to support their action by evidence before such tribunal.

Much has been said regarding Etsuji Morii, who is a naturalized Canadian citizen, but we have found no evidence which would substantiate the various accusations made against him. On the other hand, this man has been most co-operative with the police and the British Columbia Security Commission in regard to the plans of evacuation, and had we had the same co-operation from the Nisei the difficulties which the Commission had to overcome would never have occurred. There are, as you know, political groups among the Japanese, and Morii, who was the leader of the older people, made many enemies because of his advice to the Japanese that in this emergency they should co-operate.

We have had no evidence of espionage or sabotage among the Japanese in British Columbia. The situation has changed considerably since the report was written, and most of these people are now in isolated areas outside the protected area, and those at present in Vancouver will be removed by the first of November next. These consist largely of women and children.

The work camps situated along the main lines of railway in British Columbia are to be closed down

W. S. Stephenson, Esq.,
Room 3553, 630 Fifth Avenue,
New York City, N. Y.,
U. S. A.

Head of
British Intelligence
in
New York
"The Man Called
Intrepid"

and no other camps will be erected adjacent to railways over which war material is transported. There was a false impression abroad in regard to the Japanese located in these camps, and criticism was made that they were not properly guarded. I should like to point out here that these Japanese were not under any disability under the law once they were removed from the protected area, and the guards were not placed at these camps over the Japanese, but for the purpose of protecting the right of way in their vicinity. Outside of the protected area these people are under certain discipline imposed by the Commission, and they are not allowed to remove themselves from place to place without the permission of the police or the representatives appointed by the Commission.

The riot referred to, which took place in the Immigration detention building at Vancouver, was due to the fact that these people were incarcerated in the building for too long a period before they were removed to proper detention camps. These individuals had not been arrested because they were looked upon as enemies of the state in the accepted sense of the term. They had, however, refused to obey the orders of the Security Commission to leave the protected area in protest against the policy then in force of breaking up Japanese families. This has now been changed and I expect that many of these men, who are now in detention, will be given their liberty on their undertaking to comply with the orders of the Security Commission from now on. In conclusion, I should like to make this point clear, i.e., we have surveyed the Japanese question in British Columbia from a realistic point of view for a long time past. A number of factors had to be taken into consideration in dealing with the problem. There is no need for me to go into them here, as Assistant Commissioner Mead covered some of that ground at the conference on Monday. The fact remains, however, that we have searched without let-up for evidence detrimental to the interests of the state and we feel that our coverage has been good, but to date no such evidence has been uncovered. The work will go on, and many of the suggestions made by you will be carried out.

Sincerely yours,

S. T. Wood.

Encl.
FJM/MB