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ANGUS FAMILY PAPERS
HENRY ANGUS
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 2

(b) Orientals in Canada

My interest in the Far East had been aroused and I was impressed with the importance of the issues that had to be faced and with the dangers of delay. I was also acutely aware of the extent of my ignorance. Much as I had done in approaching university teaching, I asked myself what I, in spite of my meagre qualifications, could usefully do and decided to attempt to improve the position in British Columbia of immigrants of Oriental race and of their descendants.

These people fell into three groups: Chinese, Japanese and East Indians. While men and women of all three groups were subject to disabilities on racial grounds, irrespective of their nationality, they presented economically and socially quite different problems. The East Indians were British subjects resident in Canada. Some of the Chinese and Japanese had naturalized before 1914 and some later.* Children born in Canada were Canadians. The extent to which Japanese law maintained a second nationality was vague. No persons of Oriental race could vote in British Columbia either in provincial or federal elections. This disability, itself indefensible, was made the pretext for exclusion from a number of occupations, notably from the legal profession. Such was the situation that I had to face.

Of the three races the Chinese had been longest in Canada and could be found in small numbers in almost every province, though

* Before 1914 naturalization in Canada did not confer British nationality outside Canada.

the largest number were in British Columbia. The restriction on Chinese immigration had become progressively severe and by 1929 approximated to exclusion. The head tax that had at one time been imposed practically stopped the immigration of women and the Chinese population could be expected to decline until a balance of the sexes was achieved. I once infuriated a very respectable and relatively liberal minded British Columbian politician by suggesting that even members of a legislature must be assumed to have intended the natural and probable consequences of their acts and that they were, therefore, the deliberate authors of the evils that are likely to arise in a population of celibate males. Were they justified in assuming that these evils would be outweighed by some social benefits? On the subject of Chinese immigration I wrote an article in the Dalhousie Review. (23)

The Japanese were not quite as numerous as the Chinese but they had brought their families to Canada and, like most immigrant groups, were increasing at a faster rate than the Canadian population of other races. I had the greatest difficulty in getting alarmists to take a reasonable view of this matter and to realize that the rate of growth would diminish with cultural assimilation. The obvious remedy was to invite the Japanese to their parties and accustom them to the spending habits of the rest of the community. This idea, though hard to dispute, was very distasteful. I used then to say "Have it your way". But bear in mind that if any racial group increases at a faster rate than other racial groups it will eventually outnumber them. Remember compound interest! As you can neither kill nor deport,

You should as a matter of common sense, make sure that a group destined, in accordance with your belief in a peculiar racial birth and survival rate, to be numerically dominant is not embittered and antagonized." This argument was never answered and I imagine that there was a lingering belief in the possibility of deportation that was to find political expression in the course of World War II.

It was easy to make a good case on intellectual grounds but as might be expected extremely difficult to use this case to demolish emotional rascism. The typical question, defiantly asked, was "How would you like your daughter to marry a Japanese?" My reply became a matter of routine, "If your daughter shares your views there is not the faintest danger of her marrying a Japanese. The question arises only if she does not share them. Our law does not allow a father or mother to prevent a daughter's marriage. Do you think it should? And even if you do, suppose that you arranged all the males of suitable age, the most eligible on the right the least eligible on the left, do you think that the grouping would be racial?"

On one occasion I was invited to address a group of ministers of religion. I disclaimed any pretence of expertise in religion or morality based on religion and, with this important reservation, told them that I thought it detestable that they should have separate churches for Japanese or Chinese instead of mixing them with Christians of other races in one community for the worship of God. This plea was received with polite but, I thought sullen silence. Years later I met the moderator at a garden party. He reminded me of my address and I said

that I thought it had been very coldly received. His reply surprised me, "What did that matter if you were right!"

Sometimes when I spoke the opposition itself made some half grudging admissions. "It was the Japanese who have brought baseball to the district" (in the Okanagan) and, "When the Japanese had to leave they scrupulously paid all their debts in full - no other group would have done so in the circumstances!"

The East Indians commanded some sentimental sympathies because they were British subjects by birth. While I was all for allowing them to vote, I could never understand why British nationality conferred by birth in India should be superior to British (and later Canadian) nationality conferred in virtue of Canadian law by birth in Canada. But so it was and the exclusion of East Indian immigrants was effected by the requirement of continuous voyage, which made no mention of nationality.

Although I expressed myself on these matters without the faintest trace of emotion, perhaps indeed because I avoided emotion, I became very unpopular. My articles on the race question comprise an article in the Canadian Bar Review dealing with the disabilities of persons (including Canadians) of Japanese race (⁴24), an article in the Dalhousie Quarterly dealing with Chinese immigration (⁵23), and a chapter in a book edited by Norman MacKenzie, The Legal Status of Aliens in Pacific Countries (⁶24). As a practical matter I confined my argument to the treatment of Canadians of Japanese race, confident

⁴(24) 9 Canadian Bar Review p. 1

⁵(23)

⁶(24) Oxford University Press 1937.

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that if something were done for them it would have to be done for the other groups as well. The very phrase "Canadians of Japanese race" proved provocative as many people were convinced that there was no such animal.

In fairness I always emphasized that if discrimination in Canada was based on race the reason was that the provinces had no power to legislate concerning aliens. In the United States the situation was reversed. There were innumerable discriminations against aliens but none based on race (23) as between American citizens.

(23) See Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law, Cornell University Press, 1946.

of his Lend-Lease intentions and knew that the war would not be brought to an end by British bankruptcy and that complete defeat was impossible.

On occasion I amused myself by explaining to American audiences why Canada had not confined her aid - as some Canadians would have liked - to donating supplies and munitions. I said it would be repugnant to us to say to the British, "We are your partners in this war! We shall provide supplies and arms free of charge; while you provide supplies, arms and man power as well. The dead, the wounded, the widows and the orphans will all be yours. We shall expect you to be grateful for our help. In speaking in this way to Americans I should have liked to add "attrape," but perhaps this word was unnecessary.

During the winter of 1940 - 41 I was a participant in two Royal Commissions concerned with Japanese Canadians, a witness before the first, a member of the second. The first question was whether Canadians of Asiatic race should be exempted from military service for home defence. Those of Japanese race were anxious to serve and in my opinion entirely reliable. What effect calling them up might have on race relations in British Columbia was another matter. The Commission did not advise their inclusion in the armed forces and went further in advising that all persons of Japanese race should be registered for security purposes. The second Commission was appointed to supervise their registration that was to be carried out by the R.C.M.P. I think that the R.C.M.P. were surprised by the unusual experience of dealing with people

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who were completely co-operative. Registration was expected to detect illegal entrants. It is my impression that only one was found.

When intervention in Greece seemed imminent I was annoyed by the way in which Clifton Fadiman, writing in the New Yorker, denounced Britain for hesitating to go to the help of Greece, using the phrase "Chadband Chamberlain." I wrote to him to say that Britain was entitled, in all honour, to decide this military problem and that the United States, though not bound by treaty, had just as much interest in the general question of right and wrong. I suggested that "Pecksniff" might be a fair retort to "Chadband". I received a courteous but evasive reply to the effect that if America were at war Fadiman would urge intervention in Greece. When the actual landings took place I was at a Social Science Research Conference in California. I could myself see no glimmer of hope to justify the dropping the bone of North Africa for the shadow in the Balkans and could only wish that there might be some important unknowns.

I was invited to teach in a summer session at the University of Southern California but had to withdraw my acceptance when I was asked to be a Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, then Norman Robertson, a former student of mine. In war time such an invitation is equivalent to a command. Before leaving we had a short holiday at Pavillion Lake in the Cariboo and it was there that we heard of the German invasion of the U. S. S. R. My last Week-end Review broadcast was on this subject. It had to be read for me as I developed an ulcer in my throat and was sent to

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hospital by a cautious doctor who thought that I might have diphtheria. Fortunately he was wrong and I left for Ottawa leaving Annie to follow with the children in a month's time. We decided to send Michael to Upper Canada College and Anne to Havergal.

During the school holidays but moderate in cost. There was no great choice and, with some misgivings, I settled for a tiny flat near the Rideau River not far from its junction with the Ottawa. When Anne arrived she bravely accepted my choice and we called our new home "The Doll's House". It was one of four flats in a small apartment building designed by our landlord who was an interesting character, like other landlords only in aversion to any available independence. The situation can best be described as marginal. The one side was the lower town, at this time almost a slum; on the other by crossing the Rideau, we came to new Edinburgh and Rockcliffe. In front was a pretty park, at the back the railway. The nine-months' period afforded one person standing room only. There were two bedrooms and a bed could be made up in the living room. It was within reasonable-walking distance of my office in the West Block. It had its pointers. It did not display the shabby completeness of most of the down-town flats. We have retained happy memories of our time there.

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(c) Ottawa in Wartime.

Even as early as the summer of 1941 Ottawa, as Malcolm Macdonald had warned me, was overcrowded. Hugh Keenleyside found me a room near the University Club and I set about looking for a suitable furnished flat capable of housing Michael and Anne during their school holidays but moderate in cost. There was no great choice and, with some misgivings, I settled for a tiny flat near the Rideau River not far from its junction with the Ottawa. When Annie arrived she bravely accepted my choice and we called our new home "The Doll's House". It was one of four flats in a small apartment building designed by our landlord who was an interesting eccentric, like other landlords only in aversion to any avoidable expenditure. The situation can best be described as marginal. On one side was the lower town, at this time almost a slum; on the other by crossing the Rideau, we came to new Edinburgh and Rockliffe. In front was a pretty park, at the back the railway. The minuscule kitchen afforded one person standing room only. There were two bedrooms and a bed could be made up in the living room. It was within reasonable walking distance of my office in the East Block. It had its points: it did not display the shabby commonplaceness of some of the down-town flats. We have retained happy memories of our days there.

We were successful in procuring a new car (an austerity car) to serve our needs, but it was extremely difficult to find a garage for it. Eventually we secured minimum accommodation half a mile away on the other side of the Rideau River and in the depth

of winter it was not a very agreeable end to an evening to put the car away and walk back over the long bridge. There were other little miseries but the inconveniences of life in Ottawa were outweighed by the amusement of sharing them with other temporary residents. To walk a mile to my office in the West Block was a good way to begin the day even in the coldest weather when there was a policeman at the door to warn those whose ears had been nipped by frost.

Bit by bit a cheerful social life developed, made completely informal by the simple facts of overcrowding and rationing. The financial policies that reduced our incomes made living economical. Food and liquor were in short supply. The residents of Ottawa could be easily distinguished as permanent or temporary. The permanent residents, many of whom were retired, seemed to feel that the amenities of Ottawa were being rudely destroyed in a very inconsiderate way. The temporary residents, engaged in some form of war work, were inclined to think that the government should see that they got suitable accommodation. Perhaps a more ruthless government would have done something to clear the capital of "useless mouths". Of course, the government did have to do something for the representatives of other governments, whose numbers constantly increased as negotiators were sent to obtain Canadian assistance through an allocation of controlled supplies. These negotiators naturally did their best to make themselves agreeable and many of them thought themselves fortunate to

be well away from enemy action.

For career diplomats the constant changes of personnel, the succession of acquaintanceships that are unlikely to ripen into friendships, and the tedious repetition of formal courtesies may become very boring and the professionals were not all dedicated men who made winning the war the supreme object of their lives. To many of the temporary residents it was all new, strange and interesting and to some a welcome interlude from academic life. Various wartime agencies - the Film Board for example - brought together interesting people most unlikely under ordinary circumstances to have found their way into the service of the government. The war, after the ~~first~~ ^{fall of France} ~~war~~, was a people's war and everyone felt uncomfortable if he were not actively participating in the national effort.

It would have been very dull if everyone had not talked far too freely. This does not mean that state secrets were betrayed but rather that superiors were unbecomingly criticised. We were told by professionals from other countries that while civil servants everywhere criticise the policies of their governments and the behaviour of politicians, nowhere in the world was such criticism so outspoken and uncurbed as in Canada. Perhaps it is the price of making a war "a people's war."

The war news was grim during the summer and early autumn of 1941. There seemed to be nothing but retreat in Russia and it was a relief when the approach of winter immobilized the armies, without the loss of Leningrad or Moscow. Looking back I can hardly

believe that only five months elapsed between my arrival in Ottawa and the war with Japan. Everything seemed frustrating. There was no indication that the United States was politically ready for the active participation that alone could ensure victory. There was constant fear that war in the Pacific might begin, largely as a result of prodding by the United States, but without American participation. Relations with France and the Free French were ambivalent.

My work at External Affairs was disappointing. I was to be Canadian liaison officer to the Joint United States-Canadian Committees for Economic Co-operation that were being planned. But there was no real need for a liaison officer, partly because the Committees had nothing much to do at the outset, partly because too many people wanted to take part in their operations. The active members of the Canadian Committee were Sandy Skelton and John Deutch who worked admirably together but not very easily with anyone else. Hugh Keenleyside, who had been a student at the University of British Columbia when I first taught there though never in my classes, was Head of the American and Far Eastern Division of the Department of External Affairs and eagerly attended the meetings of the Committees that were held sometimes in Washington and sometimes in Ottawa. The Joint Committees came to very little because their functions were purposely (and probably wisely) left extremely vague. In certain circumstances they might have been used; for instance if we had lost the war and Canada had sought refuge in the arms of the United States or if the United States had entered the war in a perfunctory or half-hearted way. The Committees were, therefore, a sort of insurance.

When, as a result of Pearl Harbour, the United States came into the war, determined to win it, the Committees lost their raison d'être. I repeatedly pressed Norman Robertson to treat me as an ordinary member of the Department and use me for anything at all. I was assigned to Keenleyside's division where I had to do with some of the problems that concerned Japan and China. But I still felt relatively useless and was glad when eventually I was transferred to the Economic Division of which I became Head on Scott Macdonald being sent to Newfoundland.

Relations with other members of the Department, whether permanent or temporary, were uniformly pleasant. My colleagues were men of great ability. John Read of the Legal Division was a steady friend and I could always turn to him for frank advice. He never underestimated the enemy. He had said as early as the spring of 1939 that "if we go to war now we shall be licked" and even after Russia had been forced to become our associate it seemed as if he might well have been right. Hugh Keenleyside seemed, in 1940 - 41, more and more oriented towards the United States. Scott Macdonald never completely got over his early enthusiasm for the Russian revolution, his "verderbte Liebe" as Virginia Thompson called her early enthusiasm for Germany. He worked steadily and conscientiously but completely without enthusiasm and I think he felt that Canada ought never to have got into the war. Tommy Stone, who had rejoined the Department after retiring from it, was one of the men whom I found most congenial. Both Stone and Macdonald were never reluctant to speak in French in the course of their work. Hume Wrong was perhaps the most experienced in the traditions of the

service and a man of excellent judgment. Alfred Rive was another former student of mine and an old friend. He was largely occupied with specialized matters such as relations with the I. L. O. in peace time and with P. O. W. 's in war. I had the pleasure many years later of presenting Alfred Rive for an honorary degree at the University of British Columbia that had already honoured Norman Robertson and Hugh Keenleyside. I found the young French members of the Department most congenial and have followed their careers with great interest. Somewhat later the Department was joined by two of my friends, Fred Soward from the University of British Columbia and R. A. Mackay, my former colleague on the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations. His familiarity with this subject made him the obvious man to help in negotiating the terms on which Newfoundland was to enter Confederation.

I have kept two outstanding men to the last: Norman Robertson and Lester B. Pearson. Norman was, and indeed still is, something of an enigma to me. He had been one of my earliest students and had been a successful candidate for a Rhodes Scholarship. I had met him frequently, first at Oxford in 1924 and later in Ottawa during the years of the Royal Commission. He, like others, may have gone through a period of frustration but he emerged as a very close colleague of Oscar Skelton. On Skelton's death he had been appointed to succeed him as Under Secretary of State for External Affairs and this position was still thought of as equivalent to that of a Deputy Minister, that is as a permanent appointment to be held until superannuation. The change came with

the return to the Department of career men who had been High Commissioners or Ambassadors. The Skelton tradition overhung the department in conditions that were fast becoming totally different from those under which it had been established; for instance, Skelton had personally signed practically everything and had retained a close supervision of every detail. Norman Robertson was not an obvious successor for there were several men somewhat senior to him - notably John Read, unless it were assumed that the legal adviser was external to the department of external affairs. Probably ability to serve smoothly under Mackenzie King was Robertson's distinctive characteristic. His colleagues, whatever their private views may have been, were generous and loyal. Temperamentally and by design, Robertson was as cautious as King himself and as fond of a circuitous approach to a problem. He disliked any appearance of exercising leadership and constantly avoided publicity in writing, speeches or interviews. He was probably more interested in the economic than in the traditionally diplomatic aspects of external policy. To me he was friendly, generous and thoughtful and often went out of his way to include me in something that he thought I might be specially interested in. He gave very little guidance, but did venture on one precept: that when members of the department sat in as they often did on discussions that primarily concerned some other department they should never show any disposition to interfere or proffer advice but be always ready to respond in such a way that they would be asked for advice and treated as a colleague.

Mike Pearson was in England when I joined the department but returned shortly afterwards. He was utterly different from most members of the Department in appreciating the importance of public relations and in not shrinking from letting himself be seen and heard. He had very great personal charm and was always ready to discuss policy matters. He inspired great personal loyalty and great confidence. I am afraid that later events were to show that these engaging and admirable qualities did not quite add up to commanding leadership. At the time I certainly thought that they did.

Our social relations with members of the department were as pleasant as relations with busy and hard-working men can be. We made some friends among the other busy people whom the wartime developments had brought to Ottawa. First and foremost was my cousin, Commander William Angus, and through him and his wife, Caro, we met others. Gilbert Tucker, who occupied a flat in the same small apartment house, was one of the historians of the Canadian navy and was after the war a colleague of mine at the University of British Columbia.

The hot summers were something of a problem. In 1942 we were able to rent Graham Towers' house at Kingsmere. It was at a convenient distance from Ottawa and we could economize gasoline, which was rationed, by coasting down the long hill to the main road. Ottawa itself could be very hot and stuffy, though even at its worst it seemed salubrious to our visitors from New York and Washington.

Michael found summer employment in one of the government departments as a draftsman. Anne, who at that time had greater academic ambitions, worked seriously at German and I used to help her a little when I got home in the evenings. In subsequent summers we had short holidays further from Ottawa, but within the range set by gasoline rations. In the second summer, that of 1943, Michael worked on a farm near Ottawa; in the third summer he was in the navy.

We moved our lodgings twice, on each occasion making a change for the better. The old houses in Ottawa had been converted into flats. The ground floor flats had large living rooms with makeshift kitchens and bathrooms. Those on the upper floors had a number of small rooms. The electric wiring was always bad and the furniture was apt to be non-descript. In our last year we were fortunate in being able to rent the ground floor flat that the Scott Macdonalds had occupied and in which they had left some beautiful furniture. The drawback, and it was serious, was the character of the landlord who was psychologically incapable of any expenditure, though he made no great protest when we had the storm windows repaired and deducted the cost from the rent. In every instance the car was a problem as the garages were makeshift affairs and very difficult of access.

These minor discomforts mattered very little. As time slipped by we ceased to be transients, or even newcomers on the edge of a closed society, and became part of the established Ottawa that was constantly receiving and stuffing in somewhere more and more transients and newcomers - representatives of other countries,

Canadians engaged in some phase of war work, men in the services stationed in Ottawa. We queued up patiently for wine at one store and for hard liquor at another and we did our best to return the hospitality we received. This was not always possible, for foreign agencies were likely to be better provisioned particularly as it is their traditional duty to make themselves agreeable to officials of the government with which they had to deal. They enjoyed untaxed liquor, ampler rations and, I imagine, much more free time.

Anne did not want to continue at Havergal after two years there. She felt that an Ontario collegiate school that was co-educational would be better preparation for life at a university and we agreed. She lived at home and seemed happy in her school life. Michael, in due course, matriculated at McGill and began to prepare for a course in applied science. At the end of the first year he entered the navy and surprised us at Christmas 1944 by appearing in an officer's uniform. He was happy and excited and so were we.

(d) War with Japan

During the autumn of 1941 relations with Japan went from bad to worse, largely because of Canada's close association with the United States. My own work was concerned chiefly with rather petty negotiations about blocking funds in such a way as to reduce the Japanese legation in Ottawa and the Canadian legation in Japan to living on credit. But we did not wish the telephone company to disconnect the Japanese legation or the butcher to stop supplying food! No reciprocal release of funds, even for necessary purposes, could be negotiated as it was inexpedient to establish any official rate of exchange between Canadian dollars and yen.

A minor legal tangle was created by the detention at Victoria, B.C., of a Greek ship loaded with scrap iron bought by Japan in the United States. We wanted not merely to deny Japan the iron but also to use the ship. To expropriate the scrap (under the right of angary) was possible only if we used it ourselves for war purposes. To acquire it by negotiated purchase raised the question of blocked funds and also the question of price as our steel-controller said he could not pay more than the value of the scrap less the freight from Victoria, B.C., to Nova Scotia where it would be delivered to DOSCO. The cargo was eventually bought by agreement and paid for in blocked funds. In Seattle where the ship was sent, the crew went on strike because their wages had not been paid and the longshoremen refused to unload.

These futile details were the surface symptoms of a situation that was basically most serious. American policy was steadily forcing Japan to submit or to strike back, though not necessarily at the United States. Britain and Holland might be faced with an attack in Southeast Asia that they were in no position to resist and yet they could not exact a cast-iron pledge of assistance from the United States if they were attacked as a result of having followed the policies desired by the United States. They could get no such pledge because President Roosevelt was constitutionally powerless to give it. He might even turn out to be politically powerless to honour an informal undertaking. Events moved to a crisis and we were advised of a phrase in a routine broadcast that would inform us that war was certain.

It was in these circumstances that my wife and I were invited to dine at the Japanese legation on December 6, to see coloured pictures that the charge d'affaires had taken in Canada. We accepted as a matter of course, although we knew that the party might be embarrassing. It would have been our duty to make polite conversation with our host while we knew and he knew that war was on the point of breaking out and while each suspected that the other also knew. I found the assignment interesting but it was hard to persuade Annie that we should play our parts with the aplomb of professional diplomats and savour the ironies of the situation.

Fortunately or unfortunately we were prevented from attending the dinner by Joint Committee business that called me to Washington. On my way back, it was suggested that I should attend, as an observer,

a meeting of the American Foreign Policy Association in Cleveland. The atmosphere suggested a Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, although the meeting was of course less representative. Edward Carter managed the Conference and the Institute technique of Round Tables, that ~~were to~~ ^{was to} Report to a final general meeting, was followed. For a Canadian observer it was most depressing. The consensus was that there would be no war because Japan would not dare to fight the United States. No one seemed much interested in what the United States would do if Japan struck south or in what obligations (can one say "of honour"?) the United States or its President had incurred to Britain. Personally I felt that Roosevelt was as far committed in honour as a man can be to do his utmost to intervene. But would he live up to this obligation and, even if he did, would his utmost be enough? A day and a half as a mute observer in the Round Tables was exasperating.

The final meeting assembled after lunch on Sunday. We were seated round a huge table with Edward Carter presiding. He held some papers in his hand. Instead of calling on the rapporteurs of the Round Tables for their reports he began to read some telegrams that gave the first news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. Then he asked everyone in turn to comment briefly. It was very instructive. Some shamelessly said, "I told you so!" Isolationist Congressmen were quick to assert that they had never said that the United States should not fight if attacked. A distinguished correspondent who had been reiterating that as the navy was politically dominant in Japan, and as the navy knew the power of the United States, there would be no war,

got out of his predicament very cleverly by saying that as the navy had agreed to war the Japanese must be far stronger than had been anticipated. When my turn came I merely said that as Canada have been at war for some time we could not feel the same shock as the Americans. Indeed, we felt relief, for we were now assured of a powerful ally and knew that, in the long run, we were bound to win. I resisted the temptation to say that if you want to teach a terrier to catch rats it is helpful if a rat bites the terrier!

Later that afternoon Brooks Emeny took a few of us to his home for drinks. Until recently he had been a strong isolationist but he had recanted and I think he felt a sense of satisfaction that his change of outlook had been justified. A Free French naval officer who was one of the party took a very gloomy view of war in the Pacific because of the immense distances.

As is well known the Canadian declaration of war came quicker than the American. On my return to Ottawa I was met by the playful reproaches of John Read of the Legal Division that I had not been available to help him in drafting it!

An immediate problem, both in the United States and in Canada, concerned the treatment of Japanese nationals and of persons of Japanese race who were Canadian citizens either by birth or naturalization. They might well have been treated precisely as German and Italian nationals and Canadian citizens of German and Italian race had been and were being treated. It was, however, possible

to dispute such an analogy on the ground that while there were plenty of Germans who detested Hitler and plenty of Italians who detested Mussolini there were no Japanese who detested the Emperor of Japan. My own view was that loyalty to the country of lawful allegiance would be strong enough for our purposes. I also thought that as a matter of policy we should not make it easy for Japan to pose as fighting for racial equality. I was never extreme in the matter and in our conferences I was ready to approve of all precautions asked for by the responsible military, naval and air force authorities and, in addition, any precautions for which the R.C.M.P. might ask. I was strongly opposed to additions to these precautions on grounds of civilian panic. In theory, I could see a case for inflicting injustice on Canadians of Japanese race if it were necessary in order to sustain the will to victory of other civilians, but I did not think that the will to victory was in any real danger or that people in British Columbia would refuse to buy war bonds if people of Japanese race were not interned. The contention that there might be bloodshed in British Columbia if persons of Japanese race were not interned seemed to me absurd. It would have been vicarious punishment with a vengeance if we punished loyal and law-abiding citizens of Japanese race because Canadians of other races might resort to murder. I could respect out and out fanatics more easily than hypocrites who pretended to share their views. When two speakers added emotional emphasis to their appeals by saying how long they had lived in British Columbia, I did try to deflate them by saying that I was not claiming that any special weight should be given to my views on the ground that my residence in British Columbia had been even longer, and that I relied on reason alone.

The fate of the persons of Japanese race in British Columbia was sealed by the panic action taken by the United States, in spite of its famous bill of rights. In Canada, persons of Japanese race, with a few exceptions, were required to leave a zone extending 100 miles inland from the Pacific Coast. Much of their property was stolen or wantonly damaged by more "trustworthy" Canadians.

I made no secret of my opinions and, although I expressed them without excitement or violence, I incurred some hostility. I still have a long letter of remonstrance that I received from my old friend D. N. Hossie. I considered whether I should go the length of resigning quietly from the service of the government and even wrote a draft letter to the Prime Minister. John Read to whom I showed it said it was "too good" and I agreed not to send it because I felt that a civil servant, albeit temporary, should not resign in wartime except under the most extreme circumstances.

Both Hugh Keenleyside and I were criticised in Parliament and a Member from British Columbia, Tom Reid, actually said that someone on the staff of External Affairs, clearly meaning me, had been bribed by the Government of Japan. Speech in Parliament is privileged and John Read always contended that civil servants were fair game, that it is the duty of an M.P. to speak freely and that it is between the Member and his conscience if he lies or makes positive statements on inadequate evidence. After the election, ^{of 1945} was over the Prime Minister insisted on a sort of retraction and the Member admitted grudgingly in Parliament that he had no evidence to support his charge. Norman Robertson sent me a marked copy of the Hansard ^{of December 17} that I still have. I do not think that anyone ever took the charge seriously, but a verdict of "not-proven" is

not quite the same thing as an admission of deliberate defamation, and the Prime Minister did not rebuke his supporter until the election was over.

Towards the end of the war the United Kingdom wanted interpreters and I was consulted by Canadian military officers about suitable Japanese personnel. They were so pleased with the man at the top of my list that, when they found that he knew almost no Japanese, they wanted to enlist him and have him taught the language. Yet he was a man whose services they had refused when he endeavoured to volunteer in the early days of the Japanese war. No distrust was shown of the interpreters who volunteered to enter the Canadian service and be attached to British forces in the Pacific area, though the earlier deportation of these men and their families had been unlikely to conciliate them.

To complete the unpleasant story: the government was not the only offender in treating unfortunate people unfairly. Persons of Japanese race were handicapped in their professions even in Eastern Canada and Canadians were not above taking advantage of what seemed a heaven-sent source of cheap labour. Far from being invited to join the local University Women's Club, Japanese women graduates might find themselves expected to be available as domestic servants and men to be available for farm labour. The churches had a somewhat better record as it was contrary to their whole ideology to tell men and women who asked to join in the worship of God to go to hell! slowly the Japanese won respect for themselves in a hostile environment.

After the war a number of harmless families were virtually required to go to Japan - though children born in Canada were legally free to return. Canadian nationality was revoked by Order-in-Council, a flagrant abuse of the War Measures Act. Persons of Japanese race were told by the Prime Minister of Canada that they would not be allowed to "congregate" in British Columbia, though the legal means of stopping them were not described. The men who did or approved these things have often without expressing shame or even regret, become strong advocates of the very human rights that they themselves did not respect.

Fortunately the scattering of persons of Japanese race appears in the long run to have been beneficial to them and to have enabled them to do what they most wanted to do - merge in the Canadian people. But any acceptance of the idea of human rights implies that conjectural benefits of this character should not be conferred on unwilling people by the action of a government.

(e) The Economic Division of the Department of External Affairs

The outbreak of war with Japan left me with very little to do in External Affairs, particularly as intimate collaboration between Canada and the United States deprived the Joint Economic Committees of their principal functions. I was therefore free to attend a conference held at Princeton to discuss of all things the strategy of the war. It was composed of some government officials and of some soi-disant experts but included no one with direct responsibility for policy formation. I was amazed to find that, at this intellectual level, at which everyone was presumably intent on the early and economical defeat of the common enemy, virtually every speaker advocated precisely those measures that would afford relief or security to his own state. Some even imported emotion into the discussion. Americans wanted to give priority to defence of their own West Coast; Australians did not want Australia to become a second Poland; the Chinese (Chang Kai-chek's men) wanted an offensive mounted on the mainland of Asia to expel the Japanese; Europeans wanted an early invasion of southern Europe and so forth. It seemed to me that a little irony might help and I suggested that if the Japanese showed any disposition to invade British Columbia we should encourage them to do so and should certainly not immobilize a garrison there. There was a small population to lose even if it were exterminated; nothing much to destroy that money could not replace; a point at which the United States and Canada could readily concentrate troops; a long and vulnerable sea route for the enemy to protect. I was struck by one exception to the general denunciation of Pearl Harbour. Mr. Nash, then New Zealand's High Commissioner in

Washington, said that war was a dirty business and that there was little to choose between legitimate and illegitimate methods of surprise. Then as always he was fair-minded and outspoken.

My transfer to the Economics Division made my work much more interesting and Scott Macdonald was pleasant to work with. After I had succeeded him as Head of the Department I was made Chairman of the Food Requirements Committee that was set up to make sure that while as much food as possible was made available to allied countries, essential supplies in Canada were not reduced ^{below} beyond the point of safety. Requests for supplies were carefully screened, and every effort was made to meet them. This work brought me into contact with several of the men engaged in procurement for the United Kingdom, notably Lord Brand, one of the founders of the Round Table. Wisely or unwisely Mutual Aid to the United Kingdom, the counterpart of Lend Lease, had been extended to include food as well as purely military supplies. Later food had to be found for relief purposes - first for military relief and later for UNRRA. By exporting to these agencies Canada was able to recoup the financial contributions that had been made to them and in this respect was far more fortunate than most other contributors.

Our contacts with the Russians were particularly interesting. They were among those anxious to obtain supplies and food. They were sparing of gratitude but lavish in entertainment. Their favourite form of hospitality was dinner at the Chateau. As one of the less heavily worked members of the Department I was sometimes

delegated to attend and at the Cabinet level M. St. Laurent was likely to be a representative, perhaps for a similar reason. On one occasion my neighbour at dinner was a young major fresh from Stalingrad where he had been wounded. He had learnt some English and some diplomacy on the plane. His other neighbour, Hubert Kemp from Trade and Commerce broke the ice by saying that he knew only one word of Russian, "nichevo." It seemed to me an unhappy choice, capable of giving offence where none was meant. So I hastened to add that I also knew only one word, "tovarish." The effect was electric. By word and gesture the major assured us that with that master word alone we could travel from one end of the U.S.S.R. to the other. The Russians were good hosts and on the anniversary of the Red Army and other festive occasions gave buffet suppers at their legation to which they invited everyone with whom they had been in public contact. There conversation was not completely restricted by difficulties of language, but it could never ramble freely over the events of the day.

The war-time food problems were followed by the formation of the Food and Agriculture Organization - an attempt by President Roosevelt to get the United Nations "house-broken." The delegates assembled at The Homestead, Hot Springs, Virginia, where the hospitality of the United States limited our expenses to \$5.00 per diem at what was ordinarily an expensive resort. It was, of course, the foreign governments and not their delegates who benefitted by this action! Indeed, some of the delegates were far from pleased. I shared a room with Mike Pearson, then Canadian Minister in Washington,

who by sheer skill became one of the leaders of the Conference. He maintained excellent relations with the press. This was more than the Americans did for they confined the press to their own quarters where delegates visited them if they chose. Delegates who left the main building even to go to the swimming pool had to take passes to present to the armed guards at the doors when they returned. The press retaliated by mild ridicule of the "luxury" diet provided for the guests, a diet which in order to avoid red meat that was in short supply comprised such alternatives as guinea-fowl.

The Russians displayed their usual hospitality with the result that they ran out of liquor in a dry state and to their indignation could not replenish their supplies. At their first party the Americans succumbed to a long sequence that alternated vodka with whisky. The Canadians survived the party in their honour as there was no more whisky and vodka alternated with red wine from south Russia. Apart from hospitality the Russians did not seem to take the Conference very seriously. When the British enquired courteously if they expected to make an important contribution their chief delegate replied at some length and the interpreter advised us that he had said "No." The same brief interpretation sufficed for their long reply to the question whether they expected the Conference to have important results. The third question was naturally, "Why not?" Again the answer was lengthy but the translation brief, "Russia is at war." It was a New Zealander who made

the appropriate riposte. When, at a social session delegates were invited, for fun of course, to "translate" the remarks made by others whose language they did not know, he listened to a Russian and then interpreted: "Mr. Inscrutakoff says 'No'."

The Chinese raised a theoretical question that embarrassed the other delegates. They insisted that, though there might well be practical difficulties, in principle Chinese needs in calories should be assessed at the same level as those of other races. I found to my amazement that I could extract no definite opinion from the expert dieticians on this simple question of fact. They did not welcome my suggestion that if there were any doubt it should be resolved by measuring Chinese needs in the same way as those of persons of other races had been calculated. It appeared that the western countries shrank from facing this issue at that time.

The South Americans did not understand the Anglo-Saxon apprehensions about population growth and the Brazilian ambassador to the United States who presided at the final session began by urging all nations to live in amity and "In the words of God himself 'increase and multiply'."

Among the Conferences I attended was one that was, in its way, unique. It concerned the release of securities held by Custodians of Enemy Property in Britain, Canada and the United States and the disposal of enemy-held patent rights. The various American officials were meeting each other for the first time and fell into

furious disputes, so embarrassing to the others that we moved to an adjoining office in the vain hope of getting out of earshot.

The entertainment at this Conference was lavish. We had lunch at the Bankers' Club in New York and were taken to see a very special sight, a billion dollars in gold coin and bullion stored in vaults under the Hudson River. At the door were armed guards, no one of whom knew the full combination for the locks. For the benefit of anyone locked in by accident during a holiday or a week-end, a notice was posted inside saying that the air was sufficient for a certain number of man-hours, that a telephone was available for re-assuring conversations and appropriate numbers listed, and that there was an iron ration of chocolate bars. Midas was less fortunate! We dined at the Harvard Club where, by a miracle, steaks were to be had and by another kind of miracle a hint procured us seats in the fourth or fifth row for Oklahoma, then at the height of its popularity.

There was an Extraordinary Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations at the Homestead, at Hot Springs, Virginia, to which I was able to take Annie. It was unusual in relaxing the rule that government officials should not attend and had been preceded by a preparatory conference at Atlantic City that had to be held in the one major hotel that would receive a negro - in this case Ralph Bunche who was secretary of the American delegation. In Virginia the colour bar was suspended as it had been for the Conference on Food and Agriculture.

The conference was widely attended and there were delegations from liberated France, from Holland and from India. The Dutch resented the American attacks on colonialism and the tone in which they were made. The French were, if anything, even more indignant. "When you have a negro President, or at least a negro Secretary of State, you may be in a position to offer us lessons in race relations."

The Head of the Indian delegation, Mrs. Pandit, found her delegates very difficult to keep in hand and the violence of their language could easily seem fair evidence that British rule should be prolonged. Mr. Siddiki, ex-Mayor of Calcutta, explained his distrust of Hindus saying something like this: "I have lived for many years in London. I never heard the word, 'Jew' used without an adjective. It was never a nice adjective! The Moslems are a religious minority in India. Every other religious minority has sooner or later succumbed. For me religion is not a one-day-a-week matter but my whole life. Can I look forward to my children being brought up to worship a monkey or a cow?" I think that Mrs. Pandit found it a relief to talk with Westerners and even with a member of the I.C.S. who, for his part, said that it was one of the good features of the crisis in India that personal relations had not been affected.

I do not expect that there will ever be another conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations which completely lost the confidence of the great American foundations that had provided its main

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financial support. No doubt the war in the Pacific resulted in a diffusion of knowledge about countries in that area that made the efforts of the I.P.R. look small indeed. But the Institute did not deserve the reproach of being a front for Communism. As late as 1945 it had been almost universally considered a good thing to enlist the support of scholars in the U.S.S.R. and their co-operation in research projects in which the political element could be kept very slight. Roosevelt had been most considerate of the U.S.S.R. and most anxious to bring it into the United Nations and into its technical organizations. A change came as a result of two things, perhaps not unconnected with each other - the American use of the atomic bomb without frank discussions with the Russians; and the Russian espionage in Canada and elsewhere, that seemed suspicion carried to the length of gross ingratitude.

It was true that Carter had visited the U.S.S.R. immediately before the war and during the war and had developed friendly contacts. It was also true that some prominent members of the I.P.R. were avowed communists at a time when freedom of opinion and of speech prevailed in the United States. There was no secret about these things. It was possibly Owen Lattimore's behavior in fighting back when he was accused, and perhaps his manner more than anything he actually did, that frightened the Institute's sponsors. But American persecutions belong to the post-war period.

Canada was host to a conference of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Association in Montreal. Mike Pearson was the chief Canadian delegate at the civil service level and won

marked approval from the Prime Minister. He managed his press conferences with consummate skill.

There were the usual amusing incidents. The accommodation at the Windsor Hotel was limited and delegates were not allowed to bring their wives. The wife of one of the South American diplomats in Ottawa boldly disregarded this rule by saying blandly, "Croyez-moi, je suis le secrétaire de mon mari."

The Manager of the Hotel was so delighted with the Conference that in an ecstasy of generosity he cancelled the bills of all Canadian delegates. They expressed becoming gratitude although only those who had run up a bill for drinks gained anything from his act as they could not charge their government for expenses they had not incurred.

When I noticed a man of colour dining at a table by himself, I invited him to join me and found that I was conversing with the Ethiopian delegate who had been his country's representative in Paris and expressed delight in being, once again, in a country where he could speak French. I am afraid my French quickly destroyed any pretence that Canada was genuinely bilingual.

Brooke Claxton, the Head of the Canadian delegation, had the bright idea of inviting Paul Robeson, who happened to be in Montreal, to a final convivial meeting. Robeson could not sing because of his contractual obligations; but he personified racial equality rather to the embarrassment of our American guests, while the Russians greeted him with delight.

The conference did have serious problems though they did not lead to the open disputes that provide a livelihood for newspaper men. The essence of the business was la mise au tas, la prise au tas. Each contributing country wanted to keep its contribution within reasonable bounds, each receiving country wanted as much relief as possible and, what was quite as important, as high a priority as possible if supplies were short.

It was obvious that the United States would be the largest contributor. Was the correct formula to be a percentage (one per cent for the first round) of the national income, or a percentage of the amount by which the national income exceeded bare national requirements? The United States naturally preferred the former of these principles. Even so the United States would have to put up three-quarters of the money. Canada and some other countries were prepared to go along in the same proportions as the United States. It was agreed that devastated countries should make no contribution and that the poorer countries would make small contributions. Two countries presented special problems: the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. The United Kingdom, though not devastated had suffered far more than the United States and had been impoverished. No one contested this, but the Americans argued that Congress would not vote the necessary money unless it could be assured that there would be at least one other large contributor. It seemed obvious - and yet obviously unjust - that Britain would have to make one more sacrifice. Russia, on the other hand, had indubitably been devastated but Russian claims might make Congress shy away and might postpone relief for other countries.

Should the millions of Russia and China benefit, pari passu, with the people of Holland or Greece? Finally, should any country be free to help its friends by country to country gifts before it had fulfilled its UNRRA obligations? The success of the conference - and it was successful - depended upon keeping these issues from becoming acute.

An extreme case of unfairness was advanced on behalf of Ethiopia. Ethiopia was the first country to be devastated and the aggressor had been Italy. Ethiopia had received no relief supplies, but Americans were already helping the Italians, notably by sending milk products for pregnant women. The Ethiopians made a humane gesture by waiving their objections in the case of the women but protested against further discrimination in favour of aggressor countries. The alternative principle is that no people is a wrongdoer and that no people is responsible for the acts of its governments to the extent of being disintitled to relief pari passu with the victims of aggression. The abstract ethical question was never faced and, on the whole, the saying that "blood is thicker than water" explained what was done, though no one liked to say so.

My serious duties sometimes occasioned amusing incidents that illustrate life in wartime. A conference shortly before President Roosevelt's death in 1945 took me to Washington at very short notice in company with Ken Taylor, then No. 2 man at the Wartime Prices and Trade Board, and Barton, the Deputy Minister of Agriculture. Alone of the three I was able to get American dollars from my department together with the proper documents. Taylor got a few dollars from his chief and Barton a few from his bank. But at Dorval my two

companions got the sharp order "Show me your pocket book." Taylor was asked who gave him his dollars and replied "Donald Gordon." "And who is Donald Gordon?" Taylor replied, "Chairman of the Foreign Exchange Control Board." Not only was his money confiscated but he was later asked not to claim it back. Barton got off a little more lightly but entered the United States with empty pockets.

It was a good thing that I had some money because our plane had to land on the small airport at Albany on account of weather. We were lucky in finding hotel space and even luckier in finding a steak supper in a country short of meat. Next morning we went on by train, but half way between New York and Washington the trolley broke and we had to wait until a coal burning locomotive came to take us in tow. We reached Washington late at night and, again by good fortune contacted someone at the Canadian embassy and, with the help of the State Department got rooms at a Club.

At our meeting with the British and American officials a dispute developed over allocations of sugar, a commodity of which Americans are inordinately fond, but which they had agreed to share alike with the other two countries in proportion to their populations. This agreement they were unable to honour. Each country treated sugar differently. The English used it to sweeten tea which they drank in large quantities. But they had used less than their allocation in order to build up a reserve to use if submarine warfare interrupted their future supplies. The Americans argued that for the ensuing year this reserve should constitute part of the United Kingdom's supply,

i.e. that its allocation should be reduced. The Canadians had used their ration, no more and no less, largely for preserving fruit. The Americans had used too much but had promised the Canadians to restrict their consumption so as to bring it into accord with their allocation. This was what they found it politically impossible to do. American troops were not closely rationed and sugar rather than alcohol was used to overcome fatigue. We heard heart-rending stories of mothers - voting mothers at that - who saved up money to send candy to their boys in the army. The Americans said bluntly that if we held them to their promise they would observe it but be tough about other things. This threat was not quite as crude as it sounds. The Americans had been extraordinarily generous in sharing supplies with Canada - for instance in allocating dried fruits they had treated Canada like their own deficit areas. They could have tightened their allocations without any breach of agreement.

As a very minor member of the conference, as an observer without any technical competence, I thought of a face-saving device and suggested it to Ken Taylor. It was to allocate between the three countries not in proportion to population but in proportion to population plus mobilized personnel. This would allow double rations for soldiers who probably needed more food than an average civilian. Canada may have lost something by this method of calculating, but the United Kingdom was able to keep its reserve and the Americans succeeded in including "ancillary personnel". I did not remind them that ancilla was the Latin for handmaid!

The death of the President occurred while we were in Washington and, after dining one evening with a friend from the State Department, I ventured on the delicate question of what the feelings of the State Department were. I asked this question because I remembered the unfortunate consequences of the prolonged illness of Woodrow Wilson in the critical months after the drafting of the Peace Treaty at the end of the first world war. The reply was "on the whole, relief." The great fear had been that recurring incapacity might have crippled United States policy at critical moments.

A second meeting of UNRRA was held in London shortly after the end of the German war and immediately after the formation of the Labour Government. A British official with whom I talked on the trans-Atlantic flight showed no great concern over Churchill's defeat. It was a sign of a mature democracy to resist a sentimental appeal, "If a girl saves your life, you don't have to marry her." His attitude was in sharp contrast to that of a French-Canadian woman whom I had met on the train to Dorval who thought the peace as good as lost. But a mechanic with whom I chatted in Wembley said in a sensible way that he had voted against the local conservative candidate because he was always talking of Churchill and not of himself.

There were some symptoms of the newness of the Labour government. The host country has the right to preside at a conference. The British invited Sir Girga Bajpai to preside, in disregard of the protests of the Russians. At a Russian cocktail party, one of the new Ministers paced up and down telling all and sundry, "I don't want this job, anyone can have this bloody job!" Incidentally the British government, as I had thought they must, but as one of their negotiators

said they could not (adamant was his word), agreed to contribute a second one per cent of their national income.

It was during this conference that the atomic bombs were dropped on Japan and that Japan surrendered. Financially, this was a blow to the British who had expected to earn some dollars in the Far East. It was followed by a rude shock - the abrupt cessation of Lend-Lease supplies, an inelegant gesture considering Britain's recent contribution to UNRRA, modified later to exclude supplies "in the pipe lines."

The Russians failed to get an allocation from UNRRA. Both with the Russians and with the British I think a generous gesture would have saved the Americans money in the long run. But it would have been politically impossible. If Roosevelt had survived and Churchill had won his election, would they have done better?

I did not see much of England during my brief visit in 1945. I had looked forward to the flight from Prestwick to London but nothing could be seen but the overcast of white cloud. In London one saw the ruins of the buildings destroyed by bombs or fire, the patching that had made some places habitable, and the structures erected to protect doorways and windows. Some venerable buildings had gone that could ill be spared.

Hotel time was rationed and I had rooms at three hotels in turn, each for the prescribed number of days. The meals were simple but reasonably good. Restaurants were hard to find and their hours were strictly limited. When I managed a visit to Coupland

at Boar's hill I arrived of necessity without having had supper. All Souls College where he had often taken me for dinner was not serving meals. The legend was that Rhodes Scholars in the German Air Force had spared Oxford, the more unromantic conjecture was that Oxford was too close to good industrial targets to justify a raid. I called on Mrs. Gerrans and found her confined to bed but able to recognize me and to talk coherently of old days. She seemed peaceful and happy. I also visited the Ashtons at Cambridge. They had come through the war without great hardship though they had had to alter their house to receive a refugee from Bath. Ashton had joined the Home Guard and had a photograph in uniform that he labelled "Britain's last hope." At one stage he was greatly pleased with the comradeship of men of all classes in the Guard and had expressed an intention of voting Labour. But to his bitter disappointment, brotherhood ceased with victory and he soon became anxious to be able to return to Vancouver. People found everything drab and shrank from the prospect of years more of austerity in order to help those who had not spontaneously opposed Hitler.

The return flight was slow and I arrived in Montreal exhausted. I queued up at the Windsor for a room and did not get one. I then had the idea of telephoning to Dr. Chipman to ask for hospitality. I think he was really pleased and someone fresh from England was still a curiosity. He told me he had seen Roosevelt and Churchill when they met at Quebec and that both men looked as if they were near the end of their tether.

As a close to my association with the Department of External Affairs, Norman Robertson, with great thoughtfulness, had me included in the invitation list for a dinner party given by the Prime Minister at the Country Club in honour of the representatives of the great allied powers. At the end of the dinner the Prime Minister addressed his guests and I have never heard him speak so well as he did that night, at the very moment of the formal surrender of Japan. Every word counted, every word was in good taste and every word sounded sincere. The suggestion "I think in these circumstances, we may speak of the British Empire" had possibly an ominous overtone, but it did not sound like the kiss of death and was probably quite unintended. As we were waiting for cars outside the Club I took the opportunity of saying good-bye to Mr. King and of telling him what a pleasant memory had been left.

So ended World War II. It had destroyed, probably at an unnecessarily high price, the three menacing dictatorships. It had prepared the world not for peace and justice but for the experiment of the United Nations that hardly seems likely to confer either of these blessings on humanity. While "buying time" is a nasty phrase, it is worth considering that if the war had been postponed, on any terms, for six years, the development of atomic bombs might have made it unthinkable and have given one side or the other supremacy without loss of life. War between states might have been superseded by civil wars and resistance movements, in neither of which atomic bombs can be used advantageously. As in the first world war my part had been negligible and my experience frustrating. But I had had a somewhat better ringside seat.

The Second World War, like the first, afforded the winners an opportunity of building a world in which international peace and justice would obtain. Again they might be compared to the holder of a lottery ticket, acquired at a price far in excess of its actuarial value, and they should not be harshly blamed for not holding a winning ticket. The conditions were in some ways more favourable than in 1918, in some ways less favourable.

The demand for retribution was far higher; the expectation of indemnification more modest. The nations that had suffered least physical damage were disposed to do something to help their associates. The element of mutual distrust was greater than ever. Some planning had been done well in advance but for this very reason had taken no account of the development of the atomic bomb and of the desirability of depriving any one nation of the power to use it. The persistent doctrine of the equality of states in international matters, inconsistent as it is with the equality of individuals, was not squarely faced (as, for instance, it had been in making the American constitution) nor was it appreciated how troublesome it would become with the transformation of colonies and dependencies into independent nations. Something was achieved at San Francisco. An idealist may think it shockingly little, a detached observer may think it surprisingly much, a realist must accept it as a foundation. The problem is whether to attempt to build on it or to face the task of reconstructing it. Perhaps it is the impatience of an old man that inclines me to prefer the second alternative.